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MARITIME PIRACY:

How CAN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY ADDRESS THIS
GROWING GLOBAL MENACE?
VED P. NANDA
I. INTRODUCTION
Maritime piracy disrupts international navigation and trade and threatens the
lives and property of people of many nations. Thus, because of both the human
and commercial cost and the threat to regional security at sea, piracy has become a
matter of grave concern for the international community and has consequently
attracted global attention. Several international organizations including the United
Nations Security Council and General Assembly, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and
regional organizations such as the European Union (EU) and African Union (AU)
have been actively engaged in addressing this grave problem.
Navies from the EU and NATO and from several countries, including the
United States, Russia, China, India, and Japan, have deployed their warships off
the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden to protect trade routes and the global
supply chain because of the recent upsurge of attacks on ships by Somali pirates.
However, notwithstanding these deployments, the attacks on and hijacking of ships
transiting the area continue, and as the problem is not confined just to that
geographical area, pirate attacks have intensified in other areas where there is not

such deployment, including West Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Caribbean.
Thus, it would be a fair appraisal that these efforts have met with only limited
success in combating the menace of piracy and armed robbery.
To address the challenge posed by pirates, the United Nations Security
Council has adopted several resolutions authorizing states to take the necessary
action to combat piracy, including in the territorial waters of Somalia. Norms
prescribed under several conventions including the U.N. Law of the Sea
Convention (UNCLOS), maritime law, and domestic laws of various states provide
for jurisdiction by states to prosecute and punish pirates. The UN Secretary
General has offered several options on "prosecuting and imprisoning persons

*John Evans University Professor, University of Denver; Thompson G. Marsh Professor of Law
and
Director, International and Comparative Law Program, University of Denver Sturm College of Law.
This is an adapted version of a presentation given at the University of Hawaii Richardson School of
Law which will be published as a chapter in a forthcoming book, GOvERNING OCEAN RESOURCES (JinHyun Paik, Harry N. Scheiber, & Jon M. Van Dyke, eds. 2011). I am deeply grateful to Ms. Joan
Policastri, Foreign, International and Comparative Law Librarian at the Sturm College of Law, for her
extraordinary assistance in providing the research material.
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responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia,"
including the creation of a regional or international tribunal.1 Although piracy
must indeed be seen as a global challenge that requires a global response, 2 and
while this paper addresses the challenges of piracy to the entire international
community and explores actions that could effectively meet them, its focus will
primarily be on the Somali pirates.
The next section assesses the nature and scope of the challenge. This is
followed by a discussion of the legal framework applicable to piracy and a review
of the wide range of international, regional, and national responses to prevent and
deter acts of piracy and punish the perpetrators. The concluding sections contain
an appraisal and recommendations.
II. NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE CHALLENGE

Acts of piracy have been on the rise for several years, presenting a serious
threat to commercial maritime shipping, especially in the Gulf of Aden and off the
Horn of Africa. For international shipping and trade both east and west of the Suez
Canal, the strategic importance of the Gulf of Aden lies in the number of vessels
and the volume of the international trade passing through it-22,000 vessels
annually, carrying around eight percent of the world's trade, including twelve
percent of the 3total volume of oil transported by sea, raw materials and finished
goods, as well.
Somalia has suffered from the tragedy of an ongoing civil strife since 1991,4
and this surge of piracy off its coast is primarily related to its being a failed state

1. U.N. Security Council [SCOR], Report of the Secretary-Generalon possible options to further
the aim ofprosecutingand imprisoningpersons responsiblefor acts ofpiracy and armed robbery at sea
off the coast of Somalia, including, in particular, options for creating special domestic chambers
possibly with international components, a regional tribunal or an international tribunal and
corresponding imprisonment arrangements, taking into account the work of the Contact Group on
Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, the existingpractice in establishing internationaland mixed tribunals,
and the time and resources necessary to achieve and sustain substantive results, 80-104, U.N. Doc.
S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010) [hereinafter SG's Report].
2. See, e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSEN, BENJAMIN BROCKMAN-HAWE & PATRICIA GOFF., AM. SOC'Y
OF INT'L LAW ET AL., SUPPRESSING MARITIME PIRACY: EXPLORING THE OPTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL

at i (2009) ("Maritime piracy is a persistent global criminal activity, and solving the Somali
problem does not solve piracy in the rest of the world.").
3. Piracy in Waters Off the Coast of Somalia, INT'L MAR. ORG. [IMO] (Nov. 13, 2009),
http://www5.imo.org/SharePoint/mainframe.asp?topic id= 1178.
4. In November 2008 the U.N. commissioned a workshop on "Piracy Off the Somali Coast,"
which brought together experts from various fields - diplomacy, the military, peacekeeping, and
humanitarian aid, among others. Workshop Commissioned by the Special Representative of the
Secretary General of the UN to Somalia Ambassador Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, Nairobi, Kenya, Nov.
10-21, 2008, Piracy Off the Somali Coast, 2 (Nov. 21, 2008), available at http://www.imcsnet.
org/imcs/docs/somalia piracyintl experts report consolidated.pdf [hereafter U.N. Experts Report on
Somali Piracy]. The experts produced a comprehensive study of the political and legal issues involved.
Id. The report proved influential with the United Nations Security Council, as several of its
recommendations paralleled those made in Security Council Resolution 1851 of December 16, 2008.
See id. at 41-44. The report states that Somalia has been a failed state for about 20 years "divorced
from the world economy, regional and global institutions, and the rule of law." Id at 33.
LAW,
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with endemic poverty and lawlessness. Acts of piracy have also disrupted the
delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia.5 Off Somalia's long coast line-almost
2000 miles-foreign vessels have engaged in unauthorized fishing and the
dumping of toxic material and waste ever since the early 1990s. 6 The names of

pirate fleets such as "National Volunteer Coast Guard of Somalia" and "Somali
Marines" can be aptly described as a "testament to pirates' initial motivation. 7
However, their current motivation lies in the huge ransom payments, in the range
of millions of dollars, pirates receive from the companies involved, including
vessel owners and insurers.8 Pirates use hijacked fishing vessels as mother ships as
they prey on their victims off Somalia's coastline, and have now extended their
reach to more than 700 miles offshore. 9 They wage attacks with sophisticated
weapons such as M-16 and AK-47 assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades
instead of machetes, knives, and guns, which were their weapons just a few years
ago; they are also equipped with speedboats, global positioning systems, and
satellite phones.10
The Piracy Reporting Center of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), a
division of the International Chamber of Commerce, issues periodic piracy reports.
It reports that incidents of piracy and armed robbery in 2009 exceeded 400,11
Africa accounting for 270 of these, and the Somalia coast and the Gulf of Aden
accounting for 196.12 Compare these more than 400 attacks with 239, 263, and
293 attacks that were reported in 2006, 2007, and 2008, respectively.13
According to the annual report of the Piracy Reporting Center for 2009, there
were 84 attempted attacks, 153 vessels boarded, 120 vessels fired upon and 49
hijacked, compared to 46 ships fired upon in 2008.14 The report states that in 2009

a total of 1052 crew were taken hostage, while 68 were injured and eight were

5. Id. at 29.
6. Ishaan Tharoor, How Somalia's Fishermen Became Pirates,TIME, Apr. 18, 2009, available at
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1892376,00.html.
7. Id
8. Pirates extorted $60 million in ransom in 2009 alone. See President Ali Treki, Address at the
Informal Meeting of the General Assembly on International Maritime Piracy (May 14, 2010),
http://www.un.org/ga/president/64/statements/piracyl4O5lO.shtml.
9. See INT'L MAR. BUREAU, INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY
AGAINST SHIPS: ANNUAL REPORT: JANUARY 1 - DECEMBER 31,2009 39 (2010).
10. William Pentland, Sea Piracy's Bloody Growth, FORBES.COM (June 10, 2008, 6:00 AM),
www.forbes.com/2008/06/09/piracy-logistics-shipping-biz-logistics-cx wp_0610piracy.html.
11. INT'L MAR. BUREAU, supra note 9, at 5-6. Although the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention
defines piracy in limiting terms, the IMB has adopted a broader approach for statistical purposes as it
combines the terms "piracy" and "armed robbery at sea." Id. at 3. The International Maritime
Organization also issues periodic reports on acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships. For the
2009 report, see Int'l Mar. Org. [IMO], Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships:
Annual Report 2009, IMO Doc. MSC.4/Circ.152 (Mar. 29, 2010), available at http://www.imo.org/
0
OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/MIonthy%2
ando2annuao2piarcy%2and%20armed%2
Orobbery%20report/152-Annual2009.pdf
12. INT'L MAR. BUREAU, supranote 9, at 5-6.
13. Id.
14. Id at 12.
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killed in various incidents.15
However, increased naval patrols (NATO's
Operation Open Shield and Allied Protector; the EU-NAVFOR Mission; the
International Combined Task Force-151; and several nations' forces) conducting
anti-piracy operations have reduced the success rate of these attacks since pirates
find it increasingly difficult to board and hijack vessels. 16 However, the first eight
months of 2010 witnessed 286 attacks, 17 demonstrating that, despite the naval
presence off the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden, 18 pirates remain active.
In his report of July 26, 2010, to the UN Security Council, the SecretaryGeneral noted that as of May 15, 2010, 450 mariners were being held hostage on
vessels captured by pirates off the coast of Somalia. 19 More than 45 states
participate in naval operations to combat piracy, conducted unilaterally or
coordinated by the European Union Naval Operation "Atalanta," the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the US-led Combined Taskforce 151 .2
III.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK APPLICABLE TO PIRACY

A. Introduction
The legal framework applicable to piracy consists of the customary
international law norm, under which piracy is a jus gentium crime and therefore
subject to universal jurisdiction,21 meaning that no nexus is required and thus
jurisdiction is available regardless of the nationality of the pirates or the victims,
the ship or aircraft, or the location of the act. However, it has been suggested that
"the nominal availability of universal jurisdiction for piracy does not translate in
practice into ending impunity for the crime," as states have not implemented the
jurisdictional grant through legislation.22

15. Id. at 12-13.
16. Id. at 38.
17. See IMO, Reports on Acts of Piracy andArmed Robbery Against Ships: Acts ReportedDuring
August 2010, Annex 1-2, IMO Doc. MSC.4/Circ. 159 (Sept. 1, 2010); IMO, Reports on Acts of Piracy
and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Acts Reported During July 2010, Annex 1-2, IMO Doc.
MSC.4/Circ. 157 (Aug. 1, 2010); IMO, Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships:
Acts ReportedDuringJune 2010, Annex 1-2, IMO Doc. MSC.4/Circ. 156 (July 7,2010); IMO, Reports
on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: First Quarterly Report, Annex 1-2, IMO Doc.
MSC.4/Circ. 153 (June 9, 2010); IMO, Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships:
Acts ReportedDuringMay 2010, Annex 1-2, IMO Doc. MSC.4/Circ. 155 (June 3, 2010); IMO, Reports
on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Acts Reported During April 2010, Annex 1-2,
IMO Doc. MSC.4/Circ. 154 (May 5, 2010).
18. See infra Section III.D.
19. SG's Report, supranote 1, pt. II(B), 8.
20. See INT'L MAR. BUREAU, supra note 9, at 38.

21. Piracy was the first international crime subject to universal jurisdiction. As early as 1820, the
United States Supreme Court stated that common law "recognises and punishes piracy as an offence,
not against its own municipal code, but as an offence against the law of nations .. .as an offence
against the universal law of society, a pirate being deemed an enemy of the human race." United States
v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 161 (1820). See also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for
InternationalCrimes: HistoricalPerspectives and Contemporary Practice,42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81, 13651 (2001) (stating that under international law universal jurisdiction over piracy is well established);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 34 cmt. b (1965).
22. Eugene Kontorovich & Steven Art, An Empirical Examination of UniversalJurisdictionfor
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Currently, the legal framework is comprised of the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 23 which retained the provisions
relating to piracy of the earlier 1958 Convention on the High Seas, 24 several other
international conventions, and pertinent Security Council and General Assembly
resolutions. In addition, several regional and sub-regional arrangements, along
with national efforts, are ongoing to fight piracy.
B. Applicable Conventions and Actions by the UN Security Council and General
Assembly
1. Conventional Norms
Customary international law on piracy is codified in the UN Convention on
the Law of the Sea, which in section 100 obligates all states to cooperate to the
fullest possible extent in repressing piracy "on the high seas or in any other place
outside the jurisdiction of any State. 25 Piracy is defined in article 101 to consist
of "any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed
for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private
aircraft. 26 Such an act must take place on the high seas or outside the jurisdiction
of any state and must be directed
against another ship or aircraft, or the persons or
27
property on board such vessel.
It should be noted that the definition does not refer to either an attempt to
commit an act of piracy or to conspiracy relating to such an act, but it does include
voluntary participation or facilitation. 2 Also, criminal acts constituting piracy do
not fall under the UNCLOS definition if they occur inside the territorial waters of a
state, but are called "armed robbery at sea" or "armed robbery against ships. 29
The IMO defines "armed robbery against ships" to mean any of the following acts:
1. any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof,
other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or
against persons or property on board30 such a ship, within a State's internal waters,
archipelagic waters and territorial sea;
2. any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described above.31 State
action is authorized within the state's own exclusive economic zone.32
Piracy, 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 436, 453 (2010).
23. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 100-07, openedfor signature Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereafter UNCLOS].
24. Id.; Convention on the High Seas arts. 13-22, April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S.
82.
25. UNCLOS, supranote 23, art. 100.
26. Id.
art. 101.
27. Id
28. Id
29. Id.
30. IMO, Code of Practicefor the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against
Ships, Annex 2.2.1, IMO Assemb. Res. A. 1025 (26) (Dec. 2, 2009); see also Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, arts. 3-4, Mar. 10, 1988,
1678 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereafter SUA Convention].
31. IMO, Code of Practice, supra note 30 2.2.2. The Code of Practice adopts the UNCLOS
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UNCLOS Article 105 authorizes any state to seize a pirate ship or aircraft and
its property on board, arrest the crew, and prosecute them through its own courts,
so long as the seizure takes place on the high seas or on waters outside the
jurisdiction of any state. Under Article 107 only warships or military aircraft or
those on government service are authorized to undertake such seizures. 4
It is noteworthy that while UNCLOS authorizes universal jurisdiction it does
not make it obligatory for the states to take action.35 Acts which would constitute
piracy if committed on the high seas are referred to as "armed robbery at sea"
when committed within the territorial waters of a state.16 UNCLOS does not refer
to armed robbery at sea, which falls under the coastal state's jurisdiction in whose
territorial waters such acts are committed.37
Other conventions under which some acts of piracy may also be considered
offenses include the 1988 SUA Convention, which was primarily intended to apply
to acts of terrorism.38 It may be recalled that this convention was adopted in the
wake of the Achille Lauro incident in 1985, which involved an Italian flag cruise
ship seized by a faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization. 39 The hijackers
killed an elderly American citizen in a wheelchair and threw him overboard.40
Since the incident did not involve two ships nor were the hijackers motivated "for
private ends," the incident did not fit the UNCLOS definition of piracy; thus the
gap was filled by the adoption of the SUA Convention, which only binds states
parties since it has not yet attained the status of customary international law.41
The SUA Convention obligates states parties to establish a number of
criminal offenses, most of which correspond at least in part with actions committed
by pirates or armed robbers.42 It especially mandates that a party
take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over
the offences set forth in article 3 when the offence is committed: (a)
against or on board a ship flying the flag of the State at the time the
definition of piracy. Id. 2.1. Earlier, in November 2001, the 22nd Assembly of the IMO had adopted a
similar definition of "armed robbery against ships," as to mean "any unlawful act of violence or
detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, directed against a ship
or against persons or property on board such ship, within a State's jurisdiction over such offences."
IMO, Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships,
Annex 2.2, IMO Assemb. Res. A. 922 (22) (Jan. 22, 2002) [hereinafter Piracy and Armed Robbery
Against Ships Code].
32. UNCLOS, supranote 23, art. 58.
33. Id. art. 105.
34. Id art. 107.
35. Id. art. 105.
36. Id. art. 101; see also Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Code, supranote 31, Annex
2.1, 2.2.1.
37. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Code, supra note 31, Annex TT 2.1, 2.2; see
UNCLOS, supranote 23, art. 101
38. SUA Convention, supranote 30, para. 3.
39. SUE MAHAN & PAMALA L.GRISET, TERRORISM IN PERSPECTIVE 139 (2d ed. 2008).
40. Id.
41. See SUA Convention, supra note 30, 222 n.1 (listing the parties to the SUA Convention).
42. Id arts. 3, 5.
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offence is committed; or (b) in the territory of43that State, including its
territorial sea; or (c) by a national of that State.
It also authorizes non-state parties to establish jurisdiction when the person
"seized, threatened, injured, or killed" is a national of that state and when the act is
intended to "compel that State to do or abstain from doing any act. 44
Furthermore, the Convention obligates the state in whose territory the alleged
offender is present to establish jurisdiction if it does not extradite the offender to
one of the states that has established jurisdiction. 45 A special feature of the SUA
Convention is that it does not require that two ships be involved, nor does it
distinguish between maritime areas.46 Thus, it fills the gaps left by the rather
limited definition of piracy under UNCLOS.
In 2005, the states parties to the SUA Convention adopted a Protocol to the
Convention that extensively amended the Convention to keep its legal framework
up to date.47 It added a new article on the procedures for a state party requesting
the flag state of a suspect vessel for its authorization to board and search that
vessel, its cargo, and persons on board, thus providing the necessary legal basis to
states for intercepting acts of piracy.48
Other applicable conventions include the 1979 International Convention
Against the Taking of Hostages, 49 the 1999 International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,' ° and the 2000 United Nations
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. 1
2. Response by the United Nations
a. Security Council
As the incidents of piracy increased in 2008, the UN Security Council, acting
under Chapter VII, adopted several resolutions to counter piracy and armed
robbery at sea.52 That year it adopted more resolutions on piracy than on any other

43. Id.art. 6, 1.
44. Id.art. 6, 2.
45. Id.art. 6, 4.
46. See id. arts. 3-4.
47. IMO, Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation, pmbl., IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.15/21, Nov. 1, 2005, S. TREATY Doc.
No. 110-8 (2007) (entered into force July 28, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/87452.pdf. The US Congress has yet to adopt the necessary implementing legislation.
48. Id.art. 8bis.
49. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11,081,

1316 U.N.T.S. 205.
50. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999,
T.I.A.S. No. 13,075.
51. United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, T.I.A.S.
No. 13,127, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209.
52. See S.C. Res. 1897, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1897 (Nov. 30, 2009); S.C. Res. 1851, U.N. Doc.

S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008); S.C. Res. 1846, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1816,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2,2008).
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subject. In Resolution 1816, 53 adopted on June 2, 2008, it authorized member
states cooperating with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to take action
against pirates, even in Somalia's territorial waters ("hot pursuit"), for a period of
six months.54 This authorization was extended for one year under Security Council
Resolutions 1846 of December 2, 2008, 55 and 1851 of December 16, 2008.56
Subsequently, Resolution 1897 of November 30, 2009, further extended the scope
of permissible military force in Somalia's territorial waters for another twelve
months, and broadened the definition of piracy to include certain land-based
operations on the Somali mainland.57
The Security Council also noted in Resolution 1846 that the SUA Convention
"provides for parties to create criminal offenses, establish jurisdiction, and accept
delivery of persons responsible for or suspected of seizing or exercising control
over a ship by force or threat [of force] or any other form of intimidation," and
thus it urged states parties to the SUA Convention to fully implement their
obligations under the Convention, including cooperating with the IMO to "build
judicial capacity for the successful prosecution of persons suspected of piracy and
armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia. 58
On December 16, 2008, the Security Council passed Resolution 1851, under
which it decided that states and regional organizations cooperating in the fight
against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia could "undertake
all necessary measures that are appropriate in Somalia, for the purposes of
suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea," in accordance with
applicable human rights law and international humanitarian law.59
Subsequently, in Resolution 1897 of November 30, 2009, it renewed its call
upon states and regional organizations that have the capacity to do so to deploy

53. S.C. Res. 1816, supranote 52.
54. Id. 7.
55. S.C. Res. 1846, supranote 52, 10.
56. S.C. Res. 1851, supranote 52, 6.
57. S.C. Res. 1897, supra note 52, 7 ("[D]ecid[ing] that for a period of twelve months from the
date of this resolution to renew the authorizations as set out in paragraph 10 of Resolution 1846 (2008)
and paragraph 6 of Resolution 1851 (2008) granted to States and regional organizations cooperating
with the TFG [Transitional Federal Government] in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea
off the coast of Somalia, for which advance notification has been provided by the TFG to the SecretaryGeneral."); see S.C. Res. 1897, supra note 52, 2 (noting that escalating ransom payments and lack of
enforcement of the 1992 arms embargo contribute to piracy in off the coast of Somalia).
58. S.C. Res. 1846, supranote 52, 15; see also UN Experts Report on Somali Piracy,supra note
4, § 4.2.4.1:
The SUA Convention provides a legal basis to effect the rapid transit ashore of
pirates captured at sea where both the flag State and the receiving State are States
Parties to SUA. The receiving State Party to SUA is required to make an
immediate inquiry into the facts, and to notify other State Parties that might have
jurisdiction as to whether it intends to exercise its jurisdiction. The receiving
State Party is required to extradite such offenders to another State Party with
jurisdiction or to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of
prosecution.
59. S.C. Res. 1851, supranote 52, 6.
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"naval vessels, arms and military aircraft" and seize and dispose of "boats, vessels
arms and other related equipment used in the commission of piracy and armed
robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, or for which there are reasonable grounds
for suspecting such use. ' 60 It also emphasized the need to build judicial capacity
for the successful prosecution of operative paragraph 14.61
Finally, in Resolution 1918, adopted on April 27, 2010, the Security Council
called on member states to criminalize piracy under their domestic laws and to
favorably consider the prosecution and imprisonment of suspected pirates.62 It also
requested the Secretary General to present within three months a report on possible
options to further the aim of prosecuting and imprisoning those responsible for acts
of piracy off the coast of Somalia,
including, in particular, options for creating special domestic chambers
possibly with international components, a regional tribunal or an
international tribunal and corresponding imprisonment arrangements,
taking into account the work of the CGPCS [Contact Group on Piracy
Off the Coast of Somalia], the existing practice in establishing
international and mixed tribunals, and the time 63and the resources
necessary to achieve and sustain substantive results.
In response to the request from the Security Council, the Secretary General
presented a report on July 26, 20 10,64 identifying seven options for the Security
Council's consideration. The first option calls for the UN to enhance assistance to
build the capacity of regional states to prosecute and imprison suspected pirates.65
This the UN is already doing through the work of the United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP), and others, in assisting prosecutions and imprisonments in regional
states.66
The second option 67 involves establishment of a Somali court sitting in the
territory of another regional state and applying Somali law, either with or without
the United Nations' participation. This option derives from the example of the
Lockerbie Court, which did not have participation from either the UN or a regional
organization. 6 ' The necessary arrangements would have to be made through
negotiations between Somalia and the host state. If the United Nations was to
participate it would also require agreement between the UN, Somalia, and the host
state. However, as Somalia currently faces instability and other major challenges,
including that of its judicial system, there are no realistic prospects for the
implementation of this option, which therefore has to be a plan for the future.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

S.C. Res. 1897, supranote 52, 3.
Id. 14.
S.C. Res. 1918, supranote 52, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1918 (Apr. 27, 2010).
Id.4.
SG's Report, supranote 1.
Id.
pt. V(B).
Id. pt. V(B), 55.
Id.
pt. V(B).
Id. pt. V(B), 62.
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Option three 69 envisages the establishment of a special chamber within the
national jurisdiction of a state or states in the region, without UN participation,
while the fourth option 70 is the same arrangement but with UN participation. It
does not seem that in the near future either of these options holds great promise.
Somalia, as a failed state, lacks judicial capacity, although Kenya, Seychelles, the
United Republic of Tanzania, and Mauritius have judicial capacity in the region to
establish a special chamber,71 the cost involved and the logistics, with or without
the UN's participation, will present formidable hurdles to be overcome.
Option five 72 consists of a regional tribunal, not embedded in a national
jurisdiction but established on the basis of a multilateral agreement among regional
states and with the UN's participation. An agreement with the United Nations
would, however, be needed with this option, regarding the selection of judges,
prosecutors, etc. The sixth option 73 is an international tribunal on the basis of an
agreement between the United Nations and a state in the region. This would be
along the lines of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon.74
Finally, the seventh option 75 establishes an international tribunal by Security
Council resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The UN's participation
in the creation of a new judicial mechanism would require a Security Council
resolution requesting the Secretary General to negotiate an agreement with the
state concerned.76
The Security Council considered the Secretary General's options in a meeting
on August 25, 2010, in which the Council commended the ongoing efforts of
states, especially Kenya and Seychelles, to prosecute suspected pirates in their
national courts, and commended UNODC and other international entities assisting
these countries to prosecute suspected pirates in their national courts.77 It also
emphasized that it was necessary to have "peace, stability, development and
respect for human rights in Somalia" in order to find durable eradication of piracy
and armed robbery at sea off its coast.78 It asked the Contact Group on Piracy Off
the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) to consider the "advantages and disadvantages of
the various options" suggested by the Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon.79
Mr. Ban appointed former French Culture Minister and Education Minister,
69. Id.pt. V(B).
70. Id. pt. V(B).
71. Id. pt. IV(B), 27.
72. Id. pt. V(B).
73. Id. pt. V(B).
74. Id. pt. V(B), 90.
75. Id. pt. V(B).
76. Id. pt. V(B), 97.
77. Press Release, U.N. Dep't of Pub. Info., Security Council Stresses Long-Term Solution
Needed to Problem of Prosecuting, Imprisoning, Pirates Operating Off Somalia's Coast, Welcomes
Report on Issue, U.N. Press Release SC/10014 (Aug. 25, 2010), available at http://157.150.
195.10/News/Press/docs/2010/sclOO14.doc.htm.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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Jacques Lang, to advise him on legal issues relating to piracy off Somalia. 0
Devising an effective mechanism for prosecuting captured pirates and their
imprisonment is certainly one such important issue claiming the new adviser's
attention.
b. General Assembly
The General Assembly has considered piracy on an annual basis as part of its
discussions on "oceans and the law of the sea." In the latest such resolution from
December 4, 2009, 81 the UN General Assembly adopted a comprehensive
Resolution on Oceans and the Law of the Sea, similar to another resolution it had
adopted a year earlier.82 Several provisions relate to piracy. Among others, the
resolution states:
[T]he crucial role of international cooperation at the global, regional,
subregional and bilateral levels in combating, in accordance with
international law, threats to maritime security, including piracy, armed
robbery at sea, terrorist acts against shipping, offshore installations and
other maritime interests, through bilateral and multilateral instruments
and mechanisms aimed at monitoring, preventing and responding to
such threats, the enhanced sharing of information among States relevant
to the detection, prevention and suppression of such threats, and the
prosecution of offenders with due regard to national legislation,83and the
need for sustained capacity-building to support such objectives.
After noting that piracy affects the entire range of vessels engaged in
maritime activities, the resolution emphasizes the "importance of promptly
reporting piracy incidents to enable accurate information on the scope of the piracy
problem, '84 and "[c]alls upon States to take appropriate steps under their national
laws so as to facilitate" apprehending and prosecuting suspected pirates.85 It also
urges states to "actively combat piracy" in cooperation with the IMO by adopting
measures to bring the "alleged perpetrators to justice. '86 Responding to the
concern of some states, it notes that the Security Council resolutions authorizing
state action in the territorial waters of Somalia and inland do not
establish
87
customary international law and apply only to the situation in Somalia.
C. Response by the IMO, UNODC, UNDP, andRegional and SubregionalGroups
1. Response by the IMO and Other Intergovernmental Organizations
The IMO is a specialized agency of the United Nations that works in
cooperation with the shipping industry and nongovernmental organizations,88 and
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id
G.A. Res. 64/71, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/71 (Mar. 12,2010).
Id; G.A. Res. 63/111, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/111 (Feb. 12, 2009).
G.A. Res. 64/71, supra note 81, 69.
Id 71.
Id 72.
Id. 73.
Id 77.
Introductionto IMO, IMO, http://www.imo.org/About/Pages/Default.aspx (2010).
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is the most effective organization in fighting piracy. Its activities pertaining to
piracy began as early as 1983, when the IMO Assembly adopted a resolution on
measures to prevent acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships.89 Since then,
and especially since the 1990s, it has very actively and effectively addressed the
question of maritime piracy.
The IMO's initiatives have resulted in the establishment of several regional
and subregional arrangements aimed at preventing, deterring, and repressing acts
of piracy and armed robbery against ships.90 These include the 2004 Regional
Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery (ReCAAP); the
2008 Sub-Regional Coast Guard Network for the West and Central African
Regions, under the auspices of the Maritime Organization for West and Central
Africa (MOWCA); and the 2009 Djibouti Code of Conduct Concerning the
Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in the Western Indian
Ocean and the Gulf of Aden (Djibouti Code of Conduct). 91 Another important
initiative is the IMO's effort to improve maritime security, safety, and
environmental protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, which resulted
in the 2007 Singapore Statement. 92
In addition to these initiatives creating regional arrangements, two recent
important sets of guidelines for effectively fighting piracy are noteworthy. First, in
September 2009, the IMO's Maritime Safety Committee updated its guidance on
combating piracy and armed robbery against ships and adopted a set of "best
management practices" to deter such attacks. 93 The guidelines include several
recommendations related to travel routes and more technical advice regarding
preferred modes of communication and reporting, evasive maneuvering tactics,

and other defensive measures.94 Second, in December 2009, the IMO adopted a
guidance document in the form of the Code of Practice for the Investigation of
Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships 95 to foster regional
cooperation and to coordinate governments' actions.

89. IMO, Measures to Prevent Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, IMO Assemb.
Res. A. 545 (13) (Nov. 17, 1983).
90. Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery in Southeast Asia
art. 2, 1, Apr. 28, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 829 [hereinafter ReCAAP]; IMO, Code of Conduct Concerning the
Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of
Aden, Annex, IMO Council Doc. C 102/14 (Apr. 3, 2009), available at http://www.imo.org/
OurWork/Security/PIU/Documents/DCoC%/ 2OEnglish.pdf [hereinafter Djibouti Code of Conduct];
About MOWCA, MAR. ORG. OF W. & CENT. AFR. [MOWCA], http://www.mowca.org/new / 20design/
about-mowca.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2010).
91. ReCAAP, supranote 90; Djibouti Code of Conduct, supranote 90; MOWCA, supranote 90.
92. IMO, Singapore Statement on Enhancement of Safety, Security and EnvironmentalProtection
in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, IMO Doc. IMO/SGP 1/4 (Sept. 6, 2007), available at
www.mpa.gov.sg/sites/pdf/spore statement.pdf [hereinafter Singapore Statement].
93. IMO, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Waters Off the Coast of Somalia: Best
Management Practicesto Deter Piracy in the Gulf ofAden and Off the Coast of Somalia Developed by
the Industry, 5-6, IMO Doc. MSC.1/Circ.1335 (Sept. 29, 2009).
94. Id.Annex 2.
95. IMO, Code of Practicefor the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against
Ships, Annex, IMO Assemb. Res. A. 1025 (26) (Jan. 18, 2010).
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Among other UN bodies, UNODC set up its program to support piracy
prosecutions in May 2009.96 The organization's assistance is especially focused on
Kenya and Seychelles, although it has also provided support in the Puntland and
Somaliland regions of Somalia. 97 UNODC has trained police in modem
investigatory procedures and supplied the police with cars, offices, etc. 98 In
Kenya, it has supported the criminal justice system; it has trained the judiciary and
renovated courtrooms, introduced computers and provided defense lawyers; it has
refurbished prisons, providing medical facilities among other improvements; and
has undertaken similar capacity building and support programs in Seychelles,
where the European Commission has entered into partnership with it. 99 The UNDP
has been engaged in training for the judiciary and police and has also supported
court infrastructure in each of the regions of Somalia. 100
2. Regional and Subregional Groups
a. The 2004 Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed
Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP)
The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed
Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), 01 signed in 2004 and in force since
September 4, 2006, was a pioneering attempt at a regional arrangement aimed
exclusively at fighting piracy and armed robbery in the Malacca and Singapore
Straits, another major area then being targeted by pirates. Japan played a leading
role in bringing the states together by issuing the "Tokyo Appeal" in March 2000
and "Tokyo Action Plan" the following month. 102
Under the treaty, the sixteen states parties 10 3 are to "make every effort to take
effective measures" in preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery
against ships, arresting pirates or those who have committed armed robbery against
ships, seizing ships or aircraft used in committing such acts, as well as ships taken
by them and the property
on board such ships, and rescuing victim ships and
10 4
victims of such acts.
The member states agreed in the ReCAAP initiative to enhance their
multilateral cooperation in three areas: sharing of information regarding piracy (the
Information Sharing Centre (ISC)) by coordinating communications and exchange
of information, expediting responses to attacks, and recording and analyzing

96. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Counter PiracyProgramme, at 3 (Nov.
2009), available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/eastemafrica//iracy/UNODC Counter
PiracyProgramme.pdf.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 6-7.

100. SG's Report, supranote 1, pt. IV(B), 28.
101. ReCAAP, supranote 90.
102. Id. para. 5.
103. The parties are Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, People's Republic of China, India, Indonesia,
Japan, South Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and
Vietnam. ReCAAP, supra note 90, art. 18, 1.
104. Id. art 3.
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10 5
statistics, all through a secure web-based information network system;
improving the anti-piracy capabilities of the member states through exercises,
training workshops, and programs for technical assistance to share best practices
among the members; and establishing cooperative arrangements for fighting
piracy, such as between "governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental
organisations" and institutes doing relevant research, to which it gives the status of
*
,106
partner organisations.

As this arrangement was so successful in preventing and deterring piracy in
the region, the IMO in November 2007 called upon East African states to adopt a
similar agreement to fight piracy. 10 7 The IMO sponsored meetings in Yemen,
Oman, and Tanzania to explore the possibility of creating such an arrangement
among states in the Western Indian Ocean. 108 The UN Security Council
recommended in its Resolution 1851 that Eastern African states follow this
example to coordinate their activities in the Horn of Africa; the outcome was the
2009 Djibouti Code of Conduct, 10 9 which will be discussed below.
b. The 2007 Singapore Statement
This IMO initiative began in Jakarta, Indonesia, in September 2005.110 It
continued with a meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in September 2006,111
followed by a meeting in Singapore in September 2007, where states signed the
Singapore Statement on Enhancement of Safety, Security and Environmental
Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.1 12 The states parties affirmed
that "the primary responsibility over the safety of navigation, environmental
protection and maritime security in the Straits lies with the littoral States,"'11 3 and
agreed to continue their efforts toward "enhancing maritime security in the
Straits. 11 a This regional arrangement among Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore,
and subsequently Thailand, was primarily responsible for curbing piracy in that
region.

105. Id. arts. 7, 9-10; see also RECAAP ISC, http://www.recaap.org/index home.html (last visited
Nov. 12, 2010).
106. RECAAP ISC, supranote 105, CooperativeArrangements.
107. IMO, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Waters Off the Coast of Somalia, 7, IMO
Assemb. Res. A. 1002 (25) (Dec. 6, 2007) (adopted Nov. 29, 2007).
108. IMO, Report of the MaritimeSafety Committee on its Eighty-Fifth Session, 18.13, IMO Doc.
MSC 85/26 (Dec. 19, 2008).
109. S.C. Res. 1851, supranote 52
4-5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008); Djibouti Code
of Conduct, supranote 90, para. 6.
110. IMO, JakartaStatement on Enhancement of Safety, Security and EnvironmentalProtection in
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Annex 2, IMO Doc. IMO/JKT 1/2, C/ES.23/8 (Sept. 8, 2005),
available at http://www.sjofartsverket.se/upload/5926/23-8.pdf.
111. IMO, Kuala Lumpur Statement on Enhancement of Safety, Security and Environmental
Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, IMO Doc. IMO/KUL 1/4 (Sept. 20, 2006),
available at www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data id%3 D15677/kualalumpurstatement.pdf.
112. SingaporeStatement, supranote 92.
113. Id. at 3.
114. Id. at5.
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c. The 2008 Sub-Regional Coast Guard Network for the West and Central African
Regions under the Auspices of MOWCA.
MOWCA comprises 20 coastal and five landlocked countries from
Mauritania to Angola.1 5 An intergovernmental institution based in Abidjan, Cote
d'Ivoire, MOWCA was established in May 1975 and its long-term objective is to
provide "'profitable maritime and auxiliary services, with greater security, more
safety and less pollution.' 1 6 Several developed countries and international
117
organizations, including the IMO and the AU, support MOWCA's efforts.
Among its projects and programs are the establishment of maritime safety and
security, marine environmental protection, and the creation of an "institutional
'
framework for cooperation and integration."118
Since 1999, one of its major
projects has been to protect vessels from piracy, along with terrorism and
pollution.11 9
In July 2008, through a Memorandum of Understanding, MOWCA
established a Sub-Regional Integrated Coast Guard Network in West and Central
Africa,1 20 aimed at combating piracy and armed robbery; enhancing maritime
safety, security, and search and rescue; and marine environmental protection in the
coastal waters.121 This is a comprehensive agreement under which parties have
assumed obligations to coordinate their national legislation, practices and
procedures, and policies related to safeguarding maritime trade, providing security
for safe operation of port facilities and ships, and effective protection of the marine
environment. 22 They are also obligated to prosecute "perpetrators of all forms of
piracy and unlawful acts against seafarers, ships, port facility personnel
and port
24
facilities,"123 and to establish the Maritime Fund in each member state.1

Parties make the obligation at the regional level "to combat piracy, armed
robbery against ships, unlawful acts and transnational organized crime at sea by
enhancing the regional maritime security strategies and multilateral co-operation in
their implementation; 1 25 to take effective cooperative measures so that pirates do

115. MOWCA, supra note 90.
116. Id. pt. IV.
117. Id.
118. Projects & Programs, MOWCA, www.mowca.org/new%/o20design/projects-programs.html
(last visited Nov. 10, 2010).
119. Id.
120. Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of a Sub-Regional Integrated Coast
Guard Network in West and Central Africa,13th Sess., July 29-31, 2008, MOWCA, MOWCA Doc.
MOWCA/XIII GA.08/8, available at http://www.mowca.org/new / 20design/MOWCA / 20draft
%
20final%20E%20and 0o20F[1] doc%20Addico%20fmal.rtf [hereinafter MOWCA MOU].
121. Strategy of MOWCA Sub-Region in SuppressingPiracy, Armed Robbery and Other Unlawful
Acts Against Shipping, Responding to Maritime Accidents and Protecting the Marine Environment,
MOWCA, www.mowca.org/new%/o20design/strategyofinowcamemberstatesoncoastguard.html
(last
visited Nov. 10, 2010).
122. MOWCA MOU, supranote 120, art. 4, 1.
123. Id. art. 4, 5.
124. Id. art. 4, 6.
125. Id. art. 6, 4.
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not evade prosecution, conviction, and punishment; 126 to share information and
ensure naval cooperation; and to become parties to and implement the pertinent
international conventions,
including the 1988 SUA Convention and its 1988 and
27
2005 protocols.

1

The network comprises four coast guard zones with four zonal coordinating
centers and two principal coordinating centers. 12 "States Parties recognize the
right of hot pursuit." 129 MOWCA's institutional arrangements indeed are an
exemplary model for other regions.
d. The Djibouti Code of Conduct
An important regional instrument, the Djibouti Code of Conduct was
developed under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) on
January 29, 2009.130 Sixteen regional states, signatories to the Djibouti Code, 131 a

nonbinding instrument, have declared their intention to review their national
legislation "with a view towards ensuring that there are national laws in place to
criminalize piracy and armed robbery against ships, and adequate guidelines for
the exercise of jurisdiction, conduct of investigations, and prosecutions of alleged
offenders. 13 The signatory states have also committed to "facilitate coordinated,
timely, and effective information flow" among
themselves through a system of
133
national focal points and information centers.
D. Response by NATO, the EU, Coalitionsof States, and NationalEfforts
1. Introduction
The international community has responded to the growing threat of piracy in
the Gulf of Aden and off the Somali coast by undertaking naval operations to deter
pirates and to ensure the safety of commercial maritime routes and international
navigation. These operations have been coordinated by NATO, the EU, and a
coalition led by the United States, in addition to several countries operating on
their own. Apart from the naval response there have been numerous coordinated
efforts, as well as by states acting alone, at capacity building in affected countries
to strengthen their criminal justice systems so that pirates can be apprehended,
prosecuted, and convicted.
2. NATO
Pursuant to the request of UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, NATO
provided escorts to the UN World Food Programme vessels transiting through the
126. Id. art. 6,
127. Id. art. 6,

6-7.
2, 10.

128. Id. art. 12.
129. Id art. 55.
130. Djibouti Code of Conduct, supranote 90, 7.
131. The signatories are Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Madagascar,
Maldives, Mauritius, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, United Republic of Tanzania,
and Yemen. Signatory States, IMO, http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/PIU/Pages/SignatoryStates.aspx (last visited Nov. 10, 2010).
132. Djibouti Code of Conduct, supranote 90, art. 11.
133. Id. art. 8.
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Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa under Operation Allied Provider between
134
October and December 2008, in order to provide humanitarian aid to Somalia.
In March 2009, NATO expanded its role in counter-piracy efforts with the
launching of the successor Operation Allied Protector to contribute to the "safety
of commercial maritime routes and international navigation" by helping to deter,
defend against, and disrupt pirate activities in the area. 135 Canada, Denmark,
Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and the United
States
136
routinely contributed to the NATO naval force conducting the operation.
That operation lasted until August 2009 and since that time NATO has been
conducting Operation Ocean Shield. 137 The Alliance has broadened its mission to
include assistance to regional states at their request to develop their own capacity,
such as strengthening their local coast guard, to combat piracy activities."'
3. European Union
The European Union's operation EU-NAVFOR Somalia, known as operation
"Atalanta," is conducted in support of UN Security Council resolutions 1814,
1816, 1838, 1846, and 1897.139 According to the EU Council Decision of
December 8, 2008, the EU's first ever maritime operation was launched "to
contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed
robbery off the Somali coast." 140 The operation became fully operational in
February 2009. Specifically, it has responsibility for ensuring the protection of 1)
shipments of the World Food Programme carrying food aid to displaced persons in
Somalia and 2) vulnerable cruising vessels off the Somali coast. 141 In general, its
objective is to deter, prevent, and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea in
that area. 142 On June 14, 2010, the Council of the EU decided to extend the
mandate of the Operation until December 12, 2012.143 The Operation has taken the
leading role in the SHADE (Shared Awareness and Deconfliction) mechanism to
promote coordination144among international, regional, and national naval forces
operating in the area.

In the first EU-NAVFOR operation to result in court judgment, a Mombasa
Law Courts Chief Magistrate sentenced seven Somali pirates who were
apprehended by a EU-NAVFOR warship after they attacked a German naval

134. Counter-PiracyOperations,N. ATL. TREATY ORG. (NATO), http://www.nato.int/issues/allied-

provider/index.html (last updated Apr. 2, 2009).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Operation Ocean Shield,NATO, http://www.aco.nato.int/page208433730.aspx?print=Y.
138. Id.
139. EU Common Security and Defense Policy: EUNA VFOR Somalia, COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION, www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1518&lang=en (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
140. Council Decision 2008/918, 2008 O.J. (L 330) 19 (EU), available at http://eur-lex.europa.
eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:330:0019:0020:EN:PDF.
141. EU Common Security andDefense Policy: EUNA VFOR Somalia, supranote 139.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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tanker. 145 As of September 2010, EU-NAVFOR had
transferred 75 suspects to
146
Kenyan authorities for prosecution on piracy charges.
An initiative established by EU-NAVFOR with close collaboration from
industry, the Maritime Security Centre-Horn of Africa (MSCHOA), is designed
as a coordinating center to provide a service to mariners in the Gulf of Aden, the
Somali Basin, and off the Horn of Africa. 147 This it does by safeguarding freedom
of navigation, in the light of increasing piracy attacks, in support of UN Security
Council's resolutions 1814, 1816, 1838, and 1846.148 Military and merchant navy
personnel from several countries operate the Centre, and ship owners and ship
masters register their movements through the region with MSCHOA
and receive
149
information and guidance to reduce the risk of pirate attacks.
4. Combined Task Force 151
Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) is a "multinational task force
established in January 2009" to conduct counter-piracy operations off the Eastern
coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, 150 "covering an area of approximately
1.1 million square miles. 15 1 The Task Force operates under a mandate of the 25nation Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), which patrols approximately "2.5
million square miles of international waters" to ensure safety of the seas in that
area. 152 It does this essentially by fighting terrorism, preventing piracy, and
reducing illegal trafficking.1 53 CTF-151's primary responsibility, to actively deter
and suppress piracy, is aimed at protecting global maritime security and securing
international freedom of "navigation for the benefit of all nations. 154
To illustrate one of the Task Force's many activities to deter piracy, US
Marines operating in the Gulf of Aden boarded a German-owned vessel, M/V
Magellan Star, on September 9, 2010, and seized control from pirates who had
attacked and boarded the vessel a day earlier. 155 The Marines returned control of
the ship to the civilian mariners, ensuring safety of the ship's crew. 15 6 There were
145. Press Release, Eur. Union Naval Force Pub. Affairs Office, Verdict for the First EU NAVFOR

Case in Kenya (Sept. 7, 2010), available at http://www.eunavfor.eu/2010/09/verdict-for-the-first-eunavfor-case-in-kenya/ [hereinafter EU NAVFOR Press Release].
146. Id.
147. About MSCHOA and OP ATALANTA,
MAR. SEC. CTR. HORN OF AFR.,
http://www.mschoa.org/Pages/About.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Combined Task Force (CTF) 151, COMBINED MAR. FORCES, http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/cmf/
151/index.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2010).
151. Id.
152. Combined Maritime Forces, COMBINED MAR. FORCES, http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/cmf/
cmf command.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2010).
153. Id.
154. Combined Task Force (CTF)151, supranote 150.
155. Jeffrey Gettleman & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Marines Free Ship and Capture Somali Pirates
Without Bloodshed, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2010, at A4; Press Release, U.S. Naval Forces Cent.
Command, Maritime Raid Force Recaptures Ship from Pirates (Sept. 9, 2010), available at
www.cusnc.navy.mil/articles/2010/104.html.
156. Gettleman & Schmitt, supra note 155; U.S. Naval Forces Cent. Command, supra note 155.
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no injuries and nine pirates ' were
captured, remaining under "control of CTF-151,
157
pending further disposition."
5. The Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia
Following the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1851, the United
States took the lead in creating the Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of
Somalia on January 14, 2009.158 The primary objective is to coordinate an
effective international response to piracy in that region. This is a voluntary
international forum that has brought together almost 50 countries and several
international organizations-the African Union, the League of Arab States,
INTERPOL, IMO, NATO, and the UN Secretariat-as well as two major maritime
industry groups that take part as observers.15 9 The participants have established
four working groups: military and operational coordination, information sharing,
and capacity building, chaired by the United Kingdom; legal issues, chaired by
Denmark; commercial industry coordination,
chaired by the United States; and
160
public information, chaired by Egypt.
At the sixth plenary meeting of the Contact Group at the UN Headquarters in
New York on June 10, 2010,161 participants agreed that, for a viable solution for
ending piracy, the root causes on land have to be addressed effectively, and thus
they emphasized the need for regional capacity building. 162
The meeting
underlined the central importance of adherence to the Best Management Practices
guide, whose purpose is to "assist ships to avoid, deter, or delay piracy attacks" in
the area.163 The Contact Group stated that international efforts to restrict support
for pirates 164
should include "tracking and freezing" pirates' assets to deter their
operations.
In January 2010, the Contact Group established a Trust Fund to help countries
in the region fight piracy, the main objective of which is to "build capacity in their
criminal-justice systems so they can prosecute" suspected pirates. 16 Then, in
April, the Board of the Trust Fund decided to undertake five projects focused
primarily on efforts to prosecute suspected pirates. Four of these projects are
designed to help strengthen institutions in Seychelles and the autonomous Somali
157. U.S. Naval Forces Cent. Command, supranote 155.
158. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, Contact Grp. on Piracy Off the Coast of Som. (May 18,
2009), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/O5/123584.htm.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, Sixth Plenary Meeting of the Contact Group on Piracy
Off the Coast of Som. (June 11, 2010), available at www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/06/143010.htm
[hereinafter Plenary Meeting].
162. Id.
163. BIMCO ET AL., BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICE 3: PIRACY OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA AND

ARABIAN SEA AREA 1 (3d version, 2010), available at www.marad.dot.gov/documents/PiracyBest
Management Practices 3.pdf.
164. Plenary Meeting, supranote 161.
165. Press Conference, U.N. Dep't of Pub. Info., Press Conference on Work of Contact Grp. on
Piracy Off Somali Coast (Jan. 28, 2010), http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2010/100128_
Somalia.doc.htm.
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regions of Puntland and Somaliland relating to "mentoring prosecutors and police,
building and renovating prisons, reviewing domestic laws in piracy and increasing
the capacity of local courts." 166 The fifth project is designed to help local media
disseminate anti-piracy messages within Somalia.
6. National Legal Responses
Several states have enacted laws to criminalize piracy and to prosecute
alleged pirates in their courts. These include Kenya and Seychelles in Africa,
several European countries, and the United States. The UN Secretary-General
1 67
noted in his report that ten states are currently prosecuting acts of piracy.
a. Africa and Europe
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1851 of December 16, 2008, which
had urged states and regional organizations to conclude special agreements with
countries willing to take custody of and prosecute pirates, Kenya entered into
several agreements-with the European Union, the United Kingdom, the United
States, Denmark, China, and Canada. 168 It would be desirable if more states in the
region would allow prosecutions of pirates in their courts, but no such additional
agreements have been reached as of September 2010.
In April 2010, the Kenyan government announced that it would no longer
prosecute pirates because its legal system was overburdened and the international
community had not provided sufficient support. 16 9 However, Kenya subsequently
resumed the adjudication of piracy cases in May after receiving assurances of
additional support. 170 In July, Kenya opened a new high-security courtroom near
Mombasa with funds donated by the European Union and several countries, and
channeled through UNODC. 17 1 EU-NAVFOR alone has turned over 75 suspects
to the Kenyan authorities since its deployment.1 72 In September 2010, Kenya
was
1 73
reported to have convicted fourteen Somali men accused of acts of piracy.

166. U.N. News Serv., UN Trust Fund Backs Projects in Fight Against Piracy Off Somali Coast
(Apr. 23, 2010), www.un.org/apps/news/printnewsAr.asp?nid=34472.
167. These are Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia (in the Somaliland and Puntland regions), Maldives,
Yemen, the Netherlands, United States, France, Spain, and Germany. SG's Report, supra note 1, pt.
IV(A), 19.
168. James Thuo Gathii, Kenya's Piracy Prosecutions,104 AM. J. INT'L L. 416, 416-17 (2010).
169. Hillary Stemple, UN Announces Opening of New Kenya Courtroomfor Piracy Trials, JURIST
(June 25, 2010), available at http://jurist.org/paperchase/2010/06/un-announces-opening-of-new-kenyacourtroom-for-piracy-trials.php.
170. Hillary Stemple, UN Announces $9.3 Million in Donations to Fund Piracy Courts, JURIST
(June 15, 2010), available at http://jurist.org/paperchase/2010/06/un-announces-93-million-indonations-to-fund-piracy-courts.php.
171. Mike Pflanz, At Last, a Court to Try Somali Pirates,CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 8, 2010,
available at http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2010/0708/At-last-a-court-to-try-Somali-pirates.
172. EU NAVFOR Press Release, supranote 145.
173. Zach Zagger, Kenya Court Convicts 7 More Somali Pirates,JURIST (Sept. 24, 2010, 1:53 PM),
available at http://jurist.org/paperchase/201 0/09/kenya-court-convicts-7-more-somali-pirates.php; see
also EU NAVFOR Press Release, supra note 145 (discussing the first seven convictions).
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Seychelles was the second state in the region to set up a UN-backed regional
center for prosecution of suspected pirates. 174 In the course of the Security Council
meeting on August 25, 2010, the country's delegate informed the Council that
Seychelles' Supreme Court had sentenced 11 Somali
pirates to ten years in prison
175
each and another 29 suspects were awaiting trial.
The first European trial of Somali pirates for hijacking a cargo ship registered
in the Netherlands Antilles commenced in the Netherlands District Court of
Rotterdam on May 25, 2010.176 They were convicted and sentenced to five years
each, while another Dutch court approved
the extradition of ten other Somali
177
piracy suspects to Hamburg, Germany.
b. United States
In 2007 President George W. Bush signed the US policy on piracy and armed
robbery at sea, which was developed after years of deliberation. 178 It provides for
taking unilateral and cooperative action to prevent, interrupt, and terminate pirate
acts; facilitate the prosecution of suspected pirates; "preserve the freedom of the
seas;" and "protect sea lines of communication," among others. 17 9 It 18
also
provides
0
for the implementation of this policy through an inter-agency process.
Subsequently, in December 2008, the US National Security Council released
an action plan implementing the policy.181 The plan seeks to involve all nations,
international organizations, and industry, among others that are interested to take
steps to repress piracy in that region. 182 It focuses on operational measures for
183
prevention, disruption, and punishment of acts of Somali pirate organizations.
As part of the Maritime Administration Action Plan on addressing this problem,
pertinent information and advice to counter piracy and armed robbery is provided
to assist ship owners, operators, and the maritime industry in preventing ship
hijackings.184
174. U.N. News Serv., Seychelles to Launch UN-Backed Courts to Combat Piracy (May 5, 2010),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=34601&Cr=piracy&Crl =&Kwl=pirate&Kw2=&Kw
3=#.
175. U.N. Dep't of Pub. Info., supranote 77, para. 96.
176. Sarah Miley, Dutch Court Begins Europe's FirstSomali Pirate Trial, JURIST (May 25, 2010,
10:30 AM), available at http://jurist.org/paperchase/2010/05/dutch-court-begins-europes-first-somalipirate-trial.php.
177. Spencer Swartz, WorldNews: Somali PiratesSentencedfor Ship Attack, WALL ST. J., June 18,
2010, at All.
178. See Memorandum from President George W. Bush on Mar. Sec. (Piracy) Policy to the Vice
President (June 14, 2007), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/06/2007
0614-3.html.
179. Id. pt. III.
180. Id. pt. IV.
181. U.S. NAT'L SEC. COUNCIL, COUNTERING PIRACY OFF THE HORN OF AFRICA: PARTNERSHIP &

ACTION PLAN 3, (2008), available at http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/CounteringPiracyOff
The Horn of Africa_-_Partnership Action Plan.pdf
182. Id.
183. Id. at 3-4.
184. Horn of Africa Piracy, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., MAR. ADMIN, www.marad.dot.gov/news

_room landingjnage/horn of africajniracy/horn of africaniracy.htm
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The United States Constitution in Article 1 grants Congress the power to
"define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and
Offences against the Law of Nations." 185 In a decision on August 17, 2010, United
States v. Said, a federal district court construed the statute defining piracy, which
was originally enacted in 1819. 186 The statute reads: "Whoever, on the high seas,
commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards
brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life. ' 187 The
188
court also noted other related federal statutes on Attack to Plunder a Vessel,
Acts of Violence Against Persons on a Vessel, 189 Conspiracy to Perform Acts of
Violence Against Persons on a Vessel, 190 Assault with a Dangerous Weapon on
Federal Officers and Employees, 191 Conspiracy Involving Firearm and a Crime of
Violence, 192 and Use of Firearm During a Crime of Violence. 193
The court dismissed the piracy count of a five-count indictment against
defendant Said and his co-defendants, all of whom were passengers aboard a skiff
from which shots were fired on the USS Ashland in the Gulf of Aden in April
2010.194 The defendants had asked for such dismissal because they did not board
nor did they take control of the US ship or take anything from it.195 In response,
the government's argument was that the motion should be denied because
historically piracy is not limited to the common law definition of robbery on land
and has included conduct beyond robbery. 196 Specifically, the prosecution's
assertion was that, as defined by the "law of nations," any unauthorized violent act
or attack committed on the high seas against another ship197suffices to constitute
piracy, which does not require the actual taking of property.
The court began its analysis by noting that the language of the piracy statute
did not provide any guidance on the scope of piracy under the law of nations, and
thus it must examine the pertinent case law. 198 It relied upon an 1820 case decided
by the US Supreme Court, United States v. Smith, 199 "the only case to ever directly

examine the definition of piracy under § 1651"

185.
186.
2010).
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
2010).
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
2010).

200

as the governing authority, and

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
United States v. Said, No. CRI.A.2:10cr57, 2010 WL 3893761, at *2-3 (E.D. Va. Aug. 17,
18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2010).
18 U.S.C. § 1659 (2010).
18 U.S.C. § 2291(a)(6) (2010).
18 U.S.C. § 2291(a)(9) (2010).
18 U.S.C. § 111(a)-(b) (210).
18 U.S.C. § 924(o) (2010).
Id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii).
United States v. Said, No. CRI.A.2:10cr57, 2010 WL 3893761, at *2-3 (E.D. Va. Aug. 17,
Id at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id at *4.
Id.; United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153 (1820).
United States v. Said, No. CRI.A.2:10cr57, 2010 WL 3893761, at *4 (E.D. Va. Aug. 17,
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stated that since the defendants "did not board, take control or otherwise rob the
USS Ashland," they did not commit the offense of "piracy" as defined by the
Supreme Court in Smith.20 1
The Court observed that, as with every criminal statute, piracy under the law
of nations is subject to constitutional due process, requiring fair warning before the
statute is enforced against the defendant.2 2 Thus, enforcement of a "statute which
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application" is barred.20 3 It also referred to the canon of strict construction of
criminal statutes.20 4
The court noted that the law of nations means "customary international law,"
and defined the term as it is normally defined, to wit: international law principles
that "countries must
universally abide by ... out of a sense of legal obligation and
20 5
mutual concern.,
In Smith,20 6 the US Supreme Court had concluded that writers on the common
law, the maritime law, and the law of nations "universally treat piracy as an
offense against the law of nations, and that its true definition by that law is robbery
upon the sea., 20 7 The Said court found that this definition had been reiterated and
followed without exception-it had "reached a level of concrete consensus in
United States law since its pronouncement in 1820. " 208
As mentioned above, the defendants in Saidthus argued that the statute could
not be read to include the charged conduct. 20 9 Their rationale was that, although
the statute did not define "piracy," the term, derived from "the law of nations," did
not encompass a shooting without a concomitant robbery at sea. 10 On the other
hand, the government's position was that, even if "piracy" was defined in Smith
and subsequent cases as "robbery or forcible depredation," the term included many
crimes beyond robbery, including defendants' alleged attack on the US vessel with
an AK-47 rifle.211
The court rejected the government's argument, stating that
"depredation" itself is defined as "the act of plundering: pillaging,.
[or] the act of plundering; a robbing; a pillaging. 212 Thus, the court
stated:

201. Id at *3-4, *11.
202. Id. at *4.
203. Id at *2 (citing United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997)).
204. Id. at *3.
205. Id. at *2 (citing Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 144 (2d Cir. 2003)).
206. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153 (1820).
207. Smith, 18 U.S. at 161, quoted in United States v. Said, No. CRI.A.2:10cr57, 2010 WL
3893761, at *4 (E.D. Va. Aug. 17, 2010).
208. Said,2010 WL 3893761, at *4.
209. Id. at *3.
210. Id. at *7-8.
211. Id. at *6.
212. Id. at *6 (citations omitted).
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This definition does not include acts of assault or aggression, and
Justice Story's use of the terms "robbery" and "forcible depredations"
[in Smith] does not embrace the conduct charged against Defendants.
Accordingly, the Government's argument is both an expansion and a
misinterpretation of Smith and it would be erroneous for the Court to
agree with it.
In sum, the Government simply fails to cite to one case in United
States jurisprudence in which the Defendant was criminally prosecuted
for "piracy in violation of the law of nations," for conduct that fell short
of robbery or seizure of a ship. Finding none, this Court concludes that
the Supreme Court in Smith set forth the authoritative definition of
piracy as robbery or forcible depredations on the high seas, i.e., sea
robbery.213
The court did not find the cases cited by the government to support the
expanded scope of the definition of piracy persuasive.214 It also reviewed the
statutory history of Section 1651 and found that subsequent Congressional actions
since the enactment of the statute have continued to support the Smith definition of
piracy.215
Next, the court reviewed the traditional sources as evidence of customary
international law: conventions, case law, and the writings of publicists or scholars,
and concluded that contemporary international law sources are not consistent on
the definition of piracy.216 The court did refer to the 1958 Convention on the High
Seas 217 and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 218 and the
British Privy Council case In re Piracy Jure Gentium,21 9 all of which would have
included the conduct charged against these defendants in Said as piracy, but also
noted that there is no consensus among scholars on the matter.220
Finally, the court determined that constitutional due process constraints
prevented it from construing the piracy statute to extend the Smith definition of
piracy because "[t]he Smith Court held that [Section] 1651 was not
unconstitutionally vague because piracy under the law of nations had a specified
meaning: robbery at sea. 221 In the Saidcourt's words,
Given the flexible manner in which international sources treat the
definition of piracy, and that these sources inherently conflict with
Supreme Court precedent, the Court's reliance on these international
sources as authoritative would not meet constitutional muster [of due
213.
2010).
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

United States v. Said, No. CRI.A.2:10cr57, 2010 WL 3893761, at *6 (E.D. Va. Aug. 17,
Id.at *5.
Id.at *6-7.
Id. at *8-10.
Id at *8; see also Convention on the High Seas, supra note 24, art. 15.
Id. at *8; see also UNCLOS, supranote 23, art. 101.
Said,2010 WL 3893761, at *8 (citing In re Piracy Jure Gentium, [1934] A.C. 586 (P.C.)).
Id at *8-9.
Id at *10 (citing United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 162 (1820)).
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process] and must therefore be rejected. The Smith definition
222 of piracy
as sea robbery, on the other hand, is clear and authoritative.
In its sole reliance on Smith-concluding that since there is no robbery there
is no piracy, despite the defendants' attempt at piracy-the Said court misses the
point. Not to extend the definition of piracy beyond that in Smith seems
unwarranted, especially in view of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas and the
1982 UNCLOS, both of which are widely accepted as codifications of the
customary international law. However, even if there might be some doubt whether
the conventions had indeed been codified customary international law, as a party to
the 1958 Convention the United States is bound to comply by enforcing its terms
in US courts. In any event, it seems appropriate to quote the British Privy Council
in its 1934 decision, In re PiracyJure Gentium:
When it is sought to be contended ... that armed men sailing the seas

on board a vessel, without any commission from any State, could attack
and kill everybody on board another vessel, sailing under a national
flag, without committing the crime of piracy unless they stole, say, an
article worth sixpence, their Lordships are almost tempted to say that a
little common sense
is a valuable quality in the interpretation of
223
international law.
Ten days after the decision in Said was announced, the Somali suspect, Jama
Idle Ibrahim, pleaded guilty to several charges of attacking to plunder a vessel,
committing an act of violence against persons on a vessel, and the use of a firearm
in the commission of a crime of violence. 224 Under the plea agreement he will
receive a thirty-year sentence and the sentencing hearing will be on November 29,
2010.225 Earlier, in May 2010, a Somali man pled guilty to charges of hijacking
the container ship Maersk Alabama, kidnapping its captain, hostage taking, and
conspiracy. 226
IV.

APPRAISAL

The United Nations and its specialized agencies, regional organizations,
coalitions of states, as well as several states independently, have in the last few
years taken numerous robust measures to repress piracy.
However,
notwithstanding these actions piracy persists as a major threat to maritime
navigation, especially with continuous attacks off the Coast of West Africa and in
the Far East.

222. Id. at *11.
223. In re Piracy Jure Gentium, [1934] A.C. 586 (P.C.) 594.
224. Warren Richey, Somali Pleads Guilty in Case of Pirate Attack on US Warship, CHRISTIAN

SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 27, 2010, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2010/0827/Somalipleads-guilty-in-case-of-pirate-attack-on-US-warship.
225. Id.
226. Ray Rivera, Somali Man Pleads Guilty in 2009 Hqacking of Ship, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2010,

at A21, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/19/nyregion/19pirate.html.
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To illustrate, the IMO reported 46 acts of piracy and armed robbery against
ships in August 2010.227 On September 23, 2010, the Associated Press reported
pirates' failed attempt to take over an offshore oil platform in the Gulf of Guinea,
along Nigeria's coast. 228 While clashing with the Nigerian army and retreating, the
pirates kidnapped three French employees of a marine services company.229 On
the same day, the BBC reported that the IMO received a petition signed by more
than 930,000 seafarers, calling for immediate global action to halt piracy.230 The
signatories urged governments to take immediate steps to secure the release of
kidnapped sailors, numbering 354 taken by Somali pirates alone. 231 They also
called for 'significant resources
and concerted efforts to find real solutions to the
232
growing piracy problem."'
The situation has worsened for many reasons, including the geographical
expansion by pirates of their operations to hundreds of miles from the coast. The
vast distances involved, requiring millions of square miles to be covered by naval
forces, adds to the difficulties of preventing and deterring piracy.233
In addition, pirates have begun investing their ransom money in heavy
weapons and land-based militias, and both the Somali government officials and alShabaab leaders of the militant Islamicist insurgency are reportedly wooing the
pirates. 234 Thus far, al-Shabaab has been funding its operations by taxing
businesses in the territory it controls, along with contributions from its supporters
abroad.235 Its leaders are now reportedly using the pirates to raise money, which
adds further complications.236 Finally, restoration of law and order in Somalia
remains illusory, as the security situation seems to be worsening. Hence, the longterm solution to the piracy problem that has to be political is nowhere in sight.

227. IMO, Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships -- Acts reportedduring
August 2010, MSC.4/Circ.159 (September 1, 2010); see also IMO, CURRENT AwARENEss BULLETIN
(July 2010), available at http://www.imo.org/KnowledgeCentre/CurrentAwarenessBulletin/Documents/
CAB%20165%o2OJulyo202010.pdf (monthly bulletin giving maritime news, including news from the
IMO and the United Nations, and maritime news in the press); Piracy and Security, LLOYD'S LIST,
www.lloydslist.com/ll/sector/piracy-and-security (daily news and analysis for the global maritime
industry).
228. Greg Keller, 3 FrenchEmployees Kidnappedfrom Ship off Nigeria,ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept.
23, 2010, available at http://www.wfaa.com/news/world/103524974.html.
229. PiratesAttack Oil Platform, Kidnap French Workers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2010, at A18,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB20001424052748703860104575508263862382210.html.
230. Sailors Callfor Urgent GlobalAction to Halt Piracy, BBC NEWS, Sept. 23, 2010, available at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-I 1400354.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Jeffrey Gettleman, In Somali Civil War, Both Sides Embrace Pirates,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2,
2010, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/02/world/africa/02pirates.html.
235. Sarah Childress, Somali Militants Try Piracy to FundAttacks, WALL ST. J., Sept.11, 2010, at
A9, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 1000142405274870372000457547749100947
2882.html.
236. Id.
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If, for various reasons, prevention and deterrence of piratical attacks cannot
be ensured, effective mechanisms for apprehending and prosecuting alleged
pirates, their detention and imprisonment, and extradition where appropriate, must
be in place to serve two purposes: 1) as deterrence, and 2) to hold the perpetrators
accountable.237 It is worth recalling that the UN Security Council, in a preambular
paragraph to Resolution 1851, noted that "the lack of capacity, domestic
legislation, and clarity about how to dispose of pirates after their capture, has
hindered more robust international action against the pirates off the coast of
Somalia and in some cases led to pirates being released without facing
justice.... ,,238
In reality, the needed mechanisms, logistics, and facilities to ensure
apprehension and prosecution, detention, extradition, and imprisonment are barely
in place. First, many countries, including the United States, have yet to update
their criminal laws to provide such authorization.239 Second, several countries are
hesitant to bring captured suspects to their courts not only because of the logistical
problems-travel, evidence, witnesses, delay, and cost, among others-but also
considerations of the need to comply with strict human rights norms and the risk
that the suspect might seek asylum. Hence,
freed after capture, suspects often
240
await the next venture, hoping for success.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS

An effective solution to the menace of piracy off the coast of Somalia has to
be comprehensive, focusing on peace and stability in that country. How to bring
that about and what political means and political will are needed to accomplish that
objective are beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, the focus here has been on
international and regional cooperative measures to prevent and deter acts of piracy
and to bring pirates to justice. The critical elements remain (1) to find appropriate
means and authority to apprehend, detain, and prosecute suspected pirates and, (2)
to make sufficient arrangements for imprisoning them in the region, or to extradite
the suspects. In this respect, the efforts undertaken by the United Nations and
several international organizations are noteworthy. Also, although some states
have taken the necessary steps, the creation of an effective legal framework
depends upon uniform state practice in this regard.
The laudable role of the United Nations and its specialized agencies and
regional organizations in providing assistance to Kenya and Seychelles to ensure
237. James Kraska & Brian Wilson, The Pirates of the Gulf ofAden: The Coalition is the Strategy,
45 STAN. J. INT'L L. 243,254-57

(2009).

238. S.C. Res. 1851, supranote 52, pmbl.
239. See James Kraska & Brian Wilson, International Coordination is the Key to Countering
Modern-Day Freebooters, ARMED
FORCES
J., available at http://www.armedforces
journal.corn/2009/02/3928962; see also Said, 2010 WL 3893761, at *6.
240. See Piracy Laws Under Review in Nation, MOWCA, available at www.mowca.org/

new%20design/news/newsOl35.html (last visited September 26, 2010) ("The biggest challenge we are
facing in dealing with piracy in the East African Coast is lack of proper laws that allow us to prosecute
them in our own countries .... "). Thirteen pirates arrested in Tanzanian waters were set free because
of the lack of legal grounds in Tanzania to prosecute them. Kraska & Wilson, supranote 237.
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prosecution and imprisonment of those suspected of piracy needs to be enhanced.
Consequently, burden sharing becomes an important item on the international
agenda.
States that have not yet criminalized acts of piracy in their domestic
legislation or provided the necessary authorization under the pertinent international
conventions and customary international law to prosecute and punish suspected
pirates must do so as a matter of priority. States are also under a treaty obligation
to cooperate in the repression of piracy, under UNCLOS article 100: "All States
shall cooperate to the fullest extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or
in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State. 241
Granted, these efforts cannot suffice for a comprehensive long-term solution.
In the short-term, however, they can provide the necessary deterrence to limit the
toll taken by international commerce and navigation in the last decade. As the
representative from Norway said in the discussion at the Security Council, on
August 25, 2010, "It is simply unacceptable that the suspects are released when
there is sufficient evidence against them, as this undermines the credibility and
effectiveness of the naval presence. 242
Many European countries have been doing just that, the "catch-and-release"
approach. For instance, the European Union's naval forces released 235 of the 275
pirates they captured in March and April 2010, according to a Swedish navy
commander and spokesman for the EU forces.

243

Similarly, several countries

including Russia, Portugal, Canada, and the Netherlands have routinely released
captured pirates. 2 " Bringing pirates to justice is essential for its deterrent effect.
Prosecutions must be done in compliance with widely recognized principles of due
process and applicable international human rights norms.
Ideally Somalia should try and imprison its own nationals, but since it does
not have the judicial capacity for this task, alternative means have to be found.
Thus, detention, prosecution, and imprisonment have to take place in the region
where the piracy was committed because of cultural, familial, and linguistic
considerations and the proximity to where the acts took place, so that the patrolling
naval states can transfer them there. It seems appropriate that perhaps a special
chamber in one of the states in that region could specifically deal with this issue.
For this to happen extensive personnel and financial support from other countries
and organizations would be required.

241. UNCLOS, supranote 23, art. 100.
242. U.N. Dep't of Pub. Info, supranote 77, para. 85.
243. Craig Whitlock, Lack of Prosecution Poses Challenge for Foreign Navies that Capture
Pirates, WASH. POST, May 24, 2010, at A8, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/05/23/AR2010052303893.html.
244. Anne Applebaum, Somali Pirate'sClash with Russian Navy Reveals a Gap in Rule of Law,
WASH. POST, May 18, 2010, at A19; Ellen Barry, Russia Frees Somali Pirates it had Seized in
Shootout, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2010, at A4; Piracy: Wrong Signals, Pirates and Legal Knots, THE
ECONOMIST, May 9, 2009; Craig Whitlock, supranote 243.
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Should the payment of ransom to pirates, which is the usual practice in
seeking freedom for hostages or the release of hostage ships and cargo, be
prohibited? The delegate from South Africa suggested this move at the Security
Council meeting of July 26, 2010.245 However, currently there does not seem to be
wide support for this approach.
At the same Security Council meeting, Ukraine said that it intended to submit
for the General Assembly's consideration a draft comprehensive convention on
combating piracy and armed robbery at sea. 22446 The prospects for such a
comprehensive convention do not appear to be promising at this stage. Currently,
the existing legal framework presents the best prospects. States must cooperate
fully with one another and with international and regional organizations to ensure
its effective implementation.
POSTSCRIPT

Incidents of piracy and armed robbery in 2010 reached 445, compared with
400 in 2009, as reported by the Piracy Reporting Center of the International
Maritime Bureau, an agency which receives reports of pirate attacks twenty-four
hours a day from around the globe and has monitored piracy worldwide since
1991. These numbers have risen every year since 2006.247 Pirates captured 1,181
seafarers in 2010, compared with 1,050 in 2009, while 188 crewmembers were
taken hostage in 2006. 24 ' Ninety-two percent of all ships seized in 2010 were
hijacked off the coast of Somalia. Captain Pottengal Mukundan, Director of the
IMB's Piracy Reporting Center, said that the numbers for hostages and vessels
taken were the highest "we have ever
seen." Furthermore, "[t]he continued
249
increase in these numbers is alarming.,
While the number of incidents rose in Bangladesh, Indonesia, and the South
China Seas, and violent attacks continued around Nigeria, one bright spot,
according to the report, was the Gulf of Aden. In the Gulf of Aden the number of
incidents halved in 2010, with fifty-three attacks compared with 117 in 2009. The
IMB attributes the decline "to the deterrence work of naval forces from around the
world that have been patrolling the area since 2008 and to the ships' application of
self-protection measures recommended in Best Management Practices, version 3..
a booklet published last year by the shipping industry and navies. 250
Other developments included conviction of five Somali pirates on federal
piracy charges in the Virginia Federal District Court, the first piracy conviction in

245. U.N. Dep't of Pub. Info, supranote 77, paras. 83-84.
246. Id. para. 88
247. Press Release, Commercial Crime Serv. of Int'l Chamber of Commerce, Hostage-Taking at
Sea Rises to Record Levels, Says IMB (Jan. 17, 2011) available at http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/429hostage-taking-at-sea-rises-to-record-levels-says-imb. For figures for 2006-2009, see supra notes 1115.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
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the United States since 1819.251 On January 21, 2011, the South Korean Navy
rescued a tanker that had been hijacked by Somali pirates, killing eight of the
pirates, capturing five, and rescuing all twenty-one hostages. IMB Director
Mukundan commented: "The IMB commends the robust actions of the South
Korean navy and renews its call for greater naval action in the fight against this
brand of maritime crime. 252 It should be noted that during the first three weeks of
January, the IMB Piracy Reporting Center had already reported thirty-nine
incidents, thirty-one of which are attributed to Somali pirates.253
In December 2010, the One Earth Future Foundation released a report entitled
"The Economic Costs of Maritime Piracy"254 , analyzing the cost in three regions:
1) the Horn of Africa; 2) Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea; and 3) the Malacca
Straits. It concludes that the global cost of piracy "is at least $7 to $12 billion per
year," which, according to the report, is using "conservative estimates, so as to not
overinflate the costs.
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The report found that the ransoms paid to Somali pirates

have increased from an average of $150,000 in 2005 to $5.4 million in 2010. 21 6 A
South Korean oil tanker, the Samho Dream, paid the highest ransom on record,
$9.5 million to Somali pirates in November 2010; approximately $23 8 million was
paid in ransoms to Somali pirates in 2010 alone.257 Pirates held ships for an
average of 106 days between April and June 2010, up from fifty-five days in 2009
and the last four ships released in November 2010 were held for an average of 150
days.258
The judiciary in Kenya has tried pirates captured outside of Kenyan territorial
waters because of a series of agreements with the United States, the European
Union, and other countries. However, in November 2010 a senior Kenyan judge

said that the courts in Kenya have to power to prosecute crimes that took place
outside Kenya's territorial waters.259
Because most countries capturing pirates usually set them free after a period
of time, with a few exceptions, such as the trial in Virginia, there seems to be a
need for an effective punishment and deterrent system. One obvious possibility

251. Assoc. Press, 5 Somalis are Found Guilty of Attacking U.S. Warship, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25,
2010, at A26; Warren Richey, Five Somali Pirates Convicted of Attacking US Navy Ship, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 24, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2010/1124/Five-Somali-pirates-

convicted-of-attacking-US-Navy-ship.
252. Press Release, Commercial Crime Serv. of Int'l Chamber of Commerce, South Korean Navy
Rescues Hijacked Ship (Jan. 21, 2011) http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/430-southkoreannavyrescues
hijackedship.
253. Id.
254. Anna Bowden, The Economic Costs of Maritime Piracy (One Earth Future Foundation
Working Paper, Dec. 2010)
255. .Id.
at 25.
256. Id.at 9.
257. Id. at 9-10.
258. Id.
259. Mike Pflanz, Landmark Kenya Ruling Could See Dozens of Somali Pirates Set Free,

CHRISTLAN SC. MONITOR, Nov. 10, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2010/1110/
Landmark-Kenya-ruling-could-see-dozens-of-Somali-pirates-set-free.
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that should be explored is a tribunal to try pirates, under an international
framework. The Security Council's Chapter VII may provide the United Nations
the authority to establish such a international tribunal. The challenges of
establishing such an international judicial body are enormous, but seriously
considering this possibility remains worthwhile.260

260. See, e.g, David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Carlos Ramos-Mrosovsky, A Better Way to Deal With Pirates,
WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2010, at A27 available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2010/12/08/AR2010120806188.html (suggesting that the Security Council create such a
tribunal and that the United states pay a leading role).

A GROTIAN MOMENT:
CHANGES IN THE LEGAL THEORY OF STATEHOOD
MILENA STERIO*

I. INTRODUCTION

International law has undergone profound changes over the last decades. It
has transformed itself from a set of rules governing inter-state relations, where
states were the only actors, to a complex web of laws, treaties, regulations,
resolutions and codes of conduct that govern a variety of state and non-state actors
in their daily interactions. 1 Scholars have thus written about globalization and the
changes brought about through its potent forces.2 In the process of globalization,
states have lost some attributes of sovereignty, and their bundle of sovereign rights
has been meshed in with regional and global rules, which often supersede states'
decision-making power.
For example, states must consult international
organizations and authorities before they decide to use force against other states,
before they set applicable import and export trade tariffs, and before they
determine that a minority group does not deserve any self-determination rights. 4 If
states choose to ignore the existing international order and to engage in
independent decision-making processes in an area where international rules apply,
such states risk interference by other states in the form of sanctions, isolationism,
and possibly military intervention.
This kind of fundamental change in the existing world order - the increased
chipping away of state sovereignty through the forces of globalization - has
produced new rules regarding the legal theory of statehood. As this article argues
below, statehood is no longer satisfied through the four traditional criteria of the
Montevideo Convention: territory, government, population, and the capacity to
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2. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, From InternationalLaw to Law and Globalization,43 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 485, 490 (2005); Philippe Sands, Turtles and Torturers: The Transformation of
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3. Sterio, supra note 1, at 247-48 (discussing the erosion of state sovereignty brought about by
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engage in international relations. 5 Rather, for an entity to qualify as a state, and to
continue to be regarded as a state on the world scene, additional criteria need to be
fulfilled. These additional criteria are in reality subparts of the fourth pillar of
statehood, the capacity to enter into international relations, and they include: the
need for recognition by both regional partners, as well as the most powerful states,
which I refer to as the Great Powers; a demonstrated respect for human/minority
rights; and a commitment to participate in international organizations, and to abide
by a set world order.6 This type of profound development in international law
(globalization), causing the emergence of new rules and doctrines of international
law (statehood), has been described as a Grotian Moment.
This article will examine the Grotian Moment theory and its practical
application toward the legal theory of statehood. To that effect, this article will
describe, in Part II, the notion of a Grotian Moment. In Part III, it will examine the
legal theory of statehood in its traditional form. Part IV describes changes in the
legal theory of statehood brought about by the forces of globalization, in a Grotian
Moment manner. These changes include a new notion of state sovereignty and the
accompanying right to intervention, the emergence of human and minority rights
which sometimes affect state territorial integrity, the existence of de facto states,
like Northern Cyprus and Republika Srpska, and the concept of state interconnectivity and the proliferation of regional and international norms and
organizations. This article will conclude that all these changes, caused by
globalization, have affected the legal theory of statehood, in a Grotian Moment.
Moreover, this article argues that the legal theory of statehood should be
amended, to incorporate real changes in the existing global understanding of
statehood and state sovereignty. 8 Statehood is an important theory, as it provides a
sovereignty shield to entities that qualify as states and insulates some of their
decisions from global scrutiny. 9 While it is true that states no longer enjoy
absolute sovereign freedom to make decisions within their own territory, it
nonetheless remains accurate that states do enjoy a set of rights and privileges,
which non-state entities do not. The traditional theory of statehood does not take
into account modern-day features of state sovereignty, and as such, either treats
5. See infra Part III.
6. For a more detailed discussion of who the Great Powers are, see for example Michael J. Kelly,
Pulling at the Threads of Westphalia: "Involuntary Sovereignty Waiver": Revolutionary International
Legal Theory or Return to Rule by the Great Powers?, 10 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 361, 365-

66 (2005).
7. For a discussion of the Grotian Moment theory, see infra Part II.
8. See infra Part V.
9. It should be noted that the term "sovereignty" has been criticized by prominent scholars, such
as Louis Henkin, who claimed that sovereignty was "a catchword, a substitute for thinking and
precision." LouIs HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 8 (1995). However, even
Henkin acknowledged that "[s]overeignty, strictly, is the locus of ultimate legitimate authority in a
political society . . ."and that "[it is an internal concept and does not have, need not have, any
implication for relations between one state and another." Id at 9. Moreover, Henkin advocated that the
term "sovereignty" should be decomposed to its essential elements, which "do constitute essential
characteristics and indicia of statehood today[]" and which include: independence, equality, autonomy,
"personhood," territorial authority, integrity and inviolability, impermeability and "privacy." Id at 10.
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offending entities as states, thereby protecting them from outside interference, or,
denies statehood to entities that otherwise deserve it. The Grotian Moment in the
legal theory of statehood is important to capture, because it would enable scholars
and international law practitioners to more accurately describe what statehood
means today, and what states may and may not do on the international scene
without repercussions.
II. WHAT IS A GROTIAN MOMENT?
Grotian Moment is a term that signifies a "paradigm-shifting development in
which new rules and doctrines of customary international law emerge with unusual
rapidity and acceptance." 10 In other words, a Grotian Moment is an instance in
which a fundamental change in the exiting international system happens, thereby
provoking the emergence of a new principle of customary law with outstanding
speed. 1 Professor Richard Falk coined the term Grotian Moment in 1985; since
then, experts have employed it in a variety of ways.12 Here, I adopt the meaning
given to the term Grotian Moment by Professor Michael Scharf: "a transformative
development in which new rules and doctrines of customary international law
emerge with unusual rapidity and acceptance." 13
The term "Grotian" refers to Dutch scholar, Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), who
is hailed as the father of modern international law. 14 In the mid-17 th century, the
concept of nation-states crystallized to form a fundamental political unit of Europe.
Grotius, in his seminal work, De Jure Belli ac Pacts (The Law of War and Peace),
"offered a new concept of international law designed to reflect that new reality."'1 5
Similar to how the negotiation of the Peace of Westphalia, in Grotian times,
produced this novel understanding of international law by Grotius, more modem
events have constituted Grotian Moments over the last several decades. Thus,
many commentators agree that the creation of the Nuremberg Tribunal at the end
of World War II was a Grotian Moment.1 6 Moreover, the establishment of the

10. Michael P. Scharf, Seizing the "Grotian Moment": Accelerated Formation of Customary
InternationalLaw in Time of FundamentalChange, 43 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 439, 440 (2010).
11. Id. at44.
12. INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 7 (Richard Falk et al. eds., 1985); see
also BURNS H. WESTON, RICHARD A. FALK, HILARY CHARLESWORTH & ANDREW K. STRAUSS,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 1265-86 (4th ed. 2006). For earlier work of Richard Falk
on the concept of changing paradigm in international law, see Richard A. Falk, The Interplay of
Westphalia and Charter Conceptions of International Legal Order, in 1 THE FUTURE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 32 (Richard A. Falk & Cyril E. Black eds., 1969). See Scharf, supra
note 10, at 444 n.20 (noting that scholars and the former U.N. Secretary-General, Boutros BoutrosGhali, have used the term in different ways).
13. Scharf, supra note 10, at 444.
14. CHARLES S. EDWARDS, HUGO GROTIUS, THE MIRACLE OF HOLLAND 1, 8, 21 (1981).
15. Scharf, supra note 10, at 443 (citing John W. Head, Throwing Eggs at Windows: Legal and
Institutional Globalization in the 21st-Century Economy, 50 KAN. L. REV. 731, 771 (2002)); see also
HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI Ac PACIS (n.p. 1625).
16. Ibrahim J. Gassama, InternationalLaw at a Grotian Moment: The Invasion of Iraq in Context,
18 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1, 9, 33-34 (2004) (arguing that along with the Peace of Westphalia, the
Nuremberg Charter and the U.N. Charter include more recent Grotian moments).
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United Nations Charter is an example of yet another Grotian Moment. 17 Finally,
scholars have applauded the
recent establishment of the International Criminal
18
Court as a Grotian Moment.
As noted by Professor Scharf, other scholars have used other terms to convey
the idea of a Grotian Moment concept. Professor Bruce Ackerman used the term
"constitutional moment" to describe the changes in American constitutional law
resulting for the New Deal era.1 9 Professors Bardo Fassbender and Jenny Martinez
have referred to the drafting of the U.N. Charter as a "Constitutional moment" in
the history of international law. 0 Professor Leila Sadat has similarly referred to
Nuremberg as a "'constitutional moment' for international law., 21 Regarding more
recent events,, Professors Anne Marie Slaughter and William Burket-White haveth
referred to the term "constitutional moment" when arguing that the September 11
attacks on the United States represent a change in the nature of threats facing the
international community, justifying the development of new rules of customary
law. 2 The term "international constitutional moment" is similar to the concept of
Grotian Moment; the latter, however, may signify a broader change and a widerranging development, which affects international law on the whole, and not merely
subfields of international law. 3
Finally, the notion of Grotian Moment can also be distinguished from the
concept of "instant customary international law," which had been advanced by
some scholars.2 4 Normally, customary international law is formed through gradual
and widespread state practice and a sense of legal obligation to comply with the
emerging norm.2 5 The process of establishing a norm of customary international

17. Id. at 33-34.
18. Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New InternationalCriminalCourt: An Uneasy
Revolution, 88 GEO.L. J. 381, 391 n.37 (2000).
19. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 51 (1991).

20. Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International
Community, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 529, 573 (1998); Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an

InternationalJudicialSystem, 56 STAN. L. REv. 429, 463 (2003).
21. Leila Nadya Sadat, ExtraordinaryRendition, Torture, and Other Nightmaresfrom the War on
Terror, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1200, 1206 (2007).
22. Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An InternationalConstitutionalMoment, 43
HARV. INT'L L. J. 1, 2 (2002); see also Ian Johnstone, The Plea of "Necessity" in InternationalLegal
Discourse: HumanitarianIntervention and Counter-Terrorism,43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 337, 370
(2005) (arguing that 9/11 was a "constitutional moment," which led toward the recognition of a new
right for states to use force in self-defense against non-state entities operating with support of third
states).
23. Scharf, supra note 10, at 445 (describing that a Grotian Moment "makes more sense when
discussing a development that has an effect on international law at large.").
24. Bin Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: "Instant" InternationalCustomary
Law? 5 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 23, 35 (1965); see also PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 45-46 (7th ed. 1997); Benjamin Lengille, Note, It's "Instant
Custom ": How the Bush Doctrine Became Law After the TerroristAttacks of September 11, 2001, 26
B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 145, 146 (2003); Jeremy Levitt, HumanitarianIntervention by Regional
Actors in Internal Conflicts: The Cases of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone, 12 TEMP. INT'L &
COMP. L. J. 333, 351 (1998).
25. Scharf, supra note 10, at 445.
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law can take many decades, or even centuries. 26 "Instant customary international
law," on the other hand, is a theory which argues that state practice may not be
necessary at all for the formation of customary law, if states' opinio juris can be
clearly demonstrated through their votes on General Assembly resolutions.27 This
theory presents several problems, because it focuses so closely on General
Assembly resolutions, which may not represent the best evidence of states' sense
of legal obligations.28 The Grotian Moment theory, however, looks beyond
General Assembly resolutions and focuses on paradigmatic changes in
international law caused by rapid and profound global developments. "[T]he
'Grotian Moment' concept contemplates accelerated formation of customary
international law through states' widespread acquiescence or endorsement in
response to state acts, rather than instant custom based solely on General Assembly
resolutions." 29The Grotian Moment theory may thus rely on General Assembly
resolutions to a certain extant, to discover evidence of an emerging customary law
norm, resulting from a period of fundamental change. Yet, General Assembly
resolutions are purely one of the tools utilized by scholars seizing a Grotian
Moment, as noted by Professor Scharf:
[T]he 'Grotian Moment' concept may be helpful to a court examining
whether a particular General Assembly resolution should be deemed
evidence of an embryonic rule of customary international law,
especially in a case lacking the traditional level of widespread and
repeated state practice. In periods of fundamental change - whether by
technological advances, the commission of new forms of crimes against
humanity, or the development of new means of warfare or terrorism rapidly developing customary international law as crystallized in
General Assembly resolutions may be necessary
for international law to
30
keep up with the pace of other developments.
Several recent events exemplify the notion of a Grotian Moment. First, the
development of humanitarian intervention at the very end of the 20th century has
been described as a Grotian Moment.31 In 1999, NATO forces intervened in
Serbia to protect ethnic Kosovar Albanians from ethnic cleansing, instituted by the
FRY government.32 The United Nations did not authorize NATO's campaign but
the global consensus on this intervention was that it was "illegal but legitimate. ' 3
The international community responded to the intervention through a new doctrine
26. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 686 (1900) (recognizing that the process of
forming customary international law can take centuries).
27. Cheng, supranote 24, at 38.
28. For a full
discussion of problems associated with the "instant customary international law"
theory, see Scharf, supra note 10, at 447-48.
29. Id. at 446 n.34.
30. Id.at 450.
31. Scharf, supra note 10, at 450-52.
32. Milena Sterio, The Kosovar Declaration of Independence: 'Botching the Balkans' or
Respecting InternationalLaw?, 37 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 267, 271-72 (2009).
33. See, e.g., THE INDEP. INT'L COMM'N ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT 4 (2000), available
at http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/thekosovoreport.htm.
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called "Responsibility to Protect," which authorizes humanitarian interventions in
limited circumstances.34
A growing number of scholars have agreed that
humanitarian intervention has become an emerging norm of customary
international law, and that it ought to be recognized in some extraordinary
circumstances.
Thus, the notion of humanitarian intervention may have
constituted a Grotian Moment.
Second, the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on
September 11, 2001 have had a profound impact on the international community's
understanding of the laws of war.36 Following the September 11 attacks, the
Security Council adopted Resolution 1368, which confirmed the right to use force
in self-defense in Afghanistan, against al-Qaeda, thus solidifying the idea that
under international law, states may use force in self-defense against non-state
actors.37 Finally, a lesser-known Grotian Moment may consist of the situation
when the United States and Soviet Union initially "developed the abilities to
launch rockets into outer space and to place satellites in earth's orbit. ' 38 In
response to this development, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Declaration of
Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, which provided that the provisions of the U.N. Charter generally
apply to the outer space, and which attempted to limit states' ability to claim parts

34. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, 138-39, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/L.1 (Sept. 15,
2005) (stating the world's Heads of State unanimous affirmation of the responsibility to protect
doctrine); S.C. Res. 1674, 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006) (reaffirming provisions of
paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity); INT'L
COMM'N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT xi-xiii

(2001), available at http://www.iciss-ciise.gc.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf,
35. Many authors have discussed the legality of humanitarian intervention. See, e.g., Jane
Stromseth, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: The Case for Incremental Change, in
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS, 232, 256-57 (J. L.
Holzgrefe & Robert 0. Keohane eds., 2003); Richard A. Falk, NATO's Kosovo Intervention: Kosovo,
World Order, and the Future of InternationalLaw, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 847, 848, 852 (1999); Ruth
Wedgwood, NATO's Kosovo Intervention: NATO's Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 828,
828-33 (1999).
36. See, e.g., British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, Order out of Chaos: The Future of
Afghanistan, Address at the International Institute of Strategic Studies (Oct. 22, 2001), quoted in
Slaughter & Burke-White, supra note 22, at 2 (according to then British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw,
"[flew events in global history can have galvanized the international system to action so completely in
so short a time."); see also Antonio Cassese, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal
Categoriesof InternationalLaw, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 993, 993 (2001) (arguing that the terrorist attacks
on September 11, 2001 have had "shattering consequences for international law.").
37. S.C. Res. 1368, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001) (calling on states to "work
together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors" of the attacks, and
reaffirming the inherent right of self-defense in accordance with article 51 of the U.N. Charter, in the
context of the September 11 terrorist attacks). Security Council Resolution 1378, adopted after the U.S.
invasion, condemned the Taliban for allowing the al-Qaeda network and other terrorist groups to use
Afghanistan as a base, and for providing safe haven to Osama bin Laden, and other members of alQaeda and other associated groups. This resolution also supported U.S. efforts to establish a postTaliban government in Afghanistan. S.C. Res. 1378, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1378 (Nov. 14, 2001).
38. Scharf, supra note 10, at 450.

2011

A GROTIAN MOMENT

of outer space as their territory. 39 This Declaration was widely accepted as law,
and represents how accelerated technological developments can bring about a time
of change such as the possibility to launch rockets into outer space.
As scholars have acknowledged, "[c]ommentators and courts should exercise
caution, however, in characterizing situations as 'Grotian Moments,"' and some of
the above-described instances of profound change may need to be more strictly
scrutinized to determine if they truly qualify as Grotian Moments. 40 What this
article argues below is that because of increased globalization of our planet, the
legal theory of statehood has undergone profound de facto changes over the last
several decades, and that, similar to the examples above, this situation may
comprise a Grotian Moment worth more intense scrutiny.
III. THE LEGAL THEORY OF STATEHOOD
Under international law, any entity that wishes to be treated as a state needs to
satisfy four criteria. These criteria stem from the 1933 Montevideo Convention,
and include the following: a defined territory; a permanent population; a
government; and, the capacity to enter into international relations.41 Statehood,
according to these criteria, is a legal theory - something that a scholar or a judge
could easily rely upon to decide whether an entity qualifies as a state.42 In other
words, as conceived by the 1933 Montevideo Convention, statehood is a positive
legal theory, to be entirely divorced from the political act of state recognition.
Once an entity enters the international arena and presents itself as a state, external
actors are free to recognize it as such or not.44 The decision to recognize is a
purely political act and depends entirely on the governing regime of the external
actors.45 Thus, such external actors could choose to treat an entity as a state
although it does not satisfy the four criteria of statehood, and on the contrary,
external actors could choose not to treat an entity as a state although it does satisfy
the four criteria of statehood.46 This view of recognition is referred to as the
declaratory view, and it follows from the above-mentioned distinction between the
two theories, statehood and recognition: the former is legal, whereas the latter is
political.47 The Montevideo Convention, which describes the legal criteria of
39. Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1962,
3, 6, U.N. Doc. AJRES/1962(XVIII) (Dec. 13, 1963).
40. Scharf, supra note 10, at 452-53 (urging caution when recognizing the 1963 U.N. Declaration
of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, the
responsibility to protect doctrine and the post September 11 right of self-defense as Grotian Moments,
but declaring Nuremberg as an "exemplary" Grotian Moment).
41. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat.
3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter Montevideo Convention].
42. Milena Sterio, On the Right to External Self-Determination: "Selfistans," Secession, and the
GreatPowers'Rule, 19 MINN. J. INT'L L. 137, 148 (2010).
43. Id. In fact, article 3 of the Montevideo Convention states that "[t]he political existence of the
state is independent of recognition by the other states." Montevideo Convention, supra note 41, art. 3.
44. Sterio, supranote 42, at 149-50.
45. Id.
46. Id.at 148-49 (noting some anomalous applications of the statehood theory).
47. JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS,
ACTORS, PROCESS 138 (3d ed. 2010) [hereinafter DUNOFF ET AL.] ("An entity that meets the criteria of
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statehood, was drafted purposefully to ignore the political tenements of
recognition. The Convention's main proponents and drafters were Latin American
states, which attempted to distinguish the legal theory of statehood from political
influences of powerful states, by defining statehood in purely legal terms which
left out any requirement of recognition. 48 Thus, in theory, an entity could qualify
as a state although many states choose not to recognize it as such.
However, some support the so-called constitutive view of recognition, under
which recognition by outside actors represents one of the main elements of
statehood. 49 Thus, an entity cannot qualify as a state under this view unless
external actors choose to treat it as a state.50 The constitutive view is not supported
by academics, but has teeth in practice nonetheless:
While international recognition is no longer widely considered to be a
required element of statehood, in practice the ability to exercise the
benefits bestowed on sovereign states contained in the Westphalian
sovereignty package requires respect of those doctrines and application
51
of them to the state in question by other states in the interstate system.
In other words, states cannot exist in a vacuum, and if no other state wishes to
engage in international relations with a particular entity, that entity will never
become a fully sovereign partner on the international scene.52
The legal theory of statehood has produced strange results around the globe.53
Many entities have qualified as states because they once satisfied the four criteria
of statehood. However, many such entities have lost one of the four attributes of
statehood without losing their overall qualification as a state. In other words,
statehood functions as a shield, assuring those entities that qualify as states a
certain protection from attacks on their sovereignty. Minor cuts and bruises on the
statehood shield do not affect the protected state; it is only in rare cases when the
entire structure crumbles that a state may crumble and decompose into smaller
units or become absorbed by larger ones.
For example, many states have disputed territories but have managed not to
lose their statehood. South and North Korea have battled over their frontier, with
both disputing their neighbor's territory and Israel's borders have been challenged
by most of its Arab neighbors.54 Yet, all three of these states have never lost their

statehood immediately enjoys all the rights and duties of a state regardless of the views of other
states.").
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. ("[T]he refusal by states to afford recognition would mean that the entity claiming
statehood would not be entitled to the rights of a state.").
51. Kelly, supra note 6, at 382.
52. As this article argues below, the constitutive view of recognition has become the dominant
theory on the international scene, as recognition by regional partners and so-called Great Powers truly
has become a requirement of statehood. See infra Part V.
53. Sterio, supranote 42, at 148.
54. DuNOFF ET AL., supranote 47, at 115.
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statehood and no other countries have ever challenged it. 55 Moreover, many states
have transient populations and have experienced significant refugee crises. The
Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, and Iraq have all experienced population
shifts over the last decade. 56 Some states have micro-populations, like the Pacific
Island state of Nauru (14,000) and the city-state of San Marion (30,000); these
populations have never significantly grown.57 Yet, none of their statehoods have
ever been challenged on these grounds. Other states have not had stable
governments in place for years. Somalia, for example, has been called a "failed
state" because it has not had a stable government in place since the early 1990,s.58
Afghanistan did not have a stable government throughout the 1990's, and yet it
remained treated as a state and retained its seat in all major international
organizations. 59 Yet, it is still a state (the term "failed state" is an oxymoron in
itself, but virtually everyone still conceives of Somalia and Afghanistan as states,
albeit unsuccessful ones). Finally, some entities are viewed as states although they
do not have the full capacity to enter into international relations. Many micro
states voluntarily hand over their national defense to larger neighbors and
protectors, thereby relinquishing their own capacity to conduct international
relations in the field of national security.6 ° Some of these states include Palau,
which depends on the United States for its defense, Monaco, which relies on
France, and the Cook Islands, which has aligned itself with New Zealand.6 1
Similarly, some micro states depend on powerful allies for trade matters: many
Pacific island nations rely on the United States in matters of trade and some do on
Australia.62 Yet, although these small entities have admitted they do not have the
capacity to conduct international relations on their own, they are still viewed as
states, and treated as such in the global arena.
Why is statehood important? What are its main features, and how does it
protect state sovereignty? Why do Palau, Monaco, and the Cook Islands draw
significant advantages from having qualified as states? As mentioned above,
statehood functions as a sovereignty shield. An entity that is treated as a state
derives direct protection from its own statehood. First, any time an unfriendly
neighbor or a group of other states decide to cross its borders in a military fashion,
the state can argue that an armed attack has occurred and can invoke the legal
theory of self-defense to protect itself, or can request the assistance of other
55. Sterio, supranote 42, at 148.
56. REFUGEES
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THE

IRAQI

DISPLACEMENT

http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/VDUX-7GNT3D?OpenDocument;
Refugee Crisis Grows as Darfur War Crosses a Border, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/28/international/africa/28border.html;
Refugees
Congo, http://www.refugeesinternational.org/where-we-work/africa/dr-congo (last
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2010).
57. DuNOFF ET AL., supranote 47, at 115.
58. See, e.g., Eugene Kontorovich, InternationalLegal Responses to Piracy off the Coast of
Somalia, ASIL INSIGHTS, Vol. 13, Issue 2, Feb. 6, 2009, http://www.asil.org/insights090206.cfin.
59. DuNOFF ET AL., supranote 47, at 116.
60. Sterio, supranote 42, at 148-49.
61. DuNOFF ET AL., supranote 47, at 115.
62. Id.
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friendly states, under the guise of collective self-defense. 63 A non-state cannot do
so easily. A non-state can be terra nullius - no man's land - in which case any
nation can lay a claim thereon by being there first.64 This has happened in the case
of the North Pole: many states, including Russia and Canada, have claimed
proprietary rights to the North Pole and its natural resources.65 The North Pole
itself could not claim self-defense in fending off an "attack" by Russia and Canada,
because it is not a state. A non-state can also exist as a territory or province within
the larger territory of another state, which usually claims the right to do whatever it
wishes with the non-state. Thus, Israel has "occupied" Gaza and the West Bank
and has claimed that these territories are a part of Israel.66 Israel has then closed
these two territories' borders, has built Israeli settlements, and has dictated a
certain way of life for these territories' inhabitants.67 Until Gaza and the West
Bank qualify as states, Israel arguably has the legal right to exercise full control
and to impose its own political, social, and legal decisions on these two territories.
Second, statehood protects state sovereignty by allowing states to participate
in international organizations where major legal and political decisions are
undertaken. Thus, states participate in the United Nations, where each state gets
one vote in the General Assembly. The United Nations General Assembly has
already passed significant resolutions, that although initially represent soft law and
do not impose binding obligations on other states, may morph over time into
customary law, which is then binding on every state on our planet.68 States also
63. This assertion follows from the structure of the U.N. Charter: states may invoke their right to
self-defense under article 51, or collective self-defense, under the same article, any time that an "armed
attack" takes place, threatening their "territorial integrity" or "political independence." U.N. Charter
art. 2, para. 4, art. 51.
64. New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767, 787-88 (1998) ("Even as to terra nullius, like a
volcanic island or territory abandoned by its former sovereign, a claimant by right as against all others
has more to do than planting a flag or rearing a monument. Since the 19th century the most generous
settled view has been that discovery accompanied by symbolic acts give no more than 'an inchoate title,
an option, as against other states, to consolidate the first steps by proceeding to effective occupation
within a reasonable time."') (citing IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 14647 (4th ed. 1990); 1 CHARLES HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 329 (2d ed. 1945); 1 L. OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 439-41 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 5th ed. 1937)).
65. In 2007, Russia succeeded in the first ever manned attempt to descend to the ocean bottom at
the North Pole; in a symbolic act, a Russian flag was placed on the seabed at the exact position of the
North Pole. This move was largely seen as an act of displaying Russian dominance over the Arctic.
Andrew C. Revkin, Russia's North Pole Obsession, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2007,
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/08/02/russias-north-pole-obsession/; Russia plants flag under N
Pole, BBC NEWS, Aug. 2, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/6927395.stm;.
Both
Russia and Canada (as well as Norway and Denmark) have launched projects to base claims that certain
portions of the North Pole should belong to them. Shamil Midkhatovich Yenikeyeff & Timothy Fenton
Krysiek, The Battle for the Next Energy Frontier: The Russian Polar Expedition and the Future of
Arctic Hydrocarbons, OXFORD ENERGY COMMENT, Aug. 2007, www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/
comment_0807-3.pdf.
66. On a detailed discussion of the Israeli claims over Gaza, see for example George E. Bisharat,
Israel's Invasion of Gaza in InternationalLaw, 38 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 41, 47-50 (2009).
67. Id.
68. On the status of U.N. General Assembly resolutions, see for example, DUNOFF ET AL., supra
note 47, at 73-77; Scharf, supranote 10, at 448-50.
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participate in important regional organizations, like the European Union, the
Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity, inter alia.
States participate in specialized world organizations, dealing with matters of global
trade, health, labor, etc., including the World Trade Organization, the World
Health Organization, the World Labor Organization, and the World Intellectual
Property Organization. 69 Finally, states participate in important military endeavors
and alliances, like NATO or ECOWAS. 70 Non-states generally do not have access
to such force and are thus not invited participants in global affairs. Non-state
entities are limited in their ability to influence the development of international
law, to protest against existing international legal rules, or to lobby powerful states
to engage in certain behaviors on the international scene.
Statehood is thus more than a legal theory. It casts a sovereignty shield on
entities that qualify as states, and it thereby insulates some of their decisionmaking power from outside interference. It also allows qualifying members to
continually work toward the development of international law, through
participation in international treaties, organizations, working groups, alliances and
conferences. Non-state entities are denied all these privileges, and because of this
detriment, often try hard to prove their case of statehood. In today's globalized
world, participation in the international world order has become of crucial
importance to all states. Consequently, exclusion from the statehood club can have
disastrous consequences on non-state entities. In order to determine which entities
should be treated as states, the legal theory of statehood should be amended to
correspond more accurately to our globalized existence.
IV. A GROTIAN MOMENT: CHANGES IN THE LEGAL THEORY OF STATEHOOD
How has the legal theory of statehood changed through the influence of
globalization across our planet? First, the contours of state sovereignty and the
right of intervention have changed, to reflect a more inter-connected existence and
relationships among states. Second, the accepted theory of human and minority
rights has sometimes chipped away at statehood, by infringing on state territorial
integrity and altering state borders. Third, the emergence and continued existence
of de facto states - non-state entities that come very close to satisfying the
traditional criteria of statehood, but that are denied statehood because of geopolitical or strategic reasons - illustrate that statehood no longer functions as a
legal theory, if applied stricto sensu. Fourth, as I argue throughout this article,
globalization and state inter-connectivity have changed what states can and cannot
do on the world scene, as behavior of one state may inadvertently affect several
other states, causing them concern about the "offending" state. Finally, the
proliferation of regional and international organizations and legal norms has also
impacted states, which can now only engage in international relations if they
respect the existing world order.

69. Sterio, supra note 1, at 220-22 (discussing the proliferation of international organizations and
describing some of the most prominent international organizations in which states participate).
70. Id. at221.
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A. Sovereignty and Intervention
The above-described theory of statehood presumes that once an entity
becomes a state, it becomes a sovereign, equal participant in world affairs. The
concept of state sovereignty embraces the notion of state equality - that each state
has a certain bundle of rights, and that every other state needs to respect those
rights. 71 The rights of state A are supposed to remain equal to those of states B, C,
and D. The presumed equality of positive state rights also implies an equality of
so-called negative rights. Thus, sovereign states are free of outside interference if
their actions remain within the sphere of their positive rights. Thus, if state A
undertakes a certain course of action within its territory, states B, C, and D have no
intervention rights toward state A.
The contours of state sovereignty, however, have shifted over the years.
Today, it is an accepted fact that some states are more sovereign than others.72
Some states, due to their powerful economic and military status, simply wield
more power on the international scene; thus, their opinion matters more and their
actions are examined through lesser scrutiny. These super-sovereign states include
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (United States, United
Kingdom, France, Russia and China), which, through the United Nations'
institutional structure enjoy unilateral veto power over all world affairs examined
by the Security Council. 73 Other super-sovereign states dispose of enhanced rights
and powers because of their wealth and military potential, such as Italy, Germany,
and Japan.74 Additional countries that have seriously approached the status of
super-sovereign powers include non-declared nuclear states, such as India,
Pakistan, and possibly Israel, as well as powerful rogue states like Iran and North
Korea, which wield power through the unpredictable and dangerous threat that
they may exercise harmful military action against their enemies and neighbors.75
The notion of sovereignty, inherent and implicit in the legal theory of
statehood, has morphed itself and has seriously affected world affairs, resulting in
a pecking order of states.7 6 The fourth criterion of statehood - the capacity to enter
into international relations - seems most affected by this phenomenon. Super
states are free to engage in international relations, and to exercise both their
positive as well as negative rights as they see fit.7 7 Other less sovereign states
seem dependent on the super powers for their own sovereign exercise of
international relations. In fact, super states seem to directly dictate and orchestrate
71. Sterio, supra note 42, at 153-54 ("State sovereignty, in its Westphalian form, typically
includes: an equality of states within the international community, a general prohibition on foreign
interference with internal affairs, a territorial integrity of the nation-state, and an inviolability of
international borders."); see also Kelly, supranote 6, at 375-76.
72. See, e.g., Kelly, supranote 6, at 364-65; Sterio, supranote 42, at 154.
73. Sterio, supranote 42, at 154.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 147-54.
76. Kelly, supra note 6, at 364-65, 375-76.
77. Sterio, supranote 42, at 154 ("Because the Great Powers are essentially more 'sovereign' than
other states, they may engage in interventions and cross other states' borders, in the name of preserving
some higher ideals.").
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the courses of action of less sovereign states on the world scene. For example,
when the Yemen ambassador to the United Nations cast a negative vote on the
Security Council (Yemen had a seat at that time) with respect to the Security
Council's authorization to use force in Iraq in the First Gulf War, the U.S.
ambassador to the United Nations allegedly declared to his Yemeni colleague that
his vote was the most expensive one he had ever cast.78 This remark perfectly
illustrates the so-called Great Powers Rule and the dependency that less sovereign
states enjoy vis-A-vis their more sovereign partners in the realm of international
relations. In other instances, less sovereign states have simply abstained from
voting either in the General Assembly or the Security Council, for fear of
alienating the Great Powers.79
As the contours of state sovereignty shifted, so did the positive and negative
rights of states. More sovereign states acquired more sovereign rights and less
sovereign states lost negative rights. In other words, super sovereign states earned
the right to interfere in the affairs of their less powerful peer states in the form of
intervention.80
The idea of intervention is not entirely novel. The United Nations Charter
provides all states with the right to cross the frontiers of another state in a military
81
fashion, in the name of self-defense or when authorized by the Security Council.
Moreover, states are allowed to intervene within the territory of another state in the
form of collective self-defense: state A may call upon state B to help it fight off
state C.82 Thus, both states A and B may send troops to fight in state C. The idea
of intervention outside of the confines of the Charter's structure is more
controversial. Over the last few decades, several new paradigms of intervention
have evolved. One emerging theory of intervention is coupled with the rise of the
human rights movement: the idea that states may intervene in the affairs of other
states in the name of human rights protections.83 Several of these interventions
have taken place in the late 20th century. For example, an intervention on behalf
of the Kurds in Iraq was staged in the early 1990's, when several countries
launched an attack on Iraq to protect its ethnic Kurds.8 4 Similarly, a NATO-led
intervention took place in Kosovo, on the territory of the then existing Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, to protect ethnic Kosovar Albanians from the central FRY
government.85
Many scholars have supported the idea of humanitarian

78. DuNOFF ET AL., supra note 47.
79. See, e.g., Scharf, supra note 10, at 447 (noting that "states often vote for General Assembly
resolutions to... curry favor with other states").
80. Sterio, supranote 42, at 147, 154.
81. U.N. Charter arts. 42, 51.
82. U.N. Charter art. 51.
83. See, e.g., Scharf, supra note 10, at 451; see also text accompanying notes 32-35.
84. See, e.g., Michael P. Scharf, Earned Sovereignty: Judicial Underpinnings,31 DENV. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 373, 383 (2003).
85. Several influential authors have supported external intervention in Kosovo on humanitarian
grounds. Antonio Cassese, Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving Towards InternationalLegitimation of
Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 23, 25-29
(1999); Falk, supranote 35, at 855-56; Thomas M. Franck, Lessons of Kosovo, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 857,
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intervention, and most would agree that it has acquired the status of an emerging
customary norm.86
Additionally, some have advocated other forms of intervention. Richard
Haass, a senior member of the George H.W. Bush administration, advocated the
idea of the so-called involuntary sovereignty waiver.87 According to this theory,
states waive their sovereignty in an involuntary manner, thereby inviting
intervention by external actors, if they engage in three different types of
reprehensible behavior. These three behaviors justifying a waiver of sovereignty
on behalf of the offending state include harboring terrorism, hiding weapons of
mass destruction, and abusing human rights.88 The United States-led interventions
in Iraq, and more recently, Afghanistan, can certainly be explained under the first
two reasons for the waiver of sovereignty: Iraq had been accused of harboring
weapons of mass destruction, whereas Afghanistan has been accused of harboring
terrorists.8 9 The third reason for waived sovereignty, the abuse of human rights,
fits within the already existing paradigm of humanitarian intervention.
The involuntary sovereignty waiver theory represents a significant change in
the traditional perception of state sovereignty and equality. According to Haass, it
is up to the super powers - those super sovereign states described above - to
determine when an offending state has done something egregious to involuntarily
waive its sovereignty and to invite outside intervention. 90 Haass is perfectly
comfortable with the idea that a country like the United States, a super power, can
857-58, 860 (1999); Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of "HumanitarianIntervention," 93 AM. J.
INT'L L. 824, 826 (1999); Wedgwood, supra note 35, at 834. Other authors have supported NATO
actions against the FRY with reservations, arguing that the Kosovo case should not set a precedent for
the future but should be considered an exception due to regional (European) considerations. See W.
Michael Reisman, Kosovo's Antinomies, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 860, 860-61 (1999).
86. See, e.g., Scharf, supra note 10, at 450-51.
87. See Richard N. Haass, Dir. of Pol'y Planning, U.S. State Dep't, Sovereignty: Existing Rights,
Evolving Responsibilities, Remarks to the School of Foreign Service and the Mortara Center for
International
Studies
at
Georgetown
University
(Jan.
14,
2003),
available at
http://www.iwar.org.uk/news-archive/2003/01-15.htm.
88. Haass's position is that "countries constructively waive their traditional sovereignty shield and
invite international intervention when they undertake to massacre their own people, harbor terrorists, or
pursue weapons of mass destruction." Sterio, supra note 42, at 155. Haass constructed this theory
initially in 2002 with respect to states that commit atrocities against their people or harbor terrorists.
Nicholas Lemann, The Next World Order,NEW YORKER, Apr. 1, 2002, at 42. Haass then amended this
theory in 2003, when he included states that pursue weapons of mass destruction. Haass, supra note 87.
89. On Iraq and the allegations that Iraq had been developing and storing weapons of mass
destruction, see In Their Own Words: Iraq's 'Imminent' Threat, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS
(Jan. 29, 2004), http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/quotes.pdf. On Afghanistan and the allegations
that it has been harboring terrorists, see Rob Grace, The War In Afghanistan: That NaggingEvidentiary
Question, LAW AND SECURITY STRATEGY, Dec. 10, 2009, http://lawandsecurity.foreignpolicy
blogs.com/2009/12/10/the-war-in-afghanistan-that-nagging-evidentiary-question/; see also Elisabeth
Bumiller, Obama Team Defends Policy on Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/03/world/asia/03policy.html.
90. "Haass further reasoned that 'sovereignty is not a blank check,' and considered that Great
Powers have unique intervention rights with respect to rogue regimes that have forfeited their sovereign
privileges and their immunity from external, armed intervention." Sterio, supra note 42, at 155
(quoting Haass, supranote 87).
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unilaterally decide to engage in an intervention in Afghanistan. 91 Moreover, Haass
does not see the need to involve international organizations, such as the United
Nations or NATO, in the decision-making process. Haass recognizes the fact that
some states are more sovereign than others, but simply sees nothing wrong with
it.92 To the extent that this theory prevails in international relations, it represents a
true Grotian moment. Through this theory, state equality and sovereignty may
have been replaced by a system of unequal power and a rule of the Great Powers.
While the Great Powers have always had more clout on the world scene de facto,
the Grotian Moment arising from Haass' theory is in the fact that this theory
legitimizes the Great Powers rule, turning it into a serious international relations
theory.
The legal theory of statehood has changed, and notions of state sovereignty
and intervention on our globalized planet are vastly different today. In a Grotian
Moment-like manner, globalization has chipped away at state sovereignty, and
intervention has become an accepted exception to the absolute ban on the use of
force against states. Statehood no longer implies that states may engage in any
kind of behavior within their border without repercussions. On the contrary, it
seems that certain kinds of offensive behaviors produce direct sanctions by other
states.
B. Secession and Minority Rights
The formal criteria of statehood have also changed in a Grotian Moment
manner with respect to minority rights, and, more importantly, remedial secession.
Under traditional international law, a pillar of state sovereignty is the notion of
territorial integrity of every state - the idea that state borders, once established, are
inviolable.93 This principle follows both from customary international law, as well
as from the U.N. Charter, which declares in its Article 2(4) that no state shall use
force against the "territorial integrity ... of any state. 94 Territory is one of the
four fundamental requirements of statehood: the very first criterion of statehood in
the Montevideo Convention is that the entity "applying" for statehood must have a
defined territory.95
In recent years, however, the principles of territorial integrity and of the
inviolability of state borders have yielded to the rising norm of respect for minority
and human rights in general.96 Thus, states are no longer immune from criticism or

91. According to Haass, sovereignty is not a "blank check." Haass, supra note 87; see also Kelly,
supra note 6, at 403. Thus, Great Powers have unique intervention rights with respect to "rogue"
regimes which forfeit their sovereignty. Id
92. Sterio, supranote 42, at 155-56.
93. On the sanctity of state borders, see, for example, Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab
J'amahiriya/Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6, 72 (Feb. 3) ("Once agreed, the boundary stands, for any other
approach would vitiate the fundamental principle of the stability of boundaries, the importance of which
has been repeatedly emphasized by the Court.").
94. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
95. See Montevideo Convention, supranote 41, art. 1.
96. On the rise of the human rights movement in general, see DuNOFF ET AL., supra note 47, 441-
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intervention if they abuse and disrespect minority rights within their own territory.
Scholars have advanced the idea of outside interference in the form of
humanitarian intervention to aid minority groups oppressed by their mother state.97
Humanitarian intervention has become a morally acceptable norm, and a de facto
recognized exception to the general ban on the use of force.98 The respect for the
territorial integrity of the mother state can be trumped by the need to protect and
advance minority rights, even at the expense of altering territorial borders of the
mother state. Even under the involuntary sovereignty waiver theory advanced by
Richard Haass and described above, one of the situations warranting intervention
by the Great Powers against another state is if that state abuses human rights. 99
State territory under modem international law is permanent and defined, but not
infinitely. State territory can be altered to protect minority rights. Conversely, the
respect of minority rights seems to have become a de facto requirement of
statehood, or at least of the continuity of statehood. States that do not respect
minority rights risk intervention by outside actors, which can, in extreme
circumstances, lead to remedial secession by a subpart of the offending state,
where the oppressed minority has lived.
The most recent example of such outside intervention leading to secession
took place in the former Yugoslavia. After allegations of human rights abuses in
Kosovo by the Serbian leadership, NATO countries engaged in a prolonged
campaign of air strikes on the territory of the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(FRY).100 This intervention, although not legally authorized by the U.N. Security
Council, was regarded by many scholars as morally justified.101 Moreover, this
intervention fits neatly into the evolving theory of humanitarian intervention - a
situation when the territorial integrity of the mother state (in this case, the FRY) is
attacked by outside forces (NATO) in the name of protecting a specific minority
group (the Kosovar Albanians). The Kosovar Albanians unilaterally declared
independence from Serbia in February of 2008, exercising their right to remedial
secession and altering thereby the borders of their mother state, Serbia. 10 2 The
Kosovar declaration of independence was largely supported by NATO countries
that had staged an intervention on behalf of the Kosovars a decade earlier; thus,
NATO countries (and some other powerful states) determined not to honor the
territorial integrity of Serbia
by recognizing the Kosovar secession and accepting
10 3
Kosovo as a new state.

97. See, e.g., Cassese, supranote 85, at 25-29; Falk, supra note 35, at 856; Henkin, supra note 85,
at 826-27; Franck, supranote 35, at 859; Wedgwood,supra note 35, at 834.
98. See, e.g., Cassese, supranote 85, at 25-29; Falk, supra note 35, at 856; Henkin, supra note 85,
at 826-27; Franck, supranote 35, at 859; Wedgwood,supra note 35, at 834.
99. Haass, supranote 87; see also Kelly, supra note 6, at 404.
100. lAIN KING & WHIT MASON, PEACE AT ANY PRICE: HOW THE WORLD FAILED Kosovo 43-45

(2006) (describing the events leading up to the NATO air strikes in the former Yugoslavia); Sterio,
supranote 32, at 271.

101. Scharf, supra note 10, at 450-51; see also supra note 85 for a list of scholars approving the
NATO intervention in Kosovo.
102. Sterio, supranote 32, at 269.
103. Id. (noting that many powerful countries recognized Kosovo within days of its unilateral

2011

A GROTIAN MOMENT

Recently, the International Court of Justice confirmed the legality of the
Kosovar unilateral declaration of independence, albeit stopping short of endorsing
a general right for minority groups to secede from their mother states, in what
some commentators have criticized as a disappointing opinion. 10 4 The world court
held that the Kosovar declaration of independence was not prohibited by general
international law, or by any other specific sources thereof. 10 5 However, the world
court reserved judgment on the more difficult question of whether Kosovar
independence was justified based on the principle of remedial self-determination.
In fact, the world court specifically refused to address the tension between the
principles of self-determination (for the Kosovars) and territorial integrity (for
Serbia). The court instead concluded that the authors of the Kosovar declaration of
independent were not bound by any specific rules of international law, as they did
not act "in the capacity of an institution created by and empowered to act within
[a] legal order," but rather as the "democractically-elected leaders" of Kosovars,
who "set out to adopt a measure the significance and effects of which would lie
outside that [legal] order." 106
However, despite the world court ruling refusing to admit any antimony
between the Kosovar right to self-determination and Serbia's rights to the respect
of its territorial integrity, Serbian statehood was affected in the name of minority
rights. As a result of the Kosovar exercise of remedial self-determination, the
contours of Serbia as a state changed, and one of the prongs of statehood (territory)
was specifically altered in the case of Serbia. It is possible to assume that had
Serbia respected minority rights, Kosovar Albanians would not have been
supported in their quest to secede form Serbia.
The Kosovar example
demonstrates the idea that abusing minority rights by a mother state may affect that
entity's statehood in the form of a negative alteration of its territory.
Another example of a successful exercise of minority rights in the form of
minority secession, supported by the Great Powers, is the case of East Timor. East
Timor, a former Portuguese colony, was a province of Indonesia until 1999.107
Through outside interference, military, financial, and logistical aid, the East
Timorese were able to exercise their right to remedial secession in 2002, and to
form their own state, at the expense of Indonesian territorial integrity. 108 Similar to

declaration of independence); see also Kosovo Declares Independencefrom Serbia, MSNBC, Feb. 18,

2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23203607 (last visited on November 09, 2010).
104. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, (July 22, 2010) availableat http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/141/15987.pdf; for criticism of the opinion, see, e.g. Jean d'Aspremont, The
Creationof States Before the InternationalCourt oflustice: Which (II)legality?, HAGUE JUSTICE
PORTAL (2010), http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/Conmmentaries%/o20PDF
/DAspremont Kosovo EN.pdf (discussing the disappointment of some scholars with the world court

decision on the Kosovar declaration of independence).
105. Kosovo Advisory Opinion 79-80.
106. Id. 105, 107.
107. Jani Purnawanty, Various Perspectives in Understandingthe East Timor Crisis, 14 TEMP. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 61, 66 (2000).
108. Id. at 67-70; see also Sterio, supranote 42, at 158-60 (describing the events in East Timor which

ultimately led to its independence from Indonesia).
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Serbia, Indonesia had not fully respected East Timorese minority rights. 09 Like in
the case of Serbia, it is reasonable to assume that had Indonesia been more
respectful of minority rights in East Timor, this island would not have been
supported in its struggle for secession and independence. While the intervention in
East Timor by external actors did not rise to the level of humanitarian intervention,
it is widely documented that external actors and international organizations, like
the U.N., played a tremendously supportive role in aiding the East Timorese to
secede from Indonesia.110
The Grotian Moment with respect to minority rights and its impact on the
legal theory of statehood resides in the growing acceptance of secession, and the
notion that if minority rights are abused by the mother state, the latter forfeits the
right to have its territorial integrity respected, thereby inviting outside intervention.
Although defined territory still constitutes a pillar criterion of statehood de jure, in
practice, state territory can be "undefined" and altered if the result is needed to
protect a minority group.
C. De Facto States: Taiwan, Northern Cyprus, Republika Srpska, Northern
Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia
Statehood has become a malleable and somewhat anomalous theory in the
latter half of the 20th century, because of the phenomenon of de facto states. De
facto states are entities that satisfy the four criteria of statehood enumerated in the
Montevideo Convention. However, for political and/or strategic reasons, these
entities are not recognized as states, are denied membership in major international
organizations, and are thus unable to engage in international relations and become
true states. 1 Examples of such defacto states include Taiwan, Northern Cyprus,
Republika Srpska, Northern Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Taiwan has enjoyed ambiguous status on the world scene ever since the
Chinese Maoist revolution, when the Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek was
expelled from China and fled to Taiwan in 1949, where it formed a new, de facto
state.112 Most western states during the initial decades of the Cold War supported

109. In fact, Indonesian rule over East Timor "imposed a military force that viciously led to human
rights and humanity violations." Purnawanty, supra note 107, at 68-69. It is estimated that up to
200,000 people died in East Timor during the Indonesian occupation. Anthony Lewis, Op-Ed., Abroad
at Home; The Hidden Horror,N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 12, 1994.

110. In 1999, the U.N. organized a referendum in East Timor, whereby the East Timorese people
voted to separate from Indonesia. Pumawanty, supra note 107, at 67. After Indonesia contested the
referendum results and intervened militarily in East Timor, the U.N. established a peacekeeping force,
the International Force for East Timor, to safeguard East Timor. Id. at 70; see also Jean d'Aspremont,
Post-Conflict Administration as Democracy-Building Instruments, 9 CIE. J. INT'L L. 1, 9-10 (2008).

Subsequently, East Timor was administered by the U.N., with significant support from other countries,
and it ultimately gained independence in 2002. See Sterio, supra note 42, at 158-60; see also East
Timor: Birth of a Nation, BBC NEWS, May

19, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/

1996673.stm.
111. See Scott Pegg, De Facto States in the InternationalSystem 1-2 (Univ. of British Columbia
Inst. of Int'l Relations, Working Paper No. 21, 1998), available at http://www.ligi.ubc.
ca/sites/liu/files/Publications/webwp21 .pdf.
112. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 47, at 153.
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Taiwan, engaged in international relations therewith, and even entertained
Taiwanese membership in the United Nations.1 1 3 The situation changed in 1971,
when the Chinese delegation was seated in the United Nations.1 14 However, many
western states have retained international relations with Taiwan, and China has
never attempted to militarily seize Taiwan. 15 Taiwan thus remains a de facto
state: it has a defined territory, a permanent population, a government, and the
capacity to enter into international relations, but for political reasons, it has never
been officially recognized as a state.
Cyprus was a British colony until 1960, inhabited by a majority of ethnic
116
Greeks living in the south, and a minority of ethnic Turks living in the north.
Great Britain decided to negotiate Cypriot independence with representatives from
Greece and Turkey; after the initial agreements were drafted, Greek Cypriot and
Turkish Cypriot representatives were also invited to a meeting to finalize the
agreements. 117 According to a series of treaties negotiated in 1960, Cyprus would
be an independent state, governed through a power-sharing agreement between the
Greeks and the Turks.118 Each ethnic group would have adequate representation in
the government and in the parliament, and both groups would respect each other's
rights. 119 The agreement worked briefly, but the two groups found themselves
unable to share their state in a peaceful manner. 12 In 1974, Turkey staged an
intervention on behalf of the Cypriot Turks and invaded the northern part of the
island, where the Turkish Cypriots predominantly live. 121 Through the invasion,
the northern part of Cyprus de facto separated from the south, to form an
independent entity. 122 The United Nations sent peacekeepers to Cyprus to prevent
conflict from escalating between the island's north and south, but attempts by the
international community to reunify Cyprus have been unsuccessful. 123 No country

113. Id. at 153-55 (noting that the United States and other western countries retained diplomatic
ties with Taiwan, and describing the legal fight that ensued regarding the representation of China in the
United Nations).
114. Id. at 155.
115. Id. ("[t]he United States and a number of other states continued to maintain unofficial relations
with Taiwan through government-controlled private bodies.").
116. Id.at34.
117. Id.
118. Id. The power-sharing structure in Cyprus was reflected in three agreements, negotiated in
1959 between Great Britain, Greece and Turkey: a Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyrus, a Treaty of
Guarantee Between the Republic of Cyprus and Greece, the United Kingdom, and Turkey, and a Treaty
of Alliance Between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey. Id.
119. Id. at 34-35.
120. Id. at 35.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 35-36 (noting that the current demarcation line still holds today).
123. Id. at 36. In 1992, then U.N. Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar drafted a "set of ideas"
calling for the establishment of a bi-zonal federal state, with politically equal Greek and Turkish federal
subcomponents. Id. at 64. In 2002, then U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan drafted a comprehensive
plan for the resolution of the Cyprus dispute, by calling for the creation of one common state composed
of two political component sates, one Greek and the other Turkish Cypriot. History of Cyprus,
HISTORYOFNATIONS.NET, 2004, available at http://www.historyofnations.net/europe/cyprus.html (last
visited Nov. 15, 2010). In 2003, Greek Cypriots signed an accession agreement with the E.U. on behalf
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has ever recognized Northern Cyprus as an independent state, although in reality, it
functions as such. Just like Taiwan, Northern Cyprus has a defined territory, a
permanent population, a government, and some capacity to enter into international
relations. The fourth criterion of statehood seems to be the most difficult one to
fulfill in the case of Cyprus, because a state may not be able to engage in
meaningful international relations if other states do not want to treat it as a
sovereign partner. However, because Northern Cyprus functions as a defacto state
in every other aspect, it would have true potential to entertain international
relations with other states.
Republika Srpska is technically a part of Bosnia. 124 It is inhabited by ethnic
Serbs and represents the northeastern part of the country. Ever since the Yugoslav
civil wars, Republika Srpska has functioned as a de facto state. 125 It has its own
system of law enforcement, government, schools, and public offices and services
12 6
that are entirely separate from those existing in the other part of Bosnia.
Because of political reasons, like Northern Cyprus, no external actors have
recognized Republika Srpska as a state. When addressing the legality of secession
issues as they applied to the various Yugoslav republics and provinces in the early
1990's, the Badinter Commission, a body of experts commissioned to deal with
these difficult issues, refused to recognize that Serbs in Republika Srpska had the
right to self-determination. 12 7 However, the Commission's opinions were legally
inconsistent as they applied to the different Yugoslav republics, and the
Commission's diverse treatments afforded to the different republics are widely
attributed to the political situation at the time. 128 Serbia was portrayed as the
culprit and initiator of the Yugoslav civil wars, and the international community
feared that if Republika Srpska had been allowed to secede from Bosnia, it would
have rejoined Serbia and augmented the territory and power of this "rogue"
state. 129 While this reasoning could have been accurate in the early 1990's, it is no
of Cyprus, but Turkish Cypriots would not benefit from this agreement unless the island was reunited.
In order to facilitate the reunification of the island, in 2004, the Annan Plan was put to votes in the
Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, but it failed to obtain majority support within both
communities. Thus, only the Greek Cypriots joined the E.U. on May 1, 2004, and the island remains
divided. Id
124. DUNOFF et al., supra note 47, at 123.
125. Id.
126. Id
127. Opinions on Questions Arising from the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, Op. No. 2, 31 I.L.M.
1488, 1497 (Conf. on Yugo. Arb. Comm'n 1992) (opining, by the Badinter Commission, that "the
Serbian population is Bosnia-Hercegovina ... is entitled to all the rights accorded to minorities and
ethnic groups under international law" and that members of minority and ethnic groups must be
afforded "the right to choose their nationality").
128. See, e.g., Peter Radan, Post-Secession InternationalBorders: A Critical Analysis of the
Opinions of the BadinterArbitrationCommission, 24 MELB. U. L. REv. 50, 76 (2000).
129. For example, the former Serbian President Milogevid was indicted before the International
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, and accused of having attempted to create a "Greater Serbia," by
inciting ethnic Serbs in Bosnia to rebel, to secede, and to later join Serbia. See Gillian Higgins, The
Impact of the Size, Scope, and Scale of the MilogeviW Trial and the Development of Rule 73bis Before
the ICTY, 7 Nw. U. J. INT'L HuM. RTS. 239, paras. 5-6 (2009) (describing the ICTY indictment and the
charges therein against Slobodan Milogevi6).
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longer reflective of the political situation in the Balkans. Since the 1995 Dayton
Peace Accords, the new states created through the wars have peacefully existed,
and Republika Srpska has functioned, somewhat isolated, as a de facto state.13
Like Northern Cyrpus, it has a defined territory, government, a permanent
population, and would enjoy the capacity to enter into international relations, if
other states were willing to treat it as a state.
Similar to Republika Srpska, the northern part of Kosovo has functioned as an
independent, de facto state, ever since the Kosovar separation from Serbia in
February of 2008. The northern part of Kosovo is inhabited by ethnic Serbs,
whereas most of the southern portion of Kosovo is populated by ethnic
Albanians.13 1 The ethnic Serbs have expressed reluctance to share an independent
state with ethnic Albanians, and have, like their counterpart in Republika Srpska,
formed their own de facto state. Northern Kosovo has its own Serbian language
schools, Serbian law enforcement officers, and a shadow Serbian government.1
Although some scholars have advanced the idea of allowing northern Kosovo to
secede from Kosovo, and to rejoin Serbia, widespread support for this proposition
seems to be lacking. 133 Until a further resolution of this issue, Northern Kosovo
functions as a defacto state.
South Ossetia and Abkhazia are provinces in the former Soviet republic of
Georgia. 134 Since the USSR broke up in the early 1990's, Georgia has been an
independent state, albeit with its share of troubles. South Ossetia and Abkhazia
have been fighting for independence from Georgia for several years, and function
as de facto independent states. 135 In the summer of 2008, these so-called "breakaway" provinces attracted global attention when Russia decided to intervene
militarily in Georgia, in order to assist the two provinces in their secessionist
struggle. 136 The Russian parliament even went as far as to recognize South Ossetia
and Abkhazia as independent states, 137 and the South Ossetian president has
publicly relied on the Kosovo precedent to argue that his "state" had a better legal
case for secession than Kosovo did, and that South Ossetia ought to be recognized
as an independent state by the rest of the world. 138 Most of the western world
130. DuNOFF ET AL., supra note 47, at 123 (noting that Bosnia remains divided between the
Muslim-Croat federation and Republika Srpska, and that each of these has "separate government
structures, schools, and economies").
131. Sterio, supranote 32, at 298.
132. Id. at 298-99.
133. Id. at 299 n.166 (noting that scholars had advanced the idea of separating Kosovo into two
states).
134. See Nikolai Pavlov, Russia, GeorgiaSeek Control of South Ossetia Capital,REUTERS, Aug. 8,
2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL768040420080808?pageNumber-2&virtuaBra
ndChannel=0.
135. Sterio, supranote 42, at 166; Pavlov, supranote 134.
136. Heavy Fighting in South Ossetia, BBC NEWS, Aug. 8, 2008, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/europe/7546639.stm.
137. Gregory L. White & John W. Miller, Russia Raises Ante on Separatist Georgia Regions,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 121964909482268691 .html.
138. Bush Warns Moscow over Breakaway Autonomy, CNN, Aug. 25, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/
2008/WORLD/europe/08/25/russia.vote/index.html (stating that the South Ossetian President, Eduard
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however supports Georgia, which it sees as a natural ally in the Caucases region
against Russia. 139 Thus, most western states have been reluctant to recognize
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as this move would chip away from the Georgian
territorial sovereignty. 140 Thus, although these two provinces arguably could
satisfy the criteria of statehood, similar to Kosovo, Republika Srpska, or Northern
Cyprus, their quest for independence is unlikely to succeed because of the lack of
political willingness of the western Great Powers to engage with South Ossetia and
Abkhazia as sovereign state partners.
The above examples demonstrate a Grotian Moment type change in the legal
theory of statehood. In fact, several state-like entities exist on our planet and
function as de facto states. If one were to apply the legal theory of statehood to
these entities stricto sensu, they could all potentially qualify as states. However,
because of the political unwillingness of powerful states to treat these entities as
sovereign partners, these de facto states have been denied the official designation
of statehood. It can be inferred that the legal theory of statehood now comprises a
fifth element: the need for recognition by the Great Powers of any statehoodseeking entity. This Grotian Moment most likely resulted from the Great Powers
Rule phenomenon itself, and the fact that the power balance on the world scene
shifted at the end of the Cold War to provide for an unchecked concentration of
power in the most potent states. The Grotian Moment in the legal theory of
statehood has resulted in the adding of a fifth, political criterion: the need for
recognition by the Great Powers of any non-state entity seeking to prove that it
ought to be treated as a state.
D. Globalization or State Inter-Connectivity

Globalization, a phenomenon which can be described as inter-connectivity
between regions, peoples, ethnic, social, cultural, and commercial interests across
141
the globe, has affected different legal fields, one of which is international law.
Kokoity believed his region had "more political-legal grounds than Kosovo to have [its] independence
recognized").
139. Sterio, supranote 42, at 174. In fact, most NATO countries would prefer that Georgia remain
intact, as they have been exploring the possibility of Georgia joining NATO. Steven Erlanger, NATO
Duel Centers on Georgia and Ukraine, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/12/01/world/europe/0lnato.html.
140. In fact, even Russia is rumored to secretly want to annex South Ossetia and Abkhazia; if this
rumor were true, it would mean that Russia itself were against these two states' independence.
Erlanger, supra note 139.
141. Many scholars have attempted to define globalization. See, e.g., Berman, supranote 2, at 490;
Sands, supra note 2 at 537; see also supra Part II. Legal scholars also refer to globalization, for
example, by calling for the need for a broader frame of analysis entitled "law and globalization."
Berman, supra note 2, at 490. Moreover, the term "globalization" has been used in many different
fields besides the law, such as anthropology, sociology, etc. For example, anthropologists have argued
that we live in the "global cultural ecumene" or a "world of creolization." Ulf Hannerz, Notes on the
Global Ecumene, PUB. CULTURE, Spring 1989, at 66; Robert J. Foster, Making NationalCultures in the
Global Ecumene, 20 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 235 (1991); Ulf Hannerz, The World in Creolisation,
5 AFR.: J. INT'L AFR. INST. 546, 551 (1987). Sociologists, similarly, have shifted their emphasis from
bounded "societies" to a "starting point that concentrates upon analyzing how social life is ordered
across time and space...." ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCE OF MODERNITY 64 (1990).
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Reshaped by the potent forces of globalization, international law has transformed
itself from a set of legal rules governing inter-state relations, to a complex web of
transnational documents, providing a normative framework for all sorts of different
actors on the international legal scene. 142 Phenomena which used to belong to
domestic realms are now examined and monitored through the international legal
lens. Our planet is "shrinking" because issues such as the environment, nuclear
weapons, disease, and terrorism have become of global concern, and are thus
measured by international law parameters. 143 Domestic law has lost its
omnipotent, "sovereign" power and is now supplemented, corrected, and watched
over by international law. 144
Thus, international law has undergone an
evolutionary process over the recent decades, transforming itself from an interstate conflict resolution instrument, to a powerful global tool, present in every-day
life and influential of many state actors' and non-state entities' decisions and
1 45
policies.
Because international law has expanded its role in such a drastic way, it has
thereby eroded traditional state sovereignty. It is no longer true that states may do
whatever they wish within their territory; rather, what states do internally often has
an impact on other states, and often results in reactionary responses by other
states. 146 States have become inter-connected through globalization, and their
behaviors affect each other and provoke interferences, sanctions, and interventions.
For example, as mentioned above, if a state abuses human rights, other states may
decide to intervene in the name of humanitarian intervention. 147 If a state harbors
terrorism or hides weapons of mass destruction, one of the Great Powers may
decide to intervene, in the name of the involuntary sovereignty waiver theory. 148 If
a state engages in a harmful trade practice, other states may seek to alter the
harmful practice by applying to the World Trade Organization, a true global
regulator of trade and commercial matters among states. 149 If a state condones
anti-competitive economic behaviors by a group of economic operators, and if that
behavior negatively affects other states, other states may intervene by applying
their antitrust laws extra-territorially,
to reach the anticompetitive behavior at its
150
roots, in the offending country.
142. See supraPart II.
143. John Alan Cohan, Sovereignty in a Postsovereign World, 18 FLA. J. INT'L L. 907, 910 (2006).
144. Id. at 936 ("The traditional Westphalian notion of sovereignty by which a state had absolute
territorial control and the right to exercise domestic powers free from external constraints has, in large
part, become unrecognizable."); id. at 941 ("In various ways, the scope of sovereignty today is
determined in a 'top-down,' or vertical fashion, with international norms being imposed from
without.").
145. Sterio, supranote 1, at 214.
146. Id.
147. See supraPart IV.A.
148. Id.
149. On the role of the WTO in the global trade, as well as its current dispute resolution
mechanism, see DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 47, at 828-30, 834-46.
150. On the extra-territorial application of antitrust laws, see for example DUNOFF ET AL., supra
note 47, at 364-75; see also Milena Sterio, Clash of the Titans: Collisionsof Economic Regulations and
the Need to Harmonize PrescriptiveJurisdictionRules, 13 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POLY 95 (2007).
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The proliferation of international law norms, actors, and organizations has
thus restricted every mode of state behavior, so that many "offenses" committed by
states within their own territory will provoke a swift global response and some
form of interference by other states.1 51 This Grotian Moment was brought about
through the forces of globalization, and has affected the fourth criterion of the legal
theory of statehood, the capacity to enter into international relations. As argued
above, this criterion has become the pillar of the statehood theory; moreover, this
criterion has changed in a Grotian Moment-like fashion. On our global planet,
states are not only expected to engage in international relations with one another,
they are also required to behave in a certain way, unless they wish to risk
sanctions, global ostracism, shunning, or more intrusive forms of intervention. A
state, in order to remain a truly sovereign entity on the world scene, must now
respect international legal norms, and must obey a particular global code of
conduct. While these behavior requirements seem to apply in a less strict fashion
to the Great Powers, which, because of their potent status, enjoy more discretion in
their global decisions, even the Great Powers in theory profess respect for such
requirements, and typically justify non-conforming behavior through exceptions,
152
exemptions, self-defense, etc.
E. Regionalizationand InternationalOrganizationsProliferations
International law has witnessed an expansion in the number of international
legal organizations. The end of World War II saw the creation of the United
Nations, the supreme international organization, charged with many tasks, but
most importantly, conceived as a global peacekeeper that would replace any
unilateral use of force with joint decision-making and acting on the international
legal scene.153 In the wake of the United Nations establishment, other regional
bodes, assuming the roles of regional peacekeepers, were equally born. In Europe,
the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance ("NATO") was established with mostly
Western European states as members, as well as the United States, as a way of
countering the constant communist threat lurking from the former Union of the
Soviet Socialist Republics ("USSR"), and its allies. 15 4 In Africa, the Economic
Community of West African States ("ECOWAS") was created as a mixed

151. Sterio, supranote 1, at 245 (discussing the impact of state behavior on other states and actors);
see supraPart IV.A.

152. For example, when the United States, the epitome of a Great Power, decided to send troops to
Iraq in 2003, and to Afghanistan in 2001 and then again in 2009, it invoked its legal right to selfdefense. The United States did not invoke its Great Power status, or somehow claim that it has more
sovereign rights than Iraq or Afghanistan, or any other state. See supra note 89. Moreover, when
NATO countries intervened in the FRY, they relied on the theory of humanitarian intervention. NATO
countries did not claim super-sovereign status over the FRY. See, e.g., Scharf, supranote 10, at 450-51
(noting that the NATO intervention in Kosovo was seen as legitimate).
153. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 47, at 25 (noting the United Nations was formed in 1945, that it is
a multilateral body designed to address a diverse set of issues, and that the Security Council is charged
with maintaining international peace and security).
154. Id. at 26.
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organization: its mission is economic, but it encompasses mercenary forces that are
charged with keeping peace in West Africa. 155
Embracing the post-World War I ideas of preventing conflict by transferring
substantive decision-making in different areas to international bodies, international
actors engaged in negotiations to create international monetary, trade, economic,
insurance, investment, and other types of organizations. Thus, a multitude of
international organizations were created in the latter half of the 20th century,
including the International Monetary Fund, the WTO, the World Bank, the
International Center for the Settlement of Insurance Disputes, World Intellectual
Property Organization ("WIPO"), etc. 156 Similarly, states within the same regions
acted to create regional organizations charged with similar objectives. The
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations, the Organization of American States, 1as
well as the Organization of
57
African Unity, are examples of such regional bodies.
The higher level of interaction among international law actors in the 20th
century seems to have produced a myriad of international and regional bodies
charged with resolving states' differences on substantive levels and with providing
an institutional forum where states can assert their grievances.158 This proliferation
of international organizations over the last half-century has affected the legal
theory of statehood in another Grotian Moment type fashion. States seem to have
willingly delegated portions of their capacity to engage in international relations to
regional and international organizations. The fourth criterion of statehood, which
on the one hand represents the pillar of statehood, has, on the other hand, morphed
into a requirement for states to participate in a set world order, including

membership in various global organizations, abidance by those organizational rules
and codes of conduct, and regional or international decision-making in matters of
global peace and security. Instead of their traditional ability to make sovereign
decisions in international relations, a presupposition of statehood in the 1930's,
when the Montevideo Convention was drafted, states now enjoy the capacity to
participate in an ordered global system of international legal norms, actors, and
organizations. Those who respect the order are treated as states; those who do not
may see some of their sovereign statehood attributes threatened through external
interference and/or intervention.
V. GROTIAN

MOMENT:

A NEW THEORY

OF STATEHOOD

The four traditional criteria of statehood no longer suffice to prove that an
entity ought to be treated as a state under modem-day international law. In a
Grotian Moment - an accelerated formation of new customary legal norms in times
of tundamental change (globalization) - the requirements of statehood have

155. BARRY E. CARTER, PHILIP E. TRIMBLE & ALAN S. WEINER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1070 (5th

ed. 2007) (noting that "[ECOWAS] began peacekeeping operations in Liberia" and that "its forces have
since operated in Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast.").
156. DUNOFF ET AL., supranote 47, at 26.
157. Id.

158. Sterio, supranote 1,at 220-22.
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evolved. While it is true that an entity vying for statehood must still show that it
has a territory, a population, and a government, such an entity must also
demonstrate a new kind of capacity to engage in international relations. This
article argues that the fourth criterion of statehood can be broken into several subcomponents, all of which have become crucial in a new state's quest to gain global
acceptance into the statehood club.
The capacity to engage in international relations, for the purposes of
statehood, includes the following sub-criteria: the need for recognition by both
regional partners, as well as the Great Powers; a demonstrated respect for
human/minority rights; a commitment to participate in international organizations,
and to abide by a set world order. If an entity is not able to satisfy all of these
requirements, it may be forever relegated into the de facto state category, as the
above-described examples demonstrate.
First, any statehood-seeking entity must garner the support of the Great
Powers. The Great Powers' decision to recognize, or not recognize, a particular
new entity as a state, directly influences that entity's ability to become a true
sovereign state partner. This conclusion follows from the current Great Powers'
rule - a concentrated amount of power in the hands of several powerful states that,
unfortunately, dominate global relations.15 9 For example, Kosovo garnered the
Great Powers' support in its struggle for statehood, and it relatively easily
managed to assert independence from Serbia and to obtain its new place in the club
of statehood. 160 On the contrary, entities such as Tibet, Taiwan, Republika Srpska,
Northern Cyprus, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia have not been able to persuade the
Great Powers of the need to grant them the badge of statehood; thus, they have
lacked entry into the global relations scene and are formally considered parts of
larger states.161 Often, to persuade the Great Powers that its case for statehood
merits approval, the statehood-seeking entity must garner the support of its most
powerful regional partners. If the non-state entity's regional partners - those states
that likely can be affected by the decision to recognize, or not, the same entity as a
new state - are willing to approve the statehood quests, this decision is likely to
influence the Great Powers into also granting statehood approval. 162 Important

159. On a detailed discussion of the Great Powers, see Kelly, supra note 6, at 365.
160. See supraPart IV.A; see also Sterio, supranote 42, at 173-74.
161. On discussions of Taiwan, Republika Srpska, Northern Cyprus, South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
see supra Part IV.C. On a discussion of Tibet, see Sreeram Chaulia, A World of Selfistans?, FOREIGN
POLICY INFOCuS, Mar. 13, 2008, http://www.fpif.org/articles/a world of selfistans (arguing that Tibet
has been oppressed by China for many years).
162. For example, when the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia applied for recognition
within the E.U., Greece, its more powerful neighbor and E.U. member state objected to the use of the

name Macedonia and feared that a newly recognized state of Macedonia would exert territorial claims
over northern Greece. Thus, as a condition of recognition, Macedonia was required to change its name

to the "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia," and to insert a provision into its constitution
promising that it would not lay any territorial claims outside of its present borders. DUNOFF ET AL.,
supra note 47, at 143; see also Sterio, supra note 42, at 152-53 (discussing the case of Macedonia).
This is a classic example of a more sovereign state (albeit not a Great Power) exerting pressure on a less

sovereign entity and imposing conditions on the latter's ascension into statehood.
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regional partners may be strategic and political allies of some of the Great Powers,
or, in some instances, may belong to the Great Powers' club themselves; thus,
regional approval of statehood for a non-state entity
may facilitate the latter's
163
struggle for recognition as a new sovereign partner.
Second, any statehood-seeking entity must in addition demonstrate that it will
respect human/minority rights. From the discussion above, it can be asserted that
states, and entities seeking statehood, risk sanctions and intervention if they choose
to abuse human rights. 164 Human and minority rights have at times trumped state
territorial integrity, and states have suffered alterations to their territories, to
accommodate minority rights movements seeking independence. When the former
USSR and the former Yugoslavia collapsed in the early 1990's, European Union
countries refused to recognize any new country in Europe unless it specifically
committed to respecting human rights. 165 In other instances, powerful countries
have intervened in the affairs of sovereign states to protect human rights, in the
name of humanitarian intervention, and have helped minority movements obtain
recognition and at times, remedial secession. Above examples of Kosovo and East
Timor, inter alia, solidify this idea and confirm that minority rights sometimes
erode state territorial sovereignty. 166 In fact, states have lost some of their
sovereign attributes of statehood when they have abused human rights. At times,
because of human rights abuse, states have lost parts of their territory, as those
parts became new, sovereign states. Not only are new states required to pledge to
respect human rights, existing states, with the exception of the Great Powers and
their closest allies,
are also expected to do the same, at the risk of grave sanctions
167
and intervention.
Third, any statehood-seeking entity must show its willingness to participate in
international organizations and to abide by the existing world order. Because of
the proliferation of international organizations and legal norms, which now exist in
virtually every aspect of state life, it is impossible for any state-like entity to
function while ignoring international organizations. 168 It has become impossible to
trade unless the trade is accomplished within the WTO; it is illegal to use force
outside of the confines of the U.N.; it is very difficult to attract foreign investment

163. The case of Macedonia perfectly exemplifies this proposition. See supranote 162.
164. See supraPart IV.A.
165. Council of the European Community, Declaration on the "Guidelines on the Recognition of
New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union," 31 I.L.M. 1485, 1486 (1992) (requiring
"respect for the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations ... especially with regard to the rule of
law, democracy and human rights," and "guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and
minorities" in order for a new state to be recognized).
166. See supraPart IV.B.
167. Kosovo is a great example for this proposition. When Serbia (a non Great Power) abused
human rights in Kosovo, it incurred an intervention staged by NATO countries on its territory. Thus,
Serbia, because it abused human rights, lost an aspect of its sovereignty: the right to territorial integrity
and the right to be free of outside interference. Moreover, because of human rights abuses in Kosovo,
Serbia ultimately lost a portion of its territory (Kosovo), which became an independent state. On a
detailed discussion of Kosovo, see Sterio, supranote 42, at 162-66.
168. On the proliferation of international organizations, see Sterio, supranote 1, at 220-22.
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outside of the scope of prevailing investment treaties; it is probable that an entity
will be labeled "rogue" if it chooses not to respect dominant human rights norms.
States like North Korea and Syria, because of their unwillingness to participate in
the world order, have become so isolated in their existence that their capacity to
enter into international relations with other states has been seriously endangered. 169
And entities seeking to become states have no chance of succeeding unless they
can seriously demonstrate their respect for the existing order. Thus, when Kosovo
asserted its independence from Serbia in February of 2008, its declaration of
independence promised the respect of human rights and other existing legal
norms. 170 Macedonia, when it sought statehood and recognition from the EU,
promised in its constitution that it would not have any territorial claims to any of
its neighboring states. 171 And western scholars and law professors drafted the East
Timorese constitution.172 The respect of the international legal status quo has thus
become a firm requirement of statehood.
The fourth criterion of statehood, the capacity to enter into international
relations, has become the crucial component of any entity's statehood quest. As I
argue in this article, this component can be decomposed into three new subparts,
which any statehood-seeking entity must fulfill. The theory of statehood should
thus be amended, to capture this Grotian Moment, to include these new
requirements, and to ensure that the statehood label is more accurately bestowed
on applying entities.
VI. CONCLUSION
From a simple set of tools governing inter-state relations, international law
has transformed itself into a global net of norms, rules and regulations, governing
most aspects of state existence. 173 Globalization has profoundly impacted state
behavior, and has seriously limited state sovereignty.174
This change in
international law has, in a Grotian Moment manner, caused shifts and changes in
the legal theory of statehood. The traditional notion of statehood, encompassing
four requirements of territory, population, government, and the capacity to enter
169. North Korea and Syria are routinely labeled as "rogue" states; some regimes have engaged in
a politic of total isolationism toward these countries, such as the former U.S. President George W.
Bush. On the concept of rogue states, see ROBERT S. LITWAK, ROGUE STATES AND U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY: CONTAINMENT AFTER THE COLD WAR (2000) - need to find a source for this assertion - Silke
did not put this source she found in the source doc so we need to either find it or find a new source.
170. Kosovo DeclaresIndependencefrom Serbia, supranote 103.
171. Opinions on Questions Arising from the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 6 on the
Recognition of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia by the European Community and Its Member
States, 31 I.L.M. 1488, 1507 (Conf. on Yugo. Arb. Comm'n 1992). Note that the debate over
Macedonian recognition was sparked by Greek claims that Macedonia would have territorial claims
against northern Greece, a region also known as Macedonia. DUNOFF ET AL., supranote 47, at 143.
172. The author had several conversations with Professor Muna Ndulo of Cornell Law School, who
was one of the experts consulting on the drafting of the East Timorese Constitution. The Constitution
was officially drafted by a Constituent Assembly. See Vanya Tanaja, East Timor: Debate Over
Constituent Assembly Election Process, GREEN LEFT WEEKLY, Mar. 14, 2001, http://www.green
left.org.au/node/23161.
173. Sterio, supranote 1, at 213-14.
174. Id.at 214.
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into international relations, should thus be amended. This article argues that
additional criteria of statehood, all of which could exist within the fourth pillar, the
capacity to enter into international relations, include the following: the need for the
statehood-applying entity to garner the support of regional partners and the Great
Powers, to respect human and minority rights, and to pledge its support and
participation in the existing international organizations and world order. It is only
if the statehood-seeking entity fulfills these additional criteria that it will be truly
able to engage in international relations with other states. Statehood-seeking
entities that have not fulfilled these criteria have been banished to the status of de
facto states, and as such, have been denied many important attributes of state
sovereignty. If the legal theory of statehood is amended to include these new
criteria, then it will be more accurately applied to existing applicants, and will
produce more just results across our planet.
Statehood, despite all sovereign attributes that it has lost because of
globalization, remains an enormously important legal theory.
If it is
anachronistically described and applied, it can produce anomalous results and lead
to unfortunate situations on our globalized planet.

PROSECUTION AND PEACE:

A ROLE FOR AMNESTY BEFORE THE ICC?
KATE ALLAN*
INTRODUCTION

The adoption of the Statute of the International Criminal Court at the Rome
Conference was a landmark event in international law. It expressed states'
intention to cede what was guardedly reserved as a sovereign power to prosecute in
exchange for international justice and the prevention of impunity. To restrain the
International Criminal Court (ICC), states adopted complementary jurisdiction; the
ICC can only act where a state has not genuinely investigated or prosecuted
perpetrators of serious crimes, or where it is unwilling or unable to do so. 2 The
difficult question was how far should complementarity go?
It was not surprising, given divergent state practice and opinion, that a
provision on amnesties was not agreed upon.3 Some states argued that transitional
justice mechanisms ought to be accommodated.4 Domestic responses to mass
atrocity or international crimes in previous years had involved a combination of
complementary processes selected from what is becoming commonly referred to as
the 'toolkit' of transitional justice. 5 These multi-faceted approaches combined
limited prosecutions with truth commissions and blanket or conditional amnesties.
Other states were nevertheless steadfast in their opposition. Consequently, the
drafters of the6 ICC Statute left the provisions regulating jurisdiction "'creatively
ambiguous.'
* Associate Legal Officer at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia; L.L.M.
(Harvard); L.L.B. (QUT); B.Bus (International) (QUT). The views expressed herein are those of the
author's alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia or the United Nations in general. I am grateful to Martha Minow for her supervision
and comments on the Masters thesis upon which this article is based. All errors of fact and
interpretation are my own.
1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered
into force July 1, 2002), available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/source/RecentTexts/rome-en.htm
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
2. Rome Statute, art. 17.
3. See Jessica Gavron, Amnesties in the Light of Developments in InternationalLaw and the
Establishment of the InternationalCriminal Court, 51 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 91, 107-108 (2002); Anja
Seibert-Fohr, The Relevance of the Rome Statute of the InternationalCriminalCourtfor Amnesties and
Truth Commissions, 7 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N.L. 553, 561 (2003).
4. Seibert-Fohr, supranote 3, at 561.
5. See, e.g., Chandra Lekha Sriram, TransitionalJustice Comes of Age: Enduring Lessons and
Challenges, 23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 506, 508 (2005).

6. Dwight G. Newman, The Rome Statute, Some Reservations Concerning Amnesties, and a
Distributive Problem, 20 AM. U. INT'L LAW REV. 293, 320-22 (2005) (quoting the Chair of the drafting
committee, Philippe Kirsch).
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This paper asks whether the ICC can, and ought to, defer to domestic grants
of amnesty. In doing so, this paper also questions more broadly whether the ICC
ought to take the impact of prosecution on peace into account. Before this article
goes on to outline the ways in which the ICC might do this, it is important to
understand: (1) the position of amnesties in international law, and (2) the forms of
amnesty that are granted and the justifications which aim to legitimize them.
In regard to the first issue, as a matter of international law, an express
customary prohibition of amnesty has not yet crystallized. There is support for
customary and treaty7 based duties to prosecute pursuant to the Geneva
Conventions (GCs), and jus cogens norms including torture, genocide. Various
judicial and UN bodies confirm that amnesties are inconsistent with treaty based
duties to prosecute. 8 Exceptions can nevertheless be made. The most notable of
7. See Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 7, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; International Convention on the Suppression and
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid art. 4, Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243; Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 4, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 28 I.L.M.
760; see also Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 50, Aug.
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 129,
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War art. 146, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [collectively, hereinafter the Geneva
Conventions]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 85, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
8. See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, 7 153, 155-56 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998); Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 165 (Jul. 29, 1988); Chumbipuma Aguirre v. Peru (Barrios Altos Case),
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, 11 42-44 (Mar. 14, 2001); Mendoza v. Uruguay (Report
on the Situation of Human Rights in Uruguay), Inter-Am. Comm'n. H.R., Report No. 29/92,
OEA/Ser.L/VII.83, doc. 14, 77 26, 35, 50 (1993), available at http://wwwl.un.edu/humanrts/cases/
29-92-URUGUAY.htm; Consuelo et al. v. Argentina (Report on the Situation of Human Rights in
Argentina), Inter-Am. Comm'n. H.R., Report No. 28/92, OEA/Ser.LN/II.83, doc. 14, 11 32, 40, 50
(1992), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/28-92-ARGENTINA.htm; Report on the
Situation of Human Rights in El Salvador, Inter-Am. Comm'n. H.R., Report No. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.85,
doc. 28 (1994), availableat http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/country-reports/elsalvadorl994.html;
X & Y v. Netherlands, App. No. 8978/80, 91 Fur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), T 27, 28 (1985); Streletz v.
Germany, 2001-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 230, 86 (2001); Akko9 v. Turkey, 2000-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 389, 1 77
(2000); Bautista de Arellana v. Colombia, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Comm'n No. 563/1993, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/55/D/563/1993, 11 8.3, 10 (1995), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/
session55/vws56355.htm; Basilio Laureano Atachahua v. Peru, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Comm'n
No. 540/1993, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/56/D/540/1993,
10 (1996), available at http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/3ae6b70910.html. In 2010, the UN Secretary-General released a guidance note on the
UN's approach to transitional justice in which he stated that, in its transitional justice activities, the UN
should "insist[] that peace agreements not grant amnesties for war crimes, crimes against humanity,
genocide and gross violations of human rights." U.N. Secretary General, Guidance Note of the
Secretary General: United NationsApproach to the TransitionalJustice, 10 (March 2010), available at
www.unrol.org/files/TJ GuidanceNoteMarch_2010FINAL.pdf. In his report to the Security Council
in 2004 on the rule of law and transitional justice and post-conflict societies, UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan stated that "[clarefully crafted amnesties ... can never be permitted to excuse genocide,
war crimes, crimes against humanity or gross violations of human rights," and called on the

2011

BRINGING PEACE TO DARFUR AND UGANDA

these is Article 6(5) of Additional Protocol II to the GCs, which states that
authorities "shall endeav[o]r to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who
have participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for
reasons related to the armed conflict." 9 The South African Constitutional Court in
Azapo v. President of the Republic of South Africa 0 relied upon Article 6(5) to
support an exception to the prohibition on amnesty.11 The explicit or constructive
duty to prosecute is nevertheless limited by subject matter and recipient, with the
obvious gaps being crimes against humanity and war crimes, which do not give
rise to grave breaches of the GCs. Customary international law established through
state practice and opinio juris may fill these gaps.1 2 There is an emerging state
practice supporting an obligation to prosecute the most serious violations of
4
international law,1 3 with supportive opiniojuris.1
Nevertheless, courts have been

international community to reject them. U.N. Secretary General, The Rule of Law and Transitional
Justice in Conflict and Post-ConflictSocieties: Rep. of the Secretary-Generalto the Security Council,
32, U.N. Doc. No.S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004), available at http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/5154
000.52070618.html.
9. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 6(5), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609
[hereinafter Additional Protocol II]; see also American Convention on Human Rights art. 4(6), Nov. 22,
1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6(4), Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (permitting amnesty to prevent imposition of the death penalty).
10. AZAPO v. Presidentof the Republic ofSouth Africa 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC) (S. Aft.).
11. Andreas O'Shea, Amnesty for Crime, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 50 (2002). The
Constitutional Court's reasoning was flawed because it adopted an overly broad definition of jus
cogens, applied Additional Protocol II to all other jus cogens norms and did not consider whether
amnesty for offenses that were in fact jus cogens (such as torture and genocide) was permissible. 1d.;
FAUSTIN Z. NTOUBANDI, AMNESTY FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

167, 171 (2007).
12. John Dugard, Possible Conflicts of Jurisdiction with Truth Commissions, in THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 696-98 (Antonio Cassese, Paola

Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones eds., 2002).
13. Id.; O'Shea, supra note 11, at 255.
14. The Resolution on the Principles of International Cooperation in the Detection, Arrest,
Extradition, and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity provides in
Article 4 that "[s]tates shall assist each other in detecting, arresting and bringing to trial persons
suspected of having committed... crimes and, if they are found guilty, in punishing them." G.A. Res.
3074 (XXVIII), 4, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess. Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/9030, at 79 (Dec. 3, 1973).
The Resolution adopting the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crimes and Abuse
of Power called upon states to conduct impartial investigations and prosecute persons who victimize
others by committing serious crimes or extradite such persons to another State having jurisdiction. G.A.
Res. 40/34,
4, 5, 40, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/40/53, at 213 (Nov. 29, 1985);
Question of the Punishment of War Criminals and of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes Against
Humanity, G.A. Res. 2840 (XXVI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2840 (Dec. 18, 1971); Question of the
Punishment of War Criminals and of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes Against Humanity, G.A.
Res. 2712 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2712 (Dec. 15, 1970); Question of the Punishment of War
Criminals and of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 2583 (XXIV),
U.N. Doc. AIRES/2583 (Dec. 15, 1969); see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art.
7, Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002), available at http://treaties.
un.org/doc/source/RecentTexts/rome-en.htm; S.C. Res. 955, Statute of the International Tribunal for
Rwanda art. 3, U.N. SCO, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); S.C. Res. 827, Statute of
the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia art. 5, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc.
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reluctant to find amnesties "unlawful per se." 15 While much of the debate concerns
the permissibility of conditional amnesties, 16 it is nonetheless difficult to avoid the
conclusion that while customary law had not crystallized before the Rome
Conference, international
law is heading towards the prohibition of amnesties for
17
international crimes.
Looking to the second issue, amnesties can come in a variety of forms
including blanket amnesties, self-amnesties, and conditional amnesties. However,
only conditional have attracted any real support. It is therefore only in the context
of conditional amnesties that we ought to consider whether customary international
law permits grants of amnesty. Conditional amnesties are ordinarily granted
following a determination by a quasi-judicial body, such as a truth commission,
applying legislative criteria.18 Criteria might include: whether a perpetrator acted in
pursuit of a political objective and whether he or she disclosed the truth regarding
their role and the role of others in the commission of a crime. 19 Truth commissions
gain legitimacy when they provide victims with an opportunity to participate by
confronting perpetrators, with some form of reparation, and when they have
authority to make broad findings and recommendations regarding the causes of and
events giving rise to violations. It is not amnesty itself that is justifiable, but the
process by which it is granted. Advocates of truth commissions also argue that, not
only do they have a broader mandate than domestic prosecution, they have a
greater capacity to reconcile communities and engender peace.2 0 The quintessential
example is that of South Africa, where conditional amnesty was bartered for
democratic rule, and where the South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(SATRC) was hailed as a key contributor to a relatively peaceful transition to
stable democracy.2 1 Its supporters argue that without the availability of amnesty,
South Africa might have lapsed into civil war.22 States have subsequently used this
S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993); NTOUBANDI, supranote 11, at 147-48.
15. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Amnesty and the InternationalCriminal Court, in INTERNATIONAL
CRIMES, PEACE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 79 (Dinah
Shelton ed., 2000); John Dugard, Dealingwith Crimes of a PastRegime. Is Amnesty Still an Option? 12
LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 1001, 1003 (1999); Yasmin Naqvi, Amnesty for War Crimes: Defining the Limits of
International Recognition, 85 IRRC 583, 612 (2003); Leila Nadya Sadat, Exile, Amnesty and
InternationalLaw, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 955, 1018 (2006).
16. See Dugard, supra note 15, at 1004-05; Naqvi, supra note 15, at 586-87, 624; Sadat, supra
note 15, at 1021-22. The International Court of Justice adopted the more traditional approach. Arrest
Warrant of April 11th 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Beig.), 2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14) (finding that the arrest
warrant issued by Belgium against Congo's incumbent Minister of Foreign Affairs failed to respect the
immunity from criminal jurisdiction under international law); see also Newman, supra note 6, at 314;
Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior
Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2540 (1991).
17. Dugard, supra note 15, at 1004; see also Sadat, supra note 15, at 963-65, 1022-23 (agreeing
with this position).
18. Sadat, supranote 15, at 1027-28, n.343.
19. NTOUBANDI, supranote 11, at 161-162.
20. O'Shea, supranote 11, at 23-24.
21. Sadat, supra note 15, at 986.
22. See, e.g., Richard Goldstone, 1998 Otto L. Walter Lecture, InternationalHuman Rights at
Century's End, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 241, 258 (1999) (noting that "amnesty was the price for a
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model to argue that amnesty can be a vital ingredient of peace negotiations because
they "stabilize and consolidate.., transition. 23
Amnesty is therefore a policy and rule of law issue. As a policy matter, it is
justified by its contribution to resolving conflict, attaining peace, and preventing
further human rights violations. As a rule of law matter, it is justified on the basis
that it is granted by a quasi-judicial body pursuant to legislation, even though
brought about by an executive act. The disentangling of law and politics however
is not so easy in the contexts in which amnesties are granted:
The construction of the transitional rule of law as independent of
politics shares certain affinities with the understanding of the rule of law
applicable in ordinary times. Yet, controversies over transitional justice
in highly politicized contexts present hard cases for adherence to the
rule of law. Despite radical political change, the aim is the rule of law
not primarily motivated by politics. Transitional
jurisprudence reveals a
24
shining vision of the rule of law as antipolitics.
Policy and rule of law considerations are relevant for the ICC, particularly
given it is not limited to post bellum justice and separating law from politics is
more difficult during conflict.2 5 How then does and should the ICC respond? Does
the process by which conditional amnesties are granted satisfy due process under
international law and the ICC's admissibility requirements? Are conditional
amnesties a matter of both law and politics beyond the national realm? Or, if
amnesty is a matter of mere politics, what is the impact on prosecutorial discretion
to act?
The Rome Statute sets out the roles for the Prosecutor, the Security Council,
and the Pre-Trial Chamber in determining whether the ICC can exercise
jurisdiction over a matter.26 The Prosecutor plays a lead role because he has
discretion to determine whether to proceed with an investigation or prosecution. 27
The Prosecutor has two avenues to defer to conditional amnesty. First, he can
determine that amnesties satisfy the admissibility requirements of Article 17.28
Second, pursuant to Article 53, he can determine that it is not in the interests of
justice to proceed with an investigation or prosecution where an amnesty has been
or might be granted.29
ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo has been patently clear about his
approach to admissibility and the interests of justice. In regard to admissibility, he
peaceful transition from apartheid to democracy").
23. RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 54 (2000).

24. Id. at21-22.
25. Rosanna Lipscomb, Restructuring the ICC Framework to Advance TransitionalJustice: A
Searchfor a PermanentSolution in Sudan, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 182, 189-93 (2006).

26. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts. 13-18, Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
(entered into force July 1, 2002), available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/source/RecentTexts/romeen.htm [hereinafter Rome Statute].
27. For ease of reference this paper adopts the Prosecutor's current gender throughout.
28. Rome Statute, art. 17.
29. Rome Statute, art. 53.
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stated in a report to the Security Council that alternative justice mechanisms "are
not criminal proceedings as such for the purpose of assessing the admissibility of
cases before the [ICC], but they are an important part of the fabric of reconciliation
for Darfur, as recognized in resolution 1593 (2005).,, 30 Even where amnesty is
granted by quasi-judicial bodies such as the SATRC, Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo
would not find that they are determinative of admissibility under Article 17 of the
Rome Statute. While he seemed to leave open the question of whether amnesties
might be in the interests of justice because of their reconciliatory capacity, he
foreclosed this possibility in September 2007 when he released a policy paper on
the interests of justice. 31 In that paper, he notes that justice and peace are not
mutually exclusive, 32 and in dealing with the intersection of justice, peace, and
security, he will work with other institutions such as the Security Council. 33 He
further stated that while Security Council intervention would not presuppose the
Prosecutor's position on the interests of justice, he will adopt "a presumption in
[favor] of investigation or prosecution" and use his discretion only in exceptional
circumstances.34 In case of any doubt regarding his position on amnesties, the
paper footnotes a quote from the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and
United Nations Legal Counsel, who said "[j]ustice should never be sacrificed by
granting amnesty in ending conflicts. 35
Should the Prosecutor exercise unfettered discretion to determine
admissibility and the interests of justice, we might then end the discussion here.
However, Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo's paper is a policy document and not
binding for the purposes of judicial review, 36 and could be amended by the next
appointee.37 While the object of preventing serious crimes through ending
impunity is likely to continue to play a decisive role, it is possible that time and
progressive development of the law may lead the Prosecutor to favor peace and
security in certain circumstances. Moreover, the Prosecutor is subject to Security
Council and Pre-Trial Chamber oversight. The Security Council has the power to
issue a resolution referring a matter to the Prosecutor or requesting that the ICC
defer an investigation or prosecution of a matter where it is a threat to international
peace or security. 38 The Pre-Trial Chamber has authority to review the
Prosecutor's decision to proceed (although it might adopt a less intrusive role
regarding policy matters). 39 Neither the Security Council nor the Pre-Trial
30. U.N. S.C. Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Sudan, 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 5459, U.N. SCOR
5459th mtg (Jun. 14, 2009), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/PV.5459.
31. International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paperon the Interests of Justice
(Sept. 2007), available at http://www2.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/772C95C9-F54D-4321-BF0973422BB23528/143640/ICCOTPInterestsOflustice.pdf [hereinafter OTP Policy Paper].
32. Id. at 8.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1, 3.
35. Id. at 3.
36. Jens David Ohlin, Peace, Security and ProsecutorialDiscretion, in THE EMERGING PRACTICE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 251, 263 (Carsten Stahn & Goran Sluiter eds., 2009).
37. See id. at 259 (noting that the Assembly is charged with electing a Prosecutor).
38. Id. at 250.
39. Id. at 264.
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Chamber have intervened on the basis of amnesty as of yet. Whether amnesty
might be accommodated is, therefore, still open to debate.
There are two approaches that may be adopted by each of these bodies. The
Prosecutor and the Pre-Trial Chamber can adopt a restrictive approach. With
regard to admissibility, truth commissions would fail to satisfy the requirements of
"criminal justice, '40 and amnesty would indicate an unwillingness or inability to
prosecute. The President of the International Crisis Group, Gareth Evans, aptly
summarized the restrictive approach with regard to the interests ofjustice:
I have no doubt that dealing with impunity and pursuing peace can work
in tandem even in an ongoing conflict situation: these are not
necessarily incompatible objectives. The prosecutor's job is to prosecute
and he should get on with it with bulldog intensity. If a policy decision
needs to be made, in a particular case, to give primacy to peace, it
should be made not by those with the justice mandate, but with the
political and conflict resolution mandate, and that is the Security
Council. The Statute allows for this in Article 16, and41this is the way the
international community should be thinking about it.
According to this approach, the ICC prioritizes its prosecutorial mandate and
policy issues remain a matter for the Security Council.
Alternatively, the Prosecutor and the Pre-Trial Chamber can adopt an
expansive view, where the process by which amnesty is granted satisfies the
requirements of admissibility, and/or the interests of justice accommodate legal,
political, and social issues. 42 The expansive approach allows the Prosecutor and
Court to consider whether prosecution may prevent the conclusion of peace
negotiations by deterring perpetrators from engaging in actions that might lead to
their disarmament and arrest, and whether prosecution at the post-conflict stage
may lead to the resumption of hostilities.43
Literature following the ratification of the Rome Statute adopted positions
ranging from a narrow application of the law and confinement to prosecutorial
criminal justice mechanisms 44 to expansive policy approaches, which argue that
the Prosecutor could decline jurisdiction "where prosecution is likely to have
[destabilizing] effects on the state which has granted the amnesty. '45 This paper
builds upon that body of literature in two ways. First, it synthesizes the positions
put forward by scholars and practitioners and frames them in terms of the
40. OTP's Second Public Hearing: Looking Ahead, NEWSLETTER (ICC, THE HAGUE), Oct. 2006,
at 5, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/A553E1FB-3662-497E-B06E-5B089B22D0
1B/278464/ICCNL9200610_En.pdf [hereinafter OTP's Newsletter].
41. Id.; see also Kenneth Roth, Discussion, The InternationalCriminal Court Five Years on;
Progressor Stagnation?, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 763, 765 (2008) (agreeing with the ICC's approach in

prioritizing its prosecutorial mandate).
42. Diba Majzub, Peace or Justice? Amnesties and the InternationalCriminal Court, 3 MELB. J.
OF INT'L L. 247, 275-78 (2002).

43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Roth, supranote 41, at 765-66.

45. Majzub, supranote 42, at 272.
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restrictive or expansive approach. Second, it applies these approaches to the
situations of Uganda and Darfur, which are currently subject to ICC jurisdiction.
Over the last few years, events in these countries and state responses to
intervention by the ICC have altered the way in which one might view the role of
the ICC. In Uganda, ICC intervention has led to attempts by the government to
establish domestic criminal justice mechanisms that incorporate criminal
prosecution, reparations, and reconciliatory mechanisms.46 In Darfur, ICC arrest
warrants for President Omar al-Bashir and other political leaders resulted in the
expulsion of humanitarian aid groups and the withdrawal of some United Nations
peacekeepers. 47 Much of the scholarly debate regarding amnesties and the ICC predated the Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo's policy, and subsequent reactions were
few. As a result, the key contribution of this paper to that debate is its application
of the synthesized debate to recent events in states subject to ICC jurisdiction. It
determines whether, in the context of present circumstances in Uganda and Sudan,
the Court should, or has scope to, take into account political factors.
The paper will be structured as follows. Part I will discuss the Prosecutor's
application of the provisions regarding admissibility and the interests of justice to
determine whether, prima facie, a restrictive or expansive approach may be
applied. It will then go on to discuss the role of the Security Council and the PreTrial Chamber. Part II will discuss four case studies: Darfur, Uganda, Sierra
Leone, and South Africa. Uganda is the only situation currently subject to ICC
jurisdiction that provides an example of the intersection of domestic amnesty and
international prosecution. While Sudan has not granted amnesties for the conflict
in Darfur, the case study is useful because it provides insight into the role of the
Security Council in maintaining international peace and security. The case studies
of Sierra Leone and South Africa are pertinent because they granted amnesties
(blanket and conditional respectively), established truth commissions, and
conducted prosecutions, and they inform the extent to which amnesty may be
desirable as a policy matter. 41 Part III will apply the findings of Parts I-I to the
restrictive and expansive approaches. The key finding of this paper is that the
restrictive approach should be adopted for both legal and policy reasons.

I. THE ROME STATUTE
A situation can fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC in one of three ways: (1)
referral by a state party; (2) referral by the Security Council using its Chapter VII
powers;49 or (3) a propio motu investigation by the Prosecutor.50 Even where a
matter has been referred, prosecutorial discretion to investigate and prosecute is
regulated by Article 53 of the Rome Statute. Article 53 provides that the
46. See Roth, supra note 41, at 765-66.
47. Wairagala Wakabi, Aid Expulsion Leaves Huge Gap in Darfur'sHealth Services, 373 LANCET
1068, 1068-69 (2009).
48. The models adopted by South Africa and Sierra Leone will also be considered in Parts I and II.
49. See U.N. Charter Chapter VII.
50. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 13(c), Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
(entered into force July 1, 2002), available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/source/RecentTexts/romeen.htm [hereinafter Rome Statute].
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Prosecutor shall consider: (1) whether he has sufficient factual evidence to support
a reasonable basis for investigation or sufficient basis for an arrest warrant or
summons,51 (2) whether a matter is admissible in terms of article 17,52 or (3)
whether it is in the interests ofjustice to proceed.53 For our purposes, admissibility
and the interests of justice are determinative. Before proceeding to discuss these
provisions, regard ought to be had to the objects and purposes of the Rome Statute.
A. Object andpurpose of the Rome Statute
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the Vienna Convention)
provides that a "treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to [its] terms... and in the light of its object and
purpose, 54 having regard to inter alia its preamble. If the application of
interpretive guides leads to a meaning that is ambiguous or obscure, or a result
manifestly absurd or unreasonable, regard may be had to supplementary means
including preparatory work and the circumstances of the treaty's conclusion.56
Preamble
The preamble provides that the Rome Statute:
Affirm[s] that the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective
prosecution must be ensured[,]... [r]ecall[s] that it is the duty of every
state to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for
international crimes,... [and] [e]mphasiz[es] that the [ICC] established
under . [the]
..
57Statute shall be complementary to national criminal
jurisdictions.

Notable phrases include that the most serious crimes "must not go
unpunished" and that their "effective prosecution" must be ensured, as well as that
it is a "duty" of states to exercise "criminal prosecution" to which the ICC shall be
complementary. These objects must underscore the interpretation of provisions
even where they are unambiguous. It is important to bear in mind, however, that
the preamble and the procedural provisions (i.e. Articles 16, 17 and 53) were
drafted by different committees within the conference which did not interact,
and
5
that there was little effort to make these sections of the Statute consistent.
51. Id. at arts. 53(1)(a), (2)(a).
52. Id. at arts. 53(1)(b), (2)(b).
53. Id. at arts. 53(1)(c), (2)(c).
54. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]; see also JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & DAVID
WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: NoRMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 39 (Aspen Pub., 2002) (noting the Vienna
Convention is accepted as customary international law).
55. Rome Statute, art. 31(2)-(3). The latter of these was discussed.
56. Id.at art. 32.
57. Rome Statute, pmbl.
58. Sharon A. Williams & William A. Schabas, Article 17, Issues of Admissibility, in
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS'

611 (2d ed. 2008); Michael P. Scharf, From the Exile Files: An
Essay on TradingJusticefor Peace, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 339, 368 (2006).
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Travaux Pr~paratoires
The issue of amnesties was "acutely controversial" in the debate over
jurisdiction at the Rome Conference.5 9 The United States advocated for amnesties
by circulating a non-paper, which argued "that a decision by a democratic regime
to grant an amnesty should be a consideration in determining the admissibility of a
case before the ICC. ' 60 Some states, such as South Africa and Colombia, claimed
that they reserved the right to grant amnesty in appropriate circumstances.61 The
treaty prohibited reservations so Colombia, which had considered granting
amnesties and pardons to bring an end to decades of armed conflict, 62 entered its
ratification with the following interpretive declaration:
None of the provisions of the Rome Statute concerning the exercise of
jurisdiction by the [ICC] prevent the Colombian State from granting
amnesties, reprieves or judicial pardons for political crimes, provided
that they are granted in conformity with the Constitution and with
the
63
principles and norms of international law accepted by Colombia.
Whether interpretive declarations are binding depends upon a complex and
often indeterminate examination of whether the declaration is, in effect, a
reservation that is inconsistent with the object and purpose of the treaty and
whether other ratifying states object. 64 As far as it is possible to ascertain, no states
objected on this basis. Even so, the declaration is not necessarily determinative of
the treaty's interpretation for all parties.
Nevertheless, there are two ways in which the omission of a provision on
amnesty could be read. The absence of an explicit prohibition could indicate that
amnesties are permissible under Article 17.65 Whether or not participating states
concurred that amnesty should be permitted may depend upon distinguishing
unconditional from conditional amnesties. 66 On the other hand, it could indicate
59. See Sharon A. Williams, The Rome Statute on the InternationalCriminalCourt: From 19472000 and Beyond, 38 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 297, 328 (2000); see also Williams & Schabas, supra note
58, at 611.
60. Majzub, supranote 42, at 268.
61. Newman, supranote 6, at 318-28.
62. Id. at 326. Newman notes that "Colombia's ratification of the Rome Statute, absent its
interpretive declaration, might have foreclosed the government's ability to offer immunity in exchange
for peace, thereby removing any incentive for armed rebels to negotiate a truce." Id. at 326-27.
63. Id. at 325.
64. SEAN D. MURPHY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 74 (2006); HENRY STEINER, PHILLIP
ALSTON, & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS,

MORALS 1143-50 (3rd ed., 2008).
65. See lain Cameron, Jurisdiction and Admissibility Issues under the ICC Statute, in THE
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 90-91 (Dominic
McGoldrick, Peter Rowe, & Eric Donnelly eds., 2004); Darryl Robinson, Serving the Interests of
Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the InternationalCriminalCourt, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 481,
499 (2003).
66. In 2000, the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan stated that "[n]o one should imagine that [the
Rome Statute] would apply to a case like South Africa's, where the regime and the conflict which
caused the crimes have come to an end, and the victims have inherited power." Charles Villa-Vicencio,
Why PerpetratorsShould Not Always Be Prosecuted- Where the International Criminal Court and
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they have no jurisdictional impact. Neither approach appears to be appropriate.
According to the Chairman of the Committee of the Diplomatic Conference, the
question was deliberately undecided.68 The travauxpriparatoiresmight then be of
little assistance, other than to confirm no state consensus exists and, therefore, no
customary rule.
B. The Prosecutor
Before engaging in an analysis of admissibility and the interests of justice, it
is important to note that the Prosecutor may exercise jurisdiction over an individual
even where a domestic court is prosecuting him. The Pre-Trial Chamber held that
"for a case arising from the investigation of a situation to be inadmissible, national
proceedings must encompass both the person and the conduct which is the subject
of the case before the Court., 6 9 Accordingly, in the case against Thomas Lubanga,
the Court deemed the case admissible because he had not been charged with all
crimes for which he could be accused.70 The ICC's holding may have
consequences for conditional amnesties. The SATRC allocated hearings by victim
rather than perpetrator.7 1 Perpetrators of numerous violations were only granted
amnesty for conduct that would not necessarily encompass all acts that give rise to
liability.7 2 The jurisdiction of truth commissions might mean perpetrators are only
granted amnesty for some but not all conduct (whether through rejection or
through a perpetrator's omission in disclosing conduct in their application). In
principle, in a way similar to the Lubanga case, the Court and Prosecutor might
therefore exercise jurisdiction over an individual subject to amnesty for conduct
that was not subject to an investigation or grant of amnesty by the SATRC.73
1. Admissibility
Article 17 of the Rome Statute sets out the test for admissibility. It provides
that the Court, with regards to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and Article 1, shall
Truth Commissions Meet, 49 EMORY L.J. 205, 222 (2000).
67. Dugard, supranote 12, at 701.
68. Newman, supranote 6, at 320-2 1, n.123.
69. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-8, Decision on the
Prosecutor's Application for a Warrant of Arrest, 37 (Feb. 10, 2006); see also Prosecutor v Ahman
Harun & Ali Kushayb, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Decision on the Prosecution Application under
Article 58(7) of the Statute, 24 (Apr. 27, 2007).
70. See Jennifer Easterday, The Case Against Lubanga So Far, THE LUBANGA TRIAL AT THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Aug. 17, 2009), http://www.lubangatrial.org/2009/08/17/the-caseagainst-lubanga-so-far/.
71. See ANDREW WOOLFORD & R.S. RATNER, INFORMAL RECKONINGS: CONFLICT RESOLUTION

(claiming that separate hearings
were held for apartheid victims, and these hearings have led commentators to deem the SATRC as
victim centered justice).
72. See id (positing that perpetrators are held accountable through the SATRC to the extent that
they must stand before the committee and tell the full truth about their involvement in politically
motivated crime; remorse and regret are not necessary, as perpetrators are only required to tell the
truth).
73. This approach could attest to the additional criteria of "inactive." Williams & Schabas, supra
note 58, at 616. Should this be correct, it would be even more unlikely that it would defer to a
conditional amnesty that did not encompass all conduct for which a perpetrator may be charged.
IN MEDIATION, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND REPARATIONS 99 (2008)
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determine that a case is inadmissible: (a) where it is being investigated or
prosecuted by the referring or affected state; (b) where that state has investigated
the matter and decided not to proceed with prosecution, unless the state is
unwilling or unable to genuinely investigate or prosecute;74 or (c) where a person
has been tried by another court for crimes falling within the Court's jurisdiction,
unless the proceedings in the other court were, (i) for the purpose of shielding the
person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of
the Court, or (ii) otherwise not conducted independently or impartially in
accordance with the norms of due process recognized by international law and
conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent with an intent
to bring the person concerned to justice. 75 While the provision is directed at the
Court, the Prosecutor must have regard to admissibility pursuant to Article 53.76 To
determine whether amnesties and truth commissions prevent the prosecutor from
exercising jurisdiction, it is necessary to determine whether the procedure for
granting amnesty falls within the ambit of "investigation," "decision," "trial,"
"court," "independent and impartial," and "unwilling or unable. 77
a. Investigation and Decision: Article 17()(a) and (b)
The requirement to investigate is found in of Article 17(1)(a) and (b). The
preamble and Article 1, which refer to "criminal jurisdiction," infer that
investigation means criminal investigation. 78 Sub-paragraph (a) itself refers to
"criminal responsibility," and sub-paragraph (b) refers to the "intent to bring the
person to justice. ' 79 Sub-paragraph (a) also requires "the case" to be investigated.80
The provision impliedly contemplates criminal investigations.81
By adopting an expansive approach, institutions granting conditional
amnesties, such as the SATRC, might satisfy the requirements of "investigation"
and "case" where they engage in "good-faith, methodological evidence

74. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 17(1)(c), Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90 (entered into force July 1, 2002), available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/source/RecentTexts/romeen.htm [hereinafter Rome Statute]. The court may also determine that the matter is not of sufficient
gravity. This will be considered under the interests of justice. Id.
75. Id. at arts. 17(1)(c), 20(3).
76. A referring state may only challenge a Prosecutor's decision not to proceed with an
investigation or prosecution on the basis of article 53(1) and (2) (to be dealt with later). Rome Statute,
art. 53(1)-(4).
77. Id at art. 15(1)-(6); see also Id. at art. 53(1)-(4).
78. Rome Statute, pmbl. ("The States Party to this Statute, . . . recall[] that it is a duty of every
State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.").
79. Id. at art. 17(1).
80. Id. at art. 17(1)(a). An unconditional amnesty, such as in Uganda, would fail that test because
the decision to prosecute does not involve or follow an investigation at all. See Cameron, supra note 65,
at 91; MURPHY, supra note 64, at 146; Robinson, supra note 65, at 499; Siebert-Fohr, supra note 3, at
564-65.
81. John T. Holmes, Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC, in THE ROME STATUTE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 667, 674 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds.,
2002); Majzub, supra note 42, at 270; but see Siebert-Fohr, supra note 3, at 569 (discussing the
interpretation of the Rome Statute, arts. 17(1) and (2), and how the interpretation of paragraph 2 to
require "criminal investigation" goes beyond the scope of the paragraph).
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gathering" 82 of facts, to make an objective determination of criminal liability in
individual cases. 83 The SATRC operated as a quasi-judicial body, 84 because it
conducted investigations through expansive powers of search and seizure, 85 and
could subpoena the provision of information or attendance by any person and
question such persons in public or in camera hearings. 86 Victims and amnesty
applicants were entitled to be present at committee hearings with exception 87 and
cross-examine witnesses, 88 and persons questioned were entitled to legal
representation (albeit without a right to freedom from self-incrimination and a
presumption of innocence). 89 Following a hearing, the Amnesty Committee
provided written reasons for its decision regarding whether a perpetrator of human
rights violations was granted amnesty. 90 Such institutions may also satisfy
"criminal jurisdiction" by the mere fact of their jurisdiction over crimes and
"criminal responsibility" where perpetrators were brought to account through
submitting to the jurisdiction of the institution, facing victims, truth telling, and
providing reparation. Moreover, recognizing "decisions" for individualized
amnesties might be consistent with the references to "the case" and "person" in the
provision, which suggests individual decisions are required. 91
This approach could be adopted if the distinction between investigation or
prosecution in Article 17(1)(a) and (b) accepts that an investigation can be
conducted irrespective of the body that conducts it, 92 and irrespective of its
purpose.93 However, according to the rules of statutory interpretation, Articles
17(1)(a) and (b) must be read together. 94 Sub-paragraph (a) protects matters that

82. See MURPHY, supra note 64, at 427 (discussing how a state that is willing and genuinely able
to carry out an investigation will preclude ICC jurisdiction).
83. BRUCE BROOMHALL, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 101 (Ian Brownlie & Vaughn Lowe eds., 2003); see

also Robinson, supra note 65, at 499-500 (explaining that the court can adopt a broader approach and
deem that "investigation" encompasses diligence, methodological effort to retrieve evidence, and
ascertain facts in order to make an objective determination pursuant to pertinent criteria).
84. Gavron, supra note 3, at 114.
85. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act No. 34 of 1995 Ch. 6 art. 32, (S. Aft.),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/rsa/act95_034.htm
86. Id at art. 29.
87. Id. at arts. 29, 33 (explaining that no person other than a member of the staff of the
Commission or a person subpoenaed may attend any investigation, however, hearings of the
Commission are open to the public unless an informed decision is made to hold the hearing behind
closed doors).
88. Id. at art. 34.
89. Idat art. 31.
90. Id. at arts. 20-21.
91. Cameron, supranote 65, at 91.
92. Jennifer Llewellyn, A Comment on the Complementarity Jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court: Adding Insult to Injury in TransitionalJustice Contexts?, 24 DALHOUSIE L.J. 192, 203
(2001).
93. Id. at 203; Carsten Staln, Complementarity, Amnesties and Alternative Forms of Justice:
Some Interpretive Guidelinesfor the InternationalCriminal Court, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 695, 711
(2005).
94. Llewellyn, supranote 92, at 203.
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are in the preliminary phase of sub-paragraph (b),9 5 i.e. where a decision not to
prosecute has not yet been taken. The duty to prosecute is inextricably linked to
"the triad of obligations - investigate, take action against those responsible, and
provide redress," which "suggests that prosecution is thought necessary in order to
fulfill the other two obligations in the triad., 96 An investigation and decision might
be sufficient provided prosecution was one of the possible options for achieving
justice; investigation must at least contemplate prosecution. 97 The provision cannot
incorporate an investigation whose principle objective is to determine whether
amnesty should be granted. The same principles might be applied to interpreting
"decision," such that individualized decisions must be considered in terms of their
purpose.
The SATRC conducted a broad range of investigations propio motu and upon
application for amnesty. 98 Investigations connected to grants of amnesty would
have been made upon an application and were, therefore, for the purpose of
determining whether amnesty ought to be granted.99 While denials of amnesty left
the possibility of prosecution open,1°° SATRC investigations did not contemplate
prosecution, rather, they contemplated amnesty.101 The final outcome was a
decision rejecting the amnesty application and possibly a recommendation (but not
a decision) to prosecute, 10 2 but the exercise of jurisdiction precluded even the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) did
not retain any discretion to determine whether or not to prosecute until the SATRC
had made its decision. 1°3 Along a procedural spectrum, it is pre-investigation and
would only have an impact upon the decision to prosecute if an amnesty arose
from it. Whether a prosecution would occur following a rejection of amnesty was a
matter for an entirely new investigation because of the restrictions on using
evidence gathered during SATRC investigations in subsequent prosecutions. 10 4 If
the SATRC type process was accommodated, a state could argue that it is
investigating a matter with a view to granting amnesty rather than prosecuting,
before an investigation regarding whether or not to prosecute has even occurred.
Upon these grounds, a more restrictive approach is warranted.

95. See id. (explaining that paragraph (b) expressly discusses situations where investigations have
been conducted and the State has decided not to prosecute, and the meaning of this Paragraph is
dependent on Paragraph (a) which deems cases inadmissible if there is an investigation or prosecution).
96. Id. at 208.
97. Robinson, supra note 65, at 500.
98. See DRAZAN DIUKIC, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE ICC: IN THE "INTERESTS OF JUSTICE"?

22 (2006), available at http://www.prix-henry-dunant.org/sites/prixhd/doc/2007_DrazanDjukic.pdf
99. Llewellyn, supra note 92, at 210-11.
100. Stahn, supranote 93, at 711-12.
101. See Seibert-Fohr, supra note 3, at 568 (claiming that the Rome Statute would permit case-bycase investigations, such as those done in South Africa, which result in an individualized grant of
criminal impunity if offenders truthfully admit their wrongdoings).
102. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act No. 34 of 1995 Ch. 6 art. 21, (S. Aft.),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/rsa/act95 034.htm [hereinafter the SATRC Act]
103. See NPA Prosecution Policy for Apartheid Crimes Struck Down, ALLAFRICA.COM (Dec. 12,
2008), http://allafrica.com/stories/200812120792.html.
104. SATRC Act art. 31.
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The South African example is complicated by the NPA's recent prosecution
guidelines, which permit executive and prosecutorial grants of amnesty.10 5 The
guidelines allow perpetrators to apply for amnesty pursuant to conditions that are
substantially similar to those applied by the SATRC, but which include additional
factors such as whether the NPA has the resources to investigate and prosecute the
matter. 10 6 An overly expansive construction of the term accommodating a broad
executive decision would clearly be contrary to the objective of the Statute.107
However, investigations conducted prior to grants of amnesty in such a case may
not contemplate amnesty, because a grant of amnesty may be considered by the
Minister of Justice following the NPA's investigation or upon the application of
the accused.108 An investigation may then still be conducted for the purpose of
prosecution. Should a state incorporate amnesty decisions within the role of its
NPA, such that amnesty might be an exception to the primary goal of prosecution,
Article 17(1)(a) and (b) might be satisfied. This might even be the case where an
application was made by a perpetrator prior to an investigation, if an investigation
is nevertheless conducted. However, if the application is considered on its merits
without investigation, the Prosecutor will be put in the same position as the TRC;
the determination would first be whether amnesty should be granted. The existence
of the amnesty policy would negate an expansive approach. Whether the guidelines
withstand Article 17 is nevertheless determined by their expression of willingness.
b. Unwilling: Article 17(1) and (2)
Article 17(2) gives meaning to the term unwilling in Article 17(1)(a) and (b)
by providing that the Court must consider the following: (1) whether a national
decision was made for the purpose of shielding a person from criminal

responsibility, (2) whether there has been an unjustified delay in proceedings
which is inconsistent with an intent to bring a person to justice, and (3) whether the
proceedings were not conducted independently or impartially but in a way
inconsistent with an intent to bring a person to justice. 10 9 In interpreting the
provision, the Prosecutor must consider the principles of due process recognized
by international law. 110 An investigation and prosecution must be conducted
genuinely,111 and a judicial decision made, with a view to making a person
criminally responsible. 112 The provision was inserted following consensus that it
was necessary to "refute the presumption that a national system was handling the

105. President's Message to the National House of Parliament and the Nation on the Prosecution
Policy and Directives Relating to Prosecution of Criminal Matters Arising From Conflicts of the Past,
app. A, 22 (Dec. 1, 2005) (S. Aft), available at http://us-cdn.creamermedia.co.za/assets/
articles/attachments/02475_npaprosecutionpolicy.pdf [hereinafter NPA Prosecution Policy]
106. Id; see also ALLAFRICA.COM, supra note 103.
107. Robinson, supra note 65, at 496-97.
108. NPA Prosecution Policy, supranote 105, at 24.
109. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 17(2), Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
(entered into force July 1, 2002), available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/source/RecentTexts/romeen.htm [hereinafter Rome Statute].
110. Id.
111. Rome Statute, art. 17 (1)(a)-(b).
112. Rome Statute, art. 25(3).
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case in an adequate manner," so that states could not "easily prevent the ICC from
taking jurisdiction by initiating an investigation or prosecution."113 Some posit that
the underlying purpose of the qualification is to filter bona fide from mala fide
state conduct 1 4 However the provision could be read more broadly, because even
if a state subjectively demonstrates good faith, it may be objectively unable 115
to
achieve impartial and independent results through investigation or prosecution.
The requirement1 16of "genuineness" in sub-paragraphs (1)(a) and (b) supports a
broader reading.
In order to determine whether a truth commission's grant of amnesty satisfies
the qualification we must determine whether it "shields" a person. 117 An expansive
approach requires the Prosecutor to demonstrate "a devious intent on the part of a
'
State, contrary to its apparent actions."118
The restrictive approach requires that
shielding "must be an intended consequence [of the amnesty], whether or not there
is a primary, greater intention." 119 The former position might be satisfied where an
outgoing regime negotiates an amnesty, even conditional. Siebert-Fohr argues that
a truth commission established to serve peace and security would demonstrate
willingness because accountability may also be realized by non-judicial efforts
even if they fall short of criminal prosecution. 12 This approach is flawed because
the preamble calls precisely for criminal prosecution. There are other cogent
reasons supporting this approach, the most compelling of which is that upon a
broader approach the Pre-Trial Chamber is required to "pass judgment on the longterm political goals of a State," 121 a decision which is not only highly difficult to
make but beyond the authority of the Court.
In any event, it seems unnecessary to engage in this analysis because the
ordinary meaning of the words is clear: the effective provision requires a
willingness to investigate or to prosecute. 122 The grant of amnesty must ultimately
fail at the prosecution stage even if it doesn't at the investigation stage because

113. Williams &. Schabas, supra note 58, at 610.
114. Claudia Angermaier, The ICC and Amnesty: Can the Court Accommodate a Model of
Restorative Justice?, 1 EYES ON THE ICC 131, 144-45 (2004).
115. Holmes, supra note 81, at 674; see also Gavron, supra note 3, at 111 (submitting that the
qualification imports a subjective element, as it is still necessary to first consider whether the state had
the intention of bringing the person to justice or whether it intended to shield them from prosecution or
fair punishment).
116. Gavron, supranote 3, at 110-11.
117. Rome Statute, art. 17(2)(a).
118. Louise Arbour & Morten Bergsmo, Conspicuous Absence of JurisdictionalOverreach, in
REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ADRAAN Bos 67
(Herman H.A. von Hebel, Johan G. Lammers & Jolien Schukking eds., 1999).
119. Gavron, supra note 3, at 111; see also Sang Wook Daniel Han, The InternationalCriminal
Court and NationalAmnesty, 12 AUCKLAND U. L. REV. 97, 99 (2006); Roht-Arriaza, supranote 15, at
79.
120. Siebert-Fohr, supranote 3, at 571.
121. Helmut Gropengieller & Jirg Meillner, Amnesties and the Rome Statute, in 2 ESSAYS ON THE
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 171, 185 (Flavia Lattanzi & William A.
Schabas eds., 2004).
122. Rome Statute, art. 17(1)(a)-(b).
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amnesty shields a person from prosecution. One might then conclude that the
intent to bring a person to justice requires a person to be investigated and, where
appropriate, prosecuted. Even adopting the latter approach means that an amnesty,
adopted with legitimate intent such as the "pacification and reconciliation of a
society" will by default adopt the goal of shielding. 123 This is supported by the
Inter-American Court on Human Rights, which found that national reconciliation
is insufficient to make amnesties lawful. 124 Consequently, South Africa's "wider
1 25
policy to restore social peace and reconciliation after a period of transition"
would not make an investigation or prosecution inadmissible. As will be further
discussed in Part II of this article, amnesties granted by Uganda and Sierra
Leone 126 would also fail the test of admissibility because their by-product is
impunity from criminal responsibility. In the context of Uganda, MacMillan argues
that it is possible to find in the present circumstances that the Amnesty Act 2000
does not shield persons from prosecution because it is used in context of a multipronged approach to accountability which incorporates domestic prosecutions and
traditional justice mechanisms. 27 As with the South African situation, the decisive
issue, however, is whether the amnesty shields the individual; the overall approach
is not assessed. Even if the State seeks in good faith to achieve other legitimate
goals, the foreseeable consequence of shielding can be nothing other than
intentional. If we apply this reasoning to the terms "investigation," "prosecution,"
and "decision," an investigation conducted by a body such as a truth commission is
not sufficient. To hold otherwise would mean that the Prosecutor is prevented from
investigating a case where a state was investigating for the purposes of an amnesty

123. GropengieBer & MeiBner, supranote 121, at 185.
124. See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, 7 153, 155-56 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998); Velsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 1 165 (Jul. 29, 1988); Chumbipuma Aguirre v. Peru (Barrios Altos Case),
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, 7 42-44 (Mar. 14, 2001); Mendoza v. Uruguay (Report
on the Situation of Human Rights in Uruguay), Inter-Am. Comm'n. H.R., Report No. 29/92,
OEA/Ser.L/VII.83, doc. 14,
26, 35, 50 (1993), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/
29-92-URUGUAY.htm; Consuelo et al. v. Argentina (Report on the Situation of Human Rights in
Argentina), Inter-Am. Comm'n. H.R., Report No. 28/92, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.83, doc. 14, 11 32, 40, 50
(1992), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/28-92-ARGENTINA.htm; Report on the
Situation of Human Rights in El Salvador, Inter-Am. Comm'n. H.R., Report No. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.85,
doc. 28 (1994), availableat http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/country-reports/elsalvadorl994.html;
X & Y v. Netherlands, App. No. 8978/80, 91 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A),
27, 28 (1985); Streletz v.
Germany, 2001-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 230, T 86 (2001); Akkog v. Turkey, 2000-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 389, 77
(2000); Bautista de Arellana v. Colombia, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Comm'n No. 563/1993, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/55/D/563/1993, 11 8.3, 10 (1995), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/
session55/vws56355.htm; Basilio Laureano Atachahua v. Peru, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Comm'n
No. 540/1993, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/56/D/540/1993,
10 (1996), available at http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/3ae6b70910.html.
125. Christine Van den Wyngaert & Tom Ongena, Ne bis in idem Principle,Including the Issue of
Amnesty, in 1 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 705,
727 (Antonio Cassese et al eds., 2002).
126. Kathleen Ellen MacMillan, The Practicabilityof Amnesty as a Non-ProsecutoryAlternative in
Post-Conflict Uganda, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 199, 204-205, 224 (2007).
127. Id. at 231-32.
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determination, but would assume jurisdiction once the investigation was complete
and amnesty was granted.
What forecloses the ability of a grant of amnesty by a truth commission to
satisfy willingness is the extent to which it hinges on what "justice" means. An
expansive approach incorporates restorative justice, while the restrictive approach
is limited to retributive. We might find the answer in the principles of due process
recognized by international law, and the objects and purposes of the Statute. While
a conditional grant of amnesty requires a person to take responsibility through
confession, disclosure of the truth, an apology, or financial compensation,1 28 these
do not import criminal responsibility because our traditional understanding of
criminal responsibility entails punishment through imprisonment, community
service, and/or fines. 129 If due process includes procedural as well as substantive
fairness, 13 punishment is a component of due process recognized by international
law. This approach is supported by the preamble, which states that the most serious
'
crimes of concern must not go "unpunished."131
Restorative justice cannot not be a
substitute for retributive justice in any case, no matter the stage at which amnesty
is granted. Therefore, amnesty does not just preclude admissibility because it
shields a person from prosecution in a trial, but because it shields them from the
criminal consequences of guilt, namely, punishment. Even where the current South
African NPA prosecuting policy satisfies investigation and decision, amnesty does
not determine a matter inadmissible because it shields a perpetrator from
retributive justice.
c. Unable: Article 17(3)
Article 17(3) similarly gives meaning to "unable" by providing that the Court
shall consider whether a State is unable to arrest the accused or obtain necessary
evidence and testimony, or is otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings due to132a
total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system.
Where a state grants amnesties as part of a package because the number of
perpetrators makes it impossible, because it is unable to arrest the accused, or
because its legal system is in a state of disarray or collapse, 133 it would be held
"unable" upon a plain meaning of the word. Given the difficulty of satisfying the
requirements of other key terms, it would be absurd to attempt to find ways in
which an amnesty granted for these reasons would not be characterized as an
indication of an inability. The South African, Sierra Leonean, and Ugandan
situations demonstrate inability because the volume of perpetrators made it
impossible for the states to investigate and prosecute them.

128. MURPHY, supra note 64, at 45; see HELENA COBBAN, AMNESTY AFTER ATROCITY? HEALING
NATIONS AFTER GENOCIDE AND WAR CRIMES 71, 115,216 (2007).

129. This is supported by treaty-based duties in international law.
130. Williams & Schabas, supra note 58, at 623.
131. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, pmbl., Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
(entered into force July 1, 2002), available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/source/RecentTexts/romeen.htm [hereinafter Rome Statute].
132. Rome Statute, art. 17(3).
133. Majzub, supranote 42, at 268.

2011

BRINGING PEACE TO DARFUR AND UGANDA

d. Ne Bis In Idem - Trial and Court: Articles 17(1)(c) and 20
Articles 17(1)(c) and 20 preclude prosecution where the individual has been
tried for the same conduct in another court and convicted or acquitted. 134 The
ground is satisfied unless: (1) the trial shielded the accused from criminal
responsibility, or (2) was not independent and impartial in accordance with the
norms of due process and was inconsistent with an intent to bring a person to
justice.135 There are three ways in which truth and reconciliation commission
processes granting amnesty fail to meet this provision.1 36 First, a truth commission
hearing does not comport with what we ordinarily understand as a "trial" and
"court. 1 37 Even if we accept that the SATRC was sufficient because matters were
heard before Commissioners making reasoned determinations on the basis of
legislative criteria that were binding on local courts, it fails to meet the due process
requirements of criminal trials.1 38 While witnesses could be examined and crossexamined, the accused was not afforded the presumption of innocence and freedom
from self-incrimination.1 39 Rather, proceedings commenced from an assumption of
guilt, and the grant of amnesty hinged on an ability to incriminate oneself and
others. These requirements are contrary to fundamental rights contained in the
right to a fair trial in Articles 9 and 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights 140 and other regional instruments, such as the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights.1 41 While the reference to "norms of due process
recognized by international law" relates to independence and impartiality, 142 the
134.
135.
136.
"should

Rome Statute, arts. 17(1)(c), 20(1).
Rome Statute, art. 20(3)(a)-(b).
A footnote to the Preparatory Committee's draft of the Statute stated that draft article 15(1)(c)
also address, directly or indirectly, cases in which there was a prosecution resulting in
conviction or acquittal, as well as discontinuance of prosecution and possibly also pardons and
amnesties" but that "[i]t was agreed that these issues would be revisited in light of further revisions to
article 18." United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, Rome, It., June 15 - July 17, 1998, Report of the PreparatoryCommittee
on the Establishment of an InternationalCriminal Court, 41, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 (April
14, 1998), available at http://www.un.org/law/n9810105.pdf. The conference did not revisit the issue.
137. Van den Wyngaert & Ongena, supra note 125, at 727; see also Gavron, supra note 3, at 109;
Dugard, supranote 12, at 702.
138. See Ziyad Motala, The Use of the Truth Commission in South Africa as an Alternative Dispute
Resolution Mechanism Versus the InternationalLaw Obligations,45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 913, 92425 (2005) (discussing independence and impartiality problems in South Africa).
139. Id.
140. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter the ICCPR].
141. African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Jun. 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58.
Although it is arguable that these would only be relevant insofar as they are binding on the state.
142. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, pmbl., art. 20(3)(b), Jul. 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002), available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/source/
RecentTexts/rome-en.htm [hereinafter Rome Statute]. Article 20 contains an additional qualifier in
requiring the proceedings to be conducted "independently or impartially." Id These terms, which are
contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec.
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143
Pre-Trial Chamber may nevertheless take these additional norms into account.
Second, amnesty does not meet the qualifying words of "convicted" and
"acquitted." Not only does amnesty preclude a criminal trial in which a person can
be convicted, 144 it can hardly be said that amnesty constitutes an "acquittal," which
denotes an absence of guilt. Third, the traditional goal of the rule on double
jeopardy is "to prevent the state from repeatedly prosecuting a person for
offen[s]es arising out of the same incident until a conviction is obtained." 145 Given
a truth and reconciliation process is neither a prosecution nor an attempt to obtain a
conviction, upon a traditional approach, it would fall outside the ambit of ne bis in
idem.

A more expansive approach encompassing truth commissions is advocated by
states claiming that the restrictive approach is tainted by cultural imperialism and
is therefore not truly satisfactory as a norm of due process recognized by
international law. 146 This problem arises partly because treaty based rights and
norms are not yet universal. Claims of cultural imperialism have some merit if the
norms of due process were required to be customary. This is a hotly debated issue;
how it might be resolved involves a complex analysis of custom, its role, and the
participation of states in its establishment. It is tentatively posited that claims of
cultural imperialism are often closely tied to claims of cultural relativism, 147 which
are widely rejected on a number of grounds because the people often affected by
them object. While affected perpetrators might benefit from exceptions based on
cultural relativity, it cannot be said that victims would necessarily be so accepting.
In any event, this issue is foreclosed by the fourth ground, which is that amnesty
shields an accused from criminal responsibility and is inconsistent with the intent
to bring a person to justice.
2. The Interests of Justice
Article 53 provides that the prosecutor shall initiate an investigation unless he
or she determines that, when taking into account the gravity of the crime and the
interests of victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an
investigation would not serve the interests of justice.1 48 It also provides that the

10, 1948), and the ICCPR, ordinarily refer to courts, and require that they be "independent" of
government. Motala, supra note 138, at 924-25. Blanket amnesties granted by the executive cannot be
considered independent and impartial decisions or proceedings. It is unlikely that a body such as the
TRC, albeit quasi-judicial, was sufficiently independent to satisfy these requirements.
143. Rome Statute, art. 20(3)(b).
144. Gwen Young, Comment: Amnesty and Accountability, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 427, 464-65,
469 (2002).
145. Majzub, supranote 42, at 270.
146. See Martha Minow, Making History or Making Peace: When Prosecutions Should Give Way
to Commissions and Peace Negotiations, 7 J. HUM. RTS. 174 (2008) (noting that as a matter of
principle, prosecutions may be preferred over TRCs).
147. See e.g., Guyora Binder, CulturalRelativism and CulturalImperialism in Human Rights Law,
5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 211,217-18 (1999).
148. Rome Statute, arts. 53(1)(c), (2)(c). Article 48 of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence
further require that the Prosecutor consider article 53(1) when deciding to conduct a preliminary
examination of a situation.
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prosecutor may decline to prosecute if, upon investigation, he or she concludes that
there is no sufficient basis for a prosecution because it is not in the interests of
justice, taking into account all the circumstances including the gravity of the crime,
the interests of victims, the age or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator, and his or
her role in the alleged crime. 149 The Prosecutor applies both an evidentiary and
appropriateness test to determine whether to proceed with an investigation. 50
Whether the prosecutor can adopt an expansive approach accommodating amnesty
or must adopt a restrictive and exclusive approach depends upon two issues: (1)
the relevance and scope of the listed factors, including whether the interests of
justice are confined to the individual or to the situation as a whole, and (2) whether
those factors are exhaustive.
a. Scope of the Interests of Victims and the Role of the Perpetrator
In determining scope, the most relevant factor is the interests of victims.15 1
Whether amnesties are relevant to the interests of victims depends upon whether
those interests are limited to the matter at hand (i.e. the victims of the perpetrator)
or to the situation (i.e. future victims). The latter interpretation includes
considerations such as the extent to which prosecution might lead to further
violations because it creates incentives for those indicted to avoid conflict
resolution, and the extent to which alternative justice processes incorporating
amnesty facilitate stability and reconciliation of communities. This expansive
approach would require the Prosecutor to consider a tenuous connection between
investigating and prosecuting a perpetrator of crimes and future unknown victims.
The provision more logically requires that the interests of justice are limited to the
matter at hand because it requires the Prosecutor to demonstrate that it is not in the
interests of victims to investigate or prosecute. 152 In any event, even if a broader
view is adopted, it is difficult to argue that prosecution is not in the interests of
victims. In the case of actual victims, it does not presuppose an absence of other
reparative benefits. In the case of future victims, it might prevent that perpetrator
from committing further violations. 53 Upon the limited subset of factors, the
interests of justice would not accommodate amnesty.
Whether the role of perpetrators is relevant depends upon whether the role
regards their conduct in relation to the crime, their position in the organization to
which they belong, or the conflict. If role is to be relevant to amnesty, the
Prosecutor must be able to take a perpetrator's position into account. If a
149. Rome Statute, art. 53(2)(c). The different formulations may indicate nothing other than that
the Prosecutor has more latitude to investigate a person until their role is determined and until he or she
can establish who the perpetrator is. Morten Bergsmo & Pieter Kruger, Article 53: Initiation of an
Investigation, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 1065, 1072 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2d ed. 2008).

150. See Rome Statute, arts. 53(1)(a), 2(a) (containing the evidentiary test); Bergsmo & Kruger,
supranote 149, at 1067.
151. The age of the perpetrator is not relevant to amnesty.
152. Rome Statute, arts. 15(1)(f), (2)(f).
153. See Anja Seibert-Fohr, Symposium, Human Rights as Guiding Principles in the Context of
Post Conflict Justice, 13 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 179, 182 (2005) (noting that any model chosen has
implications for preventing future atrocities).
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perpetrator's role were relevant to amnesty, it would not be possible to adopt an
entirely expansive approach that defers to all amnesties because the role in itself
requires distinction between perpetrators. Role, in this regard, is relevant in one of
two ways. On the one hand, if amnesty granted to an authoritative figure facilitates
peace by permitting them to engage in negotiations without fear of prosecution, a
less restrictive view would find it not in the interests of justice to proceed with an
investigation or prosecution. The Prosecutor might take the role of the perpetrator
into account by deferring to amnesties for individuals with authority to negotiate
peace agreements. On the other hand, prosecuting authoritative figures might
prevent them from committing further violations. The prosecutor might then
prosecute only those most responsible, but not low-level perpetrators.
There is value in targeting those with authority and effective control to
condone or effectuate crimes because it may provide the only deterrent: making
government and rebel leaders aware of the possibility of prosecution might lead to
fewer violations.154 In Uganda, Kony's removal is vital to making the LRA
ineffectual, as he "stands at the apex of the LRA structure, politically, militarily,
'
and spiritually."155
The situation in Sudan is more complicated because
government leaders have been indicted, and instability in Darfur entrenches alBashir and other government leaders' positions (by preventing a unified front in
the region).156 If those indicted were arrested and successfully prosecuted, it is
possible that regime change (and possible international intervention) could reduce
crime and even stabilize the region.
The difficulty with this approach is that international courts and tribunals
have tended to commence their investigations by focusing on lower level
perpetrators in order to extract evidence to build their case against more senior
officials. 15 7 Like the ad hoe tribunals, the ICC has statute-based mechanisms by
which it can obtain evidence to build its case. For example, Article 93 provides
that states' parties must assist the ICC with evidence gathering, including the
taking of witness statements, execution of searches and seizures, and the provision
of records and documents.158 Gathering evidence necessarily relies on state
support, initially proffered by Uganda, but not at all by Sudan.
How the Prosecutor and the Court might consider role can be deduced from
the Appeals Chamber's decision in the Lubanga case.1 59 While the case dealt with

154. See Nsongurua J. Udombana, Pay Back Time in Sudan? Darfur in the InternationalCriminal
Court, 13 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 44 (2005) ("History has shown that the involvement of highly
placed functionaries or officials of states makes the commission of most international crimes possible; it
is great men, potential saints, not little men, who become merciless fanatics.")
155. Payam Akhavan, The Lord's Resistance Army Case: Uganda'sSubmission of the First State
Referral to the InternationalCriminal Court,99 AM. J. INT'L L. 403, 420 (2005).
156. AI-Bashir Should be Delivered to the ICC, Editorial, MMEGIONLINE (July 29, 2010),
http://new.mmegi.bw/index.php?sid=9&aid=3774&dir=2010/July/Thursday29.
157. For example, the ICTY's first trial was against Tadid, who was a prison guard.
158. Rome Statute, art. 93(1)(b), (1)(h)-(i).
159. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-8, Decision on the
Prosecutor's Application for a Warrant of Arrest, 37 (Feb. 10, 2006).
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the role of the perpetrator in relation to gravity, 160 it discussed the relevant

perpetrator's authority when determining the appropriateness of commencing an
investigation and prosecution. 161 In considering gravity, the Pre-Trial Chamber
held that the ICC's "deterrent effect would be greatest if [it] only dealt with the
highest-ranking perpetrators" because they "are the ones who can most effectively
prevent or stop the commission of such crimes." 162 Those "most senior leaders"
could be identified by: (1) the position played by the accused; (2) their role in
systemic or large-scale crimes; and (3) the role of state entities, organizations or
armed groups. 163 On appeal, the Prosecutor opposed this test because he said it
would:
[I]nappropriately limit his Prosecutorial discretion and would make it
impossible to investigate and prosecute perpetrators lower down the
chain of command... ; the investigation and prosecution of low and midlevel perpetrators may in certain circumstances be necessary to generate
evidence and build a case against the perpetrators on the highest
level. 164

He went on to argue that:
[T]he Pre-Trial Chamber improperly placed emphasis on the authority
of suspects to negotiate and sign peace agreements, and.., improperly
created a criterion that suspects have to be core actors in the decisionmaking process of policies or practices or have autonomy to change or
165
to prevent the implementation of policies and practices.

The Appeals Chamber agreed. It found that it is "more logical to assume that
the deterrent effect of the Court is highest if no category of perpetrators is per se
excluded from potentially being brought before the court," 1 6 6 and the "capacity of
individuals to prevent crimes in the field should not be implicitly or inadvertently
assimilated to the preventative role of the Court more generally." 167 The Appeals

160. Gravity is relevant to admissibility at the investigation stage and the interests of justice. Rome
Statute, arts. 17(1)(d), 53(1)(c), 2(c). While gravity should be interpreted the same way for both, its
inclusion under article 53 ensures that the Prosecutor takes gravity into account when considering the
interests of justice. So while gravity is not left entirely to the Prosecutor's discretion because it is a
constituent part of article 17, it can nevertheless play a role in aspects of the Prosecutor's discretion that
are subject to limited judicial review. See Bergsmo & Kruger, supra note 149, at 1071; Sharon A.
Williams & William A. Schabas, Article 17: Issues of Admissibility, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 605,

621 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2d ed. 2008) (discussing gravity).
161. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-8, Decision on the
Prosecutor's Application for a Warrant of Arrest, 37 (Feb. 10, 2006).
162. Ex parte Prosecutor, Case No. ICC-01/04, Judgment on the Prosecutor's Appeal against the
decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled "Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for Warrants of
Arrest, Article 58," 73 (Jul. 13, 2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc183559.pdf.
163. Id. 56.
164. Id. 66.
165. Id. 67.
166. Id. 73.
167. Id. 74.
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Chamber found that the criteria developed by the Pre-Trial Chamber ignored that
"the highly variable constitutions and operations of different organizations could
encourage any future perpetrators to avoid criminal responsibility before the [ICC]
simply by ensuring that they are not a visible part of the high-level decision
making process. 1 68 It emphasized that "individuals who are not at the very top of
an organization may still carry a considerable influence and commit, or generate
the widespread commission of, very serious crimes."1 6 9 Consequently, the Appeals
Chamber found the factors related to role identified by the Pre-Trial
Chamber were
"not necessarily directly related to gravity in article 17(1)(d). 170
The Prosecutor and the Court were concerned that: (1) the authority and
influence of individuals is highly variable and may not be determined by ranking
within an organization or in a situation, and (2) regard to role in an organization or
conflict would detract from the preventative and punitive goals of the Court.171
Even though the decision concerned gravity, these principles are highly pertinent
to the scope and relevance of role more generally. The case indicates that not only
the Prosecutor, but also the Court, will adopt the more restrictive approach; that is,
172
that role relates to the crime rather than the perpetrator's authority and influence.
Adopting a middle road, where only amnesty for those most responsible is upheld,
is not a viable option.
b. Other Factors
While subject to debate, the Prosecutor may take into account other grounds
at both the investigation and prosecution stages. In determining whether to
investigate, the Prosecutor must consider whether he has substantial reasons to
believe investigation would not serve the interests of justice, even when taking into
account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims. 173 Additional factors
are required to determine whether the Prosecutor can demonstrate substantial
reasons. 174 Article 53(2)(c) adopts a more straightforward approach in its use of the
word "including." Additional gaps in Article 53 lend support to a broad
discretion
175
to consider the additional political and social factors identified above.

168. Id. 77.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. It is notable that, in the Al Bashir case, the Pre-Trial Chamber found that it "neither has the
power to review, nor is responsible for, the Prosecution's assessment that, under the current
circumstances in Sudan, the initiation of a case against Omar Al Bashir and three alleged commanders
of organized armed groups would not be detrimental to the interests of justice." Prosecutor v. Omar
Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/09, Decision on Prosecution's Application for
Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, 15 (Mar. 4, 2009).
173. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts. 53(1)(c), 2(c), Jul. 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002), available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/source/
RecentTexts/rome-en.htm. [hereinafter Rome Statute].
174. According to Bergsmo & Kruger, the word "[shall] does not give the Prosecutor room for
arbitrary decision making if he or she assesses the preliminary information as providing a reasonable
basis on which to proceed under the Statute." Bergsmo & Kruger, supra note 149, at 1068.
175. Stahn, supranote 93, at 719-20.
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The factors that may be taken into account depend upon what we mean by
justice. There are three ways in which we might define it: (1) as a term of law
limited to retributive justice (as per article 17); (2) as a term of law which has been
broadened by state practice to incorporate peace building, reconciliation, and
reparation; or (3) where law has not been broadened by state practice, as a term
incorporating legal, political, and social factors. 176 The first and most restrictive
view would limit justice to retributive justice. As noted in the introduction, the
second approach is unclear as a matter of customary international law. 177
The third
and expansive approach leaves scope for amnesties to be accommodated.
17
Many scholars put forward grounds supporting an expansive view.
According to Ohlin, "it is difficult to think of a factor that would not be
relevant. 1 79 GropengieBer and Meiffner concur, arguing that the interests ofjustice
incorporate more than "just criminali[z]ation of an offence, because the
circumstances of the offence, the perpetrator, and the victim can be outweighed by
other factors not related to wrongfulness and guilt."180 According to their
interpretation, justice incorporates "a peaceful society."18' 1 Bourdon notes that the
statute drafters "wished... to give 'carte blanche' to the Prosecutor to take a
decision which is quite clearly entirely political, namely a decision in the course of
which he would have to weigh the requirement of peace and reconciliation on the
one hand against the need for justice on the other. 1 12 Goldstone and Fritz agree
that "few would aver that [justice] is demanding in the sense that it is always
'
retributive."183
According to these scholars, the expansive approach allows the
Prosecutor to consider broader goals such as amnesty's contribution to effecting

176. Rome Statute, art. 17.
177. According to Gavron, which ground a court adopts might be dependent on whether a civil
rather than common law approach is adopted. Gavron, supra note 3, at 110. Given international courts
and tribunals adopt a combination of civil and common law approaches, it is difficult to say which
approach will be influential.
178. However, few of these argue that an expansive view is justified. See Eric Blumenson, The
Challenge of a Global Standard of Justice: Peace, Pluralism, and Punishment at the International
Criminal Court,44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 801, 803 (2006); Elizabeth M. Evenson, Note, Truth and
Justice in Sierra Leone: CoordinationBetween Commission and Court, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 730, 733
(2004); Robert Gomez, Transitional States, The ICC, and Amnesties: Establishing an Advisory
Commission, 3 Eyes on the ICC 57 (2006); Philipp Kastner, The ICC in Darfur - Savior or Spoiler? 14
ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 145, 166-67 (2007); Majzub, supranote 42 at 249; Minow, supra note 146,
at 175; Newman, supra note 6, at 322; Scharf, supra note 58 at 350; Ronald C. Slye, The Legitimacy of
Amnesties Under InternationalLaw and General Principlesof Anglo-American Law: Is a Legitimate
Amnesty Possible?, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 173, 183-84 (2002); Charles Trumbull IV, Giving Amnesties a
Second Chance, 25 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 284, 313 (2007).
179. Ohlin, supranote 36, at 188.
180. GropengieBer & MeiBner, supranote 121, at 193.
181. Id.
182. William Bourdon, Amnesty, CRIMES OF WAR A-Z GUIDE, http://www.crimesofwar.org/
thebook/amnesty.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2011). The problem with this approach is that it is circular; it
distinguishes reconciliation from justice such that the interests of justice, upon a literal interpretation,
exclude reconciliation.
183. Richard Goldstone & Nicole Fritz, The ICC Prosecutor's UnprecedentedPowers, 13 LEIDEN
J. INT'L L. 655, 662 (2000).
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conflict resolution, reconciling communities, eliciting truth about and causes of the
conflict, in addition to a need for certainty and stability (post-conflict) to maintain
the rule of law.
Many others opt for the more restrictive approach. 184 While ICC's Office of
the Prosecutor's Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice dealt with amnesty in
passing, it comprehensively set out the grounds for adopting a more restrictive
approach.185 The Prosecutor submits that justice contributes to peace, which he
reinforces with the statement made by the Secretary General of the United Nations
that "[j]ustice, peace and democracy are not mutually exclusive objectives, but
rather mutually reinforcing imperatives. 186 Discretion is to be guided by the
objects and purposes of the Statute, "namely the prevention of serious crimes of
concern to the international community through ending impunity" and the
guarantee of "lasting respect for and enforcement of international justice., 187 The
Prosecutor's conclusion is buttressed by the consistent trend in the last ten to
fifteen years of imposing a duty on states to prosecute, which indicates that the
pursuit of justice is not a question of whether we agree or disagree in moral or
practical terms, but a matter of the law. 188 The policy is explicit that the ICC's
justice mandate (i.e. to prosecute) must be carried out independently and that, for
all other matters involving the interaction of humanitarian, security, political,
development, and justice elements, the OTP will "work constructively with and
respect the mandates of those engaged in other areas."18 9 While the interests of
justice accommodate "crime prevention and security[J... the broader matter of
international peace and security is not the responsibility of the Prosecutor" but that
of the Security Council. 190 Factors which might then be taken into account in this
restrictive approach would include those already identified by the objects of the
statute, such as the prevention of impunity. The Prosecutor might then decide it is
not in the interests of justice to proceed where the victims have already obtained
some form of reparation, the perpetrator is a low-level offender who might have
committed a small number of violations, investigation and prosecution of the
matter will not extract evidence that might be useful in cases against more senior
figures, and refraining from prosecution will not contribute to widespread impunity
and lawlessness.
Before going on to consider how the Security Council and the situations in
four countries affect the application of these approaches, there are three restrictions
on Prosecutorial discretion that impact additional factors and might be taken into
account. First, while it is desirable to accommodate all other relevant factors, it is
necessary to exclude factors that are explicitly or impliedly taken into account by

184. For example, see Roth, supra note 41, at 765; Gareth Evans, cited in the OTP's Newsletter,
supranote 40, at 5.
185. OTP Policy Paper, supra note 31, at 1.
186. Id at 8.
187. Id.at 1, 4.

188. Id. at4.
189. Id. at 8.
190. Id at 8-9.
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the interests of victims and the role of the perpetrator. These would include
consideration of the Prosecutor's impact upon potential future victims, i.e. the
possibility that prosecution might lead to further violations, and whether the
perpetrator might be in a position to effect peace negotiations. Further, the factors
must demonstrate that it is not in the interests of justice to investigate or prosecute.
Second, because of the explicit phrase "under this Statute" in the chapeau of
Article 53(1), when making decisions the Prosecutor must take into account the
Statute's preambular objectives of ensuring that the most serious crimes do not go
unpunished, effective prosecution is ensured, and ICC prosecutions are
complementary to national criminal jurisdiction, put an end to impunity, and
guarantee lasting respect for the enforcement of internationaljustice.1 91 What
justice might mean is justice in the international rather than domestic sense;
according to the weight of state practice, international justice generally requires
criminal prosecution and punishment. Third, Articles 53(1)(c) and 2(c) adopt a
higher burden of proof at both the investigation and prosecution stage. 92 The
chapeau of Article 53(1) requires the Prosecutor to have a reasonable basis to
refrain from investigating.1 93 However, reasonable basis upon investigation is
raised to reasonable grounds at the arrest warrant stage (Article 58) and substantial
reasons and sufficient basis at the confirmation of indictment stage (Article
53(1)(c) and 2(c) respectively). 194 On their ordinary meaning, substantial and
sufficient require more than "reasonable."1 95 The Prosecutor must have more than
suspicion that a prosecution (irrespective of whether amnesty had been granted)
would impact upon peace negotiations.1 96 Fourth, and as discussed in relation to
the interests of victims, the factors should be limited to matters "directly bearing
197
on the case itself," that is, the individual matter rather than the broad situation.
This might be supported by the substantial reasons test, because a more expansive
approach would require a considerable amount of speculation regarding tenuous
connections between potential victims and the effects of investigation and
prosecution. Individualization is consistent with the scope of the other factors that
the Prosecutor may take into account including the role and age of the perpetrator,
and the gravity of the crime, which are necessarily individual in nature. This

191. The final paragraph of the Preamble provides that states resolve to "guarantee lasting respect
for and the enforcement of international justice." Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
pmbl., Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002), available at
http://treaties.un.org/doc/source/RecentTexts/rome-en.htm [hereinafter Rome Statute]. It is of no
relevance that this phrase is not in the chapeau of article 53(2) because the Prosecutor must have
already considered the objects of the statute in terms of the interests ofjustice at the investigation stage.
192. See Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the
Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir,
8-9 (Mar.
4, 2009) (Judge Ugacka Dissenting); and Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, Case No. ICC02/05-01/09-OA, Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the "Decision on the Prosecution's
Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir," 30 (Feb. 3, 2010).
193. Rome Statute, arts. 15(3), 15(6), 53(1).
194. Rome Statute, art. 53(2).
195. Bergsmo & Kruger, supra note 149, at 1069.
196. Id at 1071-72.
197. Gavron, supranote 3, at 110.
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limitation alone could exclude amnesty from consideration because it requires the
Prosecutor to consider the impact of prosecution of one individual on the peace
process, rather than the impact of failing to give deference to national amnesties
more generally.
C. The Security Council
The Security Council may request deferral of any investigation or prosecution
into situations or of individuals for twelve months, irrespective of the method by
which the ICC exercises jurisdiction. 198 It may do so under two circumstances: (1)
when it has issued a resolution pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and (2)
where "deferral is consistent with the purpose and principles of the United Nations
with respect to maintaining international peace and security, resolving threatening
situations in conformity with principles of justice and international law, and
promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms under Article 24 of
the UN Charter."1 99 While each deferral may only extend for twelve months, there
is no limit to the number of times it can be renewed; 200 it could defer indefinitely
provided there is political willingness within the Security Council. Nevertheless,
Chapter VII of the UN Charter limits the Security Council as the deferral must be
justified on the grounds of peace and/or security.20 1 When a situation has
stabilized, and peace is seemingly achieved, the Security Council would lose its
power to defer.
Some argue that the referral power in Article 13 nevertheless gives the
Security Council greater scope to limit jurisdiction by allowing it to impose
conditions on referrals of situations, and thereby allowing it to "insulate domestic
amnesty arrangements from the reach of the ICC. ' ' 20 2 However, this view is
unwarranted. Even if the phrase "acting under Chapter VII" in Article 13 could be
interpreted to afford the Security Council a broad power, the drafting history
justifies a restrictive view. The first draft put forward by the International Law
Commission (ILC) in 1994 provided that the ICC could not exercise jurisdiction
over a situation where the Security Council was dealing with it as a threat to peace
or security, unless the Security Council issued a resolution.2 3 Some ILC members
opposed the provision on the basis that it was inappropriate that a political decision
of another forum could prevent the Court from operating.20 4 Investigations and
prosecutions upon referral or propio motu were introduced and the Security
198. Rome Statute, art. 16.
199. See Scharf, supranote 58, at 369 (referring to U.N. Charter, arts. 24, 39, para. 1).
200. Rome Statute, art. 16.

201. The Security Council may only issue a resolution when the matter constitutes a threat to the
peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. See U.N. Charter art. 39.
202. David Scheffer, Staying the course with the InternationalCriminal Court, 35 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 47, 90 (2002); see also Dan Sarooshi, The Peace and Justice Paradox: The InternationalCriminal
Court and the UN Security Council, in THE PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: LEGAL
AND POLICY ISSUES 95, 97 (Dominic McGoldrick, Peter Rowe, and Eric Donnelly eds., 2004).
203. Morten Bergsmo & Jelena Pejid, Article 16: Deferral of Investigation or Prosecution, in
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 595, 595 (Otto
Triffterer ed., 2d ed. 2008).
204. Id at 596.
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Council's power was restricted to 12-month deferrals.20 5
Whether the Security Council would exercise its deferral power on the basis
of amnesty is likely to depend upon the means by which the ICC came to exercise
jurisdiction. It is difficult to reconcile deferral with a prior referral by the Security
Council, such as in the case of Darfur, because referral assumes that exercising
international criminal jurisdiction contributes to peace. 206 It is also unlikely that the
Security Council would defer a matter where a state had referred the situation,
unless that state made a subsequent request for it to do so. There are few obvious
constraints impeding Security Council intervention in the case of a propio motu
investigation 207 other than a desire to maintain the perception of prosecutorial
independence.
While the Security Council has been willing over the last two decades to

intervene in conflicts that will fall within the ICC's jurisdiction on the basis that
they are a threat to peace and security,20 8 the threshold might be such that the
power would very rarely be used209 in general, let alone for amnesty. Moreover, it
is unlikely that the Security Council would vote for repeated and indefinite
deferrals affecting the long-term ability of the Court to exercise jurisdiction. The
consequence of a Security Council deferral is, at least in the short-term, a political
one. It might add legitimacy to amnesties as a tool for ensuring peace and security,
and strengthen the position of advocates of amnesty. However, in the face of
eventual prosecution, the political impact is unlikely to lead to a customary norm
in favor of amnesty, particularly given the debate regarding amnesties for serious
crimes is more concerned with conditions
imposed on the amnesties rather than on
1°
permission or prohibition per se.

If the Security Council required deferral, the Prosecutor could challenge the
resolution in the Pre-Trial Chamber. It is arguable that the Court would not be
constrained by a Security Council resolution because it retains competence de la
competence: the competence to determine its own jurisdiction over rationae loci
2
and rationaepersonae.
It is not a subsidiary body. Rather, it "wrest[s] some
powers from the [Security Council]. 212 If this were the case, the decision whether
to uphold an amnesty turns on: (1) whether the Security Council has jurisdiction to

205. Id. at 597.
206. Id at 599.
207. But see Han, supra note 119, at 101.
208. Gavron, supranote 3, at 109.

209. Id.
210. See discussion infra Part III.
211. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 19(1), Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90

(entered into force July 1, 2002), available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/source/RecentTexts/romeen.htm; see also Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defense Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 6 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995);
Scharf, supranote 58, at 369 (arguing that the Tadit case "suggests that the ICC could assert that it has
authority to independently assess whether these two requirements are met.").
212. Udombana, supra note 154, at 6. Parties opposed to the initial draft provision argued that it
"infringed on the judicial independence of the court," and/or that that the International Court of Justice
was not subject to similar controls. See Bergsmo & Peji6, supra note 204, at 596.
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exercise its powers, and (2) whether it has done so in a way consistent with the
purposes and principles of the UN Charter.
In regards to the first, it is debatable whether the Pre-Trial Chamber has the
competence to determine the existence of a threat to peace or an act of aggression,
as these are primarily political determinations. 213 States have conferred primary
2 4
responsibility to the Security Council for the maintenance of peace and security. 1
According to Bergsmo, the ICC Statute does not and could not weaken the
Council's ability to fulfill its obligations under the UN Charter; rather, the Court
becomes a tool for maintaining peace and security.21 5 While seemingly inconsistent
with the independence of the Court, as a matter of constitutional order, authority to
assess threats to peace and security could be an inappropriate extension of power
in determining admissibility. 216 This is not to say that support for a residual power
to determine whether the Security Council resolution is consistent with the
purposes and principles of the UN isn't warranted. The competence de la
competence of international judicial institutions to review Security Council
resolutions was upheld in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia's (ICTY) Tadi6 case, 217 and the International Court of Justice's
Namibia, Wall, and Serbia cases. 2 " The Court's power of review would be limited
to assessing its own jurisdiction, 219 and the extent to which a Security Council
resolution complies with article 16 of the Rome Statute, 220 such as to determine

213. In regard to aggression, the Pre-Trial Chamber has not been authorized to determine an act of
aggression as a matter of criminal culpability because states have not yet agreed on its definition; it
therefore remains an essentially political rather than legal determination.
214. U.N. Charter arts. 24, 39.
215. Morten Bergsmo, OccasionalRemarks on Certain State Concerns About the Jurisdictional
Reach of the International Criminal Court, and their Possible Implications for their Relationship
Between the Courtand the Security Council, 69 NORDIC J. OF INT'L L. 87, 113 (2000).
216. Ntoubandi argues that the ICJ nevertheless is competent to determine a dispute between the
ICC and the Security Council regarding the existence of a threat to peace or security. NTOUBANDI,
supranote 11, at 206.
217. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction 29, 30 (Oct. 2, 1995).
218. In Tadi, the ICTY found the power "implicit in the notion of adjudication itself." Id. 18.
Although not reviewing resolutions directed at it, the ICJ used its power in the Legal Consequences for
States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J 16, 35,
66-67 (June 21); and
in Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. &
Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 91, 212 (Feb. 26). See Sarooshi, supra note 203, at 114.
The European Court of Justice, the Human Rights Committee and the United Kingdom House of Lords
have also adopted various approaches to adjudicating Security Council Resolutions ranging from
interventionist to deferent: Kadi & Al Barakaat Int'l Found. v. Council of the European Union &
Comm'n of the European Comty., 2008 Eur. Ct. H. R. 1-06351 (2008); Sayadi & Vinck v. Belgium,
CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006, Application to have names removed from the Consolidated List of the
United Nations Sanctions Committe (U.N. Human Rights Committee Dec. 29, 2008); R (on the
application of al-Jedda) v. Secretary of State for Defence, [2007] UKHL 58; Behrami v. France and
Saramati v. France, Germany & Norway, Joined Cases 71412/01 & 78166/01, Eur. Ct. H. R. (2007),
available at http://graduateinstitute.ch/faculty/clapham/hrdoc/docs/ECHRBehrami.doc.
219. Sarooshi, supranote 203, at 115.
220. Id. at 98-99; see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 42, Jul. 17, 1998,

2011

BRINGING PEACE TO DARFUR AND UGANDA

whether it constitutes "an abuse of authority.., or [an] obvious and grave
deficiency. '221 Determining an abuse of process or grave deficiency would allow
the Court to find that the resolution was unfounded because it was clearly outside
Security Council power. The Court could also find that the resolution was
inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the UN as required by Article 24,
paragraph 2 of the UN Charter,222 where the Security Council attempted to resolve
a threatening situation in a way that is inconsistent with "justice and international
law,, 223 a legal rather than political determination. This would require an
assessment of the status of amnesties under international law.224 It is arguable that
the Court can find a resolution invalid if it does not take into account the jus
cogens character of an obligation or a duty to prosecute. 225
How this issue is resolved may still depend upon the international
constitutional order, the hierarchical status between member states, the Security
Council, and the ICC. According to GropengieBer and MeiBner, any findings by
the Court would be binding on ratifying states since they have subjected
themselves to its authority. 226 However, states are also bound by Security Council
resolutions pursuant to Article 103 of the UN Charter, which provides that "[i]n the
event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations
under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail., 227 Security
Council resolutions have a hierarchical supremacy over international treaties.228
One view is that, to the extent that a resolution would require a state to take or
not take action, it would only bind that member state and not the ICC, which has a
distinct legal personality. 29 The Security Council cannot operate beyond its own
powers to require the ICC to act inconsistently with its own treaty obligations. The
23 0
court retains authority to determine whether Article 16 was complied with

2187
U.N.T.S.
90
(entered
into
force
July
1,
2002),
available
at
http://treaties.un.org/doc/source/RecentTexts/rome-en.htm [hereinafter Rome Statute]; see also the
discussion of article 53 of the Rome Statute below.
221. Gropengieller & Mei~ner, supranote 121, at 191.
222. See Rome Statute, art. 16 (requiring that the Security Council act in accordance with Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter, which in turn requires it to comply with the purposes and principles of the UN
laid out in article 24 of the U.N. Charter).
223. See U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 2; see also U.N. Charter pmbl.
224. Roht-Arriaza, supranote 15, at 80.
225. Gropengieller & Mei~ner, supranote 121, at 191.
226. Id.
227. U.N. Charter art. 103; see Bergsmo & Pejid, supra note 204, at 596 (noting that in the context
of complete Security Council control over the jurisdiction of the ICC, a proposed preambular "savings
clause" to ensure the Charter was paramount was rejected).
228. R (on the application of al-Jedda) v. Sec'y of State for Defence, [2007] UKHL 58.
229. Sarooshi, supra note 203, at 106; see also Rome Statute, art. 48(2) (requiring member States
to carry out decisions of the Security Council "directly and through their action in the appropriate
international agencies of which they are members"); Matthew Happold, Darfur, The Security Council,
and the InternationalCriminalCourt, 55 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 226, 233 (2006).
230. Sarooshi, supranote 203, at 106-07.
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because neither member State obligations nor Security Council Resolutions could
alter its treaty-based obligations.23 1
The alternate view is put forward by Gropengieer and Meiner, who argue
that member states cannot contract out of the UN Charter and Security Council
obligations by creating an international organization, and that any such
international organization is indirectly bound by the obligations of its member
states.232 That resolutions are directed at the ICC rather than member states might
be resolved by Cassese who described an analogous institution, the ICTY, as a
"giant without arms and legs - it needs artificial limbs to walk and work. And
those artificial limbs are state authorities. 233 The ICC becomes a conglomeration
of member states. Sarooshi adds that the retention of Security Council "veto"
rights supports the retention of Security Council discretion because states could
merely have required a referral without a Chapter VII resolution.234 That referral
required such a resolution could indicate an intention to provide the Security
Council with authority over the ICC. This is nevertheless resolved by accepting
that the Court has the authority to determine whether the Security Council acted in
excess of its power because as a judicial body, it is distinguished from member
states. 235 The ICC fulfills a judicial function in an international separation of
powers, and the Security Council the executive. 216 Member states will be bound by
court decisions because the resolution would not be lawful and would not
withstand Article 103 of the UN Charter.
Whether the Pre-Trial Chamber will adopt a cautious approach is yet to be
seen; the paradox is that, while politicization might threaten the ICC's legitimacy,
it needs political backing to maintain it. Nevertheless, as Ohlin notes, it might be
"highly unlikely that the [ICC] will be staffed by sitting judges who are inclined to
take the conservative legal view that the Court - an independent judicial body must bow to237determinations made by the Security Council, an explicitly political
legal body.,
D. Summary
If the Prosecutor defers to amnesties granted by truth commissions in terms of
admissibility, he must find that they satisfy two things: (1) the terms investigation
and decision, or (2) the requirement of ne bis in idem.238 In either case, they must

231. Kastner, supra note 179, at 153.
232. Gropengieger & Meiner, supra note 121, at 189-90; see also Lipscomb, supra note 25, at
201-02.
233. Antonio Cassese, On the Current Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of
Breaches ofInternationalHumanitarianLaw, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 2, 13 (1998).
234. Sarooshi, supranote 203, at 100-101.
235. Id. at 106-107, 113-14.
236. But see Stefan Talmon, The Security Council As World Legislature, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 175,
175, 177 (2005) (stating that the Security Council acts as a quasi-legislative body).
237. Ohlin, supranote 36, at 194.
238. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts. 17, 20, Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
(entered into force July 1, 2002), available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/source/RecentTexts/romeen.htm [hereinafter Rome Statute]; see Han, supranote 119, at 98.
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also demonstrate a willingness to bring a perpetrator to justice.239 The first ground
is arguable if investigation and decision do not require prosecution to be the
objective of investigation (albeit unlikely given the intersection of investigation
and prosecution in the statute). The second ground, ne bis in idem, is likely to fail
largely because a truth commission does not have the power to convict or acquit.
Even if either of those grounds were satisfied, a conditional amnesty granted by a
truth commission will not satisfy admissibility because amnesty cannot do
anything other than shield a perpetrator from prosecution and from retributive
justice. The only avenue open to the Prosecutor to defer to amnesty is to find that it
is in the interests of justice because: (1) justice is a term of law which has been
broadened by state practice to incorporate peace building, reconciliation, and
reparation; or (2) justice is a term incorporating legal, political, and social
factors.240 How the Prosecutor or the Pre-Trial Chamber might decide the latter
could be informed by assessing the functional and structural significance of
Security Council power. The residual deferral power of the Security Council
indicates that the ICC's role is to, as contended by Gareth Evans, interpret its
rationaepersonae as a purely legal matter to the exclusion of world, regional, or
domestic politics. 241 The Security Council retains the power to trump ICC
jurisdiction for a determinate period where policy matters prevail.242
II. CASE STUDIES

In order to consider whether the Prosecutor can or should adopt an expansive
view of the interests of justice, it is necessary to place the framework outlined in
context by examining the situations of Darfur and Uganda, which are currently
subject to ICC jurisdiction, and Sierra Leone and South Africa, which offered
amnesties in conjunction with domestic or international prosecution.
A. Darfur
The conflicts plaguing the South, West (Darfur), and East of Sudan since the
1980's evolved out of increasing marginalization of periphery communities from
the centralized government led by General Omar al-Bashir. 243 Al-Bashir's military
dictatorship following seizure of power in 1989 neglected periphery communities
and exploited the cleavage between farmers and herdsman by abolishing tribal land
allocation and the governing structure; it imposed government appointed
administrators and politicized the divide between Africans and Arabs.244 The

239. See Rome Statute, art. 17(2) (defining unwillingness on the part of a State); see also Han,
supranote 119, at 98.
240. See GropengieBer & Meilner, supranote 121, at 192-94; Roht, supra note 15, at 81; see also
Ohlin, supranote 36, at 198-99.
241. OTP's Newsletter, supra note 40, at 5.
242. See Bergsmo & Pejid, supra note 204, at 598 ("[T]he Security Council's deferral power
confirms its decisive role in dealing with situations where the requirements of peace and justice seem to
be in conflict."); see also Han, supra note 119, at 100.
243. See OMER ISMAIL & MAGGIE FICK, DARFUR REBELS 101, THE ENOUGH PROJECT (Jan. 2009),

available at http://www.enoughproject.org/files/publications/Darfur%/o2ORebels%/o20101.pdf.
244. Kastner, supra note 179, at 156-57 ("[Arabs and Africans] have intermarried in the past and..
•are all Muslim and mostly speak Arabic"); Lipscomb, supra note 25, at 188-89; Peper A. Nyaba, The
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simmering conflict in Darfur erupted in April 2003 when the rebel groups, the
Sudanese Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M), and later the Justice and Equality
Movement (JEM), attacked government forces.245 When the government failed to
halt the insurrection it recruited mercenaries from other countries 246 and re-armed,
trained, and funded the Arab militia group, the Janjaweed (literally 'devils on
horseback'), and partly incorporated them into the army through the Popular
Defense Force.247 The Janjaweed, allegedly upon government orders, targeted the
civilian populations of the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit tribes to prevent them from
joining or supporting the SLA/M and JEM.248 International crimes constituting
crimes against humanity and war crimes 249 - including genocide, persecution,
murder, rape, burning and pillaging of villages, disappearances, torture, the forced
250
recruitment of child soldiers, and attacks on peacekeepers, humanitarian forces,
and internally displaced persons (IDPs) within IDP camps 251 - were allegedly
committed by government or government backed actors. In May 2004, the
Sudanese government established the National Commission of Inquiry (National
Commission) to investigate alleged violations of human rights by armed groups in
Darfur, which reported that all parties committed crimes, but that the numbers of
persons killed was exaggerated, and that rape and crimes of sexual violence were
not widespread or systemic. 25 2 It recommended judicial253investigation of specific
incidents and a committee to investigate property losses.
The international community was slow to respond. It initially turned a blind
eye to Darfur with the expectation that Sudan's demonstration of good faith and
resolution of the North-South conflict would serve as a precursor and model for
peace. 25421Despite invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter,255 deference to state

GrassrootsPeace Making in South Sudan

A resortto an Indigenous African Justice System, 8(1) E.

AIR. J. PEACE HUM. RTs. 97, 99 (2002).

245. Christopher D. Totten & Nicholas Tyler, Arguing for an IntegratedApproach to Resolving the
Crisis in Darfur: the Challenges of Complementarity, Enforcement, and Related Issues in the

InternationalCriminal Court,98(3) J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1069, 1083 (2008); Udombana, supra
note 154, at 5-6.
246. Kastner, supra note 179, at 157.
247. Id at 158-60; Udombana, supranote 154, at 6-7.
248. Kastner, supra note 179, at 159.
249. Lipscomb, supranote 25, at 185.
250. Heather Cash, Security Council Resolution 1593 and Conflicting Principles of International
Law: How the Future of the International Criminal Court is at Stake, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 573, 575
(2007); Robert Cryer, Sudan, Resolution 1593, and InternationalCriminal Justice, 19(1) LEIDEN J.

INT'L L. 195, 198 (2006); Udombana, supranote 154, at 6.
251. See Cryer, supra note 252, at 198 (stating 1.65 million remain displaced in camps in Sudan,
and two million crossed into refugee camps in neighboring Chad); see also Lipscomb, supra note 25, at
187.

252. Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry on Darfur, Report to the United Nations Secretary Generalpursuant
to Security Council Resolution 1546 of18 September 2004,

456, 461, U.N. Doc. S/2005/60 (Jan. 25,

2005), available at http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com-inq_darfur.pdf [hereinafter Int'l Comm'n of
Inquiry on Darfur].
253. Id. 461.
254. Lipscomb, supranote 25, at 191-92; Kastner, supranote 179, at 161.
255. Cryer, supranote 252, at 199; see also S.C. Res., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1556 (July 30, 2004).
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sovereignty and ongoing economic interests meant the Security Council only
provided for a limited arms embargo that failed to include the government, and
therefore, the Janjaweed, but did not impose economic sanctions or support
intervention on humanitarian grounds.256 When these measures were largely
ineffective, 257 it established a Commission of Inquiry, 258 which recommended that
the Security Council refer the matter to the ICC on the basis that prosecution
outside of the locus delicti "might ensure a neutral atmosphere and prevent the
trials from stirring up political, ideological or other passions., 259 The impossibility
of domestic trials, it reasoned, was demonstrated by the insufficient findings of the
Sudanese National Commission of Inquiry, which lacked impartiality because it
was under pressure to present a view favorable to the government. 260 The Security
Council referred the matter to the ICC in March 2005.261 On June 6th, the
Prosecutor opened an investigation into the situation, noting that it would "form
part of a collective effort, complementing African Union and other initiatives
[including traditional
African mechanisms] to end the violence in Darfur and to
262
promote justice.
In response to the referral, the Sudanese government created the Darfur
Special Criminal Court to prosecute crimes against humanity in June 2005.263 The
ICC Prosecutor indicated that he would monitor its role,264 but it soon became
apparent that the Court would not meet the test of genuineness 265
.
The unwillingness of the Sudanese government to genuinely resolve the
situation was further demonstrated by the Darfur Peace Agreement negotiated by
the Sudanese government in May 2006 in Abuja. 266 The agreement failed largely
because the government insisted that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for the
North-South conflict define the boundaries of the Darfur agreement, which left
little room for negotiation and indicated that the government held on to the
256. Kastner, supra note 179, at 162-63; see also Lipscomb, supra note 25, at 192 (stating that
ongoing economic interests include oil interests (of three members) and arms deals by four of the
permanent members of the Security Council).
257. Kastner, supra note 179, at 162-63.
258. Cryer, supranote 252, at 200; see also S.C. Res. 1564, 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1564 (Sept. 18,
2004).
259. Cryer, supranote 252, at 201, 203.
260. Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry on Darfur, supra note 254, at 462.
261. S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
262. Press Release, ICC, The Prosecutor of the ICC opens investigations in Darfur, ICC-OTP0606-104 (June 6, 2005), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/31F3684F-43BC-4D5E-9EOAA6A8DAC308EB.htm.
263. Totten & Tyler, supranote 247, at 1096.
264. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Second Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to
the UN Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593, 2-3 (Dec. 13, 2005), available at http://www2.icccpi.intlNR/rdonlyres/2CFC 123-B4DF-4FEB-BEF452E0CAC8AA79/0/LMOUNSC ReportB En.pdft see also Cryer, supra note 252, at 220 (quoting
Luis Moreno-Ocampo).
265. See id. at 5-6. As of Spring 2007, the court had prosecuted only thirteen low level offenders
for crimes not of the "same gravity or magnitude as the crimes charged in the [ICC Prosecutor's
indictments]." Totten & Tyler, supranote 247, at 1096.
266. Kastner, supra note 179, at 163.
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possibility of a military victory.267 As a result the JEM and some factions of the
SLA (which had splintered by then) did not sign it, 268 which the government used
as a justification to attack them.2 69 The Prosecutor consequently obtained arrests
warrants for Ahmad Harun, 270 Ali Kushayb, 2 7 1 and al-Bashir on multiple counts of
crimes against humanity, two counts of war crimes, and genocide.272 Despite the
arrest warrants, al-Bashir and his party were re-elected in 2010 amidst claims of
electoral fraud.273
Two key factors hinder peace in Darfur. First, there are few clear lines
dividing the various groups involved in the conflict. The Darfur agreement led to
infighting in the rebel groups, and division between them and the Darfurian
population.274 Some Arab tribes remained neutral or supported the government for
strategic reasons and some have fought amongst themselves over land.2 75 There are
accounts of Janjaweed fighters switching sides and attacking government forces,
possibly for fear of being used as scapegoats by them.276 The interchange and
division between groups supports the finding that the divide is a political rather
than an ethnic one. Second, the Darfur situation cannot be isolated from the
conflicts in the east and south of Sudan that were not subject to referral by the
Security Council. 277 The peace agreements to which these conflicts are subject also
exclude significant sections of society located in the periphery which have been

267. Sarah M. H. Nouwen, Sudan's Divided (and Divisive?) Peace Agreement, 19 HAGUE Y.B.
INT'L L.113, 117 (2006).
268. Kastner, supra note 179, at 163.
269. Nouwen, supranote 269, at 117.
270. Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun and Ali Muhammad Al Abd-al-Rahman, Case No.
ICC-02/05-01/07, Warrant of Arrest for Ahmad Harun (Apr. 27, 2007), http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc279813.PDF.
271. Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun and Ali Muhammad Al Abd-al-Rahman, Case No.
ICC-02/05-01/07, Warrant of Arrest for Ali Kushayb (Apr. 27, 2007), http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc279858.PDF. Harun is the former Minister of State for the Interior of the
Government of Sudan and Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs of Sudan, and Ali Kushayb
alleged leader of the Janjaweed.
272. Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad alBashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Public Document Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al
Bashir (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639078.pdf. On February 3, 2010, the
Appeals Chamber overturned the decision of the Pre-trial Chamber to exclude the charge of genocide.
Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Almad al-Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-OA, Judgment on Appeal of
the Prosecutor against the "Decision on the Prosecution's Application for Warrant of Arrest Against
Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir" (Feb. 3, 2010).
273. Jeffrey Gettleman, Bashir Wins Election as Sudan Edges Towards Split, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26,
2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/27/world/africa/27sudan.html?scp=3&sq=sudano2Oelection&st-cse;
RiggedElections in Darfur and the Consequences of a ProbableNCP Victory in Sudan, Africa Briefing
N172, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP (Mar. 30, 2010), http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/
horn-of-africa/sudan/b072-rigged-elections-in-darfur-and-the-consequences-of-a-probable-ncp-victoryin-sudan.aspx.
274. Kastner, supra note 179, at 163; Nouwen, supranote 269, at 118.
275. Kastner, supra note 179, at 160.
276. Cash, supranote 252, at 575; Kastner, supra note 179, at 164.
277. Nouwen, supranote 269, at 123; see also Cryer, supranote 252, at 197.
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marginalized, exploited, and subject to the "divide and rule" policies of the
Sudanese government. 278 Comprehensive peace in Sudan requires much more than
peace in Darfur. It is convincingly posited by some that what is required in Sudan
is regime change, 27 9 a goal which was not discussed in negotiations. The
indictment had positive and negative effects on the conflict in Darfur. On the one
hand, it put international pressure on al-Bashir and the Sudanese government and
reinforced the norm that no one is above the law, whether incumbent head of state
or not. On the other, it served to ensure al-Bashir would do everything he could to
maintain power to avoid arrest. The UN Special Envoy for Sudan argued that the
Security Council should consider the impact that an arrest warrant might have on
the implementation of North-South Peace Agreement of 2005.280 The African
Union, the Arab League, and China called on the Security Council to intervene,
arguing that an arrest warrant would complicate the peace process in Sudan and
that "the need for justice should not override the need for peace. 281 Costa Rica's
Security Council representative, Jorge Urdina, responded that the peace and justice
debate is a "false dilemma," and that the Security Council "supports peace and
justice" through referring the case to the ICC. 2 82 The Security Council declined to
vote on the matter, and an arrest warrant was issued on March 4th, 2009.283 In
response, al-Bashir suspended the operation of aid groups, leaving many
Darfurians and IDPs without access to food, water, or health care services, 284 and
there were subsequent reports of attacks on foreign aid workers.285 The arrest
warrants also had the effect of drumming up the support of the local population,
although, notably, only in Khartoum. 286 The conflict was complicated by a dispute
between Sudan and Chad in which each side accused the other of "aiding rebels to
topple their respective governments. '287 An agreement to "normalize relations"
signed between the respective governments in Doha in May 2009 was

278. Nouwen, supranote 269, at 119.
279. See Nouwen, supranote 269.
280. See Marlise Simons & Neil MacFarquhar, Court Orders Arrest Warrantfor Sudan's Leader,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/05/world/africa/05court.html.
281. Arrest warrant draws Sudan scorn, BBC ONLINE, Mar. 5, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/africa17924982.stm.
282. Sudan Warns of Ramifications if al-Bashir Arrested, THAINDIAN NEWS, Feb. 5, 2009,
http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/world-news/sudan-warns-of-ramifications-if-al-bashirarrested 100151716.html.
283. Court Orders Arrest Warrant for Sudan's Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/05/world/africa/05court.html.
284. UN Pleads with Sudan Over Aid Ban, BBC NEWS, Mar. 5, 2009, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/africa/7925509.stm.
285. Sarah El Deeb, Aid Groups in Darfur Weigh Future After Kidnapping,MAIL AND GUARDIAN
ONLINE, Mar. 15, 2009, http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-03-15-aid-groups-in-darfur-weigh-futureafter-kidnapping.
286. Peter Martell, Warrant Sparks Anger in Khartoum, BBC ONLINE, Mar. 4, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7924324.stm; Arrest Warrant Draws Sudan Scorn, BBC ONLINE,
Mar. 5, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7924982.stm.
287. Louis Charbonneau, Sudan, Chad Trade Accusations ofAiding Rebels, MAIL AND GUARDIAN
ONLINE, May 9, 2009, http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-05-09-sudan-chad-trade-accusations-ofaiding-rebels.
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subsequently breached; 288 collapse of the agreement would serve to complicate and
exacerbate the conflict in Darfur.
B. Uganda
Uganda has a long history of repression. British Colonial rule was followed
by Milton Obote's dictatorial rule from 1962, Major-General Idi Amin's military
rule from 1971, and a return to Obote rule in 1980.289 The rigged elections
returning Obote to power sparked a six-year civil war between Acholi forces in the
north (representing the government) and the National Resistance Army led by
Yoweri Kaguta Museveni in the south.290 In a military coup in 1986, Museveni
gained control of the capital. 291 In 1996, he banned political parties, and the oneparty system was extended by referendum in 2000.292 Following the 1986 coup,
Joseph Kony formed the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) to fight the Museveni led
government29 ' and from its Sudanese base, started targeting the local population in
northern Uganda.294 Its members allegedly committed crimes against humanity and
war crimes, including abduction, murder, rape, attacks on IDP camps, torture,
forcible relocation, and child recruitment and enslavement. 295 The conflict caused
296
the death of around 100,000 civilians and the displacement of up to two million.

The LRA does not have a popular base of support because it targets civilians, and
abducts and conscripts children.297 According to some sources, the LRA leadership
contains around 150 to 200 commanders, with the remaining 1000 to 3000
members consisting of abducted children.298
In 2000 the Ugandan government passed the Amnesty Act in an attempt to
abate the conflict. 299 Blanket amnesty was granted to those engaged in "war or
288. Id
289. O'Shea, supranote 11, at 39.
290. Id.
291. Id; see also Cecily Rose, Looking Beyond Amnesty and Traditional Justice Mechanisms in
Northern Uganda: A Proposalfor Truth-Telling and Reparations,28 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 345, 348
(2008).
292. O'Shea, supranote 11, at 40.
293. MURPHY, supranote 64, at 2-3.
294. Akhavan, supra note 155, at 406-07; William W. Burke-White & Scott Kaplan, Shaping the
Contours of Domestic Justice: The InternationalCriminal Courtand an Admissibility Challenge in the
Uganda Situation, in THE EMERGING PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 80 (Carsten

Stahn & G6ran Sluiter Eds., 2009). The conflict was complicated by Sudan's support of the LRA and
Uganda's support of SLAIM. MacMillan, supra note 126, at 202. While government support of rebel
forces purportedly ceased subject to a bilateral agreement in 2002, the conflicts in both states did not
abate. Rose, supra note 293, at 349. Ajoint Sudanese-Ugandan Operation "Iron Fist" purportedly made
matters worse "when the LRA returned to northern Uganda for retaliatory and food-seeking attacks on
the civilian population." MURPHY, supra note 64, at 21-22.
295. Burke-White & Kaplan, supranote 296, at 80.
296. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Presidential Statement Demands Release of
Women, Children by Lord's Resistance Army, Expeditious Conclusion of Peace Process, U.N. Press
Release SC/8869 (Nov. 16, 2006).
297. Akhavan, supranote 155, at 407; Rose, supranote 294, at 349.
298. Rose, supranote 293, at 349.
299. Amnesty Act 2000 (Uganda); see also Rose, supra note 293, at 353. President Museveni had
proclaimed general amnesties prior to this. O'Shea, supranote 11, at 39.
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armed rebellion" against the government for acts committed between January 16th,
1986 and the expiry of the Act. 30 0 Amnesty prevents criminal 30 1 prosecution for all
offences provided the participant reports to the authorities, renounces and
abandons involvement in the rebellion, and surrenders their weapons.30 2 An
Amnesty Committee was established to "consider and promote appropriate
reconciliation mechanisms in the affected areas," "promote dialogue and
reconciliation within the spirit of [the] Act," "monitor progra[ms] of
demobilization, reintegration[,] and resettlement of 'reporters,"' and "co-ordinate a
progra[m] of sensitization of the general public. 30 3 The Committee was neither
required nor empowered to investigate any conduct for which an amnesty is
granted.30 4 The Act was generally supported by the population and by nongovernment organizations and various states as a mechanism for reconciliation.3 5
It resulted in around 21,000 reporters surrendering arms and renouncing the
LRA,30 6 but failed to attract high-level commanders.30 7 It therefore failed 3to
08
achieve its primary preambular objectives of facilitating peace and democracy
because the structure and mandate of the LRA remained intact, and violence
continued after a short period of abatement.30 9
310
In December 2003, President Museveni referred the situation to the ICC.
The ICC issued arrest warrants for Joseph Kony and four other senior figures,
Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen, and the now deceased Raska
Lukwiay, 311 on multiple counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes. 12 The
300. Amnesty Act 2000 § 3 (Uganda).
301. O'Shea, supranote 11, at 41.
302. Amnesty Act 2000 §§ 4(1)(a)-(c) (Uganda); see also Rose, supranote 293, at 353.
303. Amnesty Act 2000 §§ 9(a)-(d) (Uganda); O'Shea, supra note 11, at 42.
304. MURPHY, supranote 64, at 21.
305. Akhavan, supranote 155, at 409; Rose, supranote 293, at 353.
306. This number is as of December 2006. Rose, supranote 293, at 354.
307. Akhavan, supranote 155, at 410.
308. The democracy sought was nevertheless a "particular brand of democracy" that would
maintain Museveni's power. O'Shea, supranote 11, at 40.
309. Akhavan, supra note 155, at 409. This may be due, in part, to the limitations of the amnesty
process, which include limited ability to reintegrate combatants into the community, targeting of
reporters by the LRA, and poor conditions in IDP camps (such that reporters returned to combat). Rose,
supranote 293, at 357-58.
310. MacMillan, supra note 126, at 205. The Ugandan government referral of only LRA crimes
was heavily criticized. The ICC did not limit its jurisdiction to the LRA and has conducted
investigations into the violations allegedly committed by the Ugandan People's Defense Forces. Despite
initial protests, as far as is possible to ascertain the Ugandan government has not attempted to prevent it
from doing so. See Akhavan, supra note 155, at 411; MacMillan, supra note 126, at 203-04; MURPHY,
supranote 64, at 3; O'Shea, supranote 11, at 39-4 1.
311. Each respectively alleged: Commander-in-Chief of the LRA, Vice-Chairman and Second-inCommand, Deputy Army Commander and Brigade Commander of Trinkle and Stockree Brigades,
Brigade Commander of the Sinia Brigade, and alleged Deputy Army Commander.
312. See Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-53, Warrant of Arrest (Jul. 8,
2005), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97185.pdf (amended Sept. 27, 2005); Prosecutor v.
Vincent Otti, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-54, Warrant of Arrest (Jul. 8, 2005), http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97189.pdf; Prosecutor v. Okot Odhiambo, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-56,
Warrant of Arrest (Jul. 8, 2005), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97197.pdf; Prosecutor v.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 39:2

LRA allegedly responded to the indictments by burning villages and IDP camps,
killing at least 337 people. 313 After issuance of arrest warrants in October 2005, the
LRA attacked foreign aid workers, killing at least six people. 314 However, the UN
reported that, after a period of renewed violence, matters improved. 315 The ICC
Prosecutor submitted that the316arrest warrants also led to an overall decrease in
violence in northern Uganda:
The Court's intervention has galvanized the activities of the states
concerned.... Thanks to the unity of purpose of these states, the LRA has
been forced to flee its safe haven in southern Sudan and has moved its
headquarters to the DRC border.
As a consequence, crimes allegedly committed by the LRA in
Northern Uganda have drastically decreased.... The loss of their safe
haven led the LRA commanders to engage in negotiations,
resulting in a
3 17
cessation of hostilities agreement in August 2006.
The reduction in violence, albeit swinging, was linked to the advantages the
referral offered Museveni. It posed a credible threat of prosecution by raising the
conflict's international profile and transferring the political and economic costs of
prosecution to international actors.318 Not only did referral and subsequent arrest
warrants lead to the LRA's political and military isolation and incapacitation,3 19
but resultant international pressure meant both sides had to genuinely participate in
peace talks. Negotiations in Juba began on July 14th, 2006,320 resulting in an
agreement to cease hostilities that took effect on 321
August 29th, 2006 and was
revised on November 1, 2006 after renewed violence.
While the arrest warrants served to compel negotiation, they were also a
stumbling block because LRA was soon negotiating for a withdrawal of the arrest
warrants in return for peace.322 The Prosecutor refused to bow to pressure on the

Dominic Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-57, Warrant of Arrest (Jul. 8, 2005), http://www.icc-
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313. MacMillan, supranote 126, at 233.
314. Id. at 205.
315. Akhavan, supra note 155, at 418 (quoting U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs, Uganda 2005: Consolidated Appeals Process, 5 (Nov. 2004), available at
http://ochadms.unog.ch/quickplace/cap/main.nsf/h-lndex/CAP-2005 Uganda/$FILE/CAP 2005 Ugan
daSCREEN.PDF?OpenElement).

316. Burke-White & Kaplan, supranote 296, at 81; Rose, supranote 293, at 350.
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basis that withdrawal was inconsistent with the Rome Statute.3 23 In 2006, after
initially promising immunity from ICC prosecution, Museveni supported the arrest
warrants but extended the availability of amnesty for another two years.324 When
the arrest warrants were not withdrawn, Kony offered to submit cases to the
domestic jurisdiction as an alternative.325 In June 2007, the LRA and the Ugandan
government agreed to a range of accountability measures, including domestic civil
and criminal prosecutions, traditional justice mechanisms, 326 and a range of
alternative sentences reflecting the gravity of the crimes and seeking to promote
reconciliation, rehabilitation, and reparations.327 The 2007 agreement was bolstered
by further discussions in February 2008, which led to an agreement for the
establishment of a "special division of the High Court of Uganda... to try
individuals who are alleged to have committed serious crimes during the
conflict, ''328 " planned or carried out widespread, systematic, or serious attacks
directed against civilians or... committed grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions., 329 The agreement also provides that the government will examine
traditional justice mechanisms and establish a truth-seeking body akin to the truth
and reconciliation commissions of Sierra Leone and South Africa.330
While these have been significantly positive developments, settlement
331
discussions are still ongoing and a conclusion to the conflict remains "elusive.
This is partly because "Kony and Otti have no serious interest in negotiations
except perhaps as a means of buying time when under pressure. 332 Prosecutor
Moreno-Ocampo argues that Kony strategically uses peace negotiations to avoid
arrest and prosecution when he is in a weak position, and returns to violence when
strengthened.333 The commission of serious crimes therefore continues. In
December and January, the LRA abducted and massacred hundreds of civilians
and children.334 In February 2009, the government launched a US backed offensive

323. Id. at 82-83.
324. Burke-White & Kaplan, supra note 296, at 104; MacMillan, supra note 126, at 205-06. As
will be noted later, Museveni did not have the power to withdraw the referral and his only option is to
bring a challenge to the arrest warrants in the Pre-Trial Chamber on the basis that the matters are
inadmissible under article 17 of the Rome Statute.
325. MacMillan, supranote 126, at 206.
326. Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation Between the Government of the Republic of
Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army/Movement, Uganda-Sudan,
4.1 (June 29, 2007),
http://www.beyondjuba.org/peace agreements/Agreement on AccountabilityAnd Reconcilition.pdf.
327. Burke-White & Kaplan, supranote 296, at 82-84.
328. Annexure to the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, Uganda-Sudan, 7 (Feb.
19, 2008), http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/documents/Annexure to agreement on Accountability_
signed today.pdf.
329. Id. 14.
330. Id.
331. Burke-White & Kaplan, supranote 296, at 80.
332. Akhavan, supranote 155, at 417.
333. Interview with Lois Moreno-Ocampo, ICC Prosecutor, in Den Haag, Neth. (Mar. 24, 2009).
334. Press Release, Human Rights Watch, DR Congo: LRA slaughters 620 in 'Christmas
Massacres' (Jan. 17, 2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/01/17/dr-congo-lraslaughters-620-christmas-massacres.
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aiming to crush the LRA, which was hiding in northern Congo.335 The plan
backfired when the leaders escaped and the LRA splintered into small groups that
went through towns "in northeastern Congo hacking, burning, shooting and
clubbing to death anyone in their way., 336 Despite poor planning being responsible
for many of the operation's failures, the reaction of the LRA demonstrates that
neither amnesty, nor threat of prosecution, has prevented the continuing
commission of atrocities.337 The Ugandan government maintains that, since Kony
refused to sign the most recent peace treaty, the only available option is a military
one.

338

C. Sierra Leone
Conflict erupted in Sierra Leone when Liberian forces, accompanied by the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
(AFRC), and forces from Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Libya, invaded the diamond
fields in the remote east of the country. 33 9 The resultant war was brutal. Atrocities,
including mass rape, sexual slavery, forced rape of family members, child
abduction, torture, killing of civilians, maiming (by cutting off arms, legs, ears, and
lips), and mass displacement,3 40 resulted in the physical and psychological scarring
of a significant section of the population. 341 The RUF, the dominant rebel group,
did not "articulate... a political agenda other than ousting successive
governments. ' ,342 It is nevertheless largely accepted that rampant corruption,
centralization of government, unemployment,
and "ethnocization of national
3 43
policies" were causal factors in the conflict.
In November 1996, the RUF and President Kabbah's Sierra Leone's Peoples
Party (SLPP) signed the Abidjan Peace Accord, which provided that, in return for
peace and disarmament, members of the RUF would not be prosecuted, all political
prisoners would be released, and the RUF would be afforded the opportunity to
transform itself into a political party with representation before domestic bodies. 3 "
Nevertheless, the RUF continued to perpetrate atrocities against the civilian
335. Jeffrey Gettlemen & Eric Schmitt, US. Aided a FailedPlan to Rout Ugandan Rebels, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 2009, www.nytimes.com/2009/02/07/world/africa/07congo.html?hp=&pagewanted
=print.
336. Id
337. Albeit that they were subject to attack and, perhaps, had the government maintained a
ceasefire in favor of peace negotiations (albeit with the adverse effect of strengthening LRA forces), the
volume of atrocities might have been less.
338. Gettlemen & Schmitt, supra note 337.
339. David Crane, The Politics of InternationalCriminal Law: The West African Experience A
Case Study: Operation Justice in Sierra Leone 3 (Crimes Against Humanity Initiative Experts'
Meeting, Washington University, St. Louis, Working Paper, 2009) (on file with the author).
340. Nsongurua Udombana, Globalizationof Justice and the Special Courtfor Sierra Leone's War
Crimes, 17 EMORY. INT'L L. REv. 55, 73-74 (2003).

341. Id. at 74.
342. Id at 72.
343. Id at 70-71.
344. Daniel. J. Macaluso, Absolute and Free Pardon: The Effect of the Amnesty Provision in the
Lomd Peace Agreement on the Jurisdictionof the Special Courtfor Sierra Leone, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L.

347, 349 (2001); Udombana, supra note 342, at 74-75.
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population. In 1997 the AFRC staged a coup, but was ousted in 1998 by the
Security Council endorsed Economic Community of West African States
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and President Kabbah was restored to power.345
When the government was again overthrown in 1999, Kabbah returned to the
negotiation table under international pressure.346 On July 7th, 1999, the
government, the RUF and the AFRC signed the Lomd Accord. 347 It transformed
the RUF into a political party whose members would be appointed to public office
34 9
and cabinet. 34 8 It also granted Foday Sankoh, the RUF leader, an explicit pardon,
gave "absolute and free pardon and reprieve to all combatants and collaborators in
respect of anything done by them,, 350 and provided for the creation of a Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (the SLTRC).35 1 The agreement stated that amnesty
was granted "[t]o consolidate the peace and promote the cause of national
reconciliation., 352 Prior to the agreement, prosecutions and executions had taken
place for actions related to the 1997 coup. 35 3 The RUF had therefore faced a real
threat of prosecution. 4 It was clear to all parties that the RUF, and Foday Sankoh
in particular, would not have signed the agreement without amnesty. 355 According
to Hayner, there was local support for amnesty provided it led to cessation of
violence, 356 but the international community condemned it. The Special
Representative for the UN was instructed at the last minute to insert a reservation
declaring that the amnesty would not apply to genocide, crimes against humanity,
war crimes, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.357
Foday Sankoh was not aware of the reservation until after he signed the
35 8
document.
Constraining amnesty by imposing conditions on its availability was never
seriously considered.3 5 9 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000
(SLTRC Act) provided a forum for perpetrators and victims to tell their stories

345. Macaluso, supranote 346, at 349; Udombana, supranote 342, at 76-78.
346. Macaluso, supranote 346, at 350; Udombana, supranote 342, at 78.
347. Macaluso, supranote 346, at 350.
348. Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United
Front of Sierra Leone, arts. II-V, Jul. 7, 1999, http://www.sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.html [hereinafter
Lom6 Accord].
349. Id. at art. IX, 1.
350. Id. at art. IX, 2.
351. Id. at art. XXVI.
352. Id. at art. IX, 3.
353. PRISCILLA HAYNER, CENTRE FOR HUMAN DIALOGUE REPORT: NEGOTIATING PEACE IN

SIERRA LEONE: CONFRONTING THE JUSTICE CHALLENGE 6-7 (2007), available at http://www.ictj.org/

static/Africa/SierraLeone/HaynerSL 1207.eng.pdf.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 13.
356. Id. at 7.
357. Macaluso, supra note 346, at 358; see also William A. Schabas, Truth Commissions and
Courts Working in Parallel: The Sierra Leone Experience, 98 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 189, 190
(2004).
358. HAYNER, supranote 355, at 6.
359. Id. at 13-19.
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without offering the carrot of amnesty. 360 The SLTRC aimed, among other things,
"to address impunity.... to promote healing and reconciliation and to prevent a
repetition of the violations and abuses suffered., 361 The SLTRC could "investigate
all or any abuses and violations of human rights and international humanitarian law
related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone. 362
Ongoing disputes between the parties led to a breakdown of the ceasefire,
resurgence in violence, and repeated violations of the terms of the Accord.363
When it became clear that the "RUF had no intention of allowing peace to reign in
Sierra Leone and, in particular, letting the UN take control of the country's
,,164
diamond-rich areas,
an agreement between the United Nations and Sierra
365
Leone,
ratified pursuant to the Special CourtAgreement (Ratification)Act 2002,
established the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) with a mandate to try those
"who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international
humanitarian law and the laws of Sierra Leone. 366
While conducting investigations, the Prosecutor of the SCSL and his team
determined that it would be necessary to arrest all indictees simultaneously
"because arresting the key players one at a time would be political suicide"; the
indictees might rally support, return to violence, and secure their positions so as to

360. Nicole Fritz & Alison Smith, CurrentApathyfor ComingAnarchy: Building the special Court
for SierraLeone, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 391, 423 (2001).
361. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000, § 6(1) (2000) (Sierra Leone), available
at http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/SeirraLeone-Charter.pdf.
362. Abdul Tejan-Cole, The Complementary and Conflicting Relationship Between the Special
Courtfor Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 6 YALE HUM. RTs. & DEV. L.J.
139, 146-47 (2003).
363. Udombana, supranote 342, at 81.
364. Id. at 82.
365. Macaluso, supranote 346, at 352; Tejan-Cole, supranote 364, at 144-45.
366. Schabas, supra note 359, at 190; see also William A. Schabas, The Relationship Between
Truth Commissions and InternationalCourts: The Case of Sierra Leone, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 1035, 103840 (2003) (discussing these debates over amnesty); William A. Schabas, Conjoined Twins of
TransitionalJustice? The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court, 2
J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1082, 1083-85 (2004) (stating that despite concurrent operation and significant
overlaps in jurisdiction, neither the SLTRC Act nor the SC Statute made specific reference to the other;
the Prosecutor of the SCSL, David Crane, merely indicated his intention not to use the resources of the
SLTRC); see also Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-2003-08-PT, Decision on the Request of the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone to conduct a public hearing with Samuel Hinga
Norman,
10-16 (Oct. 29, 2003), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl/Public/SCSL-03-08Norman/SCSL-03-08-PT-049/SCSL-03-08-PT-049-I.pdf; Prosecutor v. Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15PT, Appeal by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Accused against the Decision of Judge
Bankole Thompson, Delivered on November 3, 2003 to Deny the TRC's Request to hold a public
hearing with Augustine Gbao (May 7, 2004) (showing that as result, primacy was never subject to
legislation or agreement and was therefore a causal factor in disputes over amnesty), available at
http://www.sc-sl.org/scslIndictments/SCSL-04-15-PT%/o20RUF%/o201ndictment.pdf; see also Prosecutor
v. Kallon, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), Decision to challenge jurisdiction,
42-44, 48-49, 6162, 72, 84 (Mar. 13, 2004), available at http://www.transcrim.org/07 o20SCSL o20-%o202004%o20%20Kallon 0 o20Kamara; Prosecutor v. Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment,
14 (Aug. 2,
2007), available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=46e123dc2&page
=search.

2011

BRINGING PEACE TO DARFUR AND UGANDA

prevent arrest. 367 The covert operation, coined "Operation Justice," involved the

cooperation of several local, regional, and international actors including diplomats,
the Chief of Staff of the UN peacekeeping force, and the Inspector-General of the
Sierra Leone National Police. 368 The indictments and arrest warrants were sealed,
and all indictees (with the exception of Charles Taylor) were arrested
simultaneously on March 10th, 2003, without a shot fired.369 While serious
problems persist, including corruption, serious rule of law deficiencies, and a poor
human rights record,370 mass violence has been abated thus far and, as according to
reports, the groups most responsible for the atrocities have been disabled.371
D. South Africa
The minority rule of the apartheid State was characterized by legalized racial
discrimination of groups defined "on a territorial, residential, political, social, and
economic basis" in all areas of life including land, housing, education, health, and
access to services and premises.372 The resultant conflict spanning four decades led
to extensive human rights violations, including arbitrary imprisonment, forced
displacement, denationalization, torture, disappearances, killings, and other human
rights violations.373 When oppression heightened in the 1970's and 1980's, the
African National Congress (ANC) established Umkhonto we Sizwe (literally
"spear of the nation"), a military wing engaged in guerrilla warfare.374 The
increasing public face of violence and resultant international pressure in the 1980s
led the National Party to abandon movement control laws, un-ban political parties,
and release political prisoners.3 75 In 1990, the National Party initiated secret
negotiations with ANC leader Nelson Mandela, 76 and Parliament enacted the
Indemnity Act,37 7 by which the President could pronounce oppressed persons

367. Crane, supranote 341, at 9-10.
368. Id. at 8-9.
369. Id. at 11-13.
370. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2009, COUNTRY SUMMARY: SIERRA LEONE 1 (Jan.
2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related-material/sierraleone.pdf.
371. Scott Worden & Emily Warm, Special Court of Sierra Leone Briefing: The Taylor Trial and
Lessons from Capacity-Building and Outreach, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE,
htp://www.usip.org/publications/special-court-sierra-leone-briefing-taylor-trial-and-lessons-capacitybuilding-and-outreac (last visited Jan. 10, 2011).
372. Alex Boraine, Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa Amnesty: The Price of
Peace, in RETRIBUTION AND REPATRIATION IN THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 299, 300 (Jon Elster

ed., 2006).
373. Motala, supra note 138, at 916.
374. Christopher C. Burris, Re-examining the Prisonerof War Status of PLO Fedayeen, 22 N.C.J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 943, 999 - 1000 (1997).
375. Daisy M. Jenkins, From Apartheid to Majority Rule: A Glimpse into South Africa's Journey
Towards Democracy, 13 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 463, 478 (1996).
376. Gavron, supranote 3, at 113.
377. Indemnity Act No. 35 of 1990, as amended by Indemnity Act No. 124 of 1992 (S. Aft.)
(replacing Indemnity Act No. 14 of 1961 and Indemnity Act No. 13 of 1977, which granted political
leaders and persons employed by the State amnesty from civil and criminal liability).
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indemnified for conduct if necessary for negotiation of peace.378 In democratic
elections in 1994, the ANC gained power and Mandela was elected president.379
Peace negotiations gave rise to a political compromise: free and fair elections
in exchange for conditional amnesty. 380 The 1993 Interim Constitution and the
SATRC Act provided that amnesty from civil and criminal liability 381 could be
granted for offenses "associated with a political objective and committed in the
course of the conflicts of the past. 382 The SATRC granted amnesty to applicants
that gave "a full account of what they had done and the context within which it was
done," where their act was associated with a political objective.383 Accordingly,
applicants must have demonstrated that they "acted in support of a publicly known
political organization, the state, or in furtherance of a coup d'etat.,384 While
around 9,000 applications were received,385 the posited success of the judicial stick
and TRC carrot was 386limited by the very few applications received from
government operatives.
The SATRC was lauded in some quarters, and quietly accepted in others.387
Some praised the approach as a domestic solution, based on "the African notion of
ubuntu, which explicitly excludes retribution and favors restorative justice. 388
Others were more pragmatic in their support. Senior generals of the security forces
warned that "dire consequences [would result] if members of those forces had to
face compulsory trials and prosecutions after the election., 389 Some, like
Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the SATRC Chairperson, and Justice Richard
Goldstone,39 ° were convinced that criminal trials like Nuremberg were not
appropriate because they would have been sabotaged by security forces and right
wing groups, and negotiations would have broken down. 91 In the middle of the
spectrum, the UN General Assembly was silent on amnesty despite having

378. O'Shea, supranote 11, at 44.
379. Gavron, supranote 3, at 113.
380. Boraine, supranote 374, at 315.
381. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act No. 34 of 1995 § 20(7)(A) (S. Afr.)
[hereinafter SATRC Act].
382. Gavron, supranote 3, at 113.
383. O'Shea, supranote 11, at 45.
384. SATRC Act § 20(2); see also O'Shea, supranote 11, at 43.
385. Minow, supra note 146, at 178 (noting that only a few hundred of these were granted
amnesty).
386. Boraine, supranote 374, at 308; Dugard, supranote 15, at 1011.
387. Minow, supranote 146, at 179.
388. Wafula Okumu, Human Rights in Transition Societies: The Cases of Somalia and South
Africa, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIETIES IN TRANSITION 291, 309 (Shale Horowitz & Albrecht
Schnabel eds., 2004).
389. Boraine, supranote 374, at 302.
390. Former South African Constitutional Court Judge, Chief Prosecutor for the International
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and Chair of the Commission of Inquiry
Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation.
391. Gavron, supranote 3, at 115; Boraine, supranote 374, at 302.

2011

BRINGING PEACE TO DARFUR AND UGANDA

* 392
previously called for prosecutions.
There were nevertheless many who opposed
amnesty, so much so that they brought an unsuccessful constitutional challenge.393

On the one hand, supporters of the SATRC were vindicated. According to
Black, "South Africa's transition from racial authoritarianism of the apartheid era
to the non-racial democratic institutions and entrenched constitutional rights of the
post-1994 period is...
one of the great human rights triumphs of the post-Second
World War era. 394 This is undoubtedly due the significant role the SATRC played
in airing dirty laundry, identifying those responsible, establishing a historical
record to prevent future denials, offering a forum for victims and their families to
be given a voice, and providing some form of financial reparations to those most
affected by apartheid policies. 395 The success of the transition must also be
attributed to the exemplary role played by senior figures such as Mandela in
396
adopting a conciliatory, forgiving, and pragmatic position in peace negotiations.
On the other hand, whether the model will play a real and lasting contribution
in combating impunity in South Africa is yet to be seen. Its intention was that those
who were not granted amnesty would be subject to investigation, and possibly
prosecution, by the South African National Prosecuting Authority (NPA).3 97 Since
the close of its operations, and despite referral of around 900 cases, only a handful
have been subject to investigation and prosecution, and many of those have been
unsuccessful or unsatisfactory. 39' The NPA's reluctance to pursue apartheid crimes
has been apparent since the completion of the SATRC's work. In 2002, then
President Mbeki granted pardon to thirty-three persons who fought against

392. G.A. Res. 48/159,

3, U.N. Doc. AIRES/48/159 (Dec. 20, 1993); Gavron, supra note 3, at

115.
393. AZAPO v. President of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC) at 36 (S. Afr.);
Boraine, supra note 374, at 308; Gavron, supra note 3, at 114 (noting critiques of the model, including
that it did not differentiate between perpetration of and resistance to apartheid or "acknowledge the
essential criminality of apartheid," and that its temporal jurisdiction was too limited).
394. Wafula Okumu, supra note 390, at 291, 303 (citing David Black, The Long and Winding
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STUDIES ON THE USE OF PARDONS 13 (Nov. 2008), available at http://www.ictj.org/static/Americas/

ICTJResearch Brief-Countrycase studies on the use of pardons.pdf. In the recent prosecution of
Adrian Vlok, the former Minister of Law and Order, the NPA agreed to a plea bargain in which Vlok
was awarded a five year suspended sentence, despite that his Department played a central role in the
formulation of policies that constituted, or led to the commission of, human rights violations. It is
concerning that they bowed to a lenient sentence in one of the only recent cases to be brought against a
political leader, who had confessed to approving the poisoning of former church leader Frank Chikane.
One of the only successful prosecutions against a senior official took place in 1996 against Eugene de
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apartheid, some of whom had either applied for amnesty and been rejected or been
convicted of murder.399 In 2005, the NPA issued guidelines for prosecuting
apartheid era offenses, which allow the Minister to grant amnesty, without
publication, under specified conditions.40 0 While the factors that may be taken into
account are substantially similar to those considered by the TRC, the Minister may
also consider whether the NPA has the resources to investigate and prosecute the
matter. 40 1 In a successful Constitutional Court challenge to the policy 40 2 the South
African High Court found that it amounted to an unlawful "copy or duplication" of
the TRC amnesty process 40 3 because the NPA is under a constitutional obligation
to prosecute when there is sufficient evidence to do so, many of the criteria were
irrelevant to deciding whether to prosecute, 40 4 and the policy infringed victims'
constitutional rights, such as the rights to life, dignity, freedom, equality, and
security of the person.40 5 Despite the finding, the NPA's inability to prosecute is
likely to be decisive. In a conference held by the Institute for Justice and
Reconciliation in March 2006, Dr. J. P. Pretorius, an Advocate in the Priority
Crimes Litigation Unit in the Department of Justice, stated that the NPA did not
have investigators dedicated to apartheid era offenses and it was likely that not
more than half a dozen cases would be prosecuted.40 6
The success of amnesty must be considered in the current context of mass
violent crime, not connected to conflict but to a range of political, social, and

399.

INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, RESEARCH BRIEF, COUNTRY CASE

ON THE USE OF PARDONS 13 (Nov. 2008)
available at http://www.ictj.org/static/
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401. NPA ProsecutionPolicy, supra note 105, 4; see also NPA ProsecutionPolicyfor Apartheid
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http://www.saha.org.za/news/2010/February/press statementjudgment on specialpardons a signific
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406. Dr J. P. Pretorius, Advocate, National Prosecuting Authority, The Truth and Reconciliation
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Apartheid-Era Crimes, allAfrica.com, Apr. 20, 2006, available at Westlaw, 4/20/06 allAfrica.com
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economic factors.4 °7 Should some of the resources directed to the SATRC have
been directed to building the NPA's capacity to combat the conduct that has led to
one of the highest crime rates in the world? Did impunity breed impunity? Such
conclusions must be acknowledged as crude and unsophisticated. The TRC can be
credited with assisting to prevent lapse into civil war and some individuals' moves
from helplessness and persecution to relative hope and equality. However the
crudeness of the conclusion serves the point: do we really know what the longterm outcome and impact of amnesty is on South Africa? Can we really say it
hasn't led to impunity? Can we accept that those most responsible have walked
free to live what may be comfortable lives without punishment?
III. AMNESTIES AND THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE

International law has not yet accommodated the political and social goals
underpinning amnesties and truth commissions in justice as a term of law.
Amnesties can only be upheld if the Prosecutor finds that the interests of justice do
and should accommodate political and social factors, and that there are substantial
reasons or a sufficient basis to show that they will contribute to peace and
reconcile the community. Should legal and policy reasons dictate an expansive or
restrictive approach? Is it the ICC's role to facilitate peace, or is it merely to punish
wrongdoing and prevent impunity?
A. The ICC and Politics:Adopting an Expansive Approach
The factors that may be taken into account under the expansive view may be
restricted by the inherent limitations in article 53 of the ICC Statute: the negative
nature of the burden and its application to the individual case rather than the
situation as a whole. In the interests of exploring the most expansive role that the
Prosecutor might adopt, the first two grounds apply only to the limited view, but
the remainder apply to all grounds that support conditional amnesties accompanied
by truth commissions.
Amnesty is a Persuasive Bargaining Chip
As demonstrated in South Africa, amnesty can be a useful bargaining chip in
peace negotiations.4 8 The Prosecutor may deter perpetrators from disarming or
contribute to the resumption of hostilities at the post-conflict stage, and therefore
40 9
the commission of more serious crimes, because he poses a real threat of arrest.
Deferring to amnesty might force leaders to make a choice between survival and
peace. While amnesty is not presently offered in Darfur, some posit that the
possibility of deterring violence in Darfur is now a "specious hope., 410 The arrest
warrant for al-Bashir has led to the withdrawal of humanitarian groups and
peacekeeping forces and the creation of a "nothing-to-lose" attitude among the
leaders of belligerent groups has "increase[ed] the incentive to ramp up the attacks
407. Graeme Simpson, Urban Crime and Violence in South Africa, in

JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN:

66, 66-69 (Celia Petty & Maggy
Brown eds., 1998), available at http://www.csvr.org.za/wits/papers/papgsurb.htm.
408. Slye, supranote 179, at 198.
409. Scharf, supra note 58, at 342; Trumbull, supranote 179, at 314.
410. Kastner, supra note 179, at 165.
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411
and force[d] a final resolution by eliminating [civilians and rebel groups],
arguably, strengthening al-Bashir's position.412 Uganda might support amnesty
where it can be shown that indictments have stalled peace; indeed the Ugandan
government attempted to persuade the Office of the Prosecutor to suspend the
indictments to allow domestic judicial processes to be put in place.413 Amnesty
might expedite the transition and "decrease the probability of the continuation of
human rights violations. 414

Deferring to Amnesty Reduces Uncertainty
The restrictive approach creates uncertainty for parties to peace negotiations
and results in the failure of amnesty as a bargaining chip. 415 It might become a zero
sum game; greater prosecutions, less prospects for peace. Support for al-Bashir has
increased since he was indicted;41 6 certainly regional support has lessened support
for the ICC.4 17 The ICC might avoid this problem by sealing indictments and arrest
warrants such as Crane did in Sierra Leone, or waiting until peace negotiations are
relatively successful before investigating or prosecuting perpetrators.41 8 However,
over the long term it will become apparent that the ICC will not respect amnesty.419
Truth Commissions Advance Political Transformation
Conditional amnesty might "play a part in advancing the political
transformation" 420 of States by mobilizing institutions and actors to submit to an
accountability mechanism, identifying systemic causes of the conflict and actors
most responsible, and making recommendations for institutional reform. 421 The
identification of systemic causes and the self-examination that flows from truth
commissions "provides a critical buffer against repeated abuses" by demanding
"civic and social transformation needed to ensure that abuses are not repeated in

411. Id. at 178.
412. See Susanne Koelbl & Volkhard Windfuhr, Ifeel completely safe, SPIEGAL ONLINE (Mar. 22,
2010), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,684941,00.html; but see As Sudanese elections
near, UN voices concern over reports of harassment, UN NEWS CENTRE, http://www.un.
org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=34172&Crnsudan&Crl=election
(last visited Mar. 25, 2010)
(suggesting that the imminent elections will not be a fair indicator of whether this support translates into
democratic support, which is doubtful).
413. Kastner, supra note 179, at 179.
414. Gomez, supranote 179, at 62.
415. Trumbull, supranote 179, at 314.
416. See Koelbl & Volkhard, supranote 414; but see UN NEWS CENTRE, supranote 414.
417. See Koelbl & Volkhard, supranote 414.
418. Kastner, supra note 179, at 175 (asking whether the "international community should continue
to provide strong support for Prosecutor and only consider asking the court to suspend its activity when
and if the LRA leaders are begging to implement a fair settlement"') (quoting INTERNATIONAL CRISIS
GROUP, AFRICA REPORT No. 124, NORTHERN UGANDA: SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE 15

(Apr. 26, 2007), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfin?id=4791).
419. Although the impact on the second option might be reduced because it might provide
perpetrators with at least some hope that only the possibility of amnesty is worth the risk. In any event,
the benefits of complementarity would also be lost.
420. TEITEL, supranote 23, at 51.
421. Evenson, supra note 179, at 752-53. The benefits of conducting domestic trials may also
translate to such a process, including increased access for victims and to information.
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the future" 422 and "building a culture of respect for human rights. ' 423 There is little
doubt that international prosecutions fail to fulfill these goals on the domestic
425
42 4
level, if at all. Moreover, their deterrence capacity, which "is unclear at best,

has a limited ability to address collective consciousness that often leads to the
justification of unlawful conduct on a systemic or mass scale. 426 Prosecutions can
hinder national reconciliation by isolating supporters of former regimes and
pushing them into hostile subcultures.427 The Ugandan model does not advance
political transformation because of its unconditional nature, its failure to ensure
victim participation, and its lack of investigatory procedure, while the SATRC
provides8 a more useful basis from which to develop a conditional amnesty
42
model.
Mass Atrocities, the Interests of Victims, and Recognition of Guilt
In situations in which mass atrocities have occurred, domestic and
international justice systems cannot investigate and punish all perpetrators.429
Truth Commissions offer an alternative that fulfills a number of goals. They
provide victims with a forum within which to tell their story, confront perpetrators,
and obtain reparation. They expose crimes, identify perpetrators, and reveal more
facts than the handful of prosecutions that might be conducted, 430 and therefore
facilitate public condemnation, respect for victims' rights, and recognition of
guilt. 431 Moreover, they ensure that perpetrators are accountable in some way432
and victims are afforded some redress through confrontation, participation, and
reparation.
Development of a Norm
Deferring to grants of amnesty would contribute, by default, to the
crystallization of a norm of international law in which amnesty would be a
recognized exception to a duty to prosecute provided it meets particular criteria.433

422.
423.
424.
425.

Id. at 753.
Minow, supranote 146, at 180; see also Newman, supra note 6, at 305.
Minow, supranote 146, at 177.
Id.

426. ERvIN STAUB,

THE ROOTS

OF EVIL: THE ORIGINS OF GENOCIDE AND OTHER GROUP

VIOLENCE 67 (1992).

427. Majzub, supranote 42, at 251.
428. See Young, supra note 144, at 465, 469 (suggesting criteria and conditions upon which a

model could be based).
429. See Newman, supra note 6, at 306; see also Majzub, supra note 42, at 251-52 (noting the
difficulty of prosecuting in situations in which perpetrators destroy evidence, which occurred on a mass
scale in South Africa).
430. Blumenson, supranote 179, at 862-63.
431. Id. at 863, 870.
432. Id. at 869; see also James L. Gibson, Truth Justice, and Reconciliation:Judging the Fairness
of Amnesty in South Africa, 46 AM. J. POL. SE. 540, 544 (2002) (quoting Justice Richard Goldstone
who stated that "amnesty applicants 'suffered a very real punishment' by the shame they suffered
following their public confessions").
433. Trumbull, supranote 179, at 317.
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The ICC could thereby be instrumental in determining that criteria and play a lead
role in ensuring that the model adopted meets the goals ofjustice.
State Control and Cultural Imperialism
A state is best placed to determine how justice mechanisms contribute to
conflict resolution and reconciliation because the needs of different societies
experiencing different conflicts will vary. Affording states latitude to determine
appropriate solutions to conflicts ensures their sovereignty is not overborne and
contributes to a broader notion of complementarity. Affording states latitude also
ensures that application of the Rome Statute does not lead to cultural imperialism,
in which western notions of criminal justice overcome more traditional and
alternative accountability mechanisms more commonly adopted by non-western
states. The international community's failure to defer to sovereignty in such
circumstances by insisting on prosecution can be viewed as a substitute for their
failure to intervene to stop the injury because it "is not worth the cost associated
with military intervention. 434 On the one hand, the importance of sovereignty has
lessened in the past two decades because the international community has
acknowledged that infringements of human rights are of global concern. 435
However, states have failed to follow through with meaningful actions that prevent
atrocities.436 As a result, the cost of prosecution is placed on the victims and
communities of the conflicted state.437
Facilitating Information Exchanges
If the Prosecutor deferred to amnesty, he could still prosecute those who are
not granted amnesty. Truth Commissions and amnesties might facilitate
prosecutions through information exchange by providing the Prosecutor with lead
evidence that will assist him to target investigations and gather other information
necessary to build his case.438 They might also assist the Prosecutor to overcome
language constraints and difficulties collecting local evidence. 43 9 While the
information and evidence gathered by the SATRC could not be used as probative

434. Id. at 316.
435. Id. at 315.
436. Although states might prefer to retain their sovereignty and not wish for other states to
intervene uninvited.
437. Trumbull, supranote 179, at 316.
438. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 93(1), Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
(providing that States are required to cooperate with the Prosecutor by taking evidence and providing
records and documents, among other things) [hereinafter Rome Statute]; see Minow, supra note 146, at
179.
439. Rome Statute, art. 93 (envisaging cooperation between the ICC and the relevant state in regard
to the taking of evidence, questioning of persons, and the provision of records, including official
records and documents. Forensic and other evidence would also be useful to the ICC); Bruce M.
MacKay, A View from the Trenches: The Special Courtfor Sierra Leone - The First Year, 35 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 273, 280-81 (2003); see also Laura Hall & Nahal Kazemi, Prospectsfor Justice and
Reconciliation in Sierra Leone, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 287, 289 (2003); MARIEKE WIERDA, PRISCILLA
HAYNER, & PAUL VAN ZYL,EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SPECIAL COURT AND THE
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SIERRA LEONE 6 (Int'l Cent. for Transitional Justice,

2002), available at http://www.ictj.org/images/content0/8/084.pdf.
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evidence in prosecutions, the NPA has nevertheless been able to use that
information as lead evidence. 440 This might assist the Prosecutor to expend
resources more appropriately on those most responsible. 441
B. The ICC and Law: Adopting a RestrictiveApproach
Theoretically valid arguments are put forward for an expansive approach,
however, a restrictive approach is justified. Given the negative burden imposed on
the Prosecutor, the question to be answered is not whether it is in the interests of
justice to prosecute, but whether it is not. Accordingly, the following grounds set
out the reasons why the Prosecutor should determine that it cannot be concluded
that prosecution is not in the interests of justice where an amnesty has been
granted.
The Rome Statute and the Norms of International Law Do Not
Conclusively Support Amnesties
Article 53 of the Rome Statute does not make reference to international
norms 442 and international duties on member states to prosecute are not binding on
the ICC. 443 However, the objects of the Rome Statute and international norms and
duties should be taken into account in interpretation of ambiguous treaty
provisions. 44 If we apply a purposive approach to the Rome Statute, it serves
three primary goals: to combat impunity by prosecuting individuals for
international crimes, 445 to "prevent governments from shielding perpetrators from
prosecution for political reasons ' 446 and, by doing so, "restore and improve
regional peace and security. 447 While the last goal may be perceived as justifying
amnesty where it leads to conflict resolution, the underlying presumption of the
Court is that prosecution in itself contributes to peace and security, apparent in
both states' rejections of immunities for heads of state or persons in official
positions448 and the Security Council's referral of the Darfur situation to the
44 9
ICC.
If we will not permit immunities, why then would we permit amnesties?
The mere establishment of the ICC and state ratification contributes to a customary
duty to prosecute because it indicates that "[t]he international community...

440. See Thapelo Sakoana & Richard Mantu, NPA to Prosecute Apartheid-Era Criminals, BUA
Jan. 24,2006, http://www.buanews.gov.za/news/06/06012416451001.
441. See Trumbull, supranote 179, at 311.
442. See Rome Statute, art. 53(1) (referring to "under this statute"); see also Rome Statute, pmbl
(recalling that it is "the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible
for international crimes").
443. Siebert-Fohr, supranote 3, at 573-74; see also Gavron, supra note 3, at 108.
444. Article 31,
1 and 3 of the Vienna Convention provides that a treaty should be interpreted in
light of its object and purpose, and that regard can be had to any relevant rules of international law
applicable between the parties.
445. Gropengieller & MeiBner, supranote 121, at 181, 183; O'Shea, supranote 11, at 318.
446. Llewellyn, supranote 92, at 204.
447. Ohlin, supranote 36, at 192.
448. Rome Statute, art. 27.
449. Press Release, Security Counsel, Security Counsel Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to
Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, U.N. Press Release SC/8351 (Mar. 31, 2005), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8351.doc.htm.
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decided that justice, in the form of prosecution, must take priority over peace and
national reconciliation. 450 States' intention to send such a message is apparent in
the preamble, which recalls "it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal
jurisdiction [as understood in relation to admissibility] over those responsible for
international crimes. ,,451 Moreover, the states intending that justice meant
international justice (i.e. retributive) is indicated in the preambular resolution to
"guarantee lasting respect for and enforcement of international justice. 452
Ratification goes some way in dispelling claims of cultural imperialism.
Despite the Rome Statute's contribution to crystallization of a norm, and
despite customary and treaty based duties to prosecute some serious crimes and
other jus cogens norms, a norm prohibiting or permitting amnesty per se has not
yet crystallized. Except for the SATRC, no state has adopted a conditional amnesty
model with comprehensive criteria; whether a State might be partly dependent on
whether it views amnesty as contrary to international law. Whether it is contrary to
international law brings us back to our original question: is there a prohibition on
amnesty? In regard to member states in particular, we might simply answer this
question by finding that they have irrevocably "conferred the authority to exercise
their criminal jurisdiction to the [ICC] ."4 This has little significance for Sudan,
which is not a member state, but is relevant to Uganda, which invoked jurisdiction
by referral. 454 In any event, this leads to the conclusion that the term "justice" has
not yet been broadened as a matter of law by state practice to incorporate peace
building, reconciliation, and reparation. The ICC might assist crystallization of a
norm permitting amnesty if it finds that "justice" incorporates political and social
factors. However, it should not do so for three reasons. First, according to Scharf a
strong argument can be made that the Rome Statute does not incorporate
procedural aspects of the Geneva Conventions or the Genocide Convention that
require prosecution.455 However, it would be incongruous for the Prosecutor to

450. Dugard, supranote 15, at 702; see also Williams & Schabas, supranote 58, at 561.
451. Rome Statute, preamble. While it may be argued that this, in conjunction with other
preambular passages, imposes a duty to prosecute which prevents amnesty, it is inconsistent with the
intention of states entering into the Statute, state practice since its adoption, and article 25 which
provides that "no provision in this Statue relating to individual criminal responsibility shall affect the
responsibility of States under international law." Siebert-Fohr, supra note 3, at 558-59 (quoting Rome
Statute art. 25, 4).
452. Rome Statute, preamble. Colombia's interpretive declaration serves as a counter to this
assertion, however it has no binding effect in relation to other states. United Nations Treaty Collection,
Chapter XVIII Penal Matters, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Declarations and
Reservations,
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno=XVIII-10&
chapter- 18&lang=en#EndDec (last visited Jan. 10, 2011).
453. Gropengieler & MeiBner, supranote 121, at 182. Whether States can alter or withdraw their
treaty ratification is linked to whether the Rome Statute itself imposes an obligation on states to
prosecute. This is doubtful; the only reference to state duties is in the preamble. In any event, a
conferral basis wrongly assumes that the jurisdiction of the ICC is absolute.
454. See State Partiesto the Rome Statute, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2010).
455. Scharf, supra note 58, at 370. For reasons related to selectivity it is not feasible to constrain
amnesties by subject matter.
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apply a more permissive approach than that which states have agreed to, 456 or to
override amnesty for crimes where a duty is imposed but not for others where it is
not (i.e. crimes against humanity and war crimes). Even though the ICC applies
complementarity rather than universal jurisdiction, the purpose is to retain the
operation of domestic criminal justice processes where possible, not to limit ICC
jurisdiction with regard to personal or subject matter jurisdiction. Second, if the
ICC determines what is and what is not an appropriate amnesty model, it would in
fact impinge on the role of states that are, as advocates of an expansive approach
might posit, better placed to determine appropriate solutions to conflicts. Third,
any such determination would have adverse legal consequences on state
obligations to prosecute.457 The Court would serve to solidify the law on amnesties
when its permissibility and precise contours are still subject to debate in the
international community and within states. Should states wish to permit an
amnesty model, they ought not to ratify the Rome Statute on the one hand and
argue for crystallization of a norm on the other. They ought, rather, to adopt
explicit provisions which resolve the inter-relationship of the duties to prosecute,
deference to the ICC, and grants of amnesty.
Prosecution by the ICC Facilitates a Comprehensive Approach
The ICC cannot be "a panacea for the world's ills, '458 but neither can truth
commissions nor amnesties. Adopting an expansive approach limits justice for
victims because it excludes retribution. South Africa is a case in point. It is
doubtful that a significant percentage of victims do not want retributive justice as
well as reconciliation and reparation. Defining the interests of justice to exclude
amnesty should not and does not presuppose the exclusion of alternative justice
mechanisms altogether. Rather, it permits a "three pronged approach involving the
ICC... truth commissions," and, where possible, national prosecutions. 45 9 The
Prosecutor has recognized that traditional African mechanisms can achieve local
reconciliation and be a complementary tool to the Court's efforts. 460 A multifaceted approach facilitates complementarity by punishing perpetrators, promoting
reconciliation, and building a comprehensive picture of the situation.461
Prosecution by the ICC also strengthens the rule of law in national systems by
compelling states to conduct domestic prosecutions, as demonstrated by the
proposal of the Ugandan government to adopt a multi-layered approach involving
prosecutions and traditional justice mechanisms.462 Prosecution also prevents
456. Gropengieller & Mei~ner, supranote 121, at 193-94.
457. Siebert-Fohr, supranote 3, at 563.
458. Sadat, supra note 15, at 1034; see also Blumenson, supra note 179, at 867 ("No mechanism
will ever deliver perfect justice."); Udombana, supra note 154, at 3 ("[I]t is wrong to mistake a
particular medicine - international criminal justice - as the elixir of Africa's many ailments.").
459. MURPHY, supra note 64, at 52; see also Lipscomb, supra note 25, at 186; Rose, supra note
293, at 383; Totten & Tyler, supranote 247, at 1080-81.
460. Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, Int'l Criminal Court, The Prosecutor of the ICC
Opens Investigations in Darfur, ICC-OTP-0606-104 (2005), available at http://www.icccpi.int1NR/exeres/3 1F3684F-43BC-4D5E-9EOA-A6A8DAC308EB.htm.
461. Udombana, supranote 154, at 20-21.
462. Orentlicher, supranote 16, at 2547-48.
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revisionism by state actors 463 and ensures that victims' fundamental rights under
international law are not infringed.464
Alternative mechanisms that do not grant amnesty could most clearly operate
concurrently with ICC prosecutions. Amnesty would give rise to uncertainty
regarding whether a perpetrator would in fact benefit from it but, as shall be
discussed below, uncertainty for perpetrators is outweighed by the uncertainty
regarding recidivism.
Deferring to Amnesty Holds the ICC Hostage
If the Prosecutor refrains from prosecuting for political reasons, whether
framed solely in terms of amnesty or premised on facilitating peace negotiations
more generally, the ICC may be "held hostage by the likes of Kony. ' , 465 This might
set a precedent for future indictees because it provides an incentive for leaders
guilty of perpetrating serious crimes to refuse to negotiate peace unless amnesty is
assured. While they may do this in any event, a greater incentive is available
should the possibility of amnesty be made available. This applies equally to
governments negotiating or granting amnesty, because it is seldom the case that
individual actors within government have not committed violations. Relying on the
state in pursuit of culturally specific justice might fail to combat impunity or
ensure lasting peace.
Selectivity
The Prosecutor must assess the interests of justice on a case-by-case
approach; 466 a legitimate amnesty in one instance may not be so in another.
Decisions turn on the information and evidence on hand and rely on inextricably
interlinked factual circumstances, such as the granting of amnesty, the role and
number of perpetrators, the number of victims, and whether the country is at the
conflict or post-conflict stage. Moreover, one size does not fit all when considering
the complexity of the "interface of international law and politics. '467 This issue
was central to the inability of states to draft a provision for amnesty in the Rome
Statute.468 States had sympathy for South Africa's position, but were concerned
about decisions not to prosecute by South American dictators.469 If the Prosecutor
engages in an assessment of models, it might give rise to selectivity in application
of an exception to prosecution and to resultant challenges to the ICC's legitimacy.
How would the Prosecutor differentiate between the case studies described? Would

463. Majzub, supranote 42, at 251.
464. Slye, supra note 179, at 191-97. According to Slye, these include the right to justice (defined
as investigation, prosecution and punishment), the right to truth, the right to judicial protection, the right
to reparations and the right to access to a Court. Id.
465. Roth, supra note 41, at 767. This applies to both the Security Council and the Prosecutor.
466. Sadat, supra note 15, at 1028.
467. Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The InternationalCriminal Court and NationalAmnesty Laws, 93
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC 65, 66 (1999).
468. Siebert-Fohr, supranote 3, at 561-62.
469. Williams & Schabas, supra note 58, at 617.
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Ugandan perpetrators be permitted amnesty because they played a lead role in
negotiations and amnesties served as a valuable bargaining tool? Or, despite that
the situation was post-conflict, would South African perpetrators be permitted
amnesty because of the relative merits of a model that facilitated victim
participation and reparations? Deferring to political interests might compromise
the independence of the ICC and politicize the pursuit of international justice
because it would be required to make assessments about the value of one system
over another. 470 If we move from the case studies into an international armed
conflict, these concerns might be further exacerbated where one state grants
amnesty, which is upheld by the Prosecutor, but another other doesn't.
Lack of Empirical Evidence
Kastner submits that one way to determine whether to defer to amnesties is to
hold "individuals accountable [only] 'if the benefits of accountability over the long
term are likely to outweigh the costs on the short term of prolonging an ongoing
conflict.' 471 The problem is one of ascertainment. While there are many situations
in which amnesties have been granted since individual criminal liability was
established as a matter of international law, there have been very few empirical
studies on the long-term impact of amnesties and alternative justice mechanisms. 72
Moreover, there are competing claims regarding whether amnesties or refraining
from prosecution for political reasons lead to peace and reconciliation. In regard to
South Africa, Slye submits that, "even assuming amnesties contribute to short-term
social stability, in the long-term they undercut efforts to establish a stable
democracy that honors human rights and the rule of law" and create a culture of
impunity.473 Contrary to this position, Helena Cobban "concludes that the TRC in
South Africa, granting conditional amnesties, and the absence of any individual
accountability in Mozambique have delivered much better results than, for
instance, international prosecutions in Rwanda., 4 74 Even accepting Cobban's
position, comparing South Africa with Rwanda is like comparing apples and
oranges. To understand the impact of alternative justice mechanisms, long-term
comprehensive and contextual analysis needs to be undertaken. While it is also yet
to be shown whether international prosecutions result in peace and security and
entrenchment of the rule of law, it is difficult to rely on examples like South Africa
to demonstrate amnesties do.

470. Roht-Arriaza, supranote 15, at 89.
471. Kastner, supra note 179, at 151-52.
472. Neil J. Kritz, Coming to Terms with Atrocities: A Review of Accountability Mechanismsfor
Mass Violations of Human Rights, 59 LAw & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 127, 144 (1996); Newman,
supranote 6, at 301-02.
473. Slye, supranote 179, at 197.
474. Kastner, supra note 179, at 150 (referring to HELENA COBBAN, AMNESTY AFTER ATROCITY?
HEALING NATIONS AFTER GENOCIDE AND WAR 194 (2007)).
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The Impact of Amnesty and Indictment on the Peace Process
We might argue that amnesty encourages leaders to the negotiating table and
to cease-fire. Archbishop Tutu and others argued that prosecutions in South Africa
would have been sabotaged and would have led to more violence. 475 However, if
we look at Sierra Leone and Uganda, this position is not always substantiated over
the short or long term. Sankoh and the RUF returned to violence following grants
of unconditional amnesty, and Kony and other leaders of the LRA didn't come
forward to claim amnesty, even though the law permitted them to do SO. 4 76 In
Uganda, dealing with Kony has been described by Roth as "dealing with a
madman. 477 There is no certainty that such leaders would seize amnesty or cease
violent acts if offered it. The same might be said for indicted Sudanese leaders.
The problem is that trading amnesty for peace is not always so simple. Some
leaders with authority to negotiate don't accept the carrot of amnesty, and some
continue to perpetrate violations despite it. The benefits of amnesty, grassroots
reconciliation, rehabilitation, and reparation might still be realized if prosecution
by the ICC is "sufficiently removed" to enable it to prosecute without disturbing
the internal balance that amnesty may bring.478
What the Sudanese and Ugandan situations show us is that indictment served
to bring leaders to the negotiating table. In Sudan, attempts to negotiate peace in
Darfur had been deferred (with the acceptance of the international community) on
the basis that resolution of the North-South conflict and implementation of its
peace agreement was a necessary prerequisite.479 On the one hand, the position
acknowledged the links between the conflicts by acknowledging that there would
be no resolution in one until the other was resolved. However, at the same time it
served to dissociate the North-South conflict from that in Sudan by failing to
recognize that the conflict in Darfur might serve to destabilize that in the south. In
addition, in order to motivate the international community to act, the indictments
served to provide a compelling incentive for the government to reduce its support
for the Janjaweed.48 ° The indictments further served to isolate rebel groups from
international support and motivate them to negotiate. 481 Even the prospect of
prosecuting enemies might in itself motivate leaders to negotiate.482 The Security
Council referral, and subsequent investigation by the Prosecutor, may then have
been a crucial factor in the 2006 peace agreement.

475. Jonathan D. Tepperman, Truth and Consequences, 81 FOREIGN AFF. 128, 134 (2002).
476. Emily E.Bartholomew, ConstructingDurable Peace:Lessons from SierraLeone, 38 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 117, 132-33 (2007); Kimberly Hanlon, Peace or Justice: Now that Peace is Being Negotiated
in Uganda, Will the ICC Still PursueJustice? 14 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 295,296 (2007).
477. Roth, supra note 41, at 767.
478. Gavron, supranote 3, at 116.
479. Kastner, supra note 179, at 178.
480. Id. at 177-78.
481. Id. at 175.
482. Id. at 175-76.
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In Uganda, the indictment of LRA leaders not only drew them to the
negotiating table, but contributed to a decrease in crime. 4 83 While there were a
number of factors that led to Kony's involvement in negotiation, the ICC served a
useful role by de-legitimizing the LRA. Subsequently, it less frequently "ran off [to
hide] in a game reserve in north-eastern Congo. 484 Moreover, it might serve to
strengthen the domestic rule of law. As noted, the Ugandan government has sought
the withdrawal of ICC indictments on the basis of admissibility; it proposes to
conduct domestic criminal prosecutions of, at least, those most responsible.485
Representatives of Kony and the LRA have agreed to participate.486 The
indictment of leaders may, if domestic processes operate in accordance with the
requirements of admissibility, serve to "augment the number of national
prosecutions in the future ' 487 and meet the goals of complementarity.488
While the ability of international prosecutions to have any significant
deterrent effect is doubted, if the ICC upholds grants of amnesty for those most
responsible, any deterrent effect would be reduced. One can only hope that
"political and military leaders will be more careful in their decisions once the
Prosecutor's role has switched from a theoretical threat to a concrete Prosecutorial
89
4

organ.,

Complexity
The case studies demonstrate the inordinate complexity involved in conflict,
amnesty, and international prosecutions. In Sudan, the periphery-centre divide is
complicated by a one-party system, oil revenues, Sudan's geographic expanse,
shifting loyalties between rebel groups, the Janjaweed, the PDF, and government
institutions and authorities, and cross-border disputes with Chad.49 ° In Uganda,
Kony's attempts to evade prosecution and peace by entering negotiations only
when necessary to buy time, 491 and the LRA's attacks on Ugandan and Congolese
civilians and retreat to the DRC,492 make it difficult to ascertain their movements,
intentions, and sincerity. Even if the Prosecutor deferred to amnesty only for those
less responsible 493 for atrocities, or for those with less negotiating power,
differentiating between those with de jure and de facto power is an impossible task

483. See the discussion on pages 139-142 herein.
484. Roth, supra note 41, at 765-66.
485. Id. at 775-76.
486. Id. at 766.
487. Kastner, supra note 179, at 154.
488. The Security Council reiterated this goal in Resolution 1593 when it called on states to support
domestic efforts to establish the rule of law. S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005)
[hereinafter Resolution 1593].
489. Kastner, supra note 179, at 154.
490. Cash, supranote 252, at 575; Kastner, supra note 179, at 163-64; Nouwen, supra note 269, at
116-18.
491. Katy Glassborow, LRA on Rampage in Congo, HuM. RTS. TRIB., Oct. 30, 2008,
http://www.humanrights-geneva.info/spip.php?article3662.
492. Id.
493. Despite the complexities in the South African and Sierra Leonean conflicts, they both
envisaged prosecution of those most responsible (only by default in the former case).
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when low level perpetrators wield the power to wage violence even if they don't
have the authority to negotiate peace.494 Establishing whether amnesty will serve
the interests of justice in these contexts would therefore be extremely difficult, if
not impossible.
Collective vs. Individual Justice: the Security Council and Functional
Limitations
It is difficult to dismiss political considerations entirely given the Security
Council's residual role in the ICC Statute and the inherent interplay of law and
politics in international law. However, the temporal restriction on Security Council
deferrals indicates that politics, ever-changing, are not a permanently
determinative factor,495 the appropriate body to determine the impact of politics is
the Security Council, and the Prosecutor retains an ultimate discretion in respect to
all other issues.496 We might nevertheless consider three different scenarios: (1)
where the Security Council referred the situation to the ICC; (2) where the state
referred the situation; and (3) where the Prosecutor commenced an investigated
propio motu.

In discussing whether the Prosecutor could determine that an investigation
was not warranted despite the Security Council's referral of the situation in Darfur,
Ohlin puts forward a cogent basis for rejecting amnesty under the first scenario:
If one takes the legal basis for such referrals seriously - i.e. one thinks
of Chapter VII authority as something more than just an excuse or legal
fiction to make such pronouncements - then the Security Council's
actions would seem to allow less room for prosecutorial discretion than
the Assembly of State Parties had initially anticipated. Indeed, however
one wishes to conceive of prosecutorial discretion, it cannot be
interpreted in such a way that the prosecutor has the power to ignore
judgments made by the497Security Council - a power that no one has
under international law.

Referral presupposed the question of peace and justice; they were assumed to
go hand in hand.498 The logical conclusion is that the ICC does not have the power
to make determinations about collective peace and security itself. The Security

494. See Newman, supranote 6, at 305.
495. Moreover, the politics of conflict resolution becomes the politics of dominant powers in the
Security Council.
496. Han, supra note 119, at 101. The proposal at the Rome Conference to constrain the
Prosecutor's discretion through the Security Council was defeated. Alexander K. A. Greenawalt, Justice
with Politics? ProsecutorialDiscretionand the InternationalCriminal Court, 39 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. &
POL. 583, 585 (2007).
497. Ohlin, supranote 36, at 191.
498. The Prosecutor stated that the Darfur situation was referred to him because, in "adopting
resolution 1593 (2005), the Security Council had affirmed that justice and accountability were critical to
achieving lasting peace and security in Darfur." Press Release, Security Council, International Criminal
Court Prosecutor Briefs Security Council on Darfur, Says Will Not Draw Conclusions on Genocide
Until Investigation Complete, U.N. Press Release SC/8748 (Jun. 15, 2006).
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Council seeks peace and security as a collective action,499 whereas the Prosecutor
considers the interests of justice in individual cases. Limiting the Prosecutor to
considerations of individual justice is appropriate given the converse limitations on
the Security Council, which can refer a situation, but has limited authority to
restrain the Court in individual matters.500 In referring Darfur to the Prosecutor, the
Security Council acted pursuant to its authority to make determinations regarding
peace and security. 0 1 Consequently, the Prosecutor should be restricted to a range
of factors relevant to the individual case, rather than the broader impact on
peace.50 2 Collective assessments by the Prosecutor would undermine the
international constitutional order and possibly destabilize the peace process.
By default, the remaining two scenarios are answered because it will never be
within the Prosecutor's scope to determine threats to peace and security. In any
case, where a state refers a situation, it is difficult to conclude other than that the
state itself is competent to determine such issues and that its referral impliedly
rejects amnesty. While the Ugandan government sought the withdrawal of ICC
indictments post-referral because they are purportedly hampering peace
negotiations, it did not do so because it seeks to uphold amnesty, but on the basis
that it would conduct domestic trials.50 3
Regime Change
One of the ways in which prosecution contributes to peace and security is by
preventing those responsible for serious crimes from committing them, and by
criminalizing actors, groups, or regimes. The symbolic act of criminalization may
pressure the international community, governments, and other groups such as
civilians from supporting perpetrators. According to Udombana, "[h]istory has
shown that the involvement of highly placed functionaries or officials of states
makes the commission of most international crimes possible; it is great men,
potential saints, not little men, who become merciless fanatics. 50 4 In Uganda,
Kony's removal is a vital step in making the LRA ineffective, as he "stands at the
apex of the LRA structure, politically, militarily, and spiritually. 50 5 The situation
in Sudan is more complicated because instability in Darfur serves to entrench alBashir and other government leaders' positions by preventing a unified front in the
region.50 6 If those indicted were arrested and successfully prosecuted, it is possible
499. Ohlin, supranote 36, at 191, 196.
500. See Douglas Eisner, Note, HumanitarianIntervention in the Post-Cold War Era, 11 B.U. INT'L
L.J. 195, 198 (1993). Despite the United States expectation that "the Council will continue to exercise
such oversight as investigations and prosecutions pursuant to the referral proceed." Quoted (but not
referenced) in Happold, supranote 230, at 234.
501. With the exception that the Pre-Trial Chamber can determine whether the Security Council
acted lawfully.
502. Ohlin, supranote 36, at 207.
503. See Justin Coleman, Comment, Showing Its Teeth: The InternationalCriminal CourtTakes on
Child Conscriptionin the Congo, but Is Its Bark Worse Than Its Bite?, 26 PENN ST. INT'L L. REv. 765,
782-83 (2008).
504. Udombana, supranote 154, at 44.
505. Akhavan, supranote 155, at 420.
506. Kastner, supra note 179, at 169.
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that a regime change (and possible international intervention) could reduce crime
and stabilize the region. 507
Indictment by the ICC may nevertheless have the opposite effect. While
indictments, arrest warrants, and consequent international attention regarding the
Darfur crisis purportedly reduced Sudanese government support for the
Janjaweed, 50 8 they also served to strengthen support for al-Bashir within the
country and within regional blocks or alliances. 0 9 Since issuance of the arrest
warrant, al-Bashir has visited up to half a dozen countries within the region.510
Nevertheless, indictment might have the adverse effect of ensuring that indictees
will do everything to hold on to power by committing more serious crimes and
impeding the investigation and prosecution. In any event, the extent to which
prosecutions could facilitate regime change and conflict resolution would be
hampered where removal from office simply creates space for individuals who
may also perpetrate crime.
What this tells us though, is not that we must uphold amnesty (because it will
have no impact on regime or institutional change anyway), but that there are
broader constitutional and finctional problems with international law, which the
ICC should not attempt to resolve. Akhavan aptly states:
The view that dialogue with fanatical murderous leaders would
somehow lead to a peaceful settlement is a chimera, often encouraged
by an international community that is eager to insulate itself from
genuine engagement in putting an end to the atrocities. As one observer
concluded, Kony's "refusal for years to accept olive branches and huge
concessions including total amnesty... indicate his mental incapacity."....
But even if Kony proves to be willing and able to negotiate when
presented with the right incentives, the best means of ensuring such a
negotiation appears to be sustained military and political pressure. In
511
this respect, peace and justice are by no means mutually exclusive."
That a state engages with leaders despite their unwillingness to refrain from

violence is linked to the international community's reluctance "to use force to
topple a rogue regime."'5 12 In an ideal world, the ICC would be supported by
economic sanctions, and arms embargoes, 513 and possibly even an obligatory norm
507. Id.

508. Id. at 165.
509. See
A1-Bashir
Concludes Eritrea Visit,
ALJAZEERA,
Mar.
24,
2009,
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2009/03/200932392756117570.html;
Sudan Leader's Qatar
Visit Risks His Arrest on War Crimes, CNN, Mar. 29, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/
WORLD/africa/03/29/sudan.bashir/index.html; Joseph Mayton, Rights Groups Lash Out at Bashir's
Visit to Egypt, MIDDLE E. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2009, http://www.metimes.com/International/
2009/03/26/rightsgroups lash out at bashirs visit to egypt/9028/; Sudanese Media Advertise
Bashir's Visit to Ethiopia, SUDAN TRIB., Apr. 20, 2009, http://www.sudantribune.com/
spip.php?article30941.
510. See supranote 511 sources.
511. Akhavan, supranote 155, at 419.
512. Scharf, supra note 58, at 343.
513. Kastner, supra note 179, at 170.
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to intervene on humanitarian grounds pursuant to the responsibility to protect. On a
smaller scale, the investigation and prosecution of al-Bashir and other leaders
would have been buttressed by a further resolution calling on states to cooperate
with the ICC. That the Security Council doesn't adopt complementary measures is
a consequence of the freedom to act (or not to act) under its constitution, i.e. the
veto power of states such as the United States, China, and Russia, with economic,
ideological and political interests to protect.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Prosecutor of the ICC has adopted the correct approach to admissibility
and the interests of justice. Amnesties granted by truth commissions do not satisfy
the terms of admissibility under article 17 of the Rome Statute when interpreted in
light of the Statute's objects and purposes. An expansive interpretation of the
interests of justice, incorporating political and social factors underpinning grants of
amnesty, is inconsistent with states' intention in enacting the Rome Statute.
Moreover, it is undesirable and impractical given the position of amnesties in
international law, the complexity of both internal and international conflicts and
associated peace negotiations (even at the post-conflict stage), and the retention of
Security Council authority over international peace and justice.5 14 The Pre-Trial
Chamber is not best placed to determine or define an international norm regarding
conditional amnesties, which it would inevitably do if it makes judicial
determinations regarding whether the amnesties are in the interests of justice. The
role of the Prosecutor is to determine whether the interests of justice are served, by
considering factors such as whether the victims have access to some form of
justice, whether the perpetrator is a low-level offender who has committed a small
number of violations, and whether investigation and prosecution of the matter will
extract evidence which might be useful in cases against more senior figures. The
Pre-Trial Chamber's role is to determine whether the Prosecutor has exercised his
role in an appropriate manner, and to apply the law to the exclusion of global,
regional, or domestic politics. Where the Security Council does intervene on the
basis of amnesty, the Pre-Trial Chamber may only engage in judicial review of a
resolution to the extent that it complies with Article 16 of the Rome Statute, such
as to determine whether it constitutes "an abuse of authority.., or [an] obvious and
grave deficiency."5'15 This approach allows States to engage in actions that lead to
the development of a treaty or customary norm regarding alternative justice
mechanisms and their reconciliatory and reparatory functions, and how, or even
whether, amnesties might feature in restoration; such States being best placed to do
SO.

514. Bergsmo & Pejid, supranote 204, at 598; see also Han, supranote 119, at 100.
515. Gropengiel~er & Meifner, supranote 121, at 191.

CORPORATE OBLIGATIONS
UNDER THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER
JERNEJ LETNAR (CERNIC

Almost a billionpeople do not have access to clean and safe water. Access to safe
drinking water and sanitation is increasingly being considered a fundamental
human right. Corporationsplay an important role in the realizationof the right to
water. For example, they can become violators of the right to water where their
activities deny access to clean and safe water or where water prices increase
without warning. Corporations can have a positive or negative impact on the
human rights of individuals, wider communities and indigenous peoples. This
paper argues that corporationsbear a certain responsibilityfor the realizationof
the human right to water, which can be derived from international as well as
national (constitutional) law. Corporate obligations under the human right to
water can potentially be based on the right to water as set in national law and in
the internationalhuman rights treaties and in corporate codes of conduct. It is
asserted that this responsibility is different and separatefrom the responsibilityof
state governments and should never undermine state obligations to observe the
human right to water. In short, the paper argues that corporations have an
obligation to respect, protect andfulfil the right to water deriving primarilyfrom
nationallegal orders.
I. INTRODUCTION

The Niyamgiri Hills form a mountainous area in the Kalahandi and Rayagada
districts of Orissa, in the eastern part of India. They are populated by the
indigenous community of the Dongria Kondh, who consider the Hills sacred, as
their daily lives have depended on them for several centuries.1 In December 2008,
the Indian government, more particularly its Ministry of Environment and Forests,
approved a project to mine bauxite in the Niyamgiri Hills. This project was
proposed and will be conducted by a joint venture corporation, the South-West
*Assistant Professor of Human Rights Law, European Faculty of Law and Faculty of State and
European Studies, Slovenia, PhD in Law, University of Aberdeen, LL.M (Human Rights Law, Raoul
Wallenberg Institute, University of Lund). I would like to thank Martin Scheinin, Ernst-Ulrich
Petersman, Benedict Wray, Bel~n Olmos Giupponi, Ottavio Quirico and the editorial team of this
journal for their many helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. The author can be reached at
jernej.letnar@googlemail.com.
1. AMNESTY INT'L, DON'T MINE US OUT OF EXISTENCE, BAUXITE MINE AND REFINERY
DEVASTATE LIVES IN INDIA 4 (2010), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA
20/001/2010/en/0a8 lalbc-f5Oc-4426-9505-7fde6b3382ed/asa2000l2OlOen.pdf.
2. Id.
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Orissa Bauxite Mining Corporation, involving two major corporations: Sterlite
Industries India Limited, a subsidiary of Vedanta Resources Plc, and the stateowned Orissa Mining Corporation.3 The proposed project has faced a number of
human rights and environmental objections, not the least important of which
relates to the exercise of the right to water. Amnesty International argues in its
report that "findings... clearly demonstrate that the refinery expansion and mining
project have serious implications for the human rights of local communities,
including their rights to water, food, health, work and an adequate standard of
living." 4 In this respect, Amnesty International further notes that "the companies
involved in the mine and refinery projects have ignored community concerns,
breached state and national regulatory frameworks and failed to adhere to accepted
international standards and principles in relation to the human rights impact of
business."5 It further describes that "the streams which originate from the top of
the Hills are the only source of water for communities who live on top of the Hills
and a major source for others who live lower down the hill."6 As a consequence,
"any negative impacts on the streams.., could have disastrous consequences for the
communities, most of whom are completely dependent on this water in order to
continue to live on the Hills."7
The situation in the Niyamgiri Hills is illustrative and poses a number of
pertinent questions relating to corporate human rights obligations under the right to
water. What happens when a corporation deprives individuals of their access to
water? Or when thousands of people suffer from the lack of a safe drinking water
supply in water management systems operated by a corporation? Or where a
corporation has rapidly increased the price of water after water privatization? Do
corporations have normative obligations under the human right to water? If so,
what is the nature and scope of such obligations? Nolan and Taylor aptly note that
"it is no longer a revelation that companies have some responsibility to uphold
human rights. The more pertinent issues are which rights and to what extent
companies should be held to account." 8
The objective of this paper is to comprehensively demonstrate and analyze the
existing scope and nature of corporate obligations deriving from the human right to
water. Even though corporate responsibility for human rights may be still in the
embryonic stages, this paper attempts to argue that corporations, or alternatively
their officers, are already obliged to observe the human right to water. In other
words, the point of this paper is to demonstrate that corporations have obligations
to observe the right to water as part of a national and international value system.

3. Id.
4.Id.
at6.
5.Id
6. Id.
at 21.
7.Id.
8. J. Nolan & L. Taylor, Corporate Responsibility for Economic Social and Cultural Rights:
Rights inSearch of a Remedy?,87 J. Bus. ETHICS 433 (2009).
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Economic, social and cultural rights include rights to housing, food,
education, water and health. 9 This set of rights complements the so-called civil and
political rights. 10 As Scheinin notes, "there is no water-tight division between
different categories of human rights." 1 However, despite claims that both sets of
rights are of equal importance and interdependent, civil and political rights are
more solidly established under international and national law. 12 Economic, social
and cultural rights generally have a programmatic nature and are not always
directly justiciable to the same extent that civil and political rights are. 13 Scheinin
argues that "the problem relating to the legal nature of economic and social rights
does not relate to their validity but rather to their applicability."' 14 The central
question of economic and social rights therefore lies in their enforcement or
justiciability.
Corporations play an important role in the realization of the right to water and
the rights of society as a whole. For example, they can become violators of the
right to water when their activities deny access to clean and safe water or when
water prices suddenly increase. Corporations can have a positive or negative
impact on the human rights of individuals, wider communities and indigenous
peoples. Marks and Clapham note that "changes in the organization of the global
economy have greatly increased the role of business in generating outcomes that
threaten human rights."15 The Global Compact's CEO Water Mandate "recognizes
that the business sector, through the production of goods and services, impacts
water resources - both directly and through supply chains. 16 The preamble of the
CEO Water Mandate notes:
[T]he private sector has an important stake in helping to address the
water challenge faced by the world today. It is increasingly clear that
lack of access to clean water and sanitation in many parts of the world
causes great suffering in humanitarian, social, environmental and
17
economic terms, and seriously undermines development goals.

9. Asbjorn Eide, Economic, Social and CulturalRights as Human Rights, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL
AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK 21, 22 (Asbjorn Eide et al. eds., 2001); see also Amnesty Int'l,
What are Economic, Social and Cultural Rights?, http://www.amnesty.org/en/economic-and-socialcultural-rights/what-are-escr (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
10. Martin Scheinin, Human Rights Committee: Not Only a Committee on Civil and Political
Rights, in SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE

LAW 540, 540 (Malcom Langford ed., 2008).

11. Id.
12. Martin Scheinin, Economic and Social Rights as Legal Rights, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK, supra note 9, at 41, 53.

13. Eide, supra note 9, at 22.
14. Scheinin, supra note 12, at 41; see also Christian Courtis, Standards to Make ESC Rights
Justiciable: A Summary Exploration,2 ERAsMUs L. REV 379 (2009), available at http://www.erasmus
lawreview.nl/files /ELR_2009-4 02 Courtis.pdf.
15. SUSAN MARKS & ANDREW CLAPHAM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LEXICON 188 (2005).

16. U.N. Global Compact, The CEO Water Mandate, Nov. 3, 2010, http://www.unglobalcompact.
org/ issues/Environment/CEOWaterMandate/.
17. U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, THE CEO WATER MANDATE: AN INITIATIVE BY BUSINESS LEADERS
IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 3, available at http://www.unglobalcomp
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CERES argues in its recent report that "the vast majority of leading
companies in water-intensive industries have weak management and disclosure of
water-related risks and opportunities. 18 Without doubt, a number of positive
human rights initiatives have so far been undertaken by several corporations and a
number of them contribute to the creation of jobs, the stimulation of economic
growth, and the raising of living standards. 19
Williams notes that "since the 1970s, alternatives have been sought because
of problems with public water systems, including low service quality and
coverage, inefficiency, corruption, low rates of cost recovery, low productivity,
and high debt burden. 20 Privatization of water services has been offered as the
right medicine to cure the problems of provision of water.21 However, privatization
of water services has stirred up a number of debates as to corporate responsibility
to ensure availability, accessibility, affordability and quality of the human right to
water. In this context, Petrova observes that "defenders of privatization point out
that public utilities have largely failed to provide water access to those who most
need it, namely the poor. 22 On the other hand, "privatizing water is likely to
reduce access to clean water because of rate increases. 23 In contrast, Kent argues
that "semiprivatization of water, carefully controlled by government, remains a
plausible approach. 24
This paper argues that corporations bear a certain responsibility for the
realization of the human right to water, which can be derived from international as
well as from national constitutional law. It will be argued that corporate
obligations can potentially be based on the right to water as set in national law and
in international human rights treaties. This paper argues that corporations have an
obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the right to water deriving primarily from
national legal orders. It is submitted that the concept of corporate responsibility
primarily derives legal authority from national legal orders as one of the sources of
law. It does not undermine the proposition that the concept can also derive

act.org/docs/news-events/ 8.1/Ceo water mandate.pdf.

18. Press Release, Ceres, Largest Companies Fall Short in Managing, Disclosing Water Scarcity
Risks (Feb. 11, 2010), available at http://www.ceres.org/waterreport.
19. See John Grimond, Business Begins to Stir: But Many Water ProvidersStill Have a Long Way
to Go, ECONOMIST, May 20, 2010; SUBHASH JAIN & SUSHIL VACHANI, MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS AND GLOBAL POVERTY REDUCTION (2006); Bus. & Human Rights Res. Ctr., Positive

Human
Rights Initiatives by
Companies, Nov.
12,
2010,
http://www.businesshumanrights.org/Documents/Update-Charts; See Press Release, KPMG, KPMG Joins The Millennium
Villages Project to Help Address Extreme Poverty in Africa (Oct. 10, 2008), available at
http://www.csrwire.com/press-releases/22828-KPMG-Joins-The-Millennium-Villages-Project-to-HelpAddress-Extreme-Poverty-in-Africa.
20. Melina Williams, Privatizationand the Human Right to Water: Challenges for the New
Century, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L 469, 492 (2007); See generally Richardson Dilworth, Privatization,The
World Water Crisis,and the Social Contract,40 POL. SCIENCE & POLITICS 49 (2007).
21. See V. Petrova, Note, At the Frontiersof the Rush for Blue Gold: Water Privatizationand the
Human Right to Water, 31 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 577,581 (2006).
22. Id. at 587.
23. Id. at 589.
24. GEORGE KENT, FREEDOM FROM WANT: THE HUMAN RIGHT TO ADEQUATE FOOD 191 (2005).
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authority from other sources. The state is the primary source of legal authority for
human rights obligations and the responsibility of corporations follows from the
embryonic stage of development of binding international principles for
corporations and their human rights obligations. Corporations are under obligations
to comply with those norms.
Even though legislation on corporate responsibility for the right to water
already exists in many countries at a national level and sometimes even at the
regional level, disparities in definition and scope and a piecemeal approach in
implementation are problematic for an effective investigation and enforcement. As
suggested above, national legal orders regulate corporate responsibility for human
rights in a number of laws, which makes it difficult to have a clear and transparent
landscape of the obligations of corporations in a particular legal order. This
problem, however, can be addressed by introducing a uniform national law, which
would clearly identify the obligations and responsibilities of corporations in
relation to human rights. Primary responsibility for realizing human rights lies with
states and recognizing the responsibility of corporations should never undermine
this responsibility. Yet given the powerful position that corporations increasingly
possess, it is argued that corporations carry an additional responsibility under
human rights law. This paper seeks to contribute to the further delineation of this
responsibility, in particular when it comes to corporate human rights obligations in
the area of the right to water.
The balance of this paper is devoted to exploring corporate human rights
obligations under the right to water. First, some fundamental notions are explained
in section one. The right to water is examined in section two. In so doing, several
allegations of corporate human rights violations are mentioned. Section three
analyzes the legal nature and scope of corporate human rights obligations under the
right to water and proposes de lege ferenda corporate human rights obligations.
By doing so, it is possible to evaluate which arguments are convincing and
determine the sources and legal nature of corporate obligations under the right to
water. To be clear, the argument here is that corporations have normative
obligations deriving from the right to water.
A. Corporations
A number of private and state-owned corporations are doing business in the
provision of water services. The largest private corporations doing business with
water are Suez (111,479,116 customers),25 Veolia Environnement(130,924,000
2
customers, 26 RWE AG (38,235,000 customers),27
Aguas de Barcelona(29,511,718
28
29
customers),
Saur (12,999,000 customers),
Acea (14,305,000 customers) ,30

25. PINSENT MASONS, PINSENT MASON WATER YEARBOOK 2009-2010 202 (2009), available at
http://www.pinsentmasons.com/PDF/PMWaterYearbook2008-09.pdf.
26. Id. at 223.
27. Id. at 247.
28. Id. at 258.
29. Id. at 195.
30. Id. at251.
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Biwater PLC/Cascal (8,834,000 customers) 31 and United Utilities (24,028,000
customers). 32 Much of the literature on corporate responsibility and human rights
concentrates on the notion of transnational corporations. This may be ascribed to
work within the United Nations, which in the 1980s dealt with the protection of
and against corporations investing and operating in the developing world.33 The
adjectives 'transnational' or 'multinational' can be employed to emphasize the
different characteristics of certain corporations. International documents and other
texts use the terms 'transnational corporation,' 34 'multinational enterprise,' 35 and
'national corporation or business enterprise' in various contexts.
A corporation is a legal entity that owns and thereby carries out business
activity mostly for profit, although non-profit corporations also exist.36 The term
'corporation' is not reserved for organizations comprising a large number of
persons, but can be employed even for individual businessmen.37 A corporation has
a separate personality, as do its owners who have "limited liability."38 This means
that a corporation has separate legal rights and obligations and that its owners can
only be held liable for the corporation's debt to the extent of their investment.3 9
Company types vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but the most common types
of corporation are public limited liability corporations, corporations limited by
shares, corporations limited by guarantee, corporations limited by guarantee with
share capital (Aktiengesellschaft - AG, Societas Europaea - SE, 40 Gesellschaft mit
begrenzter Haftung, socidtd anonyme - SA, and socidt6 d'une personne A
responsibilit6 - Sprl) and unlimited corporations. Less common are chartered
corporations and statutory corporations. Other legal forms of doing business
include unlimited and limited liability partnerships. This paper employs the term
"corporation" generically to describe all the above forms and types of corporations,
and also transnational, multinational and national corporations; private or public
31. Id at 268.
32. Id.at 272.
33. Olivier De Schutter, TransnationalCorporationsand Human Rights: An Introduction 9-10
(Hauser Global Law School Program, Global Working Paper No. 01/05, 2005), available at
http://www.law.nyu.edu/global/workingpapers/2005/ECMDLV_015787.
34. U.N. Econ. and Soc. Council, Comm'n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and
Prot. of Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibility of TransnationalCorporationsand Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights
7, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003)
[hereinafter UN Norms]. The Commission, in Dec. 2004 expressed the view that, while the norms
contained "useful elements and ideas" for its consideration, as a draft the proposal had no legal
standing.
35. Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev., The OECD Guidelinesfor MultinationalEnterprises:
Text, Commentary and Clarifications,at 6, DAFFE/IME/WPG(2000)15/FINAL (Oct. 31, 2001).
36. DEREK FRENCH, STEPHEN MAYSON & CHRISTOPHER RYAN, MAYSON, FRENCH & RYAN ON
t
COMPANY LAW 1-38 (24 ed. 2007); PAuL L. DAVIES, GOWER AND DAVIES PRINCIPLES OF MODERN
COMPANY LAW 1-125 (7th ed. 2003).
37. DAVIES, supra note 36, at 10.
38. Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd., [1897] A.C. 22, 30 (H.L.) (U.K.); see also FRENCH,
MAYSON & RYAN, supranote 36, at 116-49.
39. KATSUHITO IWAL, WHAT IS A CORPORATION? THE CORPORATE PERSONALITY CONTROVERSY
AND COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2001).

40. Council Regulation 2157/2001, art. 1, 2001 O.J. (294).
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corporations; 4 1 limited or unlimited liability corporations; and state-owned or
privately-owned corporations. These terms may be used interchangeably and will
be, in most cases, substituted by the term "corporation," or the adjective
"corporate." Moreover, it appears that there is no reason to excuse purely national
corporations from the plethora of human rights obligations, even though it may be
true that larger corporations, such as transnationals, may have greater obligations
in the human rights context. In other words, the paper employs a fluid concept of
corporation. For the purposes of this paper, a corporation is defined as "an
economic entity operating in one or more than one country or a cluster of
economic entities operating in two or more countries - whatever their legal form,
whether in their home country or country of activity, and whether taken
individually or collectively, '42 including "a transnational corporation, contractor,
subcontractor, supplier, licensee or distributor; the corporate, partnership, or other
legal form used
to establish the business entity; and the nature of the ownership of
43
the entity.
B. CorporateResponsibility or CorporateLiability?
An ancient Roman legal principle suggests: culpa tenet [teneat] suos
auctores.44 Legal responsibility has a variety of contrasting faces. Responsibility
involves fulfilling legal obligations and the obligation to pay compensation for any
violations. Responsibility for one's actions generally derives from the national
legal order to which a person is subject. By the term "responsibility," this paper
refers to a broad understanding of legal responsibility and accountability. Duff
argues that "[t]he relationship between liability and responsibility can be simply
stated: responsibility is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of liability. 45 In
this way, by corporate responsibility, this paper refers to corporate legal
responsibility. The term "responsibility" is preferred to the perhaps more obvious
choices of liability or accountability. Responsibility is a broader concept than
liability as it includes not only national liability and accountability under national
legal orders (the civil, criminal and administrative liabilities of corporations under
national legal orders) but also the international legal responsibility of states and the
liability of corporations under investment law and company law. This paper,
therefore, uses the concept of responsibility as an umbrella term, also including
liability.

41. See, e.g.,
Companies Act, 2006, 46 c. 4 (U.K.).
42. UN Norms, supra note 34.The Commission, in Dec. 2004 expressed the view that, while the
norms contained "useful elements and ideas" for its consideration, as a draft the proposal had no legal
standing.
43. Id.;INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, CORPORATE COMPLICITY & LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY,
VOLUME 1: FACING THE FACTS AND CHARTING A LEGAL PATH 4 (2008).

44. English Word Information, Meaning of Culpa, http://www.wordinfo.info/words/index/info/
view unit/585, (last visited Nov. 14, 2010).
45. R. A. DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME: RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY IN THE CRIMINAL LAW

20 (Hart Publishing 2007).
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C. Corporate Violations or Abuses?
Several commentators argue that only a state can violate human rights, and
that other actors, such as corporations and individuals, can only commit human
rights abuses. Scheinin, for example, argues that the "violation is a definitive
46
conclusion that is established through a judicial or quasi-judicial procedure.
Tomuschat argues that "human rights violations can, in principle, be committed
only by states and/or the persons acting on behalf of the state. 47 This paper does
not necessarily disagree with the above arguments as it argues that corporate
obligations under the right to water derive primarily from national legal orders.
Further, the fact that international jurisdictions for legal persons are yet to be
developed does not imply that a corporation does not have any legal obligations.
On the contrary, it would be futile to argue that a substantive obligation only arises
when joined with a jurisdiction that can enforce it. In this way, it appears that
corporations are obliged to pro forma observe the human rights of individuals.
This not only matters on a normative level, but also beyond the pure normative,
when corporations are de facto faced with a decision as to what kind of business
policy to adopt. In other words, the problem is not that corporations and their
officers do not have human rights obligations. The real, and far deeper, structural
problem is that individuals do not have recourse to enforce their human rights and
ideals against corporations.
II. THE

RIGHT TO WATER

A. FundamentalIssues
A human being requires access to water for survival and a decent standard of

living. Without water there would be no human beings on earth. However, water is
a scarce and precious item, and access to it for all human beings is not fully
ensured. A WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP) report notes that
884 million people in the world do not have access to clean and safe water.48 A
further 2.6 billion people in the world lack access to basic sanitation. 49 The United
Nations Generally Assembly recognized its concern in its Millennium Declaration,
which vowed "to halve the proportion of people who are unable to reach or to
afford safe drinking water" by 2015.50 Because of its importance, it is not farfetched to recognize access to sufficient safe and clean drinking water and
sanitation as a human right. Such characterization presupposes that access to water

46. Special Rapporteur to the Human Rights Council, Report on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights and FundamentalFreedoms While Countering Terrorism, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/98
(Dec. 28, 2005).
47. CHR[STLN TOMUSCHAT, HUMAN RIGHTS: BETWEEN IDEALISM AND REALISM 309 (Oxford

University Press 2003).
48. WORLD HEALTH ORG., PROGRESS ON SANITATION AND DRINKING-WATER: 2010 UPDATE 7

(2010) available at http://www.unwater.org/downloads/JMP report 2010.pdf.
49. Id at 8.
50. G.A. Res. 55/2, 19, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 18, 2000).
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is a public good and not
a market commodity. All individuals should have access
51
to water and sanitation.
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
notes that "international human rights law entails clear obligations in relation to
access to safe drinking water. 52 Similarly, the UN Special Rapporteur for Water
noted in 2002, "the right to drinking water and sanitation is an integral part of
officially recognized human rights and may be considered a basic requirement for
the implementation of several other human rights. 53 In this way, access to safe
drinking water and sanitation is increasingly being considered a fundamental
human right. 4 Nonetheless, the description and recognition of the right to water as
a human right is not as straightforward as it may seem. Generally, states have not
reached a consensus, at an international level, to recognize water as a human
right.55 Consequently, international and regional treaties do not impose binding
obligations on states to respect, protect, and fulfil the right to water. Nonetheless, a
human right to water may arise 56from the national legal orders of several countries,
as explained in the next section.
Despite this, several international human rights treaties indirectly protect the
right to water. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR) indirectly provides for the human right to water under Articles
11(1) (right to adequate standard of living) and 12(1) of the ICESCR (the right to
health).57 Further, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) notes in Article 14 (2):
States parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in rural areas in order to ensure, on a
basis of equality of men and women, that they participate in and benefit
from rural development and, in particular shall ensure to women the
right: (h) To enjoy adequate living conditions, particularly in relation to

51. See generally S. Tully, A Human Right to Access Water, 23 NETH. Q. HUM. RTs. 35-64
(2005); E. Filmer-Wilson, The Human Rights-BasedApproach to Development: The Right to Water, 23
NETH. Q. HUM. RTS., 213-242 (2005).
52. Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
on the Scope and Content of the Relevant Human Rights Obligations Related to Equitable Access to
Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation Under InternationalHuman Rights Instruments, 47, U.N. Doc.
A/HCR/6/3 (Aug. 16, 2007).
53. Special Rapporteur on the Right of Access of Everyone to Drinking Water Supply and
Sanitation Services, Preliminary Report on the Relationship Between the Enjoyment of Economic,
Social, and CulturalRights and the Promotion of the Realization of the Right to Drinking Water Supply
and Sanitation,U.N. Doc. E/CN/4/Sub.2/2002/10 (June 25, 2002) (preparedby El Hadji Guissd).
55. Human Rights Council, Human Rights and Access to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation,
U.N. Doc A/HRC/15/L.14, Sep. 24 2010, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/G1O/
163/09/PDF/ G1016309.pdfOpenElement (last visited Jan. 16, 2010).
55. See 5th World Water Forum, http://www.worldwaterforum5.org/index.php?id=1875&L=
Otarget%3D blank% 25%2 (last visited Nov. 16, 2010).
56. See section 3.
57. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art.
11-12, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
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and water supply, transport and

communications.
Similarly, Article 24 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
states, "Parties shall take appropriate measures" to "combat disease and
malnutrition, including within the framework of primary health care, through, inter
alia.... the provision of adequate nutritious foods and clean drinking-water."58
Consequently, the right to water is also part of the right to health. Further, the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities provides, in Article 28, for
an adequate standard of living and social protection in that States parties "must
ensure equal access by persons with disabilities to clean water services, and ensure
access to appropriate and affordable services, devices and other assistance for
disability-related needs."5 9 On a regional level the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe adopted the European Charter on Water Resources, which reads
in Article 5, "everyone has the right to a sufficient quantity of water for his or her
basic needs," and provides, "international human rights instruments recognise the
fundamental right of all human beings to be free from hunger and to an adequate
standard of living for themselves and their families. 60 It is quite clear that these
two requirements include the right to a minimum quantity of water of satisfactory
quality from the point of view of health and hygiene.
International humanitarian law also protects access to water during armed
conflict. The Third Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War
61
provides that "sufficient drinking water shall be supplied to prisoners of war,,
and that "the Detaining Power shall supply prisoners of war who are being
evacuated with sufficient food and potable water, and with the necessary clothing
and medical attention. 62 Similarly, Article 46 provides that "the Detaining Power
shall supply prisoners of war during transfer with sufficient food and drinking
water to keep them in good health, likewise with the necessary clothing, shelter
and medical attention.
Similar provisions can be found in the Fourth Geneva
Convention on the protection of civilian persons in times of war,64 Additional
Protocol I on Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, 65 and
58. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, Art. 24(2)(c), U.N. Doc. A/44/49
(Sept. 2, 1990).
59. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106, art. 28, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/106 (Dec. 13, 2006), available at http://www.un.org/disabilities/convention/conventi
onfull.shtml.
60. EuR. CONSULT. Ass. DEB. 10 9th Sess. 769 (Oct. 17, 2001), available at https://wcd.
coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id =231615&Site=COE.
61. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 26, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/prisonerwar.htm.
62. Id. art. 20.
63. Id. art. 46.
64. Geneva Convention relative to the Protocol of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 85, 89,
127, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/385ec082b509e7
6c41256739003e636d /6756482d86146898c12564le004aa3c5.
65. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Prot.
of Victims of Int'l Armed Conflicts, art. 54-55, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, http://www.icrc.org/
ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/f6c8b9fee14a77fdc12564le0052b079.
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Additional Protocol II on Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed
66
Conflict.

A human right to water can also be protected indirectly through provisions in
international and regional treaties which, although they do not expressly mention
the right to water, seek to protect values that the right to water also seeks to
protect. For instance, Article 6 (1) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) provides that "every human being has the inherent right
to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of
his life. ' 6 7 Accordingly, the United Nations Human Rights Committee has noted:
[T]he right to life has been too often narrowly interpreted. The
expression "inherent right to life" cannot properly be understood in a
restrictive manner, and the protection of this right requires that States
adopt positive measures. In this connection, the Committee considers
that it would be desirable for States parties to take all possible measures
to reduce infant mortality and to increase life expectancy, especially in
68
adopting measures to eliminate malnutrition and epidemics.
Such a broad interpretation of the right to life invites the conclusion that even
the right to water may be protected under Article 6 (1) of the ICCPR. More

importantly, the ESCR Committee, the treaty-monitoring body of the ICESCR,
asserts:
Steps should be taken by States parties to prevent their own citizens and
companies from violating the right to water of individuals and
communities in other countries. Where States parties can take steps to
influence other third parties to respect the right, through legal or
political means, such steps should be taken in accordance 6 9with the
Charter of the United Nations and applicable international law.
This paragraph may indirectly

imply that not only

states, but also

corporations, have obligations to at least respect the right to water of individuals
and communities. Further, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the
Child provides that "State Parties to the present Charter shall undertake to pursue
the full implementation of this right and in particular shall take measures... to
ensure the provision of adequate nutrition and safe drinking water., 70 The Protocol

66. Id. art. 5, 14.
67. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 6(2), U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
68. U.N. Human Rights Comm. [UNHRC], Compilation of Gen. Comments and Gen.
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/l/Rev.1 at 6 (1994),
available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/hrcom6.htm.
69. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of
the Int'l Covenant on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights: The Right to Water,
33, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/a5458dldlbbd7
13fc1256cc400389e94/$FILE/G0340229.pdf [hereinafter SubstantiveIssues].
70. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, art. 14(2)(c), OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (entered into force Nov. 29, 1999), http://www.africa-union.org/official_
documents/Treaties %20Conventions o20Protocols
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to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in
Africa notes in Article 15, "States parties shall ensure that women have the right to
nutritious and adequate food. In this regard, they shall 71
take appropriate measures
to: provide women with access to clean drinking water.,
All in all, it seems that there is substantial support at an international level for
asserting that the right to water is a human right, even though the main
international human rights treaties do not directly include provisions on the right to
water. They include the human right to water only indirectly. 72 However, Kok and
Langford note that "the measure of neglect of the right to water in international and
national jurisprudence stands in contrast to the severity of the plight of the millions
without proper access to water., 73 Precisely this precarious situation of hundreds of
millions around the world has given a new impetus to strive for a self-standing
normative recognition of the human right to water in international treaties.
B. The Nature and Scope of the Human Right to Water
This section analyzes the scope and nature of the human right to water. The
UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights notes that "the human
right to water entitles everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible
and affordable water for personal and domestic uses. ' 74 The human right to water
includes two constituting elements, "both freedoms and entitlements. 75 Freedoms
include more normative obligations on the part of states. Examples of such
freedoms are "the right to maintain access to existing water supplies necessary for
the right to water, and the right to be free from interference, such as the right to be
free from arbitrary disconnections or contamination of water supplies. '76 On the
other hand, entitlements refer specifically to access to the infrastructure for the
provision of water such as "the right to a system of water supply and management
that provides equality of opportunity for people to enjoy the right to water. 77 The
UN ESCR Committee argues that "water must be adequate for human dignity, life
and health., 78 It then goes on to list four criteria for assessing the adequacy of right
to water, which are availability, quality, accessibility and affordability.79
Availability means that "the water supply for each person must be sufficient and

/a.%o20C.%o200ON2OTHE%/ 20RIGHT%/20AND%/20WELF%/0200F%/o2OCHLD.pdf.
71. Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, "Protocol of San Salvador," O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 69 (1988), entered
into force 16 November 1999, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the InterAmerican System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev. 1 at 67 (1992), Article 11.1.
72. For an opposite view see P. Thielb6rger, The Human Right to Water Versus Investor Rights:
Double Dilemma or Pseudo-Conflict?,inHUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND
ARBITRATION

488-493 (2009).

73. M. Langford, Right to Water, in
Chaskalson et al. eds., 2005).
74. SubstantiveIssues, supranote 69.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. 10
Id
Id.
Id. 11.
Id 12.
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continuous for personal and domestic uses. '80 There is no international consensus
on how many litres of water per day a person needs to satisfy basic survival and
health needs. Some argue that a person needs 40-50 litres of water per day and a
minimum of 20 litres to satisfy basic survival and health needs.8 1 Others place the
absolute minimum at 30 litres of water per human being per day.82 Further, the
Constitutional Court of South Africa, in Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg,
recently upheld a minimum quantity of potable water of 25 litres per person per
day or 6 kilolitres per household per month as reasonable under section 27(1) of
the Constitution.
As for quality, it means that "the water required for each personal or domestic
use must be safe, therefore free from micro-organisms, chemical substances and
radiological hazards that constitute a threat to a person's health. 84 Accessibility
means that everyone has to have access to water and water services. 81 In this way,
accessibility has four main elements: physical accessibility, economic accessibility,
non-discrimination and information accessibility. 86 Another aspect of the human
right to water concerns affordability, which means that everyone should have
access to "appropriate water and sanitation pricing policies, including through
flexible payment schemes and cross-subsidies from high-income users to lowincome users., 8 7 All in all, a fully-fledged implementation of the human right to
water requires that all four elements be included.
C. Examples ofAllegations of Corporate Violations of the Right to Water
As legal doctrines need to be discussed in relation to the reality of situations,
this section identifies the nature and extent of the problem. Corporate
responsibility for the human right to water is not merely an abstract matter. For
centuries, corporations have been operating beyond the borders of the country in
which they are registered. A range of mechanisms makes this possible, from
wholly-owned subsidiaries, joint ventures or other partnerships with foreign
80. Id.
81. The Right to Water: From Concept to Implementation, WORLD WATER COUNCIL,
http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/fileadmin/wwc/Library/RightToWater-FinalText Cover.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 9, 2010).
82. H.R.M.W. VAN RIJSWICK, MOVING WATER AND THE LAW: ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF WATER
RIGHTS AND WATER DUTIES WITHIN RIVER BASINS IN EUROPEAN AND DUTCH WATER LAW 10 (2008).

83. See Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg,2010 (4) SA I(CC) at 85-87, 166, 169 (S. Afr.),
available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2009/28.pdf; see also Peter Danchin, A Human Right
to Water? The South African Constitutional Court's Decision in the Mazibuko Case, EJILTALK.ORG
(Jan.
13,
2010), http://www.ejiltalk.org/a-human-right-to-water-the-south-african-constitutionalcourtE2%80%99s-decision-in-the-mazibuko-case/; see also The Case of the Communities of the
Jiguaniando and the Curbarado, Order of the Court of March 6, 2003, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E)
(2003), available at http://wwwl .umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/E/curbarado3-6-03.html.
84. SubstantiveIssues, supranote 69.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Special Rapporteur on the Right to Drinking Water and Sanitation, Realization of the Right to
Drinking Water and Sanitation, U.N. ECOSOC, Comm'n on Human Rights, § 6.1, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/25 (July 11, 2005) (by El Hadji Guissd), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/
english/issues/water/docs/SUb Com Guisse guidelines.pdf.
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companies, to supply-chain relationships with contractors and suppliers of goods
and services. This has raised the question of the extent to which corporations have
responsibilities for the protection, promotion and realization of the human right to
water, and the ways in which they can be held accountable for human rights
violations connected with their activities. Additionally, a few real-life scenarios
from different parts of the world will help to illustrate the impact that corporations
have on the human right to water.
In recent decades, there has been a growing body of evidence showing that
the impact of corporate activities on poor communities in developing countries can
result in human rights violations." Even though this phenomenon is far from being
new, globalization and its inherent forces have created favourable conditions for
the rise of corporate actors to power. Ruggie notes that "the rights of transnational
firms - their ability to operate and expand globally - have increased greatly over
the past generation as a result of trade agreements, bilateral investment treaties and
domestic liberalization."89 Today there are some 70,000 transnational corporations,
together with roughly 700,000 subsidiaries and millions of suppliers in every
corner of the globe. 90 The World Health Organization estimates that 1.7 billion
people do not have access to clean water and that 2.3 billion people are subjected
to water-borne diseases each year. 91
The private sector may have a responsibility for these high numbers. For
instance, the non-governmental organization FIAN International reports that a
private company is allegedly contaminating water in the River Chambira basin in
Peru. 92 It also reports that two Coca Cola bottling plants in Kerala (India) and
Tamil Nadu (India) were allegedly involved in the depletion and contamination of
groundwater. 93 An oil pipeline network funded by a German state-owned bank has
allegedly destroyed access to water and livelihoods in Ecuador.94

88. See On the Margins of Profit: Rights at Risk in the Global Econ., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
(Feb. 18, 2008), http://hrw.org/reports/2008/bhr02O8/; see also, Report of the Special Representative of
the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corps. & Other Bus. Enters.,
Corps. & Human Rights: A Survey of the Scope and Patterns of Alleged Corporate-RelatedHuman
Rights Abuse, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5/Add.2 (May 23, 2008) (by John G. Ruggie) (summarizing the
scope and patterns of alleged corporate-related human rights abuse found in a sample of 320 cases),
http://www.business-humanrights.org/Documents/RuggieHRC2008.
89. U.N. ECOSOC, Interim Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-Generalon the
Issue of Human Rights and TransnationalCorporationsand Other Business Enterprises: Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights, 12, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97 (Feb. 22, 2006) (preparedby J.
Ruggie) available at http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/4686402.38046646.html [hereinafter J. Ruggie's
2006 Report].
90. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2005, World Investment Report 2005:
TransnationalCorporationsand the Internationalizationof R&D.
91. Food and Water Watch, http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/water/world-water/right.
92. FIAN International, Identifying andAddressing Violations of Human Right to Water: Applying
the Human Rights ApproachlO (prepared by Maike Gorsboth), http://www.fian.org/resources/
documents/others/identifying-and-addressing-violations-of-the-human-right-towater/?searchterm=Identifying and Addressing Violations of Human Right to Water.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 12.
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On many occasions, both the public and the private sector are involved. For
example, the price of water has rapidly increased after water privatization in
Cochabamba (Bolivia). 95 And in 2003, the Indian government decided to divert
water, meant for 20,000 peasant families, for a water theme park in India. 96 The
construction of dams has also led to the deprivation of water by communities
living in the area. Several thousands of people were allegedly deprived of their
access to water in Ghana due to the damming of the river Subri.97 The project
proceeded on the basis of an investment agreement between Newmont Mining
Corporation and the government of Ghana. 98 Several thousands of people allegedly
suffer from the lack of a safe drinking water supply in Jai Bheem Nagar in Meerut,
Uttar Pradesh, in India. 99 Further, the Baba dam project in Ecuador may affect the
right to water of more than 20,000 women and men, farming and fishing
communities and indigenous peoples settled in the basin.100 Further, the
International Fact Finding Mission, an international non-governmental
organization, has concluded that extreme violations of the human right to water
have taken place due to bauxite mining in the Rayagada and Koraput districts in
Orissa, India.101

III.

CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE RIGHT TO WATER:
FROM THEIR SOURCES TO THEIR LEGAL NATURE AND SCOPE
This section attempts to identify whether corporations have normative
obligations under the human right to water in national law, international law, and
in corporate codes of conduct. The Institute for Business and Human Rights
suggests that "business has three potential responsibilities concerning water: as a
user or consumer, as an enabler of access to water and as a provider or distributor
of water."1 02 It further notes:

[I]ndustrial bodies (including both private corporations and State owned
enterprises) are often major consumers of water. It is predicted that in

95. Id at 11.
96. Id.
97. FIAN International, Identifying andAddressing Violations of Human Right to Water: Applying
the Human Rights Approach, Revised and Updated Edition 2008 12 (preparedby Maike Gorsboth and
Esther Wolf), http://www.fian.org/resources/documents/others/identifying-and-addressing-violationsof-the-human-right-to-water- 1/?searchterm-Identifying%20and/o20Addressing%20Violations%
20ofo2OHuman%2ORight%20to%20Water.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 14.
100. Id. at 15.
101. FIAN International, Investigating Some Alleged Violations of the Human Right to Water in
India 9-13,
http://www.fian.org/resources/documents/others/fian-international-2013-investigatingsome-alleged-violations-of-the-human-right-to-water-in-india/?searchterm=Investigating
some alleged
violations of the human right to water in India.
102. Institute for Business and Human Rights, Business, Human Rights & Right to Water,
Challenges, Dilemmas, Opportunities,Roundtable Consultative Report, January 2009, at 3, available at
http://www.institutehrb.org/Downloads/Draft%/20Report%/2 0 -%/20Business, / 2OHuman / 20Rights%/2
Oand%20Water.pdf.
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2025, industry, rather than agriculture, will account for most of the
projected increase in water use. As a result, industries may substantially
affect the enjoyment of the right to water if their water use curtails
access to safe-drinking water for personal and domestic
uses, either
03
through over-abstraction or pollution of water sources.1
It must be observed as a note of caution that the obligations of corporations in
relation to a right to water are not identical to those of a state. Some commentators
argue that corporations cannot have obligations which pertain exclusively to the
state apparatus, such as the right to a nationality, the right to asylum, or the right to
have a fair hearing, but surely corporations are obliged to respect the human rights
of the right to water. 104 In this regard, while their obligations may be construed as
an obligation to respect, protect and fulfil, some authors accept that such an
obligation will also include the obligation
to promote the right to water in relation
105
to contractors and subcontractors.
This section argues that the normative thrust of corporate obligations under
the human right to water derives from three levels of legal sources. First, it is
submitted that corporate obligations under the human right to water derive from
national legal orders. Second, the corporate obligations may derive from the
international level. Third, the corporate obligations under the human right to water
may derive from unilateral voluntary commitments by the corporations themselves.
This paper argues that the corporate obligations under the human right to water
derive primarily from national legal orders and only secondarily from the
international level. Both draw their foundations from a national and international
value system, which in turn is derived from national legal orders. In addition, the
voluntary commitments of corporations are identified as a third level of sources for
corporate human rights obligations under the right to water.
It has to be noted that legal differences between the three levels are also
relevant. The third level obviously presents a source of a distinct normative nature,
as it cannot be equated with the national legal orders or international law. In
contrast, the relevance of distinguishing between the first two situations may be
less obvious, as many national rules derive their origins from international law and
vice versa. Nonetheless, the distinction between national and international levels
can be made and is legally and practically relevant.

103. Id at 18.
104. John H. Knox, Concept Paper on Facilitating Specification of the Duty to Protect, Prepared for

U.N. SRSG on Business and Human Rights (Dec. 14, 2007), available at http://www.businesshumanrights.org/Updates/Archive/SpecialRepPapers (follow hyperlink under Discussion Papers).

105. Amy Hardberger, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuitof Water: Evaluating Water as a Human Right
and the Duties and Obligations it Creates, 4 Nw. U. J. INT'L HuM. RTS. 331 (2005), available at
http://www.law.northwestem.edu/journals/ihr/v4/n2/3.
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A. Legal Sources of Corporate Human Rights Obligations Under the Right to
Water
1. Sources of Corporate Human Rights Obligations in National Legal Orders
The tenets of every normative system are principles and rules that create the
rights and obligations of the subjects or participants in that system. Any valid
positive norm derives its legal authority from its membership in a legal order,
which gives it binding force. Legal scholarship has so far predominantly focused
on the international legal obligations of corporations. 10 6 in contrast, this paper
argues that corporate human rights obligations derive legal authority from national
normative orders and only secondarily from the international level. This argument
is backed by constitutional and legislative protections in national legal orders in
relation to corporate human rights obligations. Finally, this section argues that the
human rights obligations of corporations have arguably acquired the status of
customary international law.
In the absence of a clear and coherent articulation of the positive international
corporate human rights obligations relating to the right to water, it appears
necessary to first examine the sources of corporate human rights obligations in
national legal orders. This section argues that national legal orders are rooted more
deeply in a normative system than international law is. This is not different in
relation to corporate human rights obligations. A number of international human
rights contained in the various international human rights treaties, or developed
through customary international law, are directly enshrined in the national legal
orders of several countries. Viljoen notes that "when states ratify human rights
' 10 7
treaties, they undertake to domesticate and comply with their provisions."
Having said that, it must be recognised that human rights protection was first
developed in the domestic environment long before any international human rights
treaty was adopted. 108 Domestic laws include protection for human rights that can
be enforced against corporations. 10 9

106. Steven R. Ratner, Corporationsand Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111
YALE L. J.

443, 449 (2001);

NICOLA M. C. P. J'AGERS, CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS

(2002); Declaration of C. Greenwood, Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy Inc., Civil
Action No. 1 CV 9882 (AGS), (7 May 2002) at 8, para. 20.
107. FRANS VILJOEN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA 10 (Oxford University
Press, 2007).
108. See Magna Carta (1215); English Bill of Rights (1689); French Declaration of the Rights of
Man and of the Citizen (1789); United States Declaration of Independence (1776).
109. See generally Sarla Fitzgerald, Corporate Accountability for Human Rights Violations in
Australian Domestic Law (2005) 11(1) AUSTRALIAN J. OF HUM. RTS. 2, available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AJHR/2005/2.html (a detailed discussion on human rights
obligations in domestic law ); Sophie van Bijsterveld, Human Rights and Private Corporations:A
Dutch Legal Perspective, 6.4 ELECTRONIC J. OF COMPARATIVE L. (Dec. 2002), available at
http://www.ejcl.org/64/art64-21.html; S. Joseph, An Overview of the Human Rights Accountability of
MultinationalEnterprises, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAw (2000);

C. HEYNS AND F. VILJOEN, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS

TREATIES ON THE DOMESTIC LEVEL (2002).
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The corporate human rights obligations under the right to water, as noted,
derive legal authority primarily from national legal orders. 110 Domestic laws,
which place human rights obligations on corporations, including the human right to
water, exist in many states.111 The most important statutes are constitutional laws.
National constitutions often play a seminal role in the protection of human rights.
Most commonly, all natural and legal persons must act in compliance with the laws
of a national constitution. Most national legal orders include the protection of
human rights preserving the security of persons, fundamental labour rights, and
protection against discrimination. These rights can arguably be translated into
corporate human rights obligations under the right to water asconstitutional
protections of human rights can apply to both natural and legal persons.
A number of national constitutions of countries across the globe already
include the human right to water. For example, South Africa, Uganda, and
Ecuador all include numerous human rights in their national constitutions,
including the right to water.11 2 It must be recognised, however, that only a few
constitutions contain explicit obligations under the human right to water that can
be enforced against both natural and legal persons.
A few examples of national constitutions containing corporate obligations
under the human right to water are provided here. In South Africa, the provisions
of the South African Bill of Rights require natural and juristic persons to take into
account the nature of the right and the nature of any obligation imposed by the
right to water.113 Article 27 of the Constitution of South Africa provides,
"[E]veryone has the right to have access to... sufficient... water." 114 A further
example from Uganda also demonstrates that human rights obligations under the
right to water derive from national constitutions. The Constitution of Uganda
provides, in Article XIV, that "all Ugandans enjoy rights and opportunities and
'
access to... clean and safe water."115
Similarly, Section 47 of the Constitution of
Uruguay provides: "[W]ater is an essential natural resource for life. Access to
water services and sanitation are essential human rights."1' 16 Further, Article 17 of
the Constitution of the Lao People's Democratic Republic provides that "All
organizations and citizens must protect... water sources," which suggests this

110. See OECD Risk Awareness Tool for Multinational Enterprises in Weak Governance Zones,

15, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/21/36885821.pdf (noting that corporations are
expected to comply with their legal obligations).
111. See S. JOSEPH, CORPORATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 11 (2004);
see also Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights Responsibilities of Private Corporations, 35 VAND. J. OF
TRANSNAT'L L. 801, 808-809 (2002); S. Joseph, Liability of MultinationalCorporations: International
and Domestic Laws and Procedures, in SOCIAL ECONOMIC RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING
TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 613 (Malcolm Langford ed., 2007).

112. S. AFR. CONST. 1996,
UGANDACONST.1995, art. XIV(ii).

ch. II, §

113. See S. AFR.CONST. 1996, ch. II, § 8(2).
114. S. AFR.CONST. 1996, ch.II, § 27(1)(b).
115. UGANDA CONST. art. XIV(b).
116. CONST. OF URUGUAY, § 47.

27(1)(b);

ECUADOR CONST.

1998,

art. 23,

120;
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provision addresses legal persons. 117 The Constitution of Gambia provides, "The
' 118
State shall endeavour to facilitate equal access to clean and safe water."
Similarly, the Constitution of Ethiopia provides that "every Ethiopian is entitled,
within the limits of the country's resources, to... clean water." 119 Similar provision
can be found in Article 127 of the Constitution of Guatemala. 120
All in all, national legal orders that create the right to water can be found in
the constitutions of Belgium, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ecuador,
Ethiopia, Gambia, Guatemala, Kenya, Panama, Philippines, South Africa, Spain,
Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela and Zambia. 121 In this way, the International
Commission of Jurists Expert Legal Panel on Corporate Complicity in
International Crimes "has found that in a number of countries domestic
constitutional or human rights provisions do in fact provide for a direct cause of
action against a non-state actor, including companies or company officials,
alleging that their conduct infringed a protected right. 12 2 Hence, it appears that
under a constitutional and normative framework, corporations share human rights
obligations in national legal orders equally with individuals and the state.
Corporations are obliged to comply with obligations in national legal orders,
which also include the protection of human rights. 123 There are numerous examples
of corporate human rights obligations deriving from national legislation. Corporate
human rights obligations under the right to water derive from ordinary criminal
legislation, civil law legislation, consumer protection laws, company law, and
national law covering the extraterritorial operations of corporations.
A few examples of national ordinary legislation illustrate that corporate
human rights obligations derive from national legal orders. National corporate law
principles, legislation, and practices directly or indirectly create corporate human
rights obligations in countries such as France, Spain, Brazil, 124 Belgium, the
Netherlands, Kenya, Finland, Argentina, Australia, Canada, France, India,
Indonesia, Japan, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Singapore and the UK. 125 In
117. CONST. OF THE LAO PEOPLE'S DEM. REP. art. 17.

118. CONST. OF GAMBIA 1996, Art. 216(4).
119. CONSTITUTION OF ETHIOPIA (1998), Article 90(1).
120. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LAREPUBLICA DE GUATEMALA [CONSTITUTION] Nov. 17, 1993,

art. 127.
121. WORLD WATER COUNCIL [WWC], RIGHT TO WATER: MOVING TOWARDS A GLOBAL
CONSENSUS? 4 (Mar. 2007).
122. INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS [JCJ], CORPORATE COMPLICITY & LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY,
VOLUME 3: CIVIL REMEDIES, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS EXPERT LEGAL

PANEL ON CORPORATE COMPLICITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 7 (Sept. 16, 2008).
123. See U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Promotion and Protection of All

Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to
Development: Protect,Respect and Remedy: a Frameworkfor Business and Human Rights: Rep. of the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General, 54, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (by John
Ruggie), available at http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-report-7-Apr-2008.pdf [hereinafter
J. Ruggie's PromotionofAll Human Rights].
124. UNESCO, Outcome of the InternationalExperts' Meeting on the Right to Water (October
2009), http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001854/185432e.pdf.
125. U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mandate of the Special Representative
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France, for example, the Water Bill provides for the right to water in the following
way: "[E]veryone has the right, for their alimentation and hygiene, to have access
to drinking water, on the condition that it is economically affordable to
everyone."' 126 Likewise, municipalities in Spain are obliged to offer access to water
and sewer services. 127 Consequently, public and private corporations in those
countries have obligations to provide such access. In Belgium, water is a right in
all three regions. 128 The Waloon Region provided in its decree that "every person
has the right to make use of drinking water of a quality and in quantity appropriate
for nutrition, domestic needs and health." 129 The National Water Resource
Management Strategy of the Kenyan government provides: "[W]ater required to
meet basic human needs and to maintain environmental sustainability will be
guaranteed as a right., 130 Further, the Dutch national legal order effectively
recognizes water as a human right.131 The Finnish Water Services Act provides that
"the objective of this Act is to ensure water services which provide a sufficient
amount of impeccable household water with respect to health." 132 Further, the
Public Utility Code of California provides that "access to an adequate supply of
healthful water is a basic necessity of human life, and shall be made available to all
residents of California at an affordable cost. '1 33 Therefore, a substantial number of
countries from every continent, from Latin America to Asia, include the right to
water in their constitutional laws or national legislations.134 Consequently, it may
be argued that corporate obligations arising from the right to water are well
established and well recognized within national legal orders. Further, Mali,
Mauritania and Senegal signed Senegal River Water Charter 8, which provides in
Article 4: "les principes directeurs de toute r6partition des eaux du Fleuve visent A
assurer aux populations des Etats riverains, la pleine jouissance de la ressource,
dans le respect de la sdcuritd des personnes et des ouvrages, ainsi que du droit
fondamental de l'lomme A une eau salubre, dans la perspective d'un
d~veloppement durable. ,,135 Similarly, Indian courts have held that the right to life
of the Secretary General (SRSG) on the Issue of Human Rights and TransnationalCorporationsand
other Business Enterprises, (July 5, 2010) (by John Ruggie), available at http://www.reports-andmaterials.org/Ruggie-corporate-law-project-Jul-2010.pdf.
126. Loi 2006-1772 du 30 dcembre 2006 sur l'eau et les milieux aquatiques [Law 2006-1772 of
December 30, 2006 on Water and Aquatic Environments], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIC
FRANCAISE [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Dec. 31, 2006.
127. Regulating the Local System Law art. 26.1 (R.D.-Ley 1985, 80) (Spain).
128. INT'L ENVTL. L. RES. CTR. [IELRC], THE RIGHT TO WATER IN BELGIUM 6 (2008).
129. INT'L ENVTL. L. RES. CTR. [IELRC], THE RIGHT TO DRINK WATER REQUIRES NATIONAL

LAWS TO BE EFFECTIVE 2 (April 2007).
130. THE NAT'L WATER RES. MGMT. STRATEGY (2006 TO 2008), THE RIGHT TO WATER AND
SANITATION KENYA

4 (2008).

131. H.F.M.W. VAN RIJSWICK, MOVING WATER AND THE LAW, ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF WATER
RIGHTS AND WATER DUTIES WITHIN RIVER BASINS N EUROPEAN AND DUTCH WATER LAW 15-16

(Europa Law Publishing 2008).
132. WATER SERVICES ACT § 1 (Finland).
133. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 739.8(a) (Deering 2009).
134. UNITARIAN UNIVERSALIST

SERV. COMM.

[UUSC], A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PRIMARY AND

SECONDARY SOURCES OF LAW ON THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER 16-21 (Mar. 2007).

135. Charte des Eaux du Fleuve Senegal[Charter for the Waters of the Senegal River] art. 4, Mali-
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in Article 21 of the constitution of India includes the right to safe and sufficient
water.1 36 In Attakoya Thangal v. Union of India (1990), Justice Sankaran Nair of
the Kerala High Court noted, "the right to sweet water and the right to free air, are
attributes of the right to life for these are the basic elements which sustain life
itself." 137 The Argentinean
courts have also upheld the human right to water in
1 38
several decisions.
In Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg, the Constitutional Court of South
Africa recently held that the state-owned corporation, Johannesburg Water, has to
provide a minimum quantity of potable water of 25 litres per person per day or 6
kilolitres per household per month as reasonable under Section 27(1) of the
Constitution. 1" 9 In a similar recent development, the Supreme Court of Chile
confirmed the water use rights of the Aymara indigenous communities against a
private corporation, Agua Mineral Chusmiza, which has been "seeking the rights
to bottle and sell freshwater from a source used historically by Aymara indigenous
residents. 14 °
From this analysis of national legal orders, it becomes clear that a number of
sources of national law include corporate human rights obligations under the right
to water. In spite of these developments, however, deriving corporate human
rights from national legal orders is still problematic. Nevertheless, it appears that
there is growing support for the notion that corporate human rights obligations
under the right to water can be derived from constitutional protections and
safeguards in ordinary legislations.
To restate, it has been argued that corporations must comply with the national
constitutional and legislative protections of the human right to water by way of
complying with provisions of the positive law. In this light, it may be argued that
corporate obligations relating to the right to water have arguably reached the status
of the level of regional customary law, just as the substantive human rights
obligations of corporations have arguably reached the status of regional customary
law in Europe and possibly elsewhere in the world. This assertion has been backed
by a number of national constitutions in Europe, Africa, the Americas, and Asia.
Having gained an understanding of corporate human rights obligations deriving
from national legal orders, the next part of this section turns to the development of
the international human rights obligations of corporations.

Mauritania-Sen., May 28, 2002.
136. The Right to Water, Legal Redess: The Right to Water under the Right to Life:
India,
http://www.righttowater.org.uk/code/legal 3.asp (last visited Nov. 11, 2010).
137. Attakoya Thangal v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1990 Ker 321 (India).
138. See CTR ON Hous. RIGHTS & EVICTIONS [COHRE], LEGAL RESOURCES FOR THE RIGHT TO
WATER: INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL STANDARDS 111-114 (Oct. 1, 2003) (summarizing
Argentinean cases).
139. Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg,2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 85-87, 166-169 (S. Afr.).
140. Jeremy Valeriote, Chile's Supreme Court Upholds Indigenous Water Use Rights, THE
SANTIAGO TIMEs, Nov. 30, 2009.
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2. Sources of Corporate Obligations Under the Human Right to Water at the
International Level
This section argues that corporate human rights obligations under the right to
water may secondarily derive from the international level. International law
standards are the minimum standards agreed to and binding on the entire
international community or any part of it. Arguably, international law, which also
applies in relation to corporate human rights obligations, is a much shallower
normative system than national legal orders. Nevertheless, this section argues that
the international system may offer supplementary answers in relation to national
sources of corporate human rights obligations. Traditionally, sources of
international law derive from international treaties, customs, general principles of
law, and subsidiary sources of law such as judicial decisions and academic
commentaries. 141 Several international human rights treaties include state
obligations to protect the right to water in relation to the activities of
142
corporations. 1 2 Against this background, a number of international and regional
treaties providing for the right to water have been mentioned in Section 2. Further,
a number of arbitration tribunals have, in their decisions, indirectly recognised
corporate obligations under the right to water.a41
At this point it should be noted that the scholarly debate on the strength of the
direct and indirect international legal obligations of corporations has been on
going. Several commentators have argued that, despite the primary focus on states,
corporations can have additional obligations under international human rights
law. 144 In contrast, Ruggie has concluded that the main international human rights

141. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), April 18, 1946, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993,
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3deb4b9c0.html; Hugh Thirlway; The Sources of
International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 115, 118 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2d ed. (2006); Jorg
Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in the FormalSources of InternationalLaw: Customary InternationalLaw
and Some of its Problems, 15 EuR. J. INT'L L. 523 (2004); Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditionaland
Modern Approaches to Customary InternationalLaw: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 757 (2005)
(critiquing the custom as a source of international law).
142. JOHN H. KNOX, CONCEPT PAPER ON FACILITATING SPECIFICATION OF THE DUTY TO PROTECT

(2007)
available
at
http://www.businesshumanrights.org/SpecialRepPortal/Home/Materialsbytopic/nternationalorganizations/

UNhumanrightsmechanisms (follow hyperlink to PDF).
143. See Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/22 (2008); Bus. & Human Rights Res. Ctr., Case Profile: BP lawsuit (re Colombia), available
at http://www.business-humanrights.org/Categories/Lawlawsuits/Lawsuitsregulatoryaction/Lawsuits
Selectedcases/ BPlawsuitreColombia.
144. ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS 266-270 (2006);
NICOLA JAGERS, CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATION: IN SEARCH OF ACCOUNTABILITY 75-95

(2002); PETER T. MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 519-524 (2d ed. 2007);

David Kinley and Junko Tadaki; From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities
for Corporationsat InternationalLaw, 44 VA. J. INT'L L 931, 961-993 (2004); Nathaniel Stinnet,
Regulating the Privatization of War: How to Stop Private Military Firmsfrom Committing Human
Rights Abuses, 28 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. Rev. 211, 217-18 (2005); David Weissbrodt & Maria Kruger,
Current Development: Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterpriseswith Regard to Human Rights, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 901, 919-20 (2003).
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14 5
instruments do not seem to impose direct legal responsibilities on corporations.
In a similar vein, Greenwood argues that "there is no basis in existing international
law for the liability of corporations and, consequently, no rules of international law
regarding the questions which necessarily arise when a corporation is accused of
wrongdoing." 146 For Vasquez, an international norm has applicability to
corporations if "an international mechanism is established for enforcing an
international norm against a non-state actor, then it may clearly be said that the
international norm applies directly to non-state actors," 147 or if the "language is
indicating an intent to subject [the actors] to international enforcement mechanisms
in the future." 148 In other words, international obligations cannot be directed
toward corporations if they leave its enforcement to the national legal orders of
states. 149 However, it appears that such an approach confuses apples with oranges.
The nature of an obligation cannot be equated with the way it is implemented. As
Ratner has observed, such an approach "confuses the existence of responsibility

with the mode of implementing it."9150 Articulating the direct human rights

obligations of private actors, including corporations, should not depend on
establishing a jurisdiction of implementing them. The recognition of the
international human rights obligations of corporations cannot be subject to the
existence of potential international jurisdiction. Kamminga correctly notes,
"[T]here are no reasons 'of
principle why companies cannot have direct obligations
15 1
under international law."

As noted, international treaties bind only states. Yet Clapham notes that it
"makes sense to talk about the parties to a human rights treaty rather than use the
expression States parties, which indicates that states are exclusive members of
every human rights regime." 152 Ratner has suggested a method for translating
obligations under current international human rights law to the corporate context
by employing four criteria: "[a corporation's] relationship with the government, its
nexus to affected populations, the particular human right at issue, and the place of
individuals violating human rights within the corporate structure." 153 He submits
that such a theory "offers a starting point for global actors to develop a corpus of

145. Representative of the Special Representative of the Secretary General, Business and Human
Rights: Mapping InternationalStandards of Responsibility andAccountabilityfor Corporate Acts,

44,

U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/035 (Feb. 9, 2007).
146. Declaration of C. Greenwood, Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy Inc., Civil
Action No. 1 CV 9882 (AGS), (7 May 2002) 8, para. 20; See, CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, HUMAN
RIGHTS: BETWEEN IDEALISM AND REALISM 107-109 (2003).
147. Carlos M. Vazquez , Direct vs. Indirect Obligationsof Corporationsunder InternationalLaw,
43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 927, 940 (2005).
148. Id at 941.
149. Id. at 934-35.
150. Steven R. Ratner, Corporationsand Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111
Yale L.J. 443, 481 (2002).
151. MENNO T. KAMMiNGA, PRESENTATION AT THE 71ST CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW ASSOCIATION: CORPORATE OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

152. CLAPHAM, supranote 144, at 91.
153. Ratner, supranote 150, at 496-97.

(2004).
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law that would recognize obligations on businesses to protect human rights. 154 In
sum, "international law, as it exists today, includes norms that address the conduct
of corporations and other non-state actors but, with very few exceptions, the norms
do so by imposing an obligation on states to regulate non-state actors. ' 155 It is clear
that international norms may have applicability to corporations even if there is no
international mechanism established for enforcing this norm.
The previous section on the right to water listed and briefly analyzed
international treaties, which may include the human right to water. However, the
commitment of corporations to observe the human right to water may also arise
from soft law international documents. The preambular paragraph of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) stipulates:
[T]hat the General Assembly proclaimed the Declaration as a common
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that
every individual and every organ of society... shall strive by teaching
and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by
progressive measures, national and international, to secure their
universal and effective recognition and observance. 156
The preambular provision is implemented in Articles 29 and 30 of the
Universal Declaration. Article 29 articulates the correlative private duty that
everyone has to respect the rights of others.1 57 Similarly, Article 30 provides that a
"group or person do not have any rights to engage in any activity or to perform any
1 58
act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein."
Addressing the preamble, Henkin notes, "[E]very individual includes juridical
persons. Every individual and every organ of society excludes no one, no
company, no market, and no cyberspace. The Universal Declaration applies to
them all." 1 59 Undoubtedly, the language of the preambular provision includes the
role of corporations in the promotion and the protection of human rights.
The 2003 UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to
Human Rights state that corporations are required to promote, respect, and protect
"human rights recognized in international as well as national law." 160 The OECD
1976 Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (revised in 2000) requires
multinational enterprises to "respect the human rights of those affected by their

154. Id. at 530.
155. Carlos M. Vazquez, Direct vs. Indirect Obligationsof CorporationsUnder InternationalLaw,
43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 927, 930 (2005).
156. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), at
pmbl. (Dec. 10, 1948).
157. Id. at art. 29(2).
158. Id. at art. 30.
159. Louis Henkin, The Universal Declaration at 50 and the Challenge of Global Markets, 25
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 17 (1999).

160. U.N. Comm. on Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of TransnationalCorporations
and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/
2003/12/Rev.2, at 1 (Aug. 26, 2003).
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activities consistent with the host government's international obligations and
commitments." 161 The ILO Tripartite Declaration states that "all parties (including
corporations) should contribute to the realization of the ILO Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and follow-up adopted in 1998.,,162
The UN Declaration on the Rights and Responsibilities of Individuals, Groups and
Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms notes that private actors have an "important role and
responsibility.., in contributing, as appropriate, to the promotion of the right of
everyone to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set
forth in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and other human rights
' 163
instruments can be fully realized."
3. Voluntary Recognition of Corporate Obligations Under the Human Right
to Water
This section identifies a third potential layer of sources of corporate human
rights obligations deriving from the right to water. It can be argued that these
obligations may derive from unilateral voluntary commitments by corporations
themselves. The voluntary commitments of corporations in human rights and the
business field can most often be found in internal human rights policies or codes of
conduct. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
defines codes of conduct as "commitments voluntarily made by companies,
associations or other entities, which put forth standards and principles for the
conduct of business activities in the marketplace., 164 Similarly, the ILO defines a
code of conduct as:
[A] written policy, or statement of principles, intended to serve
as the basis for a commitment to particular enterprise conduct.
By their very nature, voluntary codes contain commitments often
made in response to market incentives with no legal or
regulatory compulsion. However, as public statements, codes
usually are considered to have legal implications under laws
generally regulating enterprise representations, advertising
and,
165
in cases of joint enterprise action, anti-competition.

161. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES: TEXT, COMMENTARY AND CLARIFICATIONS 14 (2001).
162. INT'L LABOR ORG., TRIPARTITE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES CONCERNING MULTINATIONAL

ENTERPRISES AND SOCIAL POLICY (3rd ed. 2000); see also Jemej Letnar terni6,

Corporate
Responsibilityfor Human Rights: Analyzing the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning
MultinationalEnterprisesand SocialPolicy, 6 MISKOLC J. INT'L L. 24 (2009).
163. See Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society
to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, G.A. Res.
53/144, U.N. Doc. AIRES/53/144, at art. 18, 3 (Mar. 8, 1999).
164. OECD, Codes of CorporateConduct: An Inventory, at A 4, TDITC/WP(98)74/FINAL (May
3, 1999). See also OECD Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, Codes of Corporate
Conduct: Expanded Review of their Contents, (OECD, Working Paper No. 2001/6); Fiona McLeay,
Corporate Codes of Conduct and the Human Rights Accountability of TransnationalCorporations: a
Small Piece of a LargerPuzzle, (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Global Law Working Paper 2005/1).
165. ILO, Working Party on the Social Dimensions of the Liberalization of International Trade,
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Codes of conduct are voluntary initiatives adopted by companies in order to
improve their public reputations and to answer to the demand that they take
responsibility for their activities. 166 They include the normatively non-binding
obligations and commitments of corporations. In other words, codes of conduct do
not create legal, but at most moral, obligations. 167 They are drafted by the
corporations themselves because it is in their interests to adopt them. The codes of
conduct include principles, standards, or guidelines. 168 De Schutter notes that "they
differ in their content by the monitoring mechanisms that they may or may not
include, and by the level (the individual company, the sector, the country or group
of countries) at which they are drafted and proposed for adoption. 1 69 They may be
specific or broad in their nature. The codes of conduct usually take principles and
norms from the principles and rules of international human rights law.
A number of corporations have formally and publicly acknowledged
responsibility for ensuring that their actions are consistent with the human right to
water. This paper will examine the human rights policies relating to the right to
water of several corporations. For instance, in Pepsi Corporation's Pepsi
Guidelines in Support of the Human Right to Water, it "agrees... to ensure that our
business engagement across the globe, first and foremost, respects the human right
to water., 170 More specifically, it notes that Pepsi "will ensure that [its] operations
preserve the quality of the water resources in the communities in which we do
business; 171 that "its use of water will not diminish the availability of community
water resources to the individuals or the communities in the areas in which we
operate;"' 172 and that Pepsi "will involve communities in our plans to develop water

Overview of Global Developments and Office Activities Concerning Codes of Conduct, Social Labelling
and Other Private Sector Initiatives Addressing Labour Issues, at 26 GB 273/WP/SDL/l(Rev. 1)
(Nov. 1998).
166. Christopher Wright & Alexis Rwabizambuga, InstitutionalPressures. Corporate Reputation,
and Voluntary codes of Conduct: An Examination of the Equator Principles,111 BUS. SoC'Y REV. 89,
90(2006).
167. N. Bernaz et P.-F. Morin, L 'Onu et socijtjs transnacionales:La nicessitk d'une collaboration
opdrationnelle en mati~re de droits sociaux internationaux, in UNE SOCIETE INTERNATIONAL EN
MUTATION: QUELS ACTEURS POUR UNE NOUVELLE GOUVERNANCE? [The UN and Transnational

Societies: The need for operational collaboration in the field of internationalsocial rights, in A
CHANGING INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY: WHAT ACTORS FOR A NEW GOVERNANCE?] 75 (Laurence
Boisson De Chazournes & Rostane Mehdi eds., 2005).
168. See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next
Level, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 389, 401 (2005); Mark Baker, Promisesand Platitudes: Toward a
New 21st Century Paradigm for Corporate Codes of Conduct?, 23 CONN. J. INT'L L. 123,128-29
(2007).
169. 0. De Shutter, TransnationalCorporationsand Human Rights: An Introduction (Global Law
Working Paper 01/05), available at http://www.nyulawglobal.org/workingpapers/GLWP0105
DeSchutter_000.rtf. 11; see also 'Codes of corporate conduct: An Inventory' (TD/TC/WP
(98)74/FINAL, 99 pages).
170. Partnerships & Community, PEPSICO, http://www.pepsico.com/Download/PepsiCo Water
Report FNL.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2010).
171. Id
172. Id
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resources."1 73 Pepsi Corporation's Guidelines also ensure that "[Pepsi] operations
will not adversely impact physical accessibility of community members to
community water resources and will address community concerns in a cooperative
manner; ' 174 and that Pepsi will "advocate to applicable government bodies that
safe water supplies should be available in a fair and equitable manner to members
of the community. Such water should be safe
and of consistent and adequate
175
supply and affordable within local practices."
Similarly, the Coca-Cola Company emphasizes: "[J]just as water is vital to
our business, it the essential building block for good health and economic growth.
We recognize the need to engage with stakeholders to understand the issues that
are the most important to them and to work jointly with communities and
governments in water-stressed areas. 176 Moreover, the Coca Cola Company
recognizes "a special responsibility with regard to water stewardship at plants
located in areas of water stress, such as drought." 177 The Suez-Environment
corporation, which provides drinking water to 76 million people, established the
Water for All Foundations, which aims to provide "support for any philanthropy
project,whether initiated in France or abroad,in favour of access to water,
sanitation and healthfor the inhabitants of developing countries, particularly in
urban environments," while committing itself to the promotion and expansion of
"knowledge and know-howin this issue. 178 Similarly, Nestld notes that it "engages
in a number of projects that help overcome the barriers faced by many
communities in accessing safe and clean water., 17 9 The International Federation of
Private Water Operators, in its Code of Ethics, "encourages its Members to carry
out their business while promoting integrity and ethical practices in every aspect of
water services: in particular supporting and respecting international human rights
and labour rights within their sphere of influence; and banning any kind of corrupt
trading practices."18 °
Additionally, the UN Global Compact has established the CEO Water
Mandate, which is a "unique public-private initiative designed to assist companies
in the development, implementation and disclosure of water sustainability policies
'
and practices."181
CEO Water Mandate recognizes that businesses "have a

173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Sustainability, THE COCA-COLA COMPANY, http://www.thecoca-colacompany.com/citizen
ship/water more.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2010).
177. Id.
178. Meaning and Mission, SUEZ ENVIRONNEMENT, http://www.suez-environnement.com/en
/sustainable-development/foundation/meaning-and-mission/meaning-and-mission (last visited Nov. 13,
2010).

179. Nestld Water Management Report, Water Management Report and Nestle (Mar. 2007),
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues doc/Environmentlceo-water-mandate/water-mandate-co
ps/Nestle CEOWater.pdf.
180. International Federation of Private Water Operators, Code of Ethics, § 1.
181. United Nations, The CEO Water Mandate, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Issues/
Environment/CEOWaterMandate/ (last updated Nov. 3, 2010).
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responsibility to make water-resources management a priority, and to work with
governments, UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, and other
stakeholders to address this global water challenge." 182 In its preamble, the CEO
Water Mandate states its six coverage areas: "Direct Operations; Supply Chain and
Watershed Management; Collective Action; Public Policy; Community
Engagement; and Transparency." 183 In this way, 63 companies have endorsed the
CEO Water Mandate and adopted the Mandate into their corporate policies and
operations.184 The problem with all of these references is that they are not
sufficiently specific and do not articulate clear guidelines as to the extent and
limits of corporate human rights responsibility.
While it is correct that voluntary initiative codes of conduct have never
worked to alter corporate behaviour, they can nonetheless contribute to some
extent to the corporate observance of human rights. 185 This paper therefore argues
that the voluntary commitments represent the third and additional layer of
corporate obligations. Corporate codes of conduct are essential in promoting
compliance with human rights obligations amongst corporations and they offer an
often necessary balance between normative protections and voluntary corporate
social responsibility. MacLeay observes that "A well drafted and implemented
code can be used to bring about real improvements in employee rights, particularly
where the host State has little commitment to such rights and where independent
civil society and unions are weak or non-existent. 1 8 6 In other words, corporations
may encourage local authorities to develop an effective means of protecting human
rights. 187 They should not, however, be used as a camouflage against attempts to
strengthen the normative responsibility and accountability of corporations for their
activities as they affect the human rights of individuals and communities.
Corporate codes of conduct also have a number of weaknesses. They are
often vaguely defined and include only select human rights, whereas others are
omitted.18 8 In addition, most do not support the mechanisms and independent
monitoring of their implementation. 189 It may appear that they can be described as
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. United Nations, The CEO Water Mandate - Endorsing CEOs, http://www.unglobalcompact.
org/Issues/Environment/CEOWaterMandate/endorsingCEOs.html
185. See Patricia R. Waagstein, From 'Commitment' to 'Compliance': The Analysis of Corporate
Self-Regulation in the BP Tangguh Project,Indonesia, 5 JURNAL HUKUM iNTERNASIONAL UNPAD 100

(2005). She concludes "the discussion on corporate self-regulation in the Tangguh Project reveals that
corporate self-regulation is not merely a corporate commitment. It can inspire, highlight, sharpen,
modify, and even supersede existing regulation. In this case, commitment can actually act as a coregulation and reaffirm existing standard or lay new standards or precedent." Id. at 117.
186. See McLeay, supra note 164, at 19.
187. See Murphy, supra note 168, at 398-99 :Ilias Bantekas, Corporate Social Responsibility in
InternationalLaw, 22 B.U. INT'L L. 309, 314 (1994) (suggesting that multinational corporations often
have the capability to influence government policies and practices).
188. See Barbara A. Frey, The Legal and EthicalResponsibilitiesof TransnationalCorporationsin
the ProtectionofInternationalHuman Rights, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 153, 180 (1997).
189. Corporate Liability for Violation of InternationalHuman Rights Law, 114 HARV. L. REV.
2025, 2025-26 (2001).
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lex imperfecta. Marks and Clapham explain that "careful consideration.., is
needed, to ensure that various voluntary codes, solemn declarations and
multistakeholder initiatives do not serve simply as 'window dressing', or worse,
co-opt the language of human rights in ways that further entrench the economic
relationship they purport to modify."1 90
It is clear, however, that codes of conduct do not have the same normative
value as the first two levels of sources of human rights obligations under the right
to water. Nevertheless, they provide an additional layer from which the corporate
commitment to observe the human right to water can be derived. Identifying
corporate human rights obligations under the right to water is a significant
exercise, of which the voluntary commitments of corporations are a small but
important part.
4. Interim Conclusion
International law and national legal orders are two autonomous legal orders
joined in a coherent pluralistic whole. This section has argued that corporate
obligations under the human right to water derive primarily from national legal
orders, and alternatively from international law. It appears to be a non sequitur to
expect that a normatively shallow system of international law could break the
conundrum of human rights obligations that normatively full-fledged national legal
orders have difficulties with.
Taken together, national legal orders and
international systems impose human rights obligations on corporations. In
addition, voluntary commitments may offer further evidence of such obligations.
In this light, sources of corporate human rights obligations under the right to water
should be treated as mutually complementary and not as mutually exclusive.
A number of commentators agree that corporations can be held responsible
for human rights violations. 191 Other commentators argue that only states can
violate international human rights. 192 Even though the precise content of the
obligations of corporations is unclear, it may appear self-evident that corporations
must at least comply with fundamental human rights standards, including the right
to water. Even still, some practitioners and commentators argue that corporations
do not have any obligations and responsibilities even under the human right to
water. 19' No matter how plausible this conclusion might sound, it is not persuasive,
as national legal orders, international treaties and declarations now include human
rights obligations of corporations relating to the right to water. The scope of
substantive obligations, however, and whether they are direct or indirect, remains
contested. In a similar vein, Ruggie states that "There are legitimate arguments in
190. See MARKS & CLAPHAM, supra note 15, at 192-93.
191. International Council on Human Rights Policy, Beyond Voluntarism: Human Rights and the
Developing InternationalLegal Obligations of Companies (2002), http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports
/7/107 report en.pdft see also Frey, supranote 188 at 158; Paust, supra note 111, at 803-04.
192. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary InternationalLaw as Federal Common
Law: A Critique of the Modem Position, 110 HARv. L. REv. 815, 870 (1997).
193. Press Release, United Nations Human Rights Council Adopts 13 Resolutions, Appoints 13
New Mandate Holders and Extends Eight Mandates (June 18, 2006), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/viewOl/F862D09328BA5EACC125746C006CB 1DF?.
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support of the proposition that it may be desirable in some circumstances for
194
corporations to become direct bearers of international human rights obligations."
This is even more so "where host Governments cannot or will not enforce their
obligations and where the classical international human rights regime, therefore,
cannot possibly be expected to function as intended."' 195 Thus, the development of
substantive human rights obligations under the right to water may require a
translation of already existing national human rights standards into a corporate
context.
B. The HorizontalApplication ofHuman Rights Law
National constitutional and international protections of human rights have not
only a vertical, but also a horizontal effect. In other words, national constitutional
frameworks impose obligations on private actors, who are obliged to observe
fundamental rights in their relationships with third parties. Traditionally, human
rights law has protected individuals from excessive action by state governments.
Human rights have been formulated within the relationship between the individual
and the state. 196 A person beaten by a state organ would, in such a context, suffer a
human rights violation, whereas the same beating by a non-state actor would
amount only to an ordinary crime. To this end, two categories of human rights
obligations can be distinguished.
The first category relates to the obligations of states toward individuals and,
vice-versa, the obligations of individuals toward the state. These are vertical
human rights obligations. Van der Walt observes, "[A] vertical application of
fundamental rights refers to the application of these rights to the vertical relation
between the state and the subject. '197 This reflects the traditional understanding of
the nature of human rights, which has been developed over decades.
The second category of private obligations involves horizontal obligations.
These include the private obligations of private actors to respect the human rights
of one another. These obligations are horizontal as they apply on the same level
between corporations, individuals or other private actors. In other words, the
horizontal application of fundamental rights includes "the horizontal relationship
between private law subjects or private individuals." 198 Some commentators argue
that one would dilute and distort the concept of human rights by applying human
rights obligations horizontally between private subjects. 199 This statement
encompasses one of the most common arguments against the horizontal effect of
human rights obligations between private actors. However, this presents a very
194. See J. Ruggie's 2006 Report, supra note 89.

195. Id.
196. Prudence E. Taylor, From Environmental to EcologicalHuman Rights: A New Dynamic in
InternationalLaw?, 10 GEO.INT'LENVTL.L. REV. 309, 331 (1998).
197. Johan van der Walt, Blixen's Difference: HorizontalApplication of FundamentalRights and
the Resistance to Neocolonialism, LAW, SOC. JUSTICE & GLOBAL DEv. (Apr. 30, 2003), available at
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/2003_1/walt/.
198. Id.
199. See the Examination question at Academy of European Law, EUI, Florence, Italy, 2.7.2004, on
file with author.
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outdated approach and does not reflect developments in recent decades. By
insisting that one of the parties to a human rights dispute should always be a state,
the argument omits one of the most important characteristics of human rights
law.200 Challenging this historical understanding of the application of human rights
law is central for invoking a horizontal application of fundamental rights.2 1
This section argues that human rights obligations also apply within a
horizontal relationship between private parties. The category of corporate human
rights obligations includes binary or correlative obligations - in other words,
corporate obligations to protect the ability of individuals, local communities, and
indigenous peoples to enjoy human rights.20 2 These are the obligations of
corporations toward other private actors. They cannot be set out within a
traditional vertical matrix of human rights law; these obligations are inherently
horizontal. While such obligations strengthen the promotion and protection of
human rights, traditional human rights law leaves the identification of human
rights obligations and its enforcement to national legal orders.20 3
A number of jurisdictions now provide for a direct horizontal application of
human rights obligations.20 4 Section 9 of the Bill of Rights of the South African
Constitution provides that "a provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or
juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking account of the
nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right., 20 5 This section
also places an obligation on private actors not to discriminate against others.20 6 The
Constitutional Court of South Africa confirmed this horizontal application of
human rights between private individuals in cases such as Fose v. Minister of
Safety and Security,20 7 Soobramoney v. Minister of Health2°8 and Minister of
Health v. Treatment Action Campaign.20 9 Additional support for a horizontal
application of human rights can be found in jurisprudence under the Irish
Constitution.210 Equally important, the German Constitutional Court

200. See Andrew Clapham, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE, 92 (Claredon Press, 1996)
[hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE];

HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE 21ST

(Angela Hegarty & Siobhan Leonard eds., Cavendish Publishing Co. Ltd., 1999); see
generally Walt, supranote 197.
201. See Walt, supra note 196.
202. Kinley & Tadaki, supranote 144, at 939.
203. See Mark Tushnet, The Issue of State Action/Horizontal Effect in Comparative Constitutional
Law, INT'L J. OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2003) (arguing that systems with greater commitments to
social democratic norms will find the issue of horizontal effect easier than systems with weaker social
democratic commitments).
204. Stephen Gardbaum, The "HorizontalEffect" of ConstitutionalRights, UCLA School of Law
Public Law & Legal Theory Research PaperSeries Research Paper No. 03-14, (2003).
205. S. Afr. Const., 1996, ch. 2, § 9, cl. 3.
206. S.Afr. Const., 1996, ch. 2, § 9, cl. 4.
207. See Fose v. Minister of Safety and Security 1997 SA 786 (CC) at 87 (S.Afr.).
208. Soobramoney v.Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal; 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) at 33 para. 54 (S.
Afr.).
209. Ministerof Health et al. v. Treatment Action Campaign et al.,
2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) at 64-65
para 106 (S.
Aft.).
210. Hosford v. John Murphy & Sons, [1988] I.L.R.M. 300 (H. Ct.) (Ir.); Meskell v. Coras Jompair
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(Bundesverfassungsgericht)confirmed the horizontal nature of human rights in the
Basic Law (Grundgesetz) of the Federal Republic of Germany through the wellknown Lith decision.211 States have obligations to implement their human rights
obligations in relations between private parties.
Read together, these developments confirm that constitutional human rights in
national legal orders impose obligations on private actors, who are obliged to
observe fundamental rights in their relationships. To be sure, one would not dilute
or distort the concept of human rights by applying human rights obligations
horizontally between private subjects, since it would recognize the obligations of
international human rights law that have been drafted and developed by states. On
the contrary, it appears that one would dilute and distort the whole concept of
human rights by denying their application in horizontal relationships between
private parties.212
C. The Nature and the Scope of CorporateObligations Under the Right to Water
The aim of this part of the paper is to examine the nature and the scope of
corporate human rights obligations under the right to water. This section argues
that corporations have obligations to respect, protect, and fulfil the human right to
water.2 13 It first examines a tripartite typology of human rights obligations.2 14
The former UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Asbjn Eide,
introduced the tripartite typology, distinguishing state obligations for economic,
social and cultural human rights at three levels: the obligations to respect, protect,
and fulfil human rights. 215 He built his doctrine upon the earlier writings of Henry
Shue, who first developed the typology of obligations in his book Basic Rights Subsistence, Affluence and U.S. ForeignPolicy, where he distinguishes three types
of duties: "duties to avoid depriving, duties to protect from deprivations and duties

Eireann, [1973] I.R. 121, 132-33 (Ir.) quoted in Stephen Gardbaum, The Horizontal Effect of
ConstitutionalRights,102 MICH. L. REv. 387, 396 (2003).
211. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 15, 1958, 7, 198
(Get.).
212. The concept of Drittwirkung implies that certain provisions of the European Convention of
Human Rights are understood to contemplate the 'horizontal effect,' meaning that they apply as
between private parties. JAGERS, supra note 144, at 36-37.
213. See, e.g., Hakeem 0. Yusuf, Oil on Troubled Waters: Multinational Corporations and
Realising Human Rights in the Developing World with ParticularReference to Nigeria 8.1 Aft. Hum.
Rts. L. J. 79, 96-97 (2008) (arguing that corporations should be similarly obligated to respect, promote
and protect human rights).
214. See M SEPULVEDA, THE NATURE OF THE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 157 (2003); Special Rapporteur on the Sub-

Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Report on the Right to Adequate
Food as a Human Right, United Nations Econ. & Soc. Council Comm. on Human Rights, 65, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23 (July 7, 1987) (by Asbj6rn Eide) [hereinafter Report on the Right to
Adequate Food as a Human Right]; ASBJORN EIDE, The right to adequatefood and to be free from
hunger -- Updated study on the right to food, submitted by Mr.Asbjorn Eide in accordance with SubCommission decision 19981106, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/12; see also Ida Elisabeth Koch,
Dichotomies, Trichotomies or Waves ofDuties?, 5 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 81.
215. See generally Report on the Right to Adequate Foodas a Human Right, supranote 214.
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to aid the deprived., 216 This paper attempts to argue that the tripartite typology
could also be employed in relation to corporate human rights obligations under the
right to water.
The tripartite typology of human rights obligations refers, under traditional
human rights doctrines, to state obligations.217 The tripartite obligations to respect,
protect, and fulfil human rights apply universally to all rights and entail a
combination of negative and positive duties. 218 However, the fact that the state is
the bearer of human rights obligations does not imply that only the state has such
obligations. Shue noted in this regard that "for every basic right - and many other
rights as well - there are three types of duties, all of which must be performed if
the basic right is to be fully honoured but not all of which must necessarily be
performed by the same individuals or institutions.,, 219 Eide noted that:
The obligation to respect requires the State, and thereby all its organs
and agents, to abstain from doing anything that violates the integrity of
the individual or infringes on her or his freedom, including the freedom
to use the material resources available to that individual in the way she
or he finds to satisfy basic need. The obligation to protect requires from
the State and its agents the measures necessary to prevent other
individuals or groups from violating the integrity, freedom of action or
other human rights of the individual-including the prevention of
infringements of his or her material resources. The obligation to fulfil
requires the State to take the measures necessary to ensure for each
person within its jurisdiction opportunities to obtain satisfaction of those
needs, recognized in the human
rights instruments, which cannot be
0
secured by personal efforts.

22

Tripartite obligations to respect, protect and fulfil the human right to water
can apply also to corporations. 221 Eide confirms this point by writing, "[I]t should
216.

HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 52

(1980).
217. International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic,

Social and Cultural Rights, at 6, Jan. 26, 1997; See U.N. Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11 of the Covenant) at

15, May 12, 1999.
218. African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 30th Sess., transmitted by letter dated
May 27, 2002 from the Director of the Center for Economic and Social Rights concerning
Communication 155/96, 44, ACHPR/COMM/A044/1 (May 27, 2002). Commission interpreted the
African Charter for Human and Peoples' Rights and developed four-fold typology of human rights
obligations in the case of Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and
Social Rights v. Nigeria, (Communication 155/96, May 27, 2002). It held that 'internationally accepted
ideas of the various obligations engendered by human rights indicate that all rights - both civil and
political rights and social and economic - generate at least four levels of duties for a State that
undertakes to adhere to a rights regime, namely the duty to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil these
rights,' Id. at para. 44.
219. SHUE, supra note 216.
220. Asbjbm Eide, Realization of Social and Economic Rights and the Minimum Threshold
Approach, 10 HuM. RTS. L.J. 35, 37(1989).
221. See JAGERS, supra note 144, at 77-78; CLAPHAM, supra note 144, at 230-3 1.
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be kept in mind, however, that all members of society share responsibility for the
realization of human rights. 222 The UN Norms for Corporations suggest that
corporations are obliged to respect, protect, and fulfil human rights norms within
their spheres of activity and influence.223 They address a wide area in which
corporations exercise their influence.224 Therefore, the tripartite typology can also
be used as an analytical tool to examine and investigate the nature and scope of the
human rights obligations of corporations. Having briefly described the tripartite
typology of human rights obligations and the general nature of the human rights
obligations of corporations, attention will now be turned to an analysis of each
limb of the tripartite human rights obligations of corporations: obligations to
respect, protect, and fulfil the human right to water.
1. The Corporate Obligation to Respect
The obligation of corporations to respect the right to water means that
corporations are obliged to refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of the
human rights of the others. In other words, they are obliged to do no harm to
others' enjoyment of water resources. This rule derives from the ancient Roman
principle sic utere tuo ut alterum non laedes.225 According to Eide, the obligation
to respect requires:
[T]he State, and thereby all its organs and agents, to abstain from doing
anything that violates the integrity of the individual or infringes on her
or his freedom, including the freedom to use the material resources
available to that
individual in the ways she or he finds best to satisfy the
226
basic needs.
For corporations, the obligation to respect human rights implies that its
corporate activities must refrain from interfering with or violating the rights of
people. 227 Ruggie notes that "the responsibility to respect is a baseline expectation,
a company cannot compensate for human rights harm by performing good deeds

222. Report on the Right to Adequate Foodas a Human Right, supra note 214, at 65.
223. U.N. ECOSOC Comm. on Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporationsand Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 1, Submitted by SubComm. on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2
(Aug. 26, 2003).
224. U.N. High Commissioner on Human Rights, Report of the UnitedNations High Commissioner
on the Responsibilitiesof TransnationalCorporationsand Related Business Enterpriseswith Regard to
Human Rights,
37-38, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/91 (Feb. 15, 2005); David Weissbrodt & Maria
Kruger, Human Rights Responsibilitiesof Businesses as Non-State Actors, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 315, 336 (Philip Alston ed., 2005); Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 144, at 946-48.
225. Elizabeth E. Ruddick, Note, The Continuing Constraint of Sovereignty: InternationalLaw,
InternationalProtection, and the Internally Displaced,77 B.U. L. REV. 429, 471 (1997). The author
defines the term as meaning "that one should use his own property in such a manner as not to injure that
of another, id. at 471 n.231. She also points out that this has become a widely accepted term in
environmental law, id. at 470-71.
226. Report on the Right to Adequate Food as a Human Right, supra note 214, at 67; JAGERS,
supranote 144, at 79.
227. Frey, supra note 188, at 163.
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elsewhere., 228 In another report, Ruggie stated that corporate responsibility to
respect human rights "has acquired near-universal recognition by all
stakeholders., 229 His 2009 Report recognizes, "[T]here may be situations in which
companies have additional responsibilities. But the responsibility to respect is the
baseline norm for all companies in all situations., 230 Tripathi and Morrison argue,
"[I]ndependent of States' duties, the baseline responsibility of companies is to
ensure that their activities do not infringe on the enjoyment of the right of access to
water., 231 The Joint Committee of the House of Commons correctly noted, "[T]he
responsibility on businesses to respect human rights is not merely voluntary. 232 In
short, corporations are obliged to respect fundamental human rights.
The obligation to respect may appear to suggest that companies have to
undertake due diligence ensuring not only that they comply with human rights
obligations under the right to water, but also that they do everything possible to
avoid causing harm.233 In this regard, one commentator has suggested that a
company's obligation to respect and protect the right to water of its employees
implies taking reasonable steps to protect workers from violations committed by
the State, or to seek legal redress for their employees if violations have been
committed.234 Corporate obligations to respect the human right to water go beyond
the sphere of employees and extend to all individuals affected by corporate
activities. 235 Corporate responsibility and corporate obligations to respect human
rights have been recognised in a number of international documents and also
within the United Nations.236
The Institute for Business and Human Rights asserts: "[P]rivate water
providers should abide by all laws, regulations, targets and benchmarks applicable
to them in this regard. Several private water providers have recognized the right to
water. 237 In this way, private water providers can:

228. J. Ruggie's PromotionofAll Human Rights, supra note 123, at 55.
229. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Business and Human Rights: Towards
Operationalizingthe "Protect,Respect and Remedy" Framework: Report of the Special Representative
of the Secretary-Generalon the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporationsand Other
Business Enterprises, 46, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/1 1/13 (Apr. 22, 2009) (by John Ruggie) [hereinafter J.
Ruggie's Towards Operationalizing].
230. Id. at 48.
231. SALIL TRIPATHI & JASON MORRISON, WATER AND HUMAN RIGHTS: EXPLORING THE ROLES
AND

RESPONSIBILITIES

OF

BUSINESS,

THE

CEO

WATER

MANDATE

4

(2009)

available at

http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues doc/Environment/ceo-water-mandate/Business-Water-a
ndHumanRights Discussion Paper.pdf.
232. House of Lords & House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights, Any of Our
Business? Human Rights and the UK Private Sector, 1SRep. of Sess. 2009-10, 110, HL Paper 5-I HC
64-I (Dec. 16, 2009) available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200910/jtselect/
jtrights/5/5i.pdf.
233. Special Representative of the Secretary General, supranote 229, at 24-25.
234. See CLAPHAM, supra note 144, at 230-31.
235. JAGERS, supranote 144, at 80.
236. See J. Ruggie's Towards Operationalizing,supra note 229, at 54-55, 58.
237. INST. FOR Bus.

& HUMAN RIGHTS, BUSINESS, HUMAN RIGHTS & RIGHT TO WATER,

CHALLENGES, DILEMMAS, OPPORTUNITIES, ROUNDTABLE CONSULTATIVE REPORT 19

(2009), available

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 39:2

... contribute to respect for the enjoyment of the right to water by
integrating considerations related to the ability to pay into disconnection
policies and ensuring that where disconnections are carried out, they do
not lead to the denial of the minimum238amount of water considered
essential for personal and domestic uses.
The measures that corporations could adopt to ensure respect for the human
right to water include: acknowledging the human right to water in their policies;
constantly and consistently examining human rights situations in countries where a
corporation operates, or intends to do so; effectively monitoring supply chains by
drafting explicit policies that protect the human rights of the corporation's
employees and workers throughout its supply chain; implementing a monitoring
system to ensure that human rights policies relating to the right to water are being
implemented; and adopting explicit policies to ensure that the corporation's
security arrangements do not contribute to violations of the right to water. 239 The
next section discusses the corporate obligation to protect the human right to water.
It must be noted that the obligations to respect and to protect function
simultaneously and are complementary.
2. The Corporate Obligation to Protect
The obligation to protect the right to water includes the obligations of
corporations to protect the individual's enjoyment of the right to water and to
support the protection of water by employing its expertise and resources to protect
the right to water of individuals as well as local communities.
Corporate obligations to protect the human right to water have both an
internal and an external dimension.240 Protection must be offered against the
activities of a parent corporation, subsidiary corporation and business partners.
Corporations have obligations to protect the right to water of persons internally in
relation to their own activities. On the other hand, the obligation to protect the
human right to water also includes an external obligation, which requires a
corporation to take necessary measures to protect the integrity and human rights of
individuals in relation to its business partners.241
For instance, the UK OECD National Contact Point noted in Global Witness
v. Afrimex that "the UK Government expects British companies to exercise the
highest levels of due diligence in situations of widespread violence and systematic
human rights abuse, such as that which prevails in Eastern DRC. 242 In this way, it
urged "UK companies to use their influence over contracting parties and business
partners, when trading in natural resources from this region, to ensure that due
at

http://www.institutehrb.org/Downloads/Draft%/o20Reporto
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238.
239.
240.
241.

Id.
See id.
See MARKS & CLAPHAM, supra note 15, at 230-3 1.
See MARKs & CLAPHAM, supra note 15, at 231.

242. FinalStatement by the UK National Contact Pointfor the OECD Guidelinesfor Multinational
Enterprises:Afrimex (UK) Ltd., at 75 (Aug. 28, 2008) [hereinafter UK-NCP Aftimex Decision].
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diligence is applied to the supply chain. 243 In other words, an obligation to protect
the human right to water denotes that corporations are obliged to adopt internal
regulations and take other measures to prohibit and prevent human rights
violations internally, in their own activities, and also externally, in business
relationships with third parties such as subsidiaries, contractors, sub-contractors
and business partners throughout their supply chains. 2 "
Similarly, Clapham suggests that corporations have the "duty to ensure that
the contractors with which they do business are complying with the Norms. ' 245 He
argues that the obligation to protect exists "even if...
threats do not derive from the
corporation itself. ' 24 6 It appears, therefore, that the corporate obligation to protect
the right to water extends much further than the obligation to respect the right. The
obligation to protect is relevant particularly in the relationship between a
corporation and third parties.247 In his 2010 report, Ruggie argues that the scope of
corporate responsibility to protect human rights is "defined by the actual and
potential human rights impacts generated through a company's own business
activities and through its relationships with other parties, such as business partners,
entities in its value chain, other non-State actors and State agents., 248 He further
notes, "[T]he corporate responsibility to respect human rights exists independently
of States' duties or capacity. It constitutes a universally applicable human rights
responsibility for all companies, in all situations. 249
As to the corporate obligation to protect the human right to water, Tripathi
and Morrison argue that private corporations should take the following actions:
"abide by the national regulatory framework for the provision of safe-drinking
water; extend services to marginalized and vulnerable areas and groups; ensure
affordability of water services; prevent arbitrary disconnections from water
services, and ensure communities' access to information and participation in
decision-making processes. 250 In addition, corporations can ensure the
affordability of water services in the following ways:
[By] regularly monitoring the price of water services and ensuring their
affordability and accessibility for the poorest and most vulnerable
sectors of society; ensuring that no community, ethnic group,

243. Id.
at 76.
244. See INT'L

COMM'N OF JURISTS, CORPORATE COMPLICITY AND LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY,

VOLUME 1: FACING THE FACTS AND CHARTING A LEGAL PATH, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION OF JURISTS EXPERT LEGAL PANEL ON CORPORATE COMPLICITY IN INTERNATIONAL

CRIMES 29-30 (2008).
245. MARKS & CLAPHAM, supra note 15, at 231
246. Id.
247. Jaigers, supranote 144, at 83.
248. Spec. Rep. of the Sec'y-Gen. on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises, Business and Human Rights: Further Steps toward the
Operationalizationof the "Protect,Respect and Remedy" Framework, Human Rights Council, 58,
U.N. Doc A/HRC/14/27 (Apr. 9, 2010) (by John Ruggie), available at http://www.reports-andmaterials.org/Ruggie-report-2010.pdf.
249. Id.at 65.
250. TRIPATHI & MORRISON, supranote 231, at 6.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 39:2

constituencies supporting opposition parties, religious, linguistic, or any
other group, or any other section of the population (such as disabled, or
those distinct because of gender or sexuality) is excluded from access to
the essential services. Establishing flexible payment terms, such as
phased connection charges, removal of requirements for deposits or
grace periods. 1
The World Health Organization notes in its Report on the Right to Water that
companies may, "depending on their nature," make the following commitments:
- To "advance the provision of services so that the number of people
served should always increase;
- establish sustainable policies toward water conservation for its own
activities;
- use differential cost-recovery/progressive pricing to contribute to
increasing coverage;
- ensure equity in reliability of services;
- give priority to supplies for the most marginalized communities;
- establish a responsible disconnection policy;
- ensure the participation of citizens in decision-making;
252
- provide clear and accurate information to all users."
It appears that corporations are under an obligation to ensure that their
business partners comply with basic standards in relation to the human right to
water. Even more, corporations can assist the state government in effectively
respecting, promoting and fulfiling human rights. If corporations contribute to the
protection of human rights, this will also strengthen regulatory mechanisms for the
protection of human rights. 253 Along these lines, the Commentary of the UN
Norms suggests that corporations should "initially work with perpetrators to
reform or decrease violations. 254 In this respect, the Institute for Business and
Human Rights explains:,
[P]rivate water providers can contribute to the respect and promotion of
the right to water by ensuring that prioritization in the extension of
water and sanitation networks is given to those who do not have access,
including within informal settlements255and to other marginalized,
excluded and vulnerable areas or groups.

251. Id.
252. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, THE RIGHT TO WATER 36 (2003), available at
http://www.who.int/water-sanitation-health/rtwrev.pdf.
253. See id.
254. Commentary on the Norms on the Responsibilities of TransnationalCorporationsand Other
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, Commission on Human Rights,
15 U.N. Doe
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003).
255. INST. FOR BUS. & HUMAN RIGHTS, supranote 237, at 19.
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Measures taken by corporations and their passive commitments "not to do any
harm" do not suffice. Corporations must adopt internal monitoring mechanisms
aimed at monitoring and regulating the behaviour of the actors with whom they
have business relationships. Several corporations recognise the obligation to
protect human rights within their activities. Shell, for example, notes that
"operating companies... have a responsibility to identify existing and potential
human rights issues which may arise in their area of operations. '25 6 Similar
provisions can be found in the codes of conduct and internal human rights policies
2 61
2 59
258
57
Coca-Cola,260 Exxon Mobil,
of British Petroleum, 2 Chevron, Citigroup,
65
2 64
2 63
2 62
Daimler-Chrysler 266
Conoco-Philips,
Wal-Mart,
General Motors,
Total,
and De Beers.267
3. The Corporate Obligation to Fulfil
The third category of corporate human rights obligations under the right to
water includes the obligation to fulfil, which requires that the corporations take
active measures to ensure the availability, accessibility and affordability of the
right to water in their internal and external activities. 268 The Commentary of the
UN Norms suggests that corporations "shall further refrain from activities that
would undermine the rule of law as well as governmental and other efforts to
promote and ensure respect for human rights, and shall use their influence in order
to help promote and ensure respect for human rights., 269 The corporate obligation
256. SHELL, BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, A MANAGEMENT PRIMER 23 (2008), available at
http://www.shell.com/static/envirosocen/downloads/managementjirimers/business and human rights primer.pdf.
257. BRITISH
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HUMAN
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A

GUIDANCE

NOTE

(2005),

available at

http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp-internet/globalbp/STAGING/global-assets/downloads/BP-Human-R
ights 2005.pdf.
258. Human Rights Statement, CHEVRON CORP., http://www.chevron.com/globalissues/human
rights/ (last updated May 2010).
259. Statement on Human Rights, CITIGROUP, http://www.citigroup.com/citi/citizen/approach/
humanrights/index.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
260. COCA-COLA Co., HUMAN RIGHTS STATEMENT (2007), available at http://www.thecocacolacompany.com/citizenship/pdf/human rights statement.pdf.
261. ExXONMOBIL, HUMAN RIGHTS (2009), available at http://www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate
/Files/human rights brochure.pdf.
262. TOTAL CORP., CODE OF CONDUCT 11 (2007), available at http://www.total.com/MEDIAS/
MEDIASINFOS/827/FR/Total-code-conduct-en.pdf.
263. Corporate Responsibility, GENERAL MOTORS, http://www.gm.com/corporate/responsibility/
(last visited Nov. 10, 2011).
264. Requirements for Suppliers: Equal Opportunity Practices, WAL-MART http://walmartstores.
com/Suppliers/248.aspx (last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
265. Human Rights Position, CONOCO-PHILIPS CORP., http://www.conocophillips.com/EN/susdev/
policies /humanrightsposition/Pages/index.aspx (last visited Nov. 10, 2010).
266. Human
Rights,
DAIMLER-CHRYSLER,
http://sustainability2008.daimler.com/cgibin/show.ssp?companyName=daimler&language=English&report id=nb-2008&id=6035&quick
Search=HR3 (last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
267. Social Responsibility: De Beers Diamond Policy, DE BEERS, http://www.debeers.com/page/
socialresp (last visited Nov. 5, 2010).
268. U.N. Norms, supranote 34, at 4.
269. Id at Commentary, art. 1.
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to fulfil requires corporations to formulate, implement and periodically review a
coherent human rights policy to lessen the risk of human rights violations
throughout the entire corporate structure. 270 The Institute for Business and Human
Rights notes that "providers can contribute to the enjoyment of the right to water
by ensuring the affordability of their water services (connection and delivery costs)
and by guaranteeing that cost-recovery objectives
do not become a barrier to
271
access to safe drinking water by poor people.
A corporation may become the primary holder of an obligation to fulfil the
human right to water in a failed state where there is no efficient governmental
272
control or authority.
A similar situation may occur when corporations operate in
territories where a state is unable to fulfil the rights of the people living there.
States are and should be primarily responsible to fulfil this obligation. It is true,
however, that corporations may have a secondary responsibility toward society that
reinforces their obligation to respect and protect human rights. The size and
availability of a corporation's resources will play a large role in meeting the
standards of the obligation to fulfil. 273 While the resources available for fulfilling
human rights obligations may not be as plentiful in small corporations as in large
corporations, corporations may adopt such policies to the maximum extent given
their available resources.
D. Corporate Obligation Under the Human Right to Water de Lege Ferenda
Returning to the illustration at the start of this paper, this section attempts to
identify the obligation relating to the human right to water of a corporation such as
the South-West Orissa Bauxite Mining Corporation in the Niyamgiri Hills.
Assuming that corporations have some obligations to observe the right to water,
the following tri-partite obligations of corporations to "respect, protect, and fulfil"
the right to water can be identified:
Obligationsto respect. Corporationsare to refrainfrom:
Internal obligations
Taking measures that negatively affect the right to water.
External obligations
Taking measures that negatively affect the right to water environment and
the health of communities;
The production and marketing of products that are detrimental to clean
and safe water;
Direct involvement in any violation of the right to water in relation to its
employees, other individuals and the wider community;
Complicity in violations of the right to water;

270. INST. FOR Bus. AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supranote 237, at 19.

271. Id.
272. Id.at 7.
273. JAGERS, supranote 144, at 85.
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Supporting corrupt regimes and giving bribes in exchange for access to
water services and other natural resources, goods and services.

Obligationsto protect Corporationsare to adopt regulations and other measures
in orderto:
Internal obligations
Adopt, disseminate and implement international human rights standards in
their business policies and codes of conduct, and to adopt internal
guidelines for the public and private corporation in weak governance
zones, emphasising the need to respect the right to water;
Prevent violations of the right to water internally in their own activities;
Introduce "human rights impact assessments as part of investment and
procurement 274 decisions, including selection of suppliers and
contractors;,
Institute effective monitoring to ensure that the above-mentioned policies
are being27followed,
and to initiate disciplinary proceedings when they are
5
violated;
Protect individuals from abusive conduct by third-parties and adopt
internal complaints procedures where victims can submit allegations of
violations of the right to water;
Protect the health and safety of workers in their corporations and in the
corporations of their contractors and business partners.
External obligations
Introduce policies and procedures to evaluate and address compliance
with the right to water within the supply chain and with contractors;
Prevent violations of the right to water externally in their supply chains
and in business relationship with contractors, sub-contractors and business
partners;
Apply human rights law and the framework of the right to water in their
contracts and in relation to others dealing with contractors, subcontractors
and any other business partners;
Condemn public and private human rights violations of the right to water
by all parties in the respective country, and possibly to address the
inappropriate use of facilities by government forces, and to establish
procedures to ensure that the activities of the corporations, their company
members, and their subcontractors do not result in, benefit from, or
contribute to human rights abuses;

274. GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE INDEX GUIDELINES, HR 2, http://www.lg.com/jp/download/

pdf/gri-Index.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2010); see also G3 Guidelines: Disclosure on Management
Approach, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, http://www.globalreporting.org/ReportingFramework/
G3Online/DMA (last visited Nov. 20, 2010).
275. GRI INDEX, supranote 274; DISCLOSURE ON MANAGEMENT APPROACH, supra note 274.
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Protect the environment in the area in which they operate;
Ensure the safety and quality of the products that they and their business
partners as well as sub-contractors produce.
Obligations to fulfil: corporations are to take active measures to ensure the
availabilityof.
Internal obligations
A safe working environment not endangering the right to water;
A human rights policy and strategy and internal codes of conduct that
address human rights challenges and that include measures to prevent and
to respond to human rights violations of the right to water.
External obligations where government services are not available such as
remote areas
To co-operate in creating an environment where human rights, including
the right to water, are understood and respected, and not to operate or
consider operating in countries where there is a "high level of human
rights violations or where legislation, governmental practice or other
constraints make it imperative to address276specific abuses and devise ways
of promoting respect for human rights;
To introduce the 277
necessary reforms to existing corporate structures or
business policies;
To promote best practices and professionalism among employees;
To promote and protect fundamental human rights, including the
framework of the right to water, in the wider local community.
To develop a proactive strategy for the protection of the water in the area
in which they operate;
To provide water services for the families of the workers and the public as
a whole in the area in which they operate.
IV. CONCLUSION

A plausible argument can be made that corporations operating in the area of
the Niyamgiri in the eastern part of India have normative obligations to respect,
protect, and fulfil the human right to water of individuals and the indigenous
community of the Dongria Kond. Corporations should therefore seriously consider
the implications of their business activities on the daily lives of the local
communities. This paper has attempted to conceptualize a normative approach
toward corporate responsibility for the human right to water. It has argued that the
corporate human rights obligations under the right to water derive primarily from
national legal orders, secondarily from the international level and thirdly from
276. Amnesty InternationalHuman Rights Principlesfor Companies: An Introduction, UNIV. OF
MINN. HUMAN RIGHTS LIBRARY, http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/links/aihrprinc.html (last visited Nov.
5,2010).
277. Part of the strategy may be the adoption of internal supervisory mechanisms.
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unilateral voluntary commitments made by the corporations themselves. Further,
this paper has attempted to show that states and corporations have a responsibility
to respect, protect and fulfil the human right to water. It has argued that corporate
obligations under the right to water are best enforced in national legal orders. In
sum, these inherently interconnected sections have attempted to explain the
concept of corporate responsibility for the human right to water.

NEW HOPES AND CHALLENGES
FOR THE PROTECTION OF IDPs IN AFRICA:
THE KAMPALA CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION AND
ASSISTANCE OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN AFRICA
FLAVIA ZORZI GIUSTINIANI*

I witnessed the historic moment of the adoption of the Convention on the
Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa. The
importance of this Convention cannot be underestimated. Building on the UN
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement it is the first legally binding IDPspecific treaty covering an entire continent. The Convention is a tremendous
achievement and a beacon of hope for the almost 12 million people in Africa
internally displacedby conflict and the many more internally displacedby natural
disasters, and hopefully serves as a model for other regions, too.
I commend the African Union for its leadership in developing this Convention. I
urge all African States to ratify it and implement its provisions, and I call on the
internationalcommunity to seize this momentum and to lend all support needed to
its implementation.1
INTRODUCTION

One of the most pressing challenges the international community is
experiencing today in the context of population movements is the problem of
internal displacement. While not being a new phenomenon, it reached worrying
dimensions after the end of the Cold War. Today, the sheer number of internally
displaced persons (IDPs) in the world coupled with the human rights violations
that they face show at once the dimension and the gravity of the problem.
Situations of mass displacement generally put considerable stress on affected
communities and negatively impact the overall stability and development of the

* Lecturer in international law (International Telematic University UNINETTUNO), PhD Degree in
International Law (University of Teramo), Diploma in International Humanitarian Law from the
International Committee of the Red Cross, Political Science Degree magna cum laude (University of
Florence). She may be contacted at f.zorzigiustiniani@uninettunouniversity.net An earlier draft was
presented at the International Conference "Protecting people in conflict and crisis. Responding to the
challenges of a changing world", held at the Refugee Studies Centre at the University of Oxford on
September 22th- 24 t , 2009.
1. Walter Kqilin, The Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, THE BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2009/1026 _internal displacement
kalin.aspx.
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territorial State. 2 In some cases, displacement may also fuel tensions and conflict
and consequently, if not properly addressed, frustrate peace building efforts.
Unlike refugees, who fall under the protection of international instruments
such as the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1969
OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,
and who have a specific UN agency - the UNHCR - to assist them, IDPs cannot
rely on comparable standards or mechanisms for their protection.4 Their own State,
while having the primary responsibility to assist and protect, is often unable or
unwilling to fulfil its duty and, owing to sovereignty concerns, hampers
international actors from acting in its place. 5
In order to come up with a solution to this problem the UN Commission on
Human Rights in 1992 entrusted an independent expert, the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General on IDPs, Mr. Francis Deng, to examine existing
international standards of human rights, humanitarian and refugee law, and their
application to the protection of internally displaced persons.6 The outcome of the
work conducted by Deng with a team of international legal experts was a thorough
compilation and analysis of legal norms pertaining to internally displaced persons. 7

2. See Addressing Internal Displacement in Peace Processes, Peace Agreements and PeaceBuilding, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Sept. 2007), http://www.brookings.edui-/media/Files
/rc/reports/2007/09peaceprocesses/20073peaceprocesses.pdf.
3. Khalid Koser, Introduction:IntegratingDisplacement in Peace Processesand Peacebuilding,
28 REFUGEE SURVEY Q., no. 1, 2009, 5.
4. Andre-Michel Essoungou, Africa's DisplacedPeople: Out of the Shadows, AFRICA RENEWAL,
Apr. 2010, at 6, available at http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol24nol/displacedpeople.html.
5. In fact, as was aptly recognized by C. Phuong, the notion of protection for IDPs is "inherently
contradictory" since it involves both "a strengthening of the capacities of the State" to live up to its
basic responsibilities toward its citizens and alternatively the possibility of some kind of an
international protection (Cf CATHERINE PHUONG, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INTERNALLY
DISPLACED PERSONS 220 (2004).
6. Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities, Rep. of the
Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis Deng, submitted pursuant to Commission on
Human Rights Resolution 1993195, Commission on Human Rights, para. 14, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1994/44 (Jan. 25, 1994). As was explained by the Representative of the Secretary-General on
Internally Displaced Persons: "Without prejudicing the issue of whether or not new normative standards
are needed, it is generally recognised that even though the existing law appears to be adequate for the
needs of internal displacement, a consolidation and evaluation of existing norms would be of value and
would provide the basis for filling whatever gaps may exist. Building on the knowledge acquired from
the practical experience on the ground, as well as the expertise of scholars with expertise in this area of
the law, the proposed project would aim at the development of ideas for normative standards based on
principles of existing international instruments. The goal would be to develop a doctrine of protection
specifically tailored to the needs of the internally displaced. This requires first a
compilation/commentary of the existing norms and a further elaboration of the relevant standards ...
and eventually a declaration or other authoritative document."
7. See generally Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities, Rep. of the
Representative of the Secretary-General,Mr. Francis M Deng, submitted pursuant to Commission on
Human Rights resolution 199557, Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/52/Add.2
(Dec. 5, 1995); Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities, Rep. of the
Representative of the Secretary-General,Mr. Francis M Deng, submitted pursuant to Commission on
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The study's conclusion was that "[w]here the analysis shows that the needs of
internally displaced persons are insufficiently protected by existing international
law, it is important to restate general principles of protection in more specific detail
and to address clear protection gaps in a future international instrument. 8
In response to a request by the Commission on Human Rights to develop an
appropriate framework for the protection of the IDPs,9 the Representative
submitted a non-binding document in January 1998: the Guiding Principles on
Internal Displacement.10 The Principles are based on existing international
humanitarian law, human rights law, and refugee law, and they seek to clarify the
gaps of the law as codified with the overall aim of protecting the internally
displaced in all three phases of displacement (i.e. before, during and after
displacement).11 They were meant to provide guidance to State authorities,
international organizations, and all other relevant actors in providing assistance
12
and protection to IDPs.
At the time of their elaboration, the option of adopting a hard law instrument
was rejected for a variety of reasons, the most weighty probably being that the
drafting of a treaty would be a time-consuming process and the expected
opposition of many States toward such an enterprise.13 The choice of a non-binding
document, strongly supported by Deng, proved to be the most practicable solution,
and over time this choice has undeniably contributed to the acceptance of the
Principles by many States. 14 However, to the extent that the Principles do not
Human Rights resolution 1995139, Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.1
(Feb. 11, 1998).
8. Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities, Rep. of the
Representative of the Secretary-General,Mr. Francis M Deng, submitted pursuant to Commission on
Human Rights resolution 1995157, Commission on Human Rights, para. 413, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1996/52/Add.2 (Dec. 5, 1995).
9. CHR Res. 1996/52, E/CN.4/RES/1996/52 (Apr. 14, 1996).
10. Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities, Rep. of the
Representative of the Secretary-General,Mr. Francis M Deng, submitted pursuant to Commission on
Human Rights resolution 1997139, Addendum: Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,
Commission on Human Rights, intro. para. 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998)
[hereinafter Guiding Principles]; see also Robert K. Goldman, International Committee of the Red
Cross, Codification of InternationalRules on Internally Displaced Persons, 324 INTERNATIONAL
REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 463 (Sept. 30, 1998), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/
documents/misc/57jpg8.htm; Walter Kalin, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT:
ANNOTATIONS 1 (American Society of International Law, Studies in Transnational Legal Policy No. 32,
2000) (indicating the legal sources that provide the basis of the principles), available at
www.asil.org/pdfs/study_32.pdf.
11. Guiding Principles, supranote 10, paras. 9-10.
12. Id.
13. Roberta Cohen, The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: An Innovation in
International Standard Setting, 10 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 459, 464-65 (2004), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4c51531f2.pdf.
14. It bears noting in this respect that States Members of the United Nations at the Millennium
U.N. Summit of 2005 solemnly recognized the Guiding Principles as an "important international
framework for the protection of internally displaced persons." General Assembly, Integrated and
Coordinated Implementation of and Follow-Up to the Outcomes of the Major United Nations
Conferences and Summits in the Economic, Social and RelatedFields: Follow-up to the Outcome of the

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 39:2

merely reproduce existing norms, States are not formally bound by them. To make
the Principles effective, governments
must incorporate them in national domestic
15
laws and policies on displacement.
General Remarks on the AU Convention for the Prevention of Internal
Displacement and the Protection of and Assistance to Internally Displaced
Persons in Africa
Against this background, the recent initiative taken by the African Union
(AU) to draft the Convention for the Prevention of Internal Displacement and the
Protection of and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons in Africa is an
important development because it demonstrates the continued progress and support
for IDPs in the region. The AU Executive Council decided to draft a treaty focused
specifically on the internally displaced in 2004.16
Following the meeting of a Group of experts in Addis Ababa from April 1113, 2006, a draft text was discussed and finalized in June 2008. After some major
amendments, the text was ultimately signed on October 23, 2008, at the end of a
Special Summit of the AU held in Kampala, Uganda. 17 This achievement has been
warmly welcomed by the UN Special Representative for IDPs, Walter Kalin, 18 as
well as by other humanitarian organisations. The Convention sends an important
message to the international community; the drafting of this text shows that Africa
intends to deal with internal displacement in a much more serious and proactive
manner.

19

The problem of internal displacement is particularly acute in Africa, which
hosts approximately 11.6 million IDPs - almost half (45%) of a global total of

Millennium Summit,
132, A/60/L.1 (Sept. 15, 2005). Several international organizations, such as
OAU, ECOWAS and OSCE, have also acknowledged the Principles and/or called on their Member
States to disseminate and apply them. See Walter Kalin, The Voting Rights Of Internally Displaced
Persons, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Apr. 21-22, 2005), http://www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/
idp/rsgstatement votingrights.pdf; Roberta Cohen, The Role of Regional Organizations,ECOWAS, THE
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Sept. 30, 2002), http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2002/0930humanrights
cohen.aspx.
15. See Walter Kalin, Khalid Koser, Andrew Solomon, and Rhodri C. Williams, Incorporatingthe
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement in Domestic Law: Issues and Challenges, THE
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Jan. 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2010/0119 internal_
displacement.aspx (since the development of the Guiding Principles the efforts of the Special
Representative for IDPs have mainly focused on their incorporation into national legislation).
16. See Executive Council of the African Union, Decision on the Situation ofRefugees, Returnees
and Displaced Persons, Doc. EX/CL/44 (III), http://www.africa-union.org/Official-documents
/council o20oP/o20minsters o20meetings/Maputo/EX CL Dec o2046.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
17. African Union, Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons
in Africa (Kampala Convention), adopted on Oct. 23, 2009, 49 I.L.M. 86, available at
http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F00.4BE3B/1/o28httplnfoFiles /29/0541BB5F1E5A13
3BC12576B900547976/$file/Convention o28En o29.pdf [hereinafter Kampala Convention].
18. U.N. General Assembly, Report of the Representative of the Secretary-Generalon the Human
Rights of Internally DisplacedPersons, 85, U.N. Doc. A/63/286 (Aug. 28, 2008).
19. NRC and IDMC Welcome African Union Convention on IDPs, INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT
MONITORING
CENTRE (Oct. 23, 2009), http://www.internal-displacement.org/80257 08F04BE3B1/
0
28httplnfoFiles o29/DDA13FFEE36B220CC12576580032001D/$file/PRAU-IDPs Oct09.pdf.
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around 26 million. 20 The gravity and urgency of the problem were one again
brought to the fore by recent events in Sudan, a country which unfortunately boasts
the largest population of IDPs in the world (around 5 million). 21 Last year in
Darfur, a region that already had a population of 2.7 million IDPs, the situation
dramatically deteriorated when 317,000 more people were displaced, and the
Sudanese government expelled 13 international aid agencies operating in the
region. 22
The Kampala Convention is not the first step taken by the African Union to
tackle the problems of population movements in Africa. In 1969, the Organization
for African Unity made the first attempt by drafting the Convention Governing the
Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.23 This treaty, which codifies a
broad definition of the term "refugee, '24 inaugurated the era of the "open door
policy. '25 In the wake of liberation struggles and the subsequent eruption of wars
of secession, various African States, moved by a strong ideological call for panAfrican solidarity, accepted and gave shelter to significant numbers of refugees
fleeing from those conflicts.26
During the 1970's and 1980's, changing attitudes toward refugee protection
and the proliferation of violent internal conflicts produced a dramatic increase in
the population of internally displaced persons, which in turn led to a shift in focus
from external to internal population movements. Because uncontrolled groups of
IDPs began causing serious internal instability during this time, threatening the
peace and security of villages, countries, or even entire regions, African
institutions were prompted to devise legal frameworks to protect IDPs.27 The
solutions that were created during this time mostly corresponded to the "African

20. Miriam Mannak, Africa Home to Half of World's Internally Displaced People, DIGITAL

(Oct 21, 2009), http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/280802. IDPs vastly outnumber
refugees in Africa. In just 10 out of 18 countries in East and central Africa, there are more than 10
million IDPs, according to the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), with
Sudan (4M), the DRC (2.12M) AND Somalia (1.55M) heading the list. In the same region, there are
refugees in 16 countries, totalling just less than 2M, according to OCHA. Analysis: African IDP
JOURNAL

Convention Fills A Void in HumanitarianLaw, IRIN HUMANITARIAN NEWS AND ANALYSIS (Oct. 27,

2009), http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?Reportld=86762.
21. Alan Boswell and Maram Mazen, Southern Sudanese Start Registering for January
Referendum on Independence, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 15, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201011-1 5/southem-sudanese-start-registering-for-january-referendum-on-independence.html.
22. Rob Crilly, A Million Face Starvation as Sudan Shuts Down, THE SUNDAY TIMES, Mar. 6,
2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africa/article5854944.ece.
23. Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Sept. 10, 1969,
1001 U.N.T.S. 45, available at http://www.africa-union.org/Official-documents/Treaties_
%20Conventions o2oProtocols/Refugee Convention.pdf.
24. Id. art. 1.
25. James Schneider, The Refugee Crisis in Southern and Central Africa, THE JOURNAL OF
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (Apr. 1, 1999), http://www.jha.ac/articles/a050.htm.
26. Id.
27. See Regional Meeting on Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in the Southern African
Development Community (SADC): Seminar on Internal Displacement (Aug. 24-26, 2005), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/idp/conferences/sadcpaper.pdf
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solutions to African problems" approach.28
The next major step taken to prevent internal displacement was made at the
sub-regional level during the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region.
With a goal of ending the endemic conflicts and consequences thereof prevailing in
the region, the eleven Member States of this conference signed a Pact on Security,
Stability, and Development in December 2006.29 As far as displacement is
concerned, the Pact acknowledges that policies addressing the plight of refugees
and IDPs are integral to restoring peace and stability, and includes two protocols
specifically dedicated to the protection of IDPs: the Protocol on the Protection and
Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons30 and the Protocol on the Property
Rights of Returning Persons.31 By signing this instrument, the Great Lakes States,
(including three of the countries with the most significant IDP populations on the
continent: Sudan, Uganda, and Democratic Republic of Congo)3 2 committed
themselves to adopting and implementing the Guiding Principles at the national
level. The Protocol also endeavours to adapt the Guiding Principles to the
characteristics of internal displacement in the region by precisely establishing the
scope of the responsibilities of States and by setting up a regional mechanism for
monitoring the protection of IDPs.
Compared to the Great Lakes experience, the African Union Convention on
the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, otherwise
known as the Kampala Convention, represents even further progress. Through its
adoption, the African Union, while acknowledging the continuing relevance and
role of the Guiding Principles, devised a completely distinct and binding legal
framework that takes into account African specificities in internal displacement.3
At a time when the main challenge to internal displacement is still the inability or
the unwillingness of the majority of States affected to take on their responsibilities,
the importance of such a development cannot be understated. Firstly, the Kampala
Convention represents the first time States are directly involved in drafting a whole
set of standards regarding IDPs.34 In fact, it bears remembering that the Guiding

28. Id.

29. The eleven signatories States are the following: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic,
Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and
Zambia.
Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region, INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT
MONITORING CENTRE, http://www.internal-displacement.org/greatlakes (last visited Nov. 29, 2010).
30. Great Lakes Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons, Nov.
30, 2006, available at http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httplnfoFiles)/
29D2872A54561F66C 12572FB002BC89A/$file/Finalo20protocolo20Protection%20IDPso20o2OEn.pdf [hereinafter Great Lakes Protocol].
31. Great Lakes Protocol on the Property Rights of Returning Persons, Dec. 15, 2006, available at
http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B 1/(httplnfoFiles)/84EO6BF26DBB 560BC125
72FB002C02D6/$file/Final%/o20protocol.PropertyRightso2O-Eno20r.pdf.
32. See Internal Displacement in Africa, INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CENTRE,
http://www.internal-displacement.org (follow "Countries" hyperlink; then follow "Africa" hyperlink)
(last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
33. Kampala Convention, supranote 17, pmbl.
34. Nonetheless, borrowing from the experience of the International Conference on the Great
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Principles were not negotiated by States, but rather were elaborated by an
international team of experts. Secondly, the Kampala Convention signals the
acknowledgement by African States that internal displacement can become an
issue of legitimate international concern if it is not dealt with adequately at the
national level. 36 In this regard, the Convention assigns the African Union the
specific responsibilities of supporting States Parties and protecting and assisting
the internally displaced. The Convention also reaffirms the AU's right to intervene
in cases where international crimes are committed against IDPs.37 In conclusion,
this treaty could serve both as a model and an incentive for other continents and
regions to opt for a binding regional instrument on internal displacement.
The Notion of Displacement
The Convention essentially aims to establish a legal framework for preventing
or mitigating internal displacement, protecting and assisting internally displaced
persons, and promoting durable solutions and mutual support among the States
Parties. Internally displaced persons are defined as:
"persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee
or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a
result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of
generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or humanmade disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized

State border."

38

Lakes Region, the treaty-making process also involved the participation of civil society organizations,
including human rights and humanitarian NGOs. In October 2009, at the Special Summit on Refugees,
Returnees and IDPs convened by the African Union in Kampala, civil society organizations presented
to the Heads of States a document in which they raised questions on some issues, such as which
statelessness, birth registration and enforcement of existing international and African standards, which
they considered as not adequately dealt with in the Convention. Recommendations of the Civil Society
Meeting on African Union mechanisms and the Protection of Refugee, IDP and Citizenship Rights
(Oct.
19-20,
2009),
http://www.citizenshiprightsinafrica.org/Publications/2009/communique
.102209.pdf. Civil society organizations will be also involved in monitoring and evaluating progress on
implementing the Convention and the ensuing AU Action Plan.
35. See Andrew Solomon, An African Solution to Internal Displacement: AU Leaders Agree to
Landmark Convention, Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement (Oct. 23, 2009), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2009/1023_african-union-solomon.aspx.
36. See Kampala Convention, supra note 17, pmbl.
37. Kampala Convention, supra note 17, art. 8. The African Union's right to intervene in a State
Party in certain grave circumstances is enshrined in art. 4(h) of its Constitutive Act. Organization of
African Unity, Constitutive Act of the African Union, art. 4, para. h, July 11, 2000, 2158 U.N.T.S. I37733.
38. Id.art. 1(k).
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This definition mirrors the one enshrined in the Guiding Principles 39 and, as
such, is not a legal definition but, in the words of Special Representative Kalin, "a
descriptive identification of the category of persons whose needs are the concern of
the Guiding Principles., 40 The term in fact merely describes the situation of an
individual being displaced within one's country of habitual residence. In
conformity with the approach first espoused by the Guiding Principles, 41 the
Kampala Convention does not create a new special legal status for IDPs, but rather
strives to ensure that the currently recognized needs are adequately addressed. As a
consequence, recognizing that IDPs are individuals who are entitled to the whole
range of rights attributed to them by international human rights and humanitarian
law instruments, the Convention judiciously declares that the protection it provides
is not prejudiced.42 Accordingly, it also requires States to refrain from and prevent
discrimination against IDPs "in the enjoyment of any rights or freedoms on the
grounds that they are internally displaced persons. 43
Of course, the list of causes of displacement contained in the above-mention
definition is not exhaustive, and the definition allows for circumstances other than
those listed to be taken into account. Indeed, the Convention devotes specific

39. See Guiding Principles, supra note 10. An alternative definition has been offered by the
International Law Association (ILA) in the London Declaration of International Law Principles on
Internally Displaced Persons, adopted at the 69th Conference of the International Law Association in
2000: IDPs are "persons or groups of persons who have been forced to flee or leave their homes or
places of habitual residence as a result of armed conflicts, internal strife or systematic violations of
human rights, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border." International Law
Association, London Declaration of International Law Principles on Internally Displaced Persons, art.
1, July 29, 2000, reprintedin 12 INT'L J. OF REFUGEE L. 672, 674 (Oct. 2000).
40. Walter Klin, supranote 10, at 1.
41. In fact, as was explained by Kalin:
It is important to stress that paragraph 2 is not a legal definition of internally
displaced persons. Becoming displaced within one's own country of origin or
country of habitual residence does not confer special legal status in the same
sense as, say, becoming a refugee does. This is because the rights and guarantees
to which internally displaced persons are entitled stem from the fact that they are
human beings and citizens or habitual residents of a particular state. Those rights
and guarantees emanate from the peculiar vulnerability and special needs that
flow from the fact of being displaced. By locating the description of "internally
displaced persons" in their introductory section rather than in their main body,
the Guiding Principles seek to highlight the descriptive and non-legal nature of
the term "internally displaced persons." Internally displaced persons need not and
cannot be granted a special legal status comparable to refugee status. Rather, as
human beings who are in a situation of vulnerability they are entitled to the
enjoyment of all relevant guarantees of human rights and humanitarian law,
including those that are of special importance to them. This does not rule out the
possibility of administrative measures such as registration on the domestic level
to identify those who are displaced and need special assistance. However, lack of
such registration would not deprive internally displaced persons of their
entitlements under human rights and humanitarian law.
Id. at 2-3.
42. Kampala Convention, supranote 17, art. 20, para. 2.
43. Id. art. 9, para. 1(a).
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attention to development-induced displacement even though this cause of
displacement was removed from the final version of the list.
Today, development projects are undoubtedly one of the main causes of
displacement. In fact, the number of people uprooted by development projects is
estimated to be much higher than those displaced by conflict.44 According to the
World Bank, the global total of IDP's reached the astonishing number of 200
million people during the last two decades of the 20 th century. 45 Developmentinduced displacees are also far more numerous than the world's current refugee
population, and the steady pace of development means that this group's population
is still growing. 46 Moreover, forced displacement caused by development projects
can trigger a vicious circle: internal displacement produces internal strife over
control of land and natural resources and, in the end, additional forced population
movements.
Despite these issues, there is a tendency to overlook the problems associated
with displacement caused by development projects.47 The Global JDP Project
found that the plight of development-induced IDPs "remains largely unnoticed and
they often receive even less support from their government and/or international aid
agencies than people displaced by conflict or natural disasters., 48 As a matter of
fact, "[t]he dominant perspective is... that the positive aspects of development
projects, the public interest, outweigh the negative ones, the displacement or
sacrifice of a few." 49 Unfortunately, the "few" all too often correspond to themost
vulnerable and marginalized segments of the population, such as minorities and
indigenous peoples.
Encouragingly, the Kampala Convention reverses this trend and directly
addresses the issue of displacement due to development. Article 10, entitled
"Displacement Induced by Projects," provides as follows:
1. States Parties, as much as possible, shall prevent displacement caused by
projects carried out by public or private actors;
2. States Parties shall ensure that the stakeholders concerned will explore
feasible alternatives, with full information and consultation of persons likely to
be displaced by projects;
3. States Parties shall carry out a socio-economic and environmental impact
assessment of a proposed development project prior to undertaking such a
44. NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL, INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT: GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF TRENDs

AND DEVELOPMENTS IN2004 35 (Global IDP Project 2005).
45. Michael M. Cernea, Development-inducedand conflict-induced IDPs: bridging the research
divide, FORCED MIGRATION REV., Dec. 2006, at 25, 26.
46. Id.
47. Cernea also notes the existence of a corresponding divide in research literature on internal
displacement. Id. at 25.
48. NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL, supra note 44, at 36.
49. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Training on the protectionof IDPs: Developmentinduced displacement, at 2, available at http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004B
E3B1/(httplnfoFiles)/C753862FA2CF8B7CC1257115004752ED/Sfile/Protectiono20fromo20module
o20handout%/o20development%/o20displacement.pdf.
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When this final text is compared to the draft text, the positive refinements of
this article are apparent.51 Particularly important is the fact that it refers to projects
irrespective of their scale, while both the corresponding draft article and the
52
Guiding Principles only considered large-scale development projects.
Furthermore, the reference to a "compelling and overriding public interest" as a
legitimate ground to carry out a project was deleted. These changes are crucial
because they avoid the impression, created by the draft text, that persons displaced
by justifiable and lawful projects or by smaller-scale development projects are not
internally displaced.
As already noted, the draft text envisaged development in the list of causes of
displacement, specifically referring to those "who have been forced or obliged to
flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result
of or in order to avoid the effects of large scale development projects, [or lack of
development] and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State
border., 53 Such a provision did not survive in the final text. This is unfortunate
because, due to the widespread reluctance to consider development projects as a
cause of displacement, the reference would have avoided the misunderstandings
connected to the lack of an analogous provision in the Guiding Principles.
In contrast, the elimination of all references to displacement caused by lack of
development is appropriate. In fact, while at first sight such references would seem
very progressive, this is not actually the case. The notion of internal displacement,
while a flexible one, is based on the contextual presence of two core elements: (1)
50. Kampala Convention, supranote 17, art. 10.
51. The corresponding draft article so provided:
1. States parties shall prevent displacement caused by development projects by
public or private actors, except where such displacement is due to the
construction of large scale development projects that are justified by compelling
and overriding public interest because of their contribution to the sustainable
development of the country or because they are in the interest of the people,
including persons or communities displaced by such projects.
2. States parties shall ensure that the planning and management of the relocation
of persons displaced by large scale development projects shall be undertaken, as
far as possible, with their full information, consultation and cooperation.
3. States parties shall ensure that public or private actors shall explore all feasible
alternatives before any development project is undertaken in order to avoid
forced displacement altogether. States parties shall take all measures necessary to
minimize and mitigate the adverse effects of displacement where no alternatives
exist.
4. States parties shall carry out, or cause to be carried out, a socio-economic and
environmental impact assessment of a proposed development project prior to
undertaking such a project.
Organization of African Unity, African Union Convention for the Protection and
Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Draft), June 2008 (on file
with author) [herinafter Draft Kampala Convention], art. 9
52. See Draft Kampala Convention, supra note 51; Guiding Principles, supra note 10, sec. II,
princ. 6, para. 2(c).
53. Draft Kampala Convention, supranote 51.
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being within one's borders, and (2) the involuntary nature of the movement. In
most cases, when people leave undeveloped villages, they do so willingly, seeking
opportunities in other places. Thus, this sort of population movement does not fit
the second element of the definition of displacement.54 Moreover, the draft text did
not provide any guidance on the definition of lack of development in this respect,
nor did it fix a threshold to limit its scope. In fact, the reference to lack of
development is similar to proposals advanced from time to time with the objective
of including in the IDP definition to those who migrate because of extreme poverty
or other economic problems.5 _The Guiding Principles do not refer to lack of
development as a cause of displacement, probably out of concern that doing so
would overstretch the concept of internal displacement, blur the distinction
between economic migrants and IDPs, and undermine the protection for all those
who migrate.56
Obligations of State Partiesand the Role of the African Union
The conventional framework for the protection and assistance of IDPs is
based on the assumption - undisputed under international law - that States bear the
primary responsibility to respect, protect, and fulfil the rights to which the
internally displaced are entitled, without discrimination of any kind.5 7 Accordingly,
the text of the Convention establishes a series of obligations on State Parties during
all the different phases of displacement.
Foremost among these obligations are those to prohibit and prevent arbitrary
displacement, to respect and ensure respect and protection of IDPs' human rights,
to ensure individual criminal responsibility and the accountability of non-State
actors involved in activities causing or contributing to displacement, and to
maintain the civilian and humanitarian character of the protection and assistance of
IDPs.58

54. See ROBERTA COHEN & FRANcIs M. DENG, MASSES IN FLIGHT: THE GLOBAL CRISIS ON

INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT 17-18 (Brookings Inst. 1998).
55. Erin Mooney, The Concept of InternalDisplacement and the Case for Internally Displaced
Persons as a Category of Concern, 24 REFUGEE SURVEY Q., no. 3, 2005, at 9, 13. In 2002, States
members of the ECOWAS, at the time of developing a glossary of migration terms for-the West African
region, recommended that development should be explicitly added among the causes of displacement in
the IDP definition. Id.
56. In this respect it bears noting that Bahame Tom Nyanduga, Special Rapporteur on Refugees,
Asylum Seekers and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, in its report to the 44th Ordinary Session of
the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, stressed the inadequacies of many African
States' national policies in providing compensation for development-induced IDPs. Report of Activities
by the Special Rapporteur on Refugees, Asylum Seekers, IDPs and Migrants in Africa for the
Intersession Period May to November 2008, 44th Ordinary Session of the African Commission on
Human and Peoples' Rights (Nov. 10-24, 2008), http://www.achpr.org/english/Commissioner/o2527s
%2520Activity/44th o25200S/Special%/o2520Rapporteurs/IDPs.pdf.
57. Kampala Convention, supra note 17, pmbl., para. 11. See also Kampala Convention, supra
note 17, art. 2, para. d, (enumerating among the Convention's objectives that of "provid[ing] for the
obligations and responsibilities of States Parties, with respect to the prevention of internal displacement
and protection of, and assistance, to internally displaced persons").
58. Kampala Convention, supra note 17, art. 3, para. l(a, d, f-i). Importantly, States Parties are
also required to register IDPs. This requirement is designed to address situations where governments
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Mindful that the primary bearers of obligations often coincide with the same
subjects who directly or indirectly cause displacement, State Parties have also
assigned a special role to the African Union. The responsibilities of the AU are
outlined in Article 8, which conceives of the organization as both a coordination
mechanism and, in exceptional circumstances such as when a State is unable or
unwilling to cope with a displacement crisis in its territory, as a major support or
substitute for State action. 59 As far as coordination is concerned, the African Union
shall support the State Parties in assisting and protecting IDPs, in particular by
strengthening the Union's institutional framework and capacity, coordinating the
mobilization of appropriate resources, and collaborating directly with relevant
stakeholders with respect to the measures to be taken to protect and assist the
displaced. 60 The AU shall also share information with the African Commission on
Human and People's Rights on the situation of displacement and collaborate
closely with the Special Rapporteur for Refugees, Returnees, IDPs and Asylum
Seekers in addressing issues of internally displaced persons.61
In relation to its role as a support or substitute for State action, the
Convention's Constitutive Act 62 provides for the right of the African Union to
intervene in the territory of a member State when international crimes are
committed. The Constitutive Act also gives member States the right to request
intervention from the AU 63 to "restore peace and security.., and thus contribute to
the creation of favourable64conditions for finding durable solutions to the problem
of internal displacement.
The Responsibilities of Armed Groups and Other Non-State Actors with
Respect to Displacement
The Convention lists among its objectives that of "provid[ing] for the
respective obligations, responsibilities and roles of armed groups, non-State actors
and other relevant actors, including non-governmental organizations, with respect
to the prevention of internal displacement and protection of, and assistance to,
internally displaced persons., 65 Among these non-State entities, particular attention
is devoted to armed groups. This reflects the nature of displacement in Africa,
where the root cause of many displacements can undoubtedly be traced to domestic

minimise or otherwise manipulate numbers of IDPs or make it difficult for them to access assistance or
social services. Article 13(1) in fact provides that "State Parties shall create and maintain an up-dated
register of all internally displaced persons within their jurisdiction or effective control." Kampala
Convention, supra note 17, art. 13, para. 1. Instead, the Guiding Principles do not require that States
institute an IDP registration system. Guiding Principles, supra note 10, princ. 20, para. 2 (providing
only that "the authorities concerned shall issue to [IDPs] all documents necessary for the enjoyment and
exercise of their legal rights, such as passports, personal identification documents, birth certificates and
marriage certificates").
59. Kampala Convention, supranote 17, art. 8.
60. Kampala Convention, supranote 17, art. 8, para. 3(a-d).
61. Kampala Convention, supranote 17, art. 8, para. 3(e-f).
62. Constitutive Act of the African Union, supra note 37, art. 4, para. h.
63. Id. art. 4, para. j.
64. Kampala Convention, supranote 17, art. 8, para. 2.
65. Draft Kampala Convention, supranote 51, art. 2(e).
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conflict situations. This issue represents another area where the final approved text
is dramatically different from the proposed draft text.
For example, the draft contained a clause, entitled "Obligations of Armed
Groups Relating to Protection and Assistance,, 66 which would have been a
complete novelty in treaty law. The clause was strongly criticized by nongovernmental organizations 67 and in fact raised a number of dilemmas from both a
legal and a pragmatic point of view.
Armed groups, as parties to an internal armed conflict, are addressees of
international obligations under international humanitarian law, and in particular
those contained in Common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions and
Additional Protocol II of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions. 68 The minimum
standards of protection espoused in Common Article 3 have to be guaranteed by
"each Party to the conflict" and are applicable in each case of armed conflict not of
international character occurring in the territory of one of the contracting Parties.69
In contrast, Protocol II requires a higher threshold for applicability both with
respect to the intensity of the fighting and the characteristics of armed opposition
groups. According to Article 1(2), non-State Parties to the conflict are (1) required
to be under responsible command, and (2) must be able to exercise control over
territory such that they are in a position to carry out military operations while
implementing the guarantees in the Protocol.
In contrast to international humanitarian law, human rights law has not
developed the same applicability toward non-State actors. In fact, a review of
international practice shows that the question whether non-State entities such as
armed groups can commit human rights violations and whether they can be held
accountable under international human rights law for these violations is a highly
divisive issue among both States and international law scholars. A cautious
approach to the matter is recommended by Zegveld, who observes:
International practice is...
ambiguous on the question of conditions
for accountability of armed opposition groups for violations of human
rights law. There is some authority for the proposition that human rights
instruments could govern armed opposition groups exercising
66. Id. art. 5
67. AMNESTY INT'L, FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME, I.D.P. ACTION,
INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA & LAWYERS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
SOUTH AFRICA, THE AFRICAN UNION CONVENTION FOR THE PREVENTION OF INTERNAL
DISPLACEMENT AND THE PROTECTION OF AND ASSISTANCE TO INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN
AFRICA: N.G.O. COMMENTARY § 3, available at http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/IDPconventionAUngo

Comments.pdf (2008).
68. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 1, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War of Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; MICHAEL N. SCHMITT,
CHARLES H.B. GARRAWAY, YORAM DNSTEIN, INT'L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, THE MANUAL ON
THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT § 1.1.1 (2006).

69. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of Aug. 12, 1949, supra
note 68, art. 3.
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governmental functions. However, this conclusion is mitigated by
practice holding armed opposition groups apparently lacking any
effectiveness accountable for human rights violations.70
Even if the conflicting legal positions just referenced were resolved, it seems
unlikely that armed groups would consider themselves bound by obligations which
they took no part in developing, and did not accept. 71 Moreover, in the final text of
the Convention the direct attribution of responsibility to armed groups has been
substituted with the agreement of States Parties to hold members of armed groups
criminally responsible "for their acts which violate the rights of internally
displaced persons under international law and national law. 72 A specific provision
then enumerates a number of acts that members of armed groups - here considered
as single individuals and not collectively - are prohibited from undertaking,
starting with the carrying out of arbitrary displacement.73 More constructively, the
70. LIESBETH ZEGVELD, ACCOUNTABILITY OF ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 151 (2002).
71. "[W]hy should armed groups abide by norms they have had no part in developing? From the
human-security perspective it may be obvious why armed groups should abide by core human rights
and humanitarian norms: to protect the victims of violence. Yet many armed groups reject this notion,
on the grounds that these are state-based instruments that simply do not apply to them. Not all groups
hold this view, to be sure, but it is common enough to pose a significant dilemma for those who expect
that the most serious obstacles to engaging armed groups are likely to come from states. In many cases,
armed groups themselves are likely to resist the very premise of engagement." Pablo Policzer, Will an
Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and InternationalHumanitarian Law Forged Between
Governments and Nonstate Actors Promote Human Security?, 21 Kasarinlan: Philippine J. of Third
World Stud., no. 1, 2006 at 184, 188.
72. Kampala Convention, supranote 17, art. 7, para. 4.
73. The draft text provides as follows:
1. Armed groups shall, in accordance with international law, refrain from
arbitrary displacement and bear responsibility for providing protection and
assistance to internally displaced persons in areas under their effective control,
without discrimination of any kind.
2. Armed groups shall respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian
law and refrain from committing acts that impair the enjoyment of human rights
of internally displaced persons.
3. Armed groups shall take necessary measures to ensure that internally displaced
persons are received without discrimination of any kind and live in satisfactory
conditions of dignity, security, sanitation, food, water, health, and shelter; [and
that members of the same family are not separated.]
4. Armed groups shall not restrict the freedom of movement of internally
displaced persons within and outside areas under their effective control.
5. Armed groups shall in no circumstances recruit children or require or permit
them to take part in hostilities.
6. Armed groups shall also allow and facilitate passage of all relief consignments,
equipment and personnel to internally displaced persons in areas under their
effective control.
7. Armed groups shall respect, protect, and not attack or otherwise harm
humanitarian personnel and resources or other materials deployed for the
assistance or benefit of internally displaced persons; and not destroy, confiscate
or divert such material.
8. Armed groups shall respect and ensure the civilian and humanitarian character
of the places where internally displaced persons are sheltered and shall not
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Convention encourages State Parties "to incorporate [their] relevant principles...
into peace negotiations and agreements for the purpose of finding sustainable
solutions to the problem of internal displacement. 74
The solution finally envisaged appears more consistent with the general
reluctance showed by States to consider non-State actors, and in particular armed
groups, as addressees of international obligations. This position reappears in two
saving clauses contained in the Convention which, in almost identical wording,
affirm that the treaty provisions "shall not, in any way whatsoever, be construed as
affording legal status or legitimizing or recognizing armed groups. 75
A State-centric approach to displacement also emerges in other provisions
concerning non-State actors. In particular, as far as multinational companies and
private military or security companies are concerned, they are considered only as
addressees of the State's repressive powers insofar as they are directly responsible
or complicit in acts of arbitrary displacement.76
Protectionand HumanitarianAssistance to IDPs
The obligations of State Parties relating to protection and humanitarian
assistance are dealt with in Article 5 of the Convention. This article is
unprecedented in human rights treaty law. In fact, as is well known, detailed
provisions regarding humanitarian assistance and, in particular, the contentious
issue of humanitarian access, can be found only in the law of armed conflict.77
With regard to international conflicts, international humanitarian law
conventions stipulate inter alia that States are bound to accept humanitarian
assistance if the civilian population under their control is not sufficiently provided
for78

and to allow the rapid and unimpeded passage of all relief consignments,
equipment, and personnel, subject to verification and supervision.79 The obligation

infiltrate such locations.
9. Nothing in the present Convention shall be construed as affording legal status
or legitimizing or recognizing armed groups and its provisions are without
prejudice to the individual responsibility of their members under domestic or
international criminal law.
Id. art. 6.
74. Id. art. 3, para. 2(e).
75. Id. art. 7, para. 1 & art. 15, para 2.
76. Id. art. 3, para. 1(h-i).
77. See, e.g., FLAVIA ZORZI GIUSTINIANI, LE NAZIONI UNITE E L'ASSISTENZA UMANITARIA
(2008); ASSISTING THE VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS AND OTHER DISASTERS 92-94, 101-104, 181,
207 (Frits Kalshoven, ed., 1989); PETER MACALISTER-SMITH, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN

22-34, 52 (
1985); Denise Plattner, Assistance to the Civilian Population: The Development and Present State of
InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 32 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS, no. 288, 1992 at 249, 249.
78. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 70, para. 1, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War art. 23, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth
Geneva Convention].
79. Protocol I, supra note 78, art. 70, paras. 2-3; Fourth Geneva Convention, supranote 78.
ASSISTANCE: DISASTER RELIEF ACTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION
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to accept external relief when needed is even more exacting with respect to the
population of an occupied territory. 80 As far as relief personnel is concerned,
Protocol I provides that it must be protected and assisted to the maximum extent
possible, even though its participation in relief activities is subject to the approval
of the party controlling the territory where those activities are being carried out.
Restrictions on the movement or the activities of relief personnel can be applied,
on a temporary basis, only when dictated by imperative military necessity.81
In relation to internal armed conflicts, humanitarian action is much more
limited. Apart from Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions affirming that
"an impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red
Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict," the only explicit
provision in this regard is found in Additional Protocol II. Here it is established
that relief actions shall be undertaken when civilians are suffering undue hardship,
subject to the consent of the government in power.8 2 The latter clause gives an
undeniable advantage to the State Party to the conflict, whose consent would be
required even when the assistance is directed to civilians under the effective
control of the insurgents. Nevertheless, a systematic reading of the Conventions as
well as the principle of effectiveness suggest that if the relief does not have to go
through territories controlled by the government, the latter's consent is not
necessary.8 3 In any case, in both international and non-international conflicts, rules
on humanitarian access have to be read in conjunction with the absolute
prohibition to use starvation as a method of warfare.84
Under international human rights law, analogous obligations to accept
humanitarian assistance do not exist.85 Nevertheless, the obligations imposed on
States by human rights treaties to guarantee the basic needs of the individuals
under their jurisdiction would require them to allow access to external relief that is
80.
55, para.
81.
82.

See Protocol I, supra note 78, art. 69, para. 1; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 78, art.
1 & art. 59, para. 1.
Protocol I, supra note 78, art. 71, para. 3.
Protocol II, supranote 68, art. 18, para. 2.

83. MICHAEL BOTHE, KARL JOSEF PARTSCH & WALDEMAR A. SOLF, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS
OF ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE Two 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA

CONVENTIONS OF 1949 at 696-97 (1982).
84. This prohibition is established in arts. 54 of the First Additional Protocol and 14 of the Second
Additional Protocol. Protocol I, supranote 78, art. 54; Protocol II, supranote 68, art. 14. In this respect
the ICRC study on the rules of customary international humanitarian law affirms that: "consent must
not be refused on arbitrary grounds. If it is established that a civilian population is threatened with
starvation and a humanitarian organization which provides relief on an impartial and nondiscriminatory basis is able to remedy the situation, a party is obliged to give consent." INTERNATIONAL
COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, VOL. 1: RULES

197 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds. 2005), available at http://www.icrc.
org/eng/resources/documents/publication/pcustom.htm.
85. An exception in this respect is to be found in the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of
the Child, which explicitly sets forth the obligation to ensure that a child receives appropriate protection
and humanitarian assistance. Organization of African Unity, African Charter on the Rights and Welfare
of the Child, art. 23, paras. 1, 4, July 11, 1990, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49, available at
http://www.africa-union.org/official-documents/Treaties_%o20Conventions_ o20Protocols/a. /20C
.0 200N o2OTH-E%20RIGHT o20AND 20WELF/20OFo2OCHILD.pdf (1990).
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indispensable for the survival of the population.86 Reference can be made, in
particular, to the obligations arising from the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights. This instrument requires State Parties "to take steps,
individually and through international assistance and cooperation, especially
economic and technical," to ensure the enjoyment of the rights contained therein.88
The Committee onEconomic, Social and Cultural Rights has interpreted such
provision, read in conjunction with the rights to food, health and an adequate
standard of living, to also mean that State Parties have a joint and individual
responsibility to provide "disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in times of
emergency, including assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons. 89
All this notwithstanding, it bears noting that so far States have been extremely
reluctant to assume explicit obligations in this regard. In times of natural disasters
and similar emergency situations they have only agreed on some soft law
instruments on humanitarian assistance, and in particular on three General
Assembly resolutions (43/131, 45/100, 46/182).90 These resolutions affirm the
primary responsibility of the territorial State to take care of the victims and the
need of its consent for external assistance, and recognize that the abandonment of
the victims "without humanitarian assistance constitutes a threat to human life and
an offence to human dignity." 91

86. "Affected States [i.e. the States where humanitarian assistance is needed] are under the
obligation not arbitrarily and unjustifiably to reject a bonafide offer exclusively intended to provide
humanitarian assistance or to refuse access to the victims. In particular, they may not reject an offer nor
refuse access if such refusal is likely to endanger the fundamental human rights of the victims . . ."
SIXTEENTH COMM'N, INST. OF INT'L LAW, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE RESOLUTION § VIII(l),

Resolution (2003), available at http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2003 bru 03 en.PDF. See also
Ruth Abril Stoffels, Legal Regulation ofHumanitarianAssistance in Armed Conflict: Achievements and
Gaps, 86 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS, no. 855, 2004 at 515, 517 ("This duty to take positive action
implies that States have a duty to ensure that the population affected by a crisis is adequately supplied
with goods and services essential for its survival and, if they are unable to do so or their efforts fail, to
allow third parties to provide the required relief.").
87. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 2, para. 1, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S.
88. Id.
89. See United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water, para. 34., U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11
(Jan. 20, 2003); United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health,
para. 40, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Nov. 8, 2000); United Nations, Economic and Social Council,
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 12: The Right To
Adequate Food, para. 38, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (Dec. 5, 1999).
90. See generally G.A. Res. 46/182, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/182 (Dec. 19, 1991); G.A. Res. 45/100,
U.N. Doc. AIRES/45/100 (Dec. 14, 1990); G.A. Res. 43/131, U.N. Doc. AIRES/43/131 (Dec. 8, 1988)
(reaffirming the importance of humanitarian assistance and state sovereignty; urging affected states,
states in proximity to affected states, and nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations to
coordinate with one another in the facilitation and implementation of humanitarian assistance for
internally displaced persons; and implementing the annex establishing the guiding principles, roles of
relevant actors, and general procedures for coordination of humanitarian assistance).
91. G.A. Res. 46/182, supranote 89, annex, para. 3; G.A. Res. 45/100, supra note 89, pmbl., para.
2; G.A. Res. 43/131, supranote 89, pmbl., para. 2.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 39:2

It therefore comes as no surprise that the former UN Representative on
Internally Displaced Persons, Mr. Francis Deng, considered the obligation of
States to accept offers of assistance for IDPs
as one of the areas where
92
international law is not sufficiently developed.
Against this background, the reading of Article 5 of the Kampala Convention
leaves mixed impressions. On the one hand, it spells out in clearest terms the need
for States to mutually support each other in protecting and assisting IDPs; to
facilitate relief action and rapid and unimpeded passage of all relief consignments,
equipment, and personnel; and to respect humanitarian principles as well as the
independence of humanitarian actors. 93 Moreover, contrary to the draft text,
paragraph 6 now explicitly provides that States shall seek the assistance of
humanitarian organizations and other relevant actors each time they cannot provide
sufficient assistance themselves, and not just where the maximum available
resources are inadequate.94
On the other hand, these welcomed provisions are counterbalanced by others
that are inspired more by sovereignty concerns than humanitarian needs. I refer in
particular to the clause on the so-called humanitarian initiative. In this respect
paragraph 6, drawing directly from Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions,
provides that humanitarian agencies and other relevant actors "may offer their
services." 95 This reference to humanitarian initiatives is not accompanied, though,
by the important addition made to the First Additional Protocol that offers of relief
"shall not be regarded as interference... or as unfriendly acts."96 The final clause of
Article 5 instead states that "[n]othing in this Article shall prejudice the principles
of sovereignty and territorial integrity of states.

97

These provisions therefore

leaves the impression that States Parties want to maintain a considerable degree of
discretion in deciding whether outside action is required in order to protect and
assist IDPs.
Generally, aid is provided in camps that are expressly set up to deliver
humanitarian services to civilians in need. Yet the ever-growing tendency to
concentrate humanitarian activities in such artificial agglomerates brings with it
serious problems. In the first place, IDP camps provide the displaced with services
of higher quality than those available to civilians who remain in their place of
92. See Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Internally
Displaced Persons: Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr.Francis M Deng,
Submitted Pursuantto Commission on Human Rights Resolution 199557, Compilation and Analysis of

Legal Norms, paras. 380, 415(q), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/52/Add.2 (Dec. 5, 1995) (discussing the lack
of recognition, under international law, of an affected state's corresponding duty to accept humanitarian
assistance from international actors when the state is unable or unwilling to provide the assistance to its
own people and the need for an international instrument addressing this duty to accept aid and facilitate
free passage and distribution of relief).
93. Kampala Convention, supranote 17, art. 5, paras. 2, 7-8.
94. Id art. 5, para. 6.
95. Id.; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, para. 2, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135

96. Protocol I, supra note 78, art. 70, para. 1.
97. Kampala Convention, supranote 17, art. 5, para. 12.
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residence.98 On the one hand, this creates dependency because those in camps have
no incentive to go back to their homes and, on the other hand, it worsens the plight
of poor local communities, which are left without sufficient resources to cope with
the displacement crisis. Consequently, camps contribute to the perpetuation of the
emergency situation, rendering difficult or impeding tout court the transition
toward restoration and development. In addition, camps are often a sort of
autarchic community ruled by "camp sheiks" 99 and infiltrated by militia groups.100
The camps dilemma was recently put again to the fore in the report released by the
ICRC on "Internal displacement in armed conflict", which observed:
"Not all IDPs flee to or stay in camps. Camps deflect the world's attention
from the harsh truth of internal displacement. They may be a last resort but more
often than not they are in accessible places, away from frontlines, near towns,
perhaps, or at least a short drive from an airstrip. Donors and media are flown in
and out and what they find becomes high profile. The consequence is that for far
too long the debate on IDPs has focused on those who are in camps to the
detriment of those who are not."101
The Kampala Convention appears to take account of these problems in
various respects. Apart from the important reaffirmation of States' primary duty to
provide protection and assistance "to internally displaced persons within their
territory or jurisdiction without discriminationof any kind,"10 2 article 5.5 also calls
upon States to extend their assistance to host communities. 103 Host communities
are often the most neglected group during displacement crises, even though the
host may not have lesser needs and the burden of supporting displaced people can
be extremely heavy and expensive. The said provision is also a progressive
element with respect to the Guiding Principles - which does not address the issue and draws inspiration from a similar provision of the Great Lakes Protocol on the
Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons 104 . Moreover, with

98. See Dennis Warner, Moral Dilemmas in Disaster Response 5 (Mar. 4, 2006) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.eng.umd.edu/ewb/files/moral.doc) (explaining the higher standard
of living in camps may discourage those in camps from return to their "uncertain prospects" at home
and that better living conditions in camps may create jealousy and anger among people living in
adjacent areas).
99. See Alex de Waal, Making Sense of Sudan: Do Darfur'sIDPs Have an Urban Future?, SOC.
Sc. RES. COUNCIL BLOGS (Mar. 31, 2009, 2:02 PM), http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/2O09/O3/31/dodarfurs-idps-have-an-urban-future/.
100. Press Release, Refugee Law Project, TransitionalJustice is key to addressing the challenge of
mass displacement in Africa (Oct. 18, 2009), http://refugeelawproject.org/press releases.php (follow
"Transitional Justice is key to addressing the challenge of mass displacement in Africa" hyperlink).
101. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT IN ARMED CONFLICT: FACING UP
TO THE CHALLENGES 13-14 (2009).

102. Kampala Convention, supranote 17, art. 5, para. 1 (emphasis added).
103. Id. art. 5, para. 5; see also id. art. 3, para. 2(c) (requiring State Parties to "adopt other measures
as appropriate, including strategies and policies on internal displacement at national and local levels,
taking into account the need of host communities").
104. See Great Lakes Protocol supra note 31, art. 4, para. l(e), (providing that Member States
should "[e]xtend protection and assistance, according to need, to communities residing in areas hosting
internally displaced persons).
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respect to the security of IDP camps or settlements, States' parties endeavour to
"respect and maintain the civilian and humanitarian character of the places where
internally displaced persons are sheltered and safeguard such locations against
infiltration by armed groups or elements and disarm and separate such groups or
elements from internally displaced persons."10 5 Again, this is a welcome
development vis-A-vis the Guiding Principles, which is limited to the assertion that
10 6
IDPs "shall be protected... against... attacks against their camps or settlements,"
merely reaffirming what
was previously, and more extensively, stated in the Great
10 7
Lakes IDPs Protocol.
The Needfor Durable Solutions
Internal displacement could not be adequately dealt with in the absence of a
genuine and vigorous effort to foster durable solutions. AU leaders meeting in
Uganda in October 2009, realized the need for durable solutions and noted:
"refugees and internally displaced persons are sometimes unable or unwilling to
return to their homes immediately after their displacement and as a result, spend
many years or even decades in camps and therefore require durable solutions to
their displacement situation."0 8 The need for a special regime of protection
disappears only once normal conditions are restored. 10 9
The endeavour to seek lasting solutions to displacement is enshrined in
Article 11 of the Kampala Convention, entitled Obligations of States Parties
relating to Sustainable Return, Local Integration or Relocation. The article starts
by providing for the promotion and the creation of "satisfactory conditions for
voluntary return, local integration or relocation on a sustainable basis and in
circumstances of safety and dignity."110 The second paragraph then affirms that
"State Parties shall enable internally displaced persons to make a free and informed
choice on whether to return, integrate locally or relocate by consulting them on
these and other options and ensuring their participation in finding sustainable

105. Kampala Convention, supranote 17, art. 9, para. 2(g).
106. Guiding Principles, supranote 10, princ. 10, para. 2(d).
107. See Great Lakes Protocol, supra note 31, art. 3, paras. 9, 4(g) (providing that "Member States
shall safeguard and maintain the civilian and humanitarian character of the protection and location of
internally displaced persons in accordance with international guidelines on the separation of armed
elements" and must also "[e]nsure the safe location of internally displaced persons, in satisfactory
conditions of dignity, hygiene, water, food and shelter, away from areas of armed conflict and danger,
and having regard to the special needs of women and children").
108. African Union [AU], Draft Kampala declaration on refugees, returnees and internally
displacedpersons in Africa, pmbl., para. 6, Ext/Assembly/AU/PA/Draft/Decl.(I) Rev. 1 (Oct. 23, 2009),
available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/SNAA-7X73N7?OpenDocument.
109. See Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced
persons, Protection of and assistance to internally displacedpersons: Report of the Representative of
the Secretary-Generalon the human rights of internally displacedpersons, transmitted by note of the
Secretary-General,para. 29, U.N. Doc. A/64/214 (Aug. 3, 2009) (recognizing that "[t]he achievement
of [durable] solutions is a process through which the need for specialized assistance and protection
gradually diminishes until an internally displaced person no longer has specific needs that are directly
linked to his or her having been displaced).
110. Kampala Convention, supranote 17, art. 11, para. 1.
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'
solutions."111
This latter provision establishes that return has to be voluntary, and,
accordingly, that the individuals concerned need to be involved in decisions
regarding durable solutions.

The right to return to one's own country is a well-known and explicitly
recognized provision of international law1 12 and can be considered a counterpart to
the right to expel non-nationals.113 In particular, as far as refugees are concerned,
the right to voluntary return is a corollary of the principle of non-refoulement
enshrined in Article 33 of the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees. 114 Under the principle of non-refoulement States cannot return an
asylum seeker to a situation where he or she would face persecution.115 Similarly,
conventions such as the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of
Refugee Problems in Africa explicitly provide that "[t]he essentially voluntary
character of repatriation shall be respected in all cases and no refugee shall be
repatriated against his will

' 116

.

In contrast, the right for those internally displaced to return to their home or
place of residence has not gained an analogous recognition by States. However,
because both universal and regional instruments for the protection of human rights
recognize the right to move freely within a State and to choose one's place of
residence117 , the right of voluntary return could be deduced implicitly. This
deduction is supported by affirmations of the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, in the Principles on Housing and
Property Restitution of Refugees and IDPs (the so-called Pinheiro Principles,
which were elaborated by drawing on existing human rights and humanitarian law
norms) which state that "all refugees and displaced persons have the right to return
'
voluntarily to theirformer homes, lands or places of habitualresidence."118
As of
yet, to our knowledge, the only case in which this right has been recognized in a
binding international instrument is that of the Dayton Peace Accord1 19, signed by
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which

111. Id. art. 11, para. 2.

112. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(IIJ)
(Dec. 10, 1948), art. 13(2).
113. See G. Goodwin-Gill, The Right to Leave, the Right to Return and the Question of a Right to
Remain, in THE PROBLEM OF REFUGEES IN THE LIGHT OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES
100 (V. Gowlland-Debbas ed. 1996).
114. Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 33, Jul. 28, 1951, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html.
115. J.C. Hathaway, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 915-16 (Cambridge
University Press 2005).
116. See OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, adopted
by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government at its Sixth Ordinary Session, art. 5, Sept. 10, 1969,
U.N.T.S. 14691.
117. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 111.
118. See Pinheiro Principles, art. 10.1, Aug. 11, 2005, available at http://www.unhcr.org.ua/
img/uploads/docs/PinheiroPrinciples.pdf (emphasis added).
119. Dayton Peace Accord, art. 7 annex 7, Dec.14, 1995, available at http://www.state.gov/
www/regions/eur/bosnia/bosagree.html.
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sought to put an end to the Bosnian conflict. 120 This Agreement in fact declared
that all those displaced by the conflict should have the right to "return to their
homes of origin. ,121
The Kampala Convention does not limit itself to affirming the principle of
voluntary return, but also indicates the modalities of such a return. In the first
place, it provides that the territorial State should protect the displaced "against
forcible return to or resettlement in any place where their life, safety, liberty and/or
health would be at risk., 122 With similar terms, article 11 of the Kampala

convention enshrines the undertaking of AU member States to seek lasting
solutions by promoting and creating conducive conditions for voluntary return,
local integration or relocation on a sustainable basis and in the circumstances of
safety and dignity., 123 Furthermore, Article 11 provides for the need to "cooperate,
where appropriate, with the African Union and international organizations or
humanitarian agencies and civil society organizations, in providing protection and
assistance in the course of finding and implementing solutions for sustainable
return, local integration or relocation and long-term reconstruction." 124 To sum up,
according to the Convention a durable solution to internal displacement requires
that return be voluntary, realised in conditions of safety and dignity and - last but
not least - organized. These characteristics, which are similar to the regime already
existing for refugees, are closely interconnected, mutually reinforcing, and
crucially ensure that IDPs can resume their lives. Voluntary return is necessary to
avoid prematurely sending IDPs back to their area of origin before prevailing
conditions are sufficiently safe and stable. 125 A forcible return could in fact
jeopardize the safety and dignity of the internally displaced individuals.
Furthermore, by using voluntary return standards to coordinate with other actors
and organizations involved, the territorial State can organize the return process to
appropriately manage the impact that the flux of returning people could have on
the life of the local population.
Following return (or resettlement), the mechanisms of redress and
compensation play an indispensable part of the recovery process for IDPs. In fact,
as Special Representative Kalin observed, "experience shows that the successful
return of IDPs and refugees to their homes and former places of habitual residence
is based on three elements: ensuring the safety of returnees; returning property to
the displaced and reconstruction of their houses; and creating an economic, social
and political environment that sustains return." 126 In particular, persistent property120. Id.
121. Id. (emphasis added).
122. Kampala Convention, supranote 17, art. 9 (2)e.
123. Id. art. 11.
124. Id.
125. See generally UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Global Consultations on International
Protection/ThirdTrack: Voluntary Repatriation,EC/GC/02/5 (Apr. 25, 2002).
126. Kilin, The Great Lakes Protocolon Internally DisplacedPersons: Responses and challenges,
SYMPOSIUM ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN POST CONFLICT SITUATIONS: THE GREAT LAKES PROCESS

(Sept. 27, 2007), available at http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2007/0927_africa
visited Nov. 23, 2010).

kalin.aspx (last
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related disputes can hinder reconciliation and undermine the security and stability
in the country.1 2 7 Despite the potentially devestating consequences, States have
scarcely recognized the property rights issue, and it was only with the adoption-of
the Pinheiro Principles, in 2005, that international standards specifically and
comprehensively addressing property restitution rights were agreed upon. 128
In this respect, Article 12, entitled Compensation, enjoins States inter alia to
provide appropriate forms of reparation for arbitrary displacement, as well as for
damages incurred as a result of displacement. 129 As far as property rights and lands
are concerned, Article 11 requires the establishment of: "appropriate mechanisms
providing for simplified procedures where necessary, for resolving disputes
relating to the property of internally displaced persons"13 and of "all appropriate
measures, whenever possible, to restore the lands of communities with special
dependency and attachment to such lands upon the communities' return,
'
reintegration, and reinsertion."131
These provisions are significant insofar as they
demonstrate an effort on the part of the States Parties to specifically address
sensitive property-related problems issues. Guiding Principle 29,132 also provides
protection of property rights, but its application is not limited to those IDPs who
choose to return to their place of origin. At the same time though, the Convention
lacks the essential assertion - contained in the Guiding Principles and reaffirmed in
the Great Lakes Property Protocol - that States should only resort to compensation
when recovery of property and possessions is not possible.133 Hopefully, State
Parties will not decide to prioritize compensation, and in particular monetary
compensation, because such a decision could have a very negative impact on the
living conditions of returned IDPs. In fact, empirical research proves that reliance
13 4
upon cash compensation leads to new poverty among the displaced population.
CONCLUSION

The African Convention is a very significant development in the field of
internal displacement and brings renewed hope for IDPs in Africa. As is often the
case in pioneering enterprises, the Convention is not perfect. In this article I

127. Id. This was also recognized by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, which affirmed that "the adoption or application of laws by States which are
designed to or result in the loss or removal of tenancy, use, ownership or other rights connected with
housing or property, the active retraction of the right to reside within a particular place, or laws of
abandonment employed against refugees or internally displaced persons pose serious impediments to
the return and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons and to reconstruction and
reconciliation." Housing and property restitution in the context of the return of refugees and internally
displaced persons, Sub-Commission resolution 1998/26, para. 3.
128. See Pinheiro Principles, supranote 118.
129. See Kampala Convention, supra note 17, art. 12.
130. Id. art. 11.
131. Id.
132. See Guiding Principles, supranote 10, princ. 29.
133. Id.; Great Lakes Protocol, supranote 31, art. 4.
134. Scott Leckie, Conclusions - Best practices to guide future housing and property restitution
efforts, in

HOUSING AND PROPERTY RESTITUTION RIGHTS OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS:
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Chapter 14, (Scott Leckie, ed. 2003).
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highlighted some critical points which deserved a deeper or different treatment.
Nonetheless, the final text made considerable improvements over the previous
drafts.
The Convention will enter into force once it has been ratified by fifteen
member States of the African Union. To date, twenty-nine countries have signed
the Convention and two countries have ratified it (namely Uganda and Sierra
Leone).135 After the entry into force, the crucial issue will be compliance. Mr.
Nyanduga, the Special Rapporteur on Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Internally
Displaced Persons in Africa, remarked in unequivocal terms: "[u]nless African
states address the gap between assumption of international legal obligations, their
implementation and domestication, adoption of additional instruments, including
those related to IDPs, will not alleviate human rights violations"

13 6

. In this same

vein, it should be noted that the monitoring mechanisms envisaged by the
Convention are not particularly strong, and are limited to periodic meetings of the
Conference of States Parties and the submission of reports by States to the African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. The Convention assigns important
responsibilities to the African Union, and perhaps this organization will be able to
engage in monitoring and reporting. The AU is meant to assume a leading role in
coordinating States' efforts and, in extreme cases, to take their place in protecting
and assisting IDPs. 13 7 Hopefully the AU will prove to be up to the task.

135. Michel Gabaudan, African Leaders Must Follow Through on Kampala Convention, THE
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 27, 2010, 2:19pm), http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/michel-gabaudan/africanleaders-must-foil b 774844.html.
136. T.B. Nyanduga, The Role of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights in
Addressing Internal Displacement, COAL. FOR AN EFFECTIVE AFRICAN CT. ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES

RIGHTS, 12 (Apr. 26, 2006), available at http://www.africancourtcoalition.org/content-files/files/
SEMINARONINTERNALDISPLACEMENTINTHEECOWASREGION.doc.
137. ABOUT THE AFRICAN UNiON, http://www.africa-union.org/About AU/fimuaenbref.htm (last

visited Nov. 23, 2010).

PERU, YALE, AND CULTURAL PROPERTY:
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CHRISTOPHER HEANEY, CRADLE OF GOLD: THE STORY OF HIRAM BINGHAM, A
REAL LIFE INDIANA JONES, AND THE SEARCH FOR MACHU PICCHU (2010).

On July 24, 1911, an American followed a barefoot, eight year-old Peruvian
boy to see Incan houses atop the terraced mountain on which the boy's family had
farmed and lived for years.1 The remains of those Incan houses now constitute one
of the world's top tourist destinations, the famous Peruvian archaeological site,
Machu Picchu. Christopher Heaney's Cradle of Gold: The Story of Hiram
Bingham, A Real-Life Indiana Jones, and the Search for Machu Picchu offers a
meticulously researched history of both the American explorer Hiram Bingham
and the Incan artifacts Bingham brought from Machu Picchu back to the United
States. Heaney's quest is to determine who owns the Incan artifacts currently
resting at the Peabody Museum in New Haven. The quest is timely, given the
claim pending in the District Court of Connecticut that the Republic of Peru filed
against Yale University in 2008.
In Parts One and Two, Heaney's book - at once a biography, a history, and an
adventure story - recounts the career influences of the explorer and his search for
Machu Picchu. Bingham, the Yale-educated son of missionaries and husband to a
Tiffany & Co. heiress, led various explorer missions. Interestingly, Heaney
suggests that Bingham's initial adventuresome spirit came from the heavy
influence of President Theodore Roosevelt's 1904 address to Congress, in which
he declared that the United States had a duty to intervene in the affairs of its
unstable neighbors.2 Combined with President Taft's later dollar diplomacy,
Heaney tells us that Bingham was inspired to build an empire of "business,
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knowledge and culture,, 3 and that he pursued exploration of Latin America as a
softer, "subtler sort of diplomacy." 4
Inspired, Bingham proposed an expedition in 1911 to "collect the natural and
human history of the Americas and bring it back" to the United States.5 American
institutions such as the Carnegie Institution, the Winchester Arms Company, the
United Fruit Company, and the Eastman Kodak Company all provided funding for
Bingham's Expedition.6 Even President William Taft helped outfit Bingham's
Expedition because he believed it could further U.S. foreign policy in the region.7
Bingham, a lecturer in the history department, also managed to convince Yale to
lend him the university name, but notably received no funding.8 Fortunately for
Bingham and the United States, Peru was in period of economic liberalization. 9
That meant the Peruvian government had fewer restrictions on foreign involvement
in the country. Thus, the Yale Expedition, without which Machu Picchu may
never have been reasserted onto the world's stage, was allowed to proceed.
In Parts Three and Four, Heaney sets out to help resolve the present dispute
over who owns the Incan artifacts by carefully sifting through Peruvian law,
international media reports, Bingham's and the Expedition's Papers, and Peruvian
and American Archives in search of any indication of ownership. It seems that
Bingham's understanding prior to the expedition was that any "treasure" the
expedition found would be deemed property of the Peruvian Government. 10 This
was in keeping with a surprisingly progressive Peruvian law, which established
Government ownership over and prohibited exportation of all excavated cultural
property.
However, before the Expedition began, Peruvian President Leguia
granted Bingham an exemption from the Peruvian law. 2 President Leguia hoped
the exemption would bring him into the good graces of American diplomats and
businessmen.13 Under this exemption, known as the Yale Concession, President
Leguia gave Bingham full permission to explore and excavate for ten to twenty
years, promising that Bingham could take half of whatever was found if the other
half were given to Peru's National Museum.14 In addition, Bingham would be
exempt from luggage inspection and provided with a military escort while in
Peru.15 Whether satisfied with the receipt of verbal permission or merely forced to
abide by a strict expedition itinerary, Bingham and the Peruvian Yale Expedition

3. HEANEY, supra note 1, at 38.

4. Id.at71.
5. Id.at 70.
6. Id.
at70, 72.
7. Id.
at 71.
8. Id.
9. Id.
at 41.
10. Id.
at 73.
11. Id.at75, 115.
12. Id.
at 130.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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commenced their 1912 mission before the official Yale Concession was signed.
Here, the details become even more complicated. President Leguia was voted
out of the Presidential Office before making the Yale Concession official.
Crucially, the new President, Guillermo E. Billinghurst, did not want to sign the
concession. 16 Rather, President Billinghurst had his Minister of Justice and
Education sign a revised concession decree that allowed Bingham to explore,
excavate, and export only until December 1, 1812, and on condition that 17a
Peruvian monitor would inventory Yale's collection prior to exportation.
Obscuring the matter further, the final, published version of the concession, set
forth on November 20, 1912, contained yet another set of allowances and
conditions.18 As Heaney recites, "[T]he artifacts could leave the country but Peru
reserved 'the right to exact from the University of Yale.. .the return of the unique
and duplicate objects it has extracted."' 1 9 Trekking through the rainforest with
machete in hand, Bingham hardly could have known of the final, published
concession.
Although Heaney presents what happens next with an admirable impartiality,
it is difficult to look favorably on Bingham and the Yale Expedition. Bingham
sent Yale everything the Expedition excavated, but neglected to have Peruvian
monitors inventory the collection. 20 Bingham also sent boxes of Machu Picchu
cultural property that he had bought in May 1914 from a competing explorer.2 1
Believing they would be safer in Yale than in Peru, Bingham illegally smuggled
them into the United States.22 In all, Yale University came into possession of over
ninety-three boxes from Machu Picchu of bones and artifacts, including bronze
items, ceramics, stonework, metallic objects (no gold), bronzes, silver, tin, human
skulls, bones and remains.23 The size of the collection, still in Yale's possession
today, is disputed. By Peru's count, Yale has some 46,000 pieces, but by Yale's
count, the University only has 5,415 pieces and another 329 "museum-quality
pieces. 24
Heaney concludes by summarizing the proceedings of the current dispute over
the cultural property. Peru has been requesting the property to be returned for
decades.25 After demeaning hints of Peruvian incapacity and lack of will to
adequately care for the cultural property, and after distressing accounts of using
bones from Machu Picchu in undergraduate osteology classes, 26 the Peruvian
16. Id. at 143-44.
17. Id. at 146.
18. Id. at 155.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 156.
21. Id. at 173.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 154-55.
24. Id. at 228.
25. Stephanie Swanson, Repatriating Cultural Property: The Dispute Between Yale and Peru
Over the Treasures ofMachu Picchu, 10 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 469, 482 (2009).
26. HEANEY, supra note 1, at 232.
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government began to pursue recovery more aggressively.2 7 Negotiations began in
2006. Peru and Yale reached a tentative agreement in 2007 that granted title of the
cultural property to Peru, but stipulated long-term collaboration and allowed Yale a
research collection of a certain number of pieces for study and display.2 8 Peru
backed out of the agreement upon learning that the research collection would stay
in New Haven for another ninety-nine years.2 9 In December 2008, Peru filed a
civil suit in the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia.30
Most recently, the upcoming Peruvian presidential elections in April 2011 and
Machu Picchu's centenary of Bingham's rediscovery have led to increased
pressure on Yale and the United States." For example, Peruvians have been
organizing marches in Cuzco, the city closest to Machu Picchu; and, on November
3, 2010, Peruvian President Alan Garcia submitted a 32formal request for American
President Barak Obama to intervene on Peru's behalf
Heaney breaks from his objective role in the final pages of the book when, in
first person narrative, he (a Yale graduate) puts forth his view on how the dispute
should be resolved. Heaney believes Yale should return the collection to Peru "as
soon as possible without conditions" for several reasons.33 For one, Peru allowed
the artifacts to leave the country on loan, not under full ownership rights. Further,
Heaney believes it is historically, ethically, and legally right to return the collection
given the distinction that this cultural property includes human remains (skulls,
bones, and funerary artifacts), not merely representative artifacts of cultural
property (paintings, ceramics, and art).34 In essence, the ancestral remains of
Peruvians belong to Peruvians.
Unfortunately, almost two years after Peru filed, it is unclear whether the
legal authorities will even reach the merits of the case. Yale successfully
challenged personal jurisdiction in the spring of 2009, and the case was transferred
to the U.S. District Court of Connecticut, where it is pending.35 Then, in July
2009, Yale filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the statute of limitations had
expired.36 Even if Peru surmounts that legal barrier, Peru may need to overcome

27. Drew Henderson, Peru Steps Up Pressure on Yale, YALE DAILY NEWS, Nov. 9, 2010,
http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/20 10/nov/09/peru-steps-pressure-yale.
28. Randy Kennedy, Arts Beat, The Culture at Large, Peru Seeks Obama'sHelp in Dispute With
Yale, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2010, 5:21 PM), http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/03/peru-seeksobamas-help-in-dispute-with-yale.
29. HEANEY, supra note 1, at 227.

30. Swanson, supranote 25, at 485.
31. Henderson, supra note 27.
32. Kennedy, supranote 28.
33. HEANEY, supranote 1, at 231.

34. Id.
35. Peru v. Yale Univ., No. 1:08-cv-2109, Filing No. 24 (D.D.C. July 30, 2009) (Justia.com
Dockets and Filing).
36. Press Release, Yale Office of Pub. Affairs and Commc'ns, Statement by Yale Univ. (Dec. 9,
2008), available at http://opac.yale.edu/news/article.aspx?id=6279.
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issues of adverse possession.37
Procedural difficulties aside, there is little indication of whether the merits of
Peru's case, which Cradle of Gold shows are dauntingly complex, will prevail.
The crux of the dispute will be whether Peru allowed Bingham to ship the boxes to
Yale on conditional loan or Peru gave Yale the collection to own. Legal scholars
already debate this. One legal scholar stated that both parties agree that Bingham
removed the artifacts from Peru with permission.38 However, another scholar
argues that the legal ambiguity surrounding the extraction and exportation of the
artifacts is central to the dispute.39 That scholar further argues that if the articles
were on loan to Yale, then (1) the loans "were only reluctantly agreed to after
significant pressure from Yale, the United States government and powerful
economic players," and (2) the university never received title. 40 Thus, the answer
to Heaney's guiding question of Who owns Inca history remains to be seen.
As Cradle of Gold shows, Yale's possession is unpopular for ethical
considerations, even if it is within the bounds of the law. That is, even if Peru gave
Yale ownership in 1912, shifting international norms on cultural patrimony suggest
that Yale may have an ethical obligation to return the collection.41 In that event,
perhaps Heaney's distinction between culture or art and ancestral human remains
would carry weight. After all, the human remains in the collection are, literally,
the ancestors of today's Peruvians.
The unethical tinge does not blemish only Yale. It also marks Bingham,
despite Heaney's painstaking efforts to give Bingham the benefit of the doubt
("There are few explorers in history who so fell in love with their subject"). 42 The
reader cannot help but assign the less charitable descriptions, 'exploit' and
'plunder,' to Bingham's ideals of 'discovery' and 'treasure.' Similarly, the book
creates a vague tension in the reader. As Heaney threads throughout the book that
Bingham treaded unethical waters because he was carried away by the desire to be
an adventuresome explorer, Heaney's own account lures the reader by appealing to
those same romantic ideals of old-fashioned quests for treasure, even referring to
Bingham as a "real-life Indiana Jones." The reader anxiously hopes Bingham
unearths a trove of gold and silver, and yet simultaneously feels a tug of guilt for
enjoying the dramatic search- or plunder - for Peru's cultural patrimony.
Ultimately, Heaney's combination of an unparalleled knowledge of Hiram
Bingham and Machu Picchu with an obvious gift for storytelling lends a nuanced
understanding of the complexities surrounding the litigious dispute between Peru
and Yale. He successfully maintains a journalist's stance, systematically laying
37. Swanson, supranote 25, at 492.
38. Patty Gerstenblith, InternationalArtand CulturalHeritage, 44 INT'L LAW. 487, 498 (2010).
39. Swanson, supranote 25 at 492.
40. Id.
41. Id at 492-93; Molly L. McIntosh, Note, Exploring Machu Picchu: An Analysis of the Legal
and Ethical Issues Surrounding the Repatriation of Cultural Property, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
199, 220-21 (2006).
42. HEANEY, supra note 1, at 232.
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out the details for readers to make their own conclusions, while putting the
Victorian outlook of Bingham's time into a fair, twenty-first century perspective.
Admittedly, the book is not tailored for legal scholars. But anyone wishing to be
informed about cultural patrimony and one pending international dispute could not
find a more entertaining read.

